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In bilateral trade disputes with China, the US has greater aggregate power and 
bargaining resources, yet it had uneven success in extracting concessions.  The 
dissertation aims to address this question: Why does American pressure encounter 
Chinese resistance, different in issue-topics and time period?  In order to interpret 
China’s trade policy-making, I build an analytical framework, which integrates three 
streams of scholarship: (1) Bounded rationality models how China, as a bounded 
rational player, adjusted behaviors based on its perception in the learning process; (2) 
The garbage can model studies the Chinese government as organized anarchies and 
its non-standard operation; and (3) The two-level game theory reveals how China 
strikes the balance between domestic bargaining and international negotiations.  With 
the assistance of this model, I conduct a detailed case study of the Sino-American 
negotiations for the 1999 Bilateral Agreement on China’s Accession to the World 




My research reveals that China tended to yield to American threats when the 
Chinese reform-minded top leaders finished power transition, when trade was 
perceived as a solution to China’s economic problems, and when the US Congress 
and executive branch united for credible threats.  American pressure confronted 
strong Chinese resistance when the Chinese protectionists and nationalists had 
leverage so that the political cost of compliance was high for pro-trade officials, and 
when the Chinese perceived the divide in American commercial interests and the 
realignment in American political arena on China issue.  Moreover, American 
pressure encountered less Chinese resistance in issue-topics, behind which were a 
politically weak industry and a ministry.  By contrast, American pressure encountered 
strong resistance in issue-topics, behind which were a politically strong industry and 
agency created by long-term policy preference.  
Upon the case study, I argue that the effectiveness of American threats backed 
by trade sanctions declined. In bargaining with this rising power, the US should first 
discern how China perceives its self-interests and build strategic linkage of it to trade 
liberalization, and then employ the combination of persuasion with appeal to self-
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Chapter	  1:	   Introduction	  
	  
Critics	   of	   US	   trade	   policy	   alleged	   that	   foreign	   producers	   and	   investors	  
enjoyed	   easy	   access	   to	   the	   relatively	   open	   US	   market,	   yet	   American	   firms	   were	  
denied	   equivalent	   opportunities	   overseas.	   	   When	   power	   and	   peace	   sidelined	  
prosperity,	   low	  politics	  was	   perceived	   as	   a	  way	   for	  maximizing	   the	   utility	   of	   high	  
politics.	   	   The	   ultimate	   goal	   of	   postwar	   American	   trade	   policy	   was	   not	   to	   achieve	  
maximum	   US	   economic	   advantage,	   but	   to	   facilitate	   geopolitical	   goals	   through	  
openness	  in	  a	  global	  trading	  network.1	  	  But	  starting	  from	  the	  early	  1980s,	  there	  was	  
mounting	  concern	  in	  large	  segments	  of	  the	  US	  business	  and	  policy	  communities	  that	  
trade	  negotiations	  in	  the	  past	  had	  not	  resulted	  in	  a	  balanced	  or	  fair	  outcome.	  	  This	  
perception	   of	   unfairness	   led	   to	   growing	   political	   pressure	   so	   that	   in	   order	   to	  
liberalize	   foreign	  markets,	   the	   US	   increasingly	   employed	   the	   tactics	   of	   retaliatory	  
threats	  backed	  by	  trade	  sanctions	  and	  restriction	  of	  foreign	  opportunities	  in	  the	  US	  
market.	  	  
Geopolitical	  talks	  served	  as	  the	  prologue	  to	  contemporary	  US-­‐China	  relations.	  	  
In	  the	  time	  since	  President	  Nixon	  came	  down	  Air	  Force	  One	  and	  shook	  hands	  with	  
Chinese	  Premier	  Zhou	  Enlai	  and,	   later,	  President	  Carter	  and	  Deputy	  Premier	  Deng	  
Xiaoping	   signed	   accords	   to	   normalize	   bilateral	   relations,	   geopolitical	   goals	   had	  
superseded	   economic	   objectives	   and	   predominated	   in	   the	   Sino-­‐American	  
relationship.	  	  This	  changed	  in	  the	  1990s,	  after	  the	  Tiananmen	  Square	  events	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  Since	  then,	  although	  geopolitics	  elements	  never	  disappear,	  
the	   Sino-­‐American	   relationship	   has	   been	   anchored	   more	   and	   more	   in	   economic	  
interests.	  	  	  
As	  globalization	  has	  unfolded,	  the	  two	  nations’	  economic	  ties	  have	  deepened	  
and	  become	  more	  and	  more	  strained.	  	  From	  1985	  through	  2010,	  China’s	  GDP	  grew	  
at	   an	   average	   rate	   of	   9.94	   percent.2	  	   Chinese	   goods	   exports	   to	   the	   U.S.	   rose	   even	  
faster:	  from	  $3,861.7M	  in	  1985	  to	  $364,943.8M	  in	  2010,	  a	  total	  exceeded	  only	  by	  the	  
European	  Union.3	  	  At	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  millennium,	  as	  China’s	  GDP	  maintained	  steady	  
growth,	  the	  US	  economy	  enjoyed	  a	  robust	  growth	  as	  well,	  before	  suffering	  from	  the	  
bursting	  of	  the	  dot-­‐com	  bubble	  in	  2000	  and	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008.	  	  Since	  then,	  
the	  closer	  economic	  ties	  have	  amplified	  trade	  friction	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  China.	  
In	   interpreting	   bilateral	   trade	   negotiations,	   the	   traditional	   realist	   theory	  
emphasizes	   nations’	   raw	   power	   balances	   and	   views	   that	   bargaining	   outcomes	  
reflects	   states’	   underlying	   relative	   power.	   	   One	   of	   Robert	   A.	   Dahl’s	   great	  
contributions	  was	  his	  definition	  of	  power	  –	  A	  getting	  C	  to	  do	  what	  A	  wants.	  	  Power	  
application	   occurs	   when	   actor	   A	   does	   or	   does	   not	   perform	   some	   act	   of	   exerting	  
pressure,	   such	   as	   threats,	   inducement,	   or	   persuasion,	   and	   the	   recipient	  C	   does	   or	  
does	   not	   act	   in	   response.	   	   While	   acknowledging	   the	   distinctions	   among	   a	   state’s	  
power,	  influence,	  pressure,	  demand,	  control,	  etc.,	  I	  use	  these	  terms	  interchangeably,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics	  of	  China.	  China	  Statistic	  Year	  Book.	  
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009/indexch.htm	  
3	  US	  trade	  in	  goods	  with	  China:	  http://www.census.gov/foreign-­‐trade/balance/c5700.html.	  The	  figures	  are	  on	  a	  




as	  in	  Robert	  A.	  Dahl’s	  The	  Concept	  of	  Power,4	  to	  decode	  the	  Chinese	  decision-­‐making	  
in	  receiving	  American	  power	  in	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  trade	  negotiation,	  and	  to	  reflect	  
on	  US	  power	  application.	  
Although	   the	   US	   has	   greater	   aggregate	   power	   and	   bargaining	   resources	   in	  
bilateral	   trade	   disputes,	   it	   had	   uneven	   success	   in	   extracting	   concessions	   from	   its	  
trading	   partners	   through	   the	   use	   of	   coercive	   strategies.	   	   Comparing	   with	   Japan,	  
China	  had	  higher	  dependence	  on	  the	  US	  market	   for	   its	  exports,	  and	   its	  raw	  power	  
should	   have	   put	   it	   in	   a	   more	   disadvantaged	   position	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   US.	   	   However,	  
American	  threatening	  of	  trade	  sanctions	  worked	  less	  well	  with	  China.	  	  The	  degree	  to	  
which	   these	   two	   target	   countries	   yield	   to	   American	   demands	   varied	   in	  ways	   that	  
cannot	  be	  completely	  explained	  by	  their	  difference	  in	  raw	  power.	  	  When	  we	  look	  at	  
the	   disparity	   in	   bargaining	   power	   only	   on	   the	   Sino-­‐American	   negotiation	   table,	  
American	  sanction	  threats	  against	  China	  worked	  more	  effectively	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  
1990s,	  and	  their	  effectiveness	  declined	  in	  the	  second	  half.	   	  Raw	  power	  fails	  to	  fully	  
explain	  the	  outcome	  of	  trade	  negotiations.	  	  
Political	   scientists	   have	   searched	   for	   explanation.	   	   Some	   have	   looked	   to	   a	  
country’s	   dependence	   on	   the	   US	   export	   market	   to	   interpret	   their	   resistance	   to	  
American	   threats,	   but	   the	   research	   pointed	   out	   that	   countries	   like	   Japan,	   whose	  
exports	  are	  less	  dependent	  on	  the	  American	  market,	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  less	  resistant	  
to	   American	   threats.	   By	   contrast,	   countries	   such	   as	   China,	   which	   are	   heavily	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





dependent	   on	   the	   US	   market	   for	   their	   exports,	   have	   shown	   more	   resistance	   to	  
American	  sanction	  threats.5	  	  	  
Others	  have	  tried	  to	  explain	   it	  with	   the	  structure	  of	   trade.	   	   If	   two	  countries	  
produce	   a	   similar	   set	   of	   commodities,	   and	   either	   can	   easily	   replace	   imported	  
commodities	   with	   similar	   domestic	   products,	   these	   two	   countries	   have	   a	  
competitive	  trade	  structure.	  	  Thereby,	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  US	  
and	  Japan,	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU,	  incur	  trade	  friction.	  	  By	  contrast,	  when	  two	  countries	  
specialize	   in	   different	   commodities	   in	   which	   they	   have	   strong	   comparative	  
advantage,	  they	  have	  a	  complementary	  trade	  relationship.	  	  Thereby,	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  
that	  they	  incur	  trade	  friction	  between	  the	  US	  and	  China.6	  	  	  
The	  structure	  of	  trade	  still	  cannot	  fully	  explain	  the	  resistance	  in	  trade,	  though	  
it	  presents	  some	  explanatory	  power.	   	  While	  the	  structure	  of	   trade	  between	  the	  US	  
and	   China	   appeared	   consistent	   through	   the	   1990s,	   China	   was	   less	   resistant	   to	  
American	  demands	   in	  early	  1990s	  and	  more	  resistant	   later.	   	  To	   follow	  the	   logic	  of	  
structure	  of	   trade,	  China	  had	   low	  productivity	   in	  machine-­‐making	  and	  agricultural	  
production	  in	  1990s	  and	  should	  have	  yielded	  to	  American	  pressures	  on	  both	  issue-­‐
topic	  equally	  easily.	  	  Nevertheless,	  China	  demonstrated	  much	  stronger	  resistance	  on	  
automobiles	  than	  agriculture.	  	  	  
For	   American	   trade	   dispute	   diplomacy,	   China	   has	   become	   one	   of	   the	  most	  
challenging	  states.	  	  The	  recent	  history	  of	  U.S.	  –	  China	  trade	  negotiations	  has	  involved	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  See	  Thomas	  O.	  Bayand	  and	  Kimberly	  Ann	  Elliot,	  Reciprocity	  and	  Retaliation	  in	  U.S.	  Trade	  Policy,	  (Washington	  
D.C.:	  Institute	  for	  International	  Economics),	  pp355-­‐67.	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  Trade	  Threats,	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the	   application	   of	   strong	   American	   pressure	   in	   the	   form	   of	   criticism	   and	   threats	  
against	  China,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  bring	  about	  policy	  change	  in	  a	  range	  of	  areas.	  	  However,	  
the	  inconsistent	  results	  of	  these	  trade	  talks	  give	  rise	  to	  questions	  about	  the	  efficacy	  
of	  American	  pressure	  on	  China.	  	  In	  early	  1990s,	  Washington’s	  attempts	  to	  threaten	  
China	  with	   trade	   sanctions	   for	   unilateral	   concessions	   had	   gain	   some	   success,	   but	  
this	  strategy	  had	  by	  and	  large	  failed	  later.	  	  They	  either	  gained	  nominal	  success	  with	  
lack	   of	   implementation	   afterwards,	   or	   induced	   counter-­‐retaliation,	   rather	   than	  
concessions,	   until	   American	   negotiators	   achieved	   the	   final	   success	   in	   1999.	   	   This	  
dissertation	   aims	   to	   address	   this	   question:	  Why	  does	  American	  pressure	  encounter	  
Chinese	  resistance,	  different	  in	  issue-­‐topics	  and	  time	  period?	  	  
To	  Americans,	  China’s	  policymaking	  is	  a	  holistic	  black	  box,	  and	  so	  is	  Chinese	  
decision-­‐making	   in	  trade	  policy.	   	  Prior	  to	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  agreement	  on	  China’s	  
accession	   to	   the	  WTO	   of	   1999,	   the	   US	   encountered	   considerable	   difficulties	   in	   its	  
effort	   to	   open	   up	   the	   Chinese	   market.	   	   The	   bilateral	   trade	   negotiation	   for	   this	  
agreement	  occurred	  when	  China’s	  economy	  became	  a	  large	  export-­‐driven	  economic	  
entity	  and	  astounded	  the	  international	  community	  with	  its	  high	  growth	  rate.	  	  What	  
paralleled	   the	  bilateral	   talks	  was	   that	  China	  steered	  away	   from	  the	  era	  of	  political	  
monopoly,	   when	   icons	   such	   as	   Mao	   and	   Deng	   were	   able	   to	   exercise	   singular	  
authority,	   into	   an	   epoch	   of	   more	   collective	   decision-­‐making	   within	   the	   central	  
government.	   	   This	   bilateral	   negotiation	   serves	   as	   grist	   for	   a	   more	   general	  
investigation	   to	   study	   China’s	   trade	   policy-­‐making	   and	   to	   understand	   China’s	  




To	  study	  governmental	  behaviors,	  Dr.	  Graham	  T.	  Allison	  successfully	  built	  a	  
set	   of	   conceptual	   models	   –	   a	   combination	   of	   the	   Rational	   Policy	   Model,	   the	  
Organizational	  Process	  Model,	  and	  the	  Bureaucratic	  Politics	  Model	  –	  and	  applied	  it	  
to	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis.	   	  These	  have	  become	  perhaps	  the	  most	  classic	  decision-­‐
making	   models	   in	   the	   study	   of	   public	   policy	   and	   provide	   the	   fundamental	  
assumptions	   and	   categories	   that	   policy	   analysts	   employ	   in	   thinking	   about	  
governmental	  behaviors.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  set	  of	  models	  limit	  its	  
explanatory	  power.	  	  	  
The	   model	   shows	   explanatory	   power	   in	   the	   Cuban	   Missile	   Crisis.	   	   Where	  
“situations	   cannot	   be	   construed	   as	   standard,	   …	   [O]rganizational	   search	   for	  
alternative	  courses	  of	  action	  is	  problem-­‐oriented.”7	  	  When	  a	  non-­‐standard	  situation	  
does	   not	   occur	   in	   the	   context	   of	   imminent	   crisis,	   decision-­‐making	  may	   not	   follow	  
Allison’s	   models	   because	   problems	   and	   solutions	   may	   have	   equal	   status. 8	  	  
Rationality,	   as	   an	   assumption,	   appears	   not	   only	   in	   the	   conventional	   descriptive	  
model	  of	  rational	  choice,	  but	   implicitly	   in	  his	  other	  two	  models.	   	   In	  variants	  of	   the	  
rational	  policy	  model,	  a	  unified	  government	  actor	  faces	  external	  as	  well	  as	  internal	  
constraints	  when	   it	   conducts	   a	   power	   calculation.	   	   Organizational	   outputs,	   as	   the	  
outcome	   from	  organizational	   process	  model,	   function	   as	   one	   of	   the	   elements	   that	  
structure	   the	   situation	   for	   power	   calculation	   in	   the	   rational	   policy	   model.	  	  
Assumptions	  of	  rationality	  and	  non-­‐rationality	  coexist	  in	  models	  of	  the	  international	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  and	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  Cuban	  Missile	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  American	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  Science	  Review,	  Vol	  63,	  Issue	  03	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  1969):	  701.	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  John	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  Agendas,	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system.9	  	  Domestic	  causes	  and	  international	  effects	  lay	  out	  only	  one-­‐sided	  analysis,	  
we	  should	  also	  study	  international	  causes	  and	  domestic	  effects.10	  	  	  
To	   study	   the	   Chinese	   decision-­‐making	   in	   trade	   policy	   and	   analyze	   its	  
response	   to	   American	   pressure,	   I	   build	   an	   analytical	   framework	   based	   on	   the	  
structure	   of	   Dr.	   Graham	  T.	   Allison’s	  models	   and	   incorporate	   advances	   in	   relevant	  
disciplines	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   a	   synergistic	   effect	   on	   their	   explanatory	   power	   in	  
analyzing	   governmental	   behaviors.	   	   I	   extend	   the	   application	   of	   the	   models	   from	  
interpretations	   of	   national	   security	   crises	   to	   an	   analysis	   of	   an	   enduring	   economic	  
relationship	   and	   multiple-­‐round	   negotiations.	   	   When	   I	   apply	   it	   to	   bilateral	  
negotiation	   for	   the	   1999	   agreement,	   I	   also	   look	   at	   factors	   beyond	   raw	   power,	  
dependence	  on	  the	  American	  export	  market,	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  trade	  in	  order	  to	  
study	  the	  variations	  in	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  American	  pressure	  tactics.	  	  	  
I	  must	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  use	  of	  a	  detailed	  case	  study	  has	  its	   limitations.	  	  
There	   is	   no	   such	   thing	   as	   a	   typical	   case.	   	   This	   makes	   it	   difficult	   to	   draw	   general	  
conclusions	   that	   may	   be	   relevant	   to	   a	   broader	   class	   of	   trade	   negotiations	   and	  
disputes	   between	   the	   US	   and	   other	   countries.	   	   Although	   the	   sample	   is	   small,	   the	  
multiple	  rounds	  of	   threats,	  counter-­‐retaliation,	  concessions,	  and	  relevant	  domestic	  
political	   dynamics	   in	   China	   facilitate	  my	   findings	   in	   some	   common	   themes	   in	   the	  
framework	   and	   help	   understand	   a	   developing	   country’s	   decision	   making.	   	   I	   also	  
need	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  existence	  of	  implicit	  threats	  sent	  by	  the	  USTR	  (for	  example,	  
Ambassador	  Barshefsky’s	  taxi	  tactics).	  	  They	  apparently	  have	  some	  deterrent	  effect	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on	  the	  bilateral	  negotiating	  table,	  but	  here	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  major	  strategy	  adopted	  on	  
the	  table.	  	  
With	  a	  name	  list	  made	  at	  the	  time	  of	  document	  review,	  my	  interviews	  started	  
with	  Chinese	  scholars	  who	  either	  actively	  studied	  the	  WTO	  regulations	  or	  worked	  as	  
consultant	  with	  trade	  agencies,	  mainly	  those	  at	  University	  of	  International	  Business	  
and	  Economics’	  WTO	  Center	  in	  Beijing.	  	  By	  snowball	  sampling,	  I	  have	  talked	  to	  many	  
Chinese	  participants	   in	  the	  negotiation	  and	  benefited	  greatly	   from	  talking	  to	  those	  
retiree	   officials	   who	   worked	   with	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Economics	   and	   Trade	  
Cooperation	   (MOFTEC),	   General	   Administration	   of	   Customs,	   and	   State	   Economics	  
and	  Trade	  Commission	  (SETC)	  in	  1990s	  and	  work	  at	  the	  WTO	  Center,	  Boao	  Forum	  
for	  Asia,	  or	  in	  private	  practice	  at	  present.	  	  During	  my	  two	  field	  trips	  to	  China,	  I	  had	  
23	   Chinese	   interviewees,	   conducted	  more	   than	   one	   interview	  with	   some	   of	   them,	  
participated	   in	   trade	   policy	   seminars	   upon	   invitation	   for	   group	   discussion,	   and	  
engaged	   in	   very	   inspiring	   discussions	   about	   China’s	   decision	   structure	   with	  
researchers	  and	  local	  observers	  who	  are	  not	  listed	  as	  my	  interviewees	  because	  their	  
main	  specialties	  are	  not	   trade	  and	  the	  discussions	  were	  carried	  out	   in	  an	   informal	  
way.	  	  To	  get	  a	  balanced	  viewpoint,	  I	  also	  conducted	  10	  interviews	  in	  the	  US,	  mainly	  
in	   Washington	   D.C.,	   including	   high	   officials	   at	   the	   USTR,	   such	   as	   Ambassador	  
Charlene	  Barshefsky,	  the	  National	  Security	  Council,	  Department	  of	  Agriculture,	  etc.	  
and	  head	  persons	  with	  trade	  associations.	  
The	  weakness	   of	  my	   interviews	  was	   that	  with	   limited	   time	   and	   funding	   to	  




different	   political	   ideologies	   and	   different	   positions	   as	   I	   wished.	   	   After	   the	   WTO	  
entry,	   the	  Chinese	  economy	  experienced	  phenomenal	  growth.	   	  This	  makes	  people,	  
who	  worked	  with	   industrial	  ministries	   and	   questioned	   about	   the	  WTO	   accession,	  
feel	   reluctant	   to	   receive	   an	   interview.	   	   I	   selected	   the	   automobile	   case	   for	   further	  
discussion	   because	   it	   has	   become	   an	   open	   debate	   recently	   in	   Chinese	  media	   that	  
major	  auto	  companies	  have	  not	  achieved	  real	  advancement	  in	  core	  technology	  after	  
the	  WTO	  accession.	  	  People	  are	  freer	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  decision-­‐making	  in	  this	  issue-­‐
topic	  at	  the	  WTO	  negotiation.	  	  	  
The	   fact	   that	  my	   research	   is	   on	   historical	   rather	   than	   current	   negotiations	  
made	   some	   officials	   less	   reticent	   in	   discussing	   them,	   but	   not	   all.	   	   Most	   gave	  
straightforward	   answers	   and	  made	   good	   comments,	   but	   a	   few	   interviewees	   took	  
this	   chance	   to	   denounce	   a	   foreign	   government	   or	   put	   forward	   their	   own	   political	  
cause.	  	  In	  the	  process	  of	  analyzing	  interview	  data,	  I	  used	  data	  of	  this	  kind	  to	  support	  
or	  refute	  other	  observation	  (for	  example,	  Zhu	  had	  a	  weakened	  political	  base	  in	  the	  
State	  Council),	  rather	  than	  taking	  them	  at	  face	  value.	  	  
Based	  on	  data	   collected	   from	  document	   review	  and	   interviews,	   I	   apply	   the	  
analytical	   framework	   to	   the	   case	   of	   China’s	   trade	   policy-­‐making	   in	   the	   process	   of	  
Sino-­‐American	   negotiation	   for	   China’s	  WTO	   entry.	   	   Here	   I	   proceed	   to	   discuss	   the	  
plan	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  The	  discussion	  in	  Chapter	  II	  begins	  with	  a	  review	  of	  major	  
models	   for	  Chinese	  politics	  and	  a	   look	  at	   the	  study	  of	  China’s	   foreign	  trade	  policy-­‐
making	  as	  paddling	  in	  two	  rivers,	  Chinese	  politics	  under	  Sinology	  and	  the	  study	  of	  




composite	   model	   for	   the	   Chinese	   politics	   and	   also	   concur	   with	   Dr.	   Alastair	   Iain	  
Johnston’s	  opinion	  that	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy	  should	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  study	  of	  
international	   relations.	   	   Given	   that	  Dr.	   Graham	  Allison’s	  models	   have	  been	  widely	  
used	   to	   analyze	   American	   government’s	   foreign	   policy-­‐making,	   I	   employ	   their	  
structure,	   incorporate	  advancement	   in	  relevant	  disciplines,	  and	  build	  an	  analytical	  
framework	   to	   analyze	   the	   Chinese	   governmental	   behavior.	   	   This	   analytical	  
framework,	  as	  a	  combination	  of	  Bounded	  Rationality,	  Garbage	  Can	  Model,	  and	  Two-­‐
level	  Game	  Theory,	  lays	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  following	  chapters.	  	  
Chapter	  III	  divides	  the	  bilateral	  negotiation	  of	  more	  than	  15	  years	  into	  three	  
stages,	   from	   beginning	   to	   1989,	   from	  1990	   to	   1994,	   and	   from	  1995	   to	   1999,	   and	  
gives	   a	   chronological	   analysis	   of	   each.	   	   Against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   the	   changing	  
international	   stage,	   the	   US	   changed	   its	   demands	   in	   the	   Sino-­‐American	   trade	  
negotiation.	   	   In	   response,	   China	   acted	   as	   a	   bounded	   rational	   player	   with	   limited	  
information	   and	   understanding,	   conducted	   calculation	   of	   how	   to	   respond	   to	   the	  
American	  power,	   and	  made	  decisions	  whether	   to	   yield	   to	  American	  pressure	   as	   a	  
matter	  of	  expediency,	  counter-­‐retaliate	  American	  threats,	  or	  make	  real	  concessions.	  	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   China	   is	   treated	   as	   a	   unitary	   actor;	   American	   politics,	   American	  
commercial	   interests	   and	   other	   international	   players	   are	   all	   treated	   as	   exogenous	  
factors.	  	  
The	   impact	   of	   decision	   structure	   on	   China’s	   decision	   making	   in	   its	   WTO	  
accession	  has	  not	  been	  studied	  yet.	  	  Chapter	  IV	  starts	  with	  description	  of	  the	  Chinese	  




decisions	   on	   trade	   negotiations.	   	   This	   chapter	   features	   detailed	   presentation	   of	  
institutions,	  processes,	  and	  stages	  of	  the	  domestic	  negotiations	  for	  WTO	  entry.	   	  My	  
original	   discovery	   is	   the	   three-­‐tier	   decision	   structure,	   which	   helps	   not	   just	  
understand	   how	   the	   Chinese	   government	   addressed	   the	  WTO	   accession,	   but	   also	  
how	  it	  operates	  more	  generally.	  	  I	  also	  draw	  on	  this	  to	  describe	  the	  leadership	  small	  
group	   (LSG),	  which	   is	  mysterious	   to	  Western	   scholars.	   	   Since	   regulations	   to	  write	  
about	   it	  were	   loosened	   in	   recent	   years,	   a	   few	   relevant	   reports	   about	   it	   have	  been	  
released.	   	   By	   examining	   LSG	   and	   its	   operation,	   I	   intend	   to	   unveil	   this	   format	   of	  
collective	  leadership	  and	  explain	  its	  role	  in	  China’s	  decision	  structure,	  for	  the	  WTO	  
accession	  and	  in	  a	  more	  general	  sense.	  	  	  
While	   presenting	   the	   decision	   structure,	   I	   show	   the	   unequal	   bargaining	  
power	   between	  ministries	   and	   commissions	   and	   power	   balance	   between	   the	   top	  
leadership	   and	   bureaucrats,	   and	   list	   established	   rules	   of	   domestic	   bargaining	  
relevant	  to	  the	  WTO	  case.	  	  After	  laying	  sufficient	  foundation	  of	  Chinese	  government	  
institutions	   and	   processes,	   I	   employ	   Garbage	   Can	   Model,	   as	   a	   substitute	   for	  
organizational	  process	  model,	  to	  study	  the	  Chinese	  trade	  policy-­‐making	  as	  outputs	  
of	  the	  institutional	  functioning.	  
With	  the	  lens	  of	  two-­‐level	  game	  theory,	  Chapter	  V	  reviews	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
Chinese	  succession	  politics	  on	   its	  decisions	  about	  economic	  reform	  and	  open-­‐door	  
policy,	   as	   part	   of	   which	   the	   WTO	   accession	   was	   regarded.	   	   It	   looks	   at	   the	  
bureaucratic	   politics	   and	   the	   contest	   between	   factions	   on	   the	   Chinese	   domestic	  




equals	  in	  the	  collective	  leadership,	  and	  the	  Chinese	  premier	  switched	  his	  interest	  on	  
to	   the	   WTO	   case,	   the	   bilateral	   negotiation	   strode	   to	   success.	   	   Although	   what	  
happened	  on	  the	  international	  negotiating	  table	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  reshuffling	  at	  the	  
top	   leadership	   in	   China,	   those	   Chinese	   officials,	   the	   USTR’s	   counterparts,	   were	  
empowered	   and	   weakened	   by	   the	   international	   negotiation	   when	   they	   turned	  
around	  and	  bargained	  with	  their	  domestic	  colleagues.	  	  
Chapter	  VI	   summarizes	   the	   findings	  with	   these	   three	  conceptual	   lenses	  and	  
compares	  the	  US	  power	  application	  and	  the	  Chinese	  reaction	   in	  different	  stages	  of	  
bilateral	  negotiation.	  	  In	  compiling	  the	  occurrences	  from	  three	  difference	  cuts	  about	  
the	   Chinese	   decision-­‐making	   on	   its	   GATT/WTO	   accession,	   this	   chapter	   presents	  
explanation	  for	  Chinese	  counter-­‐retaliation	  or	  concession	  in	  receiving	  the	  American	  
power.	   	   Reflecting	   on	   the	   American	   power	   application,	   it	   argues	   that	   retaliatory	  
threats	  had	  achievements	  as	  well	  as	  limitations,	  and	  that	  the	  third	  stage	  of	  bilateral	  
negotiation	  witnessed	  the	  decline	  of	  their	  effectiveness.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  American	  trade	  
negotiators	   succeeded	   in	   sealing	   the	   deal	   when	   they	   persuaded	   the	   Chinese	  
leadership	   by	   appealing	   to	   its	   self-­‐interest	   and	   tied	   their	   own	   hands	   by	  
congressional	  pressure.	  	  	  
Hence,	  I	  summarize	  the	  conclusions	  and	  recommendation	  that	  in	  bargaining	  
with	   China,	   a	   rising	   power,	   the	   US	   should	   continue	   to	   pursue	   aggressive	  
unilateralism	   within	   the	   WTO’s	   purview,	   which	   will	   empower	   the	   Chinese	   trade	  
negotiators	   on	   the	   domestic	   bargaining	   table	   because	   they	   can	   argue	   for	  




persuasion	  with	  appeal	  to	  self-­‐interests	  and	  tying	  hands	  by	  congressional	  pressure	  
because	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   retaliatory	   threats	  with	   trade	   sanctions	   has	   declined.	  	  
To	  discern	  how	  China	  perceives	  its	  self-­‐interests	  and	  build	  strategic	  linkage	  of	  it	  to	  
trade	  liberalization,	  the	  analytical	  framework	  should	  facilitate	  our	  understanding	  of	  
China	  as	  a	  bounded	  rational	  player,	  provide	  clear	  analysis	  of	  influential	  bureaucrats	  
and	   organizations	   in	   the	   decision	   structure	   in	   favor	   of	   change	   and	   their	   policy	  




















Chapter	  2:	   The	  Making	  of	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Trade	  Policy:	  
Chinese	  WTO	  Bid	  
	  
Although	   the	   difference	   in	   raw	   power	   has	   put	   China	   into	   a	   more	  
disadvantaged	  position	  relative	  to	  the	  US,	  Chinese	  exports	  heavily	  relied	  on	  the	  US	  
market,	  China’s	  resistance	  to	  American	  pressure	  in	  trade	  diplomacy	  appeared	  to	  be	  
inconsistent	  while	   the	   structure	  of	   trade	  between	   these	   two	   countries	  maintained	  
the	   same	   through	   the	   1990s.	   	   In	   order	   to	   apprehend	   why	   American	   pressure	  
encounters	   Chinese	   resistance,	   which	   was	   inconsistent	   across	   time	   periods	   and	  
different	  in	  issue-­‐topics,	  this	  thesis	  looks	  at	  the	  Chinese	  decision-­‐making	  in	  foreign	  
trade	  policy	  in	  response	  to	  American	  demands.	  	  	  
This	   chapter	   begins	  with	   a	   review	   about	  models	   developed	   in	   the	   study	   of	  
Chinese	   politics,	   and	   goes	   on	   to	   discuss	   that	   the	   study	   of	   China’s	   foreign	   trade	  
policy-­‐making	   is	   interdisciplinary	   research	   relevant	   to	   the	   Chinese	   politics	   under	  
Sinology	  and	  the	  study	  of	   international	  relations.	   	  Echoing	  Dr.	  Harry	  Harding’s	  call	  
for	   one	   composite	  model	   for	   the	   Chinese	   politics	   and	   Dr.	   Alastair	   Iain	   Johnston’s	  
comment	   that	   Chinese	   foreign	   policy	   should	   be	   integrated	   into	   the	   study	   of	  
international	   relations,	   I	  build	  an	  analytical	   framework	  with	   three	  primary	  cuts	   to	  
interpret	  the	  Chinese	  policy-­‐making	  in	  foreign	  trade.	  
This	   analytical	   framework,	   built	   on	   the	   structure	   of	   Dr.	   Graham	   Allison’s	  
models,	   has	   incorporated	   advancement	   in	   relevant	   disciplines.	   	   I	   substitute	   the	  
classic	   combination	   of	   Rationality	   Model,	   Organizational	   Process	   Model,	   and	  




Garbage	  Can	  Model,	   and	  Two-­‐level	  Game	  Theory.	   	   This	   new	   combination	   of	   these	  
conceptual	  models	  provides	  the	  structural	  foundation	  for	  the	  dissertation	  as	  well	  as	  
three	  primary	  cuts	  to	  analyze	  China’s	  foreign	  trade	  policy-­‐making	  during	  the	  Sino-­‐
American	  trade	  negotiations.	  	  
	  
Models	  for	  Chinese	  Politics	  	  
	  
For	   decades,	   American	   scholars	   have	   been	   trying	   to	   open	   the	   black	   box	   of	  
Chinese	   decision-­‐making	   and	   to	   attain	   sufficient	   understanding	   of	   the	   Chinese	  
Communist	   political	   process.	   	   Generations	   of	   research	   on	   China	   have	   proffered	  
various	  models,	   all	   of	  which	   facilitate	   our	  understanding	  on	   the	  Chinese	  decision-­‐
making	  in	  different	  policy	  arena	  and	  in	  different	  times.	  	  Models	  vary	  from	  some	  that	  
attribute	  the	  Chinese	  politics	  to	  decisions	  of	  a	  changing	  Mao	  Zedong;11	  to	  others	  that	  
look	   into	   either	   norms	   and	   rules,	   based	   on	   Chinese	   Communist	   doctrines,12	  or	  
tensions	   and	   struggles	   between	   two	   groups	   of	   politicians	   holding	   Communist	  
political	   philosophy	   at	   the	   two	   ends	   of	   Chinese	   political	   spectrum,13 	  such	   as	  
conservatives	   vs.	   radicals	   in	   1960s	   and	   reformers	   vs.	   conservatives	   in	   1980s	   and	  
correspondingly	   their	   policy	   preferences;	   and	   to	   others	   that	   emphasize	   either	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Michel	  Oksenberg,	  “Policy-­‐Making	  Under	  Mao,	  1949-­‐68:	  An	  Overview,”	  in	  John	  M.H.	  Lindbeck	  (ed.),	  China:	  
Management	  of	  a	  Revolutionary	  Society	  (Seattle:	  University	  of	  Washington	  Press,	  1971),	  pp.	  79-­‐115;	  and	  
Frederick	  C.	  Teiwes,	  “Chinese	  Politics,	  1949-­‐1965:	  A	  Changing	  Mao,”	  Current	  Scene,	  XII:1	  (January	  1974),	  pp.	  1-­‐
15;	  and	  Current	  Scene,	  XII:2	  (February	  1974),	  pp.	  1-­‐18.	  	  
12	  John	  W.	  Lewis,	  Leadership	  in	  Communist	  China	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1963);	  and	  Frederick	  C.	  
Teiwes,	  “The	  ‘Rules	  of	  Game’	  in	  Chinese	  Politics,”	  Problems	  of	  Communism,	  XXVIII:	  5-­‐6	  (September-­‐December	  
1979),	  pp.	  67-­‐76.	  	  
13	  Michel	  Oksenberg	  and	  Steven	  Goldstein,	  “The	  Chinese	  Political	  Spectrum,”	  Problems	  of	  Communism,	  XXIII:2	  




competition	   among	   different	   generations	   of	   Chinese	   Communist	   leaders,14	  or	   and	  
conflicts	  between	  different	  patronage	  networks.15	  	  	  
In	  his	  Competing	  Models	  of	  The	  Chinese	  Communist	  Policy	  Process,	  Dr.	  Harry	  
Harding	   sorted	   out	   all	   these	  models.	   	   He	   selected	   three	   influential	   categories	   for	  
evaluation:	   tendency	   models,	   bureaucratic	   models,	   and	   factional	   models.	   	   After	  
examining	  these	  three	  major	  models	  and	  comparing	  them	  in	  pairs,	  he	  argued,	  “It	  is	  
unwise	  to	  attempt	  to	  choose	  one	  model	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  all	  others,”	  and	  concluded	  
that	   in	   many	   ways,	   “the	   models	   are	   complementary,	   rather	   than	   competitive	   or	  
mutually	  exclusive.”16	  	  Chinese	  politics,	  like	  politics	  in	  many	  nations	  of	  the	  world,	  do	  
not	  display	   full	   range	  of	   characteristics	   that	  one	  would	  predict	   if	   any	  one	  of	   these	  
models	  was	  the	  only	  force	  at	  work	  in	  shaping	  the	  politics	  of	  China.	  	  To	  Dr.	  Harding’s	  
credit,	  he	  is	  very	  correct	  by	  suggesting	  that	  students	  of	  Chinese	  politics	  view	  these	  
models	   as	   depictions	   of	   different	   aspects	   of	   the	   same	   phenomena,	   which	   can	   be	  
synthesized.	  	  	  
Actually,	   these	   models	   share	   the	   general	   propensities	   of	   Chinese	  
bureaucratic	  politics,	  if	  we	  could	  look	  at	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Party	  and	  its	  factions	  on	  
the	  state	  affairs	  as	  another	  factor	  affecting	  bureaucratic	  decision-­‐making.	  	  Tendency	  
models	  employ	  a	  single	  underlying	  political	  philosophical	  dispute	  with	  a	  high	  level	  
of	  abstraction	  to	  define	  the	  groups	  of	  decisional	  participants	  and	  reflect	  the	  political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Michael	  Yahuda,	  “Political	  Generations	  in	  China,”	  The	  China	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  80	  (December,	  1979),	  pp.	  793-­‐805.	  
15	  Andrew	  Nathan,	  “A	  Factional	  Model	  for	  Chinese	  Politics,”	  The	  China	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  53	  (January-­‐March	  1973),	  
pp.	  34-­‐66.	  





conflicts	   between	   competing	   political	   philosophies	   and	   between	   competing	  
politicians.	   	   In	   various	   periods	   of	   time,	   the	   Chinese	   Communists	   developed	   the	  
pattern	  to	  interpret	  political	  struggles	  with	  two	  competing	  schools	  of	  thought,	  such	  
as	  proletarian	  or	  revolutionary	  vs.	  bourgeois	  during	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	   in	  the	  
1960s	   and	   1970s	   and	   reformers	   vs.	   conservatives	   after	   China	   implemented	   its	  
economic	  openness	  policy	  in	  the	  1980s.	  	  In	  fact,	  when	  a	  political	  message	  that	  falls	  
into	  the	  common	  pattern	  of	  a	  two-­‐line	  struggle,	  is	  sent	  out	  by	  Chinese	  propaganda,	  it	  
is	  usually	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  competing	  leaders	  to	  mobilize	  mass	  support	  among	  the	  
general	  public	  and	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  test	  their	  subordinates’	  loyalty	  and	  force	  them	  
to	  choose	  sides.17	  
Models	   of	   this	   category	   help	   distinguish	   opinion	   clusters	   and	   policy	  
preferences,	  yet	  their	  explanatory	  power	  lies	  in	  their	  close	  association	  with	  the	  two-­‐
line	   struggle	   pattern,	   which	   are	   per	   se	   conflicts	   and	   coalition	  within	   bureaucratic	  
politics.	   	   Only	   when	   internal	   negotiation	   and	   coordination	   come	   to	   an	   impasse	  
would	   a	   bureaucratic	   problem	   ascend	   to	   a	   party	   issue.	  18	  An	   internal	   bargaining	  
deadlock	  in	  bureaucracy	  would	  evolve	  into	  political	  philosophical	  dispute	  between	  
two	  groups	  of	  politicians	   inside	  the	  Party.	   	  At	   this	   time,	   loyalty	   to	  some	  patronage	  
networks	   would	   be	   used	   to	   achieve	   political	   outcome	   and	   to	   form	   coalition	   for	  
policy	  preference.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Tang	  Tsou,	  “Prologomena	  to	  the	  Study	  of	  Informal	  Groups	  in	  CCP	  Politics,”	  The	  China	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  65	  
(March	  1976),	  pp.	  98-­‐114.	  
18	  	  This	  comment	  was	  inspired	  by	  discussion	  with	  Dr.	  Xu	  Xianglin,	  professor	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  Peking	  University	  School	  of	  




For	  centuries,	  Chinese	  politics	  has	  been	  bureaucratic	  in	  nature.	  	  The	  politics	  
of	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  and	  its	  party	  faction	  has	  become	  another	  feature	  since	  
last	   century.	   	   Andrew	   Nathan	   began	   employing	   patronage	   networks	   within	   the	  
Chinese	   Communist	   leadership	   to	   describe	   the	   Chinese	   politics.19	  	   In	   factional	  
models,	   policy	   provides	   the	   rhetorical	   vocabulary	   with	   which	   leaders	   mobilize	  
legitimacy	  for	  their	  factions,	  and	  with	  which	  followers	  signal	  their	  support	  for	  one	  of	  
the	  contending	  factions	  at	  higher	  level.	  	  	  
The	   factional	   models	   are	   appealing	   because	   they	   fit	   well	   with	   guanxi	  
(connection).	   	  Guanxi	  has	  been	  connected	  to	  anecdotes	  and	  stories	  about	  nepotism	  
and	  family	  feuds	  back	  to	  the	  birth	  of	  CPC,	  so	  it	  is	  a	  word	  that	  sounds	  mysterious	  and	  
powerful	  to	  Westerners.	  	  The	  interpretation	  of	  Chinese	  Communist	  politics	  as	  being	  
personalistic	   is	   always	   valid,	   as	   is	   true	   for	   parties	   and	   politics	   in	   other	   countries.	  	  
However,	   as	   the	  CPC	  has	  been	   ruling	   for	  decades,	   its	   institutionalization	  has	  been	  
playing	  more	  and	  more	  important	  role	  in	  government	  decision-­‐making.	  	  Loyalties	  to	  
patronage	   networks	   inside	   the	   Party	   are	   tapped	   only	   after	   bureaucratic	  
coordination	  proves	   to	  be	   futile20	  or	  when	  a	  major	   issue	  about	  power	  balance	  and	  
succession	  is	  under	  negotiation.	  	  
Both	   bureaucratic	  models	   and	   structural	  models	   point	   students	   of	   Chinese	  
politics	   to	  organizations	  and	   institutions	  where	  policy	   is	  made;	   financial	  resources	  
are	  competed	  for;	  authorities	  are	  allocated	  and	  balanced;	  and	  power	  is	  shared	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Andrew	  Nathan,	  “A	  Factional	  Model	  for	  Chinese	  Politics,”	  34-­‐66.	  
20	  I’ll	  use	  another	  chapter	  to	  explain	  the	  structural	  design	  of	  CPC’s	  bureaucracy.	  It	  will	  explain	  how	  structurally	  




negotiated	  for.	  	  In	  a	  major	  bargaining	  and	  decision-­‐making	  arena,	  such	  as	  the	  central	  
work	  conference,	  bureaucratic	  agencies	  take	  different	  position	  or	  form	  coalitions	  on	  
major	   policy	   issues	   through	   their	   representatives	   to	   the	   conference,	   such	   as	  
ministers.	  	  	  
In	  the	  Chinese	  bureaucratic	  system,	  a	  leader’s	  opinions	  on	  major	  issues	  may	  
be	   shaped	   by	   the	   particular	   perspectives	   and	   priorities	   of	   his	   agency	   where	   he	  
currently	  sits	  on	  his	  own	  “baggage”	  that	  he	  brings	  to	  the	  post.	  	  He	  juggles	  these	  two,	  
which	  may	   not	   stand	   in	   line	  with	   each	   other	   all	   the	   time,	  when	   he	   climbs	   up	   the	  
hierarchy	   ladder.	   	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   this	   leader	  competes	   for	  greater	  prestige,	  and	  
financial	  resources	  for	  his	  agency	  and	  higher	  position	  and	  power	  for	  himself	  in	  the	  
Party.	  	  He	  also	  shoulders	  the	  responsibility	  to	  express,	  to	  some	  degree,	  the	  interests	  
of	   various	   social	   constituencies	   –	   for	   instance,	   in	   1990s,	   Ministry	   of	   Machine-­‐
Building	   to	  automobile	  companies	  and	  their	  employees	  –	  outside	   the	  bureaucracy,	  
who	  are	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  his	  agency	  or	  whose	  cooperation	  or	  compliance	  is	  
important	  to	  the	  successful	  performance	  of	  his	  agency.	  	  	  
The	   division	   and	   relationship	   between	   the	   Party	   and	   the	   state	   is	   a	   special	  
feature	  of	   this	  single-­‐party	  state.	   	  Since	  mid-­‐1980s,	  especially	  at	  and	  after	   the	  13th	  
National	  Congress	  of	   the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party,	   it	  has	  been	  widely	   recognized	  
that	   there	   should	  be	  a	  division	  of	   labor	  between	   the	  Party	  and	   the	  government	   in	  
governing	   the	   nation.	   	   The	   influence	   of	   party	   over	   the	   state	   affairs	   has	   been	  
gradually	   institutionalized	   in	   bureaucratic	   politics,	   as	   explained	   in	   Chapter	   IV.	   To	  




propensities	  of	  Chinese	  bureaucratic	  politics,	  which	  has	  a	  close	  association	  with	  the	  
structure	  of	  government,	  and	  that	  we	  should	  look	  at	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Party	  and	  
its	   factions	   on	   the	   state	   affairs	   as	   a	   special	   factor	   affecting	   bureaucratic	   decision-­‐
making.	  	  
I	  agree	  with	  Dr.	  Harding	  that	  each	  of	  these	  models	  describes	  some	  features	  of	  
the	   Chinese	   politics	   and	   has	   explanatory	   power	   for	   some	   decision-­‐making	   or	   at	  
some	  times,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive,	  and	  can	  be	  complementary	  to	  
each	  other.	  	  Actually,	  these	  models	  look	  more	  like	  factors,	  which	  explain	  part	  of	  the	  
Chinese	   Communist	   bureaucratic	   politics,	   rather	   than	   a	   function	   or	  model.	   	   After	  
commenting	  on	  the	  development	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  models,	  “which	  purported	  to	  
provide	   generalized	   descriptions	   and	   explanations	   of	   the	   Chinese	   Communist	  
political	   process”,	   Dr.	   Harding	   correctly	   proposed	   the	   reduction	   of	   the	   number	   of	  
models	   to	   “more	   manageable	   proportions.” 21 	  	   He	   also	   called	   on	   for	   a	   single	  
composite	   model	   for	   the	   Chinese	   politics.	   	   Searching	   for	   an	   effective	   and	  
parsimonious	  model,	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  scholarship	  of	  international	  relations.	  	  	  
	  
Chinese	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  International	  Relations	  
	  
Writing	  a	  thesis	  about	  China’s	  foreign	  trade	  policy-­‐making	  is	  like	  paddling	  in	  
two	   rivers;	   one	   is	   called	   study	   of	   Chinese	   politics	   under	   Sinology,	   and	   the	   other	  
study	  of	  international	  relations.	  	  For	  years,	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy	  making	  has	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




isolated	  from	  the	  study	  of	  international	  relations	  because	  it	  is	  perceived	  as	  adjunct	  
to	   Chinese	   studies,	   an	   area	   studies.	   	   On	   one	   hand,	   some	   scholars	   endeavor	   to	  
discover	  variables,	  which	  may	  feature	  the	  Chinese	  history,	  culture,	  identity,	  ideology,	  
etc.	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   its	   difference	   from	   the	  West;	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   they	   reject	  
application	  of	  concepts,	  models,	  and	  methods,	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  in	  the	  field	  
of	  international	  relations,	  to	  study	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy.	  	  
Although	  variables,	  which	  are	  or	   can	  be	   traced	   to	  history,	   ideology,	   culture	  
and	   so	   on,	   have	   relative	   explanatory	   power,	   they	   should	   be	   downplayed	   in	  
understanding	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy	  making.	  	  Michael	  Ng-­‐Quinn	  looked	  at	  variables	  
of	   this	   kind	   as	   secondary	   for	   understanding	   the	   formation	   of	   alliance	   between	  
countries	   against	   a	   dominant	   power.22	  	   John	   Gittings	   believed	   that	   short-­‐term	  
economic	   or	   security	   interests	   could	   trump	   ideology.23	  	   When	   the	   Soviet	   troops	  
along	   the	   Sino-­‐Soviet	   border	   became	   a	   growing	   security	   threat	   and	   the	   dispute	  
escalated	  to	  military	  clashes	  in	  Damansky	  Island	  in	  1969,	  China’s	  top	  leadership	  was	  
more	  and	  more	  interested	  in	  resuming	  the	  economic	  and	  cultural	  ties	  with	  the	  US,	  
not	   only	   for	   China	   to	   acquire	   advanced	   American	   equipment,	   as	   well	   as	   similar	  
technology	   from	  American	  allies	   in	  Western	  Europe	  and	   Japan,	  but	   also	   to	   form	  a	  
united	  front	  again	  the	  Soviet	  expansion.	   	  The	  ensuing	  rapprochement	  between	  the	  
US	  and	  China	  surprised	  the	  world.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  ideological	  divergence	  appears	  to	  be	  
easily	  overcome	  for	  Chinese	  decision	  makers	  in	  the	  face	  of	  imminent	  economic	  and	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security	  interest.	   	   In	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy	  making,	  variables	  of	  this	  category	  have	  
secondary	  explanatory	  power	  and	  should	  be	  downplayed.	  	  
It	  is	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  that	  the	  Chinese	  politics	  study	  is	  a	  subfield	  of	  
Sinology,	  which	  belongs	  to	  area	  studies.	  	  Scholars,	  like	  Alastair	  Iain	  Johnston,	  argue	  
against	   the	   divorce	   of	   the	   Chinese	   foreign	   policy	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   international	  
relations	  and	  for	  a	  reunion	  between	  these	  two.24	  	  He	  asserted	  that	  Chinese	  foreign	  
policy	  could	  benefit	  from	  incorporating	  more	  of	  the	  concepts,	  empirical	   indicators,	  
and	  methods	  used	  in	  international	  relations,	  and	  in	  turn,	  it	  would	  contribute	  to	  the	  
development	   of	   international	   relations	   studies.	   	   “If	   one	   looks	   back	   at	   the	   field	  
through	   the	   lenses	   of	   IR	   theory	   today,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   there	   has	   been	   a	  
theoretical	  richness.”25	  	  	  
Chinese	   foreign	   policy	   should	   be	   more	   integrated	   into	   the	   international	  
relations	  discipline,	  not	  only	  because	   this	  country	  comes	  back	   to	   the	   international	  
stage	   as	   a	   rising,	  major	   power,	   but	  mainly	   because	   Chinese	   decision-­‐makers	   bear	  
similarities	  to	  their	  counterparts	  of	  other	  countries	  in	  various	  kinds	  of	  foreign	  policy	  
making.	  	  Policy	  trade-­‐offs	  are	  an	  example.	  	  In	  front	  of	  competing	  “national	  interests,”	  
regime	  security	  as	  an	  alternative,	  and	  other	  interests	  such	  as	  economic	  development,	  
national	   status	  or	   image	  as	   another	  option,	   the	   latter	   trumps	   the	   former	   at	   times.	  	  
From	   1985	   to	   1987,	   Deng	   Xiaoping	   carried	   out	   the	   disarmament	   for	   economic	  
development.	   	   In	   1998,	   Jiang	   Zemin	   and	   Zhu	   Rongji	   completely	   banned	   military-­‐
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owned	   enterprises	   and	   issued	   the	   order	   that	   the	  military	   and	   the	   public	   security	  
organs,	   etc.	   should	   no	   longer	   engage	   in	   any	   business	   activities.	   Although	   it	   is	  
believed	  that	   the	  Communist	   leadership	  prioritizes	  regime	  security	  over	  economic	  
growth	  (because	  the	  reverse	  would	  produce	  internal	  social	  effect	  and	  threaten	  the	  
regime),	   these	   trade-­‐offs	   happened	  when	   they	   endeavored	   to	   integrate	  China	   into	  
the	  global	  economy.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  this	  question	  of	  policy	  trade-­‐offs,	  Chinese	  decision	  
makers	  are	  not	  different	  from	  leaders	  in	  many	  countries.	  	  	  
Therefore,	   the	   conventional	   wisdom	   –	   the	   Chinese	   foreign	   policy	   is	  
considered	   as	   part	   of	   Sinology,	   and	   the	   theories	   and	  models	   of	   IR	   are	   rejected	   to	  
apply	   to	   the	   Chinese	   politics	   –	  might	   need	   to	   be	   reconsidered.	   	   Graham	   Allison’s	  
analytic	   paradigm,	   for	   example,	   was	   developed	   from	   and	   applied	   to	   the	   Kennedy	  
Administration’s	  decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  Cuba	  Missile	  Crisis.	  	  It	  is	  a	  bundle	  of	  models:	  
the	  Rational	  Policy	  Model,	   the	  Organizational	  Process	  Model,	  and	   the	  Bureaucratic	  
Politics	   Model.	   	   Allison’s	   model	   was	   rejected	   by	   J.D.	   Armstrong	   in	   studying	   the	  
Chinese	  government	  decision-­‐making	  because	  it	  did	  not	  talk	  about	  a	  crucial	  variable,	  
ideology.26	  	  At	   least,	   the	   first	   two	  models,	  rational	  policy	  model	  and	  organizational	  
process	  model,	  cannot	  distinguish	  between	  a	   foreign	  policy	   influenced	  by	   ideology	  
and	  one	  not	  influenced	  by	  ideology.	  	  	  
The	  theories	  and	  models	  in	  international	  relations	  develop	  from	  cases	  on	  the	  
foreign	  policy	  of	   the	  US	  or	  European	  states,	   and	  most	  of	   this	   literature	   focuses	  on	  
the	  West.	  	  As	  matter	  of	  fact,	  each	  of	  western	  countries	  has	  its	  own	  special	  features.	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These	   special	   features	   did	   not	   restrain	   model	   construction	   or	   broader	  
generalization,	  and	  neither	  should	  the	  special	  features	  of	  China.	  	  
As	   argued	   supra,	   Chinese	  decision	  makers	   are	  not	   that	   different	   from	   their	  
equals	   in	   other	   countries	   in	   foreign	   policy,	   and	   the	   conventional	   wisdom	   in	   this	  
discipline	  can	  be	  applied	  when	  we	  acquire	  more	  and	  more	  understanding	  about	  the	  
Chinese	  government.	   	  When	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   foreign	  policy	  making	   in	  China	   share	  
similarity	  to	  other	  countries,	  that	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  we	  should	  ignore	  the	  differences,	  
its	  ideology,	  history,	  culture,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Variables	  of	  this	  kind,	  such	  as	  ideology,	  have	  
explanatory	  power	  in	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy	  making,	  but	  it	  is	  problematic	  to	  attach	  
too	  much	  weight	  to	  these	  variables.	  	  	  
The	  objective	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  identify	  variables	  that	  may	  affect	  decision-­‐
making	   in	   China,	   in	   order	   to	   facilitate	   the	   dissertation’s	   discussion	   about	   the	  
application	   of	   American	   power	   to	   China’s	   trade	   policy.	   	   When	   I	   argue	   for	  
convergence	   between	   the	   Chinese	   foreign	   policy	   and	   the	   study	   of	   international	  
relations,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   apply	   one	   of	   the	   most	   classic	   models	   for	   government	  
foreign	  policy	  making	   to	   the	  Chinese	  decision,	  by	  experiment.	   	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   I	  
would	  also	  make	  modification	  to	  enhance	  its	  explanatory	  power.	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American	   power	   to	   the	   Chinese	   trade	   policy.	   	   As	   an	   interdisciplinary	   study,	   the	  
Chinese	   foreign	  policy	  can	  be	  conceived	  as	  part	  of	  Chinese	  politics	  under	  Sinology	  
and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  study	  of	  international	  relations.	  	  The	  changes	  in	  
Chinese	  economy	  and	  politics,	  especially	  the	  dynamic	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  
and	  the	  party,	  give	  the	  students	  of	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy	  a	  moving	  target	  on	  these	  
two	  rivers.	  	  In	  front	  of	  competing	  models	  for	  the	  Chinese	  politics,	  Frederick	  Teiwes	  
suggested	  a	  sequential	  approach,27	  which	  is	  selecting	  appropriate	  models	  according	  
to	  the	  periods	  under	  study.	   	   	  However,	  we	  can	  see	  some	  variables,	  for	  example	  the	  
factionalism	  within	   the	  bureaucracy	  and	   the	  Party	   system,	  appear	  over	   time	   in	  all	  
the	  periods.	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  attempt	  to	  implement	  a	  scheme	  of	  transdisciplinarity,	  
applying	  the	  classic	  model	  in	  international	  relations	  to	  the	  study	  of	  Chinese	  foreign	  
policy	  making,	  which	  has	  been	  regarded	  as	  a	  branch	  of	  Sinology.	  	  	  	  	  
As	  Andrew	  Nathan	   said,	   “Models	   are	  pure,	   but	   systems	   are	  mixed.”28	  Given	  
the	   remarkable	   changes	   in	   China	   in	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   no	   single	   model	   has	  
sufficed	   for	   the	   task	  of	  revealing	  both	  general	  and	  specific	  propensities	  of	  Chinese	  
decision-­‐making.	   	   After	   proposing	   reducing	   the	   number	   of	   models,	   Dr.	   Harding	  
suggested	  a	  single	  composite	  model	  which	  should	  reflect	  the	  general	  propositions:	  
Chinese	  leaders	  are	  motivated	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  power	  considerations	  and	  policy	  
concerns;	  Chinese	  state	  and	  Party	  have	  substantial	  autonomy	  from	  Chinese	  society;	  
Chinese	   leaders	   may	   form	   enduring	   coalitions	   with	   each	   other	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  
shared	   commitment	   to	   basic	   political	   values	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   programs,	   or	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tendencies,	  or	  short-­‐term	  alliances	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  particular	  goals;	  their	  bases	  of	  
power	   are	   both	   formal	   and	   informal;	   and	   they	   are	   cross-­‐pressured	   by	   competing	  
demands	  from	  different	  elements	  in	  their	  power	  bases	  –	  bureaucratic	  interests	  are	  
particularly	   important	   in	   consideration	   of	   routine	   policy	   matters;	   factional	  
considerations,	  in	  times	  of	  consideration	  of	  personnel	  matters;	  and	  societal	  interests,	  
at	  times	  of	  intense	  leadership	  conflict.29	  	  
When	   we	   look	   at	   Dr.	   Harding’s	   list	   about	   general	   propositions	   of	   a	   single	  
composite	  model,	  many	  of	  these	  general	  propensities	  are	  not	  special	  characteristics	  
of	  this	  one-­‐party	  government.	  	  All	  the	  features,	  such	  as	  the	  Chinese	  culture,	  political	  
tradition,	   the	   history	   of	   society	   and	   state,	   and	   the	   Communist	   regime,	   make	   this	  
country	  appear	  mysterious.	   	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  
and	  the	  party	  is	  its	  own	  specific	  propensities.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  CPC	  has	  configured	  
itself	   from	  an	  opposition	  party	   for	   revolution	   to	  a	   ruling	  party	   that	  manages	   state	  
affairs,	  and	  also	  pulls	  efforts	  to	  separate	  party	  affairs	  from	  government	  operation,	  to	  
some	   extent.	   	   Ruling	   of	   more	   than	   half	   century	   has	   shaped	   its	   governmental	  
operation,	  which	  shares	  some	  general	  propensities	  with	  other	  governments	  under	  
different	  regimes.30	  	  	  
Government	   leaders	   sit	   on	   top	   of	   a	   constellation	   of	   loosely	   allied	  
organizations;	  they	  cut	  up	  problems	  and	  parcel	  them	  out	  to	  various	  organizations;	  
organizations	   have	   established	   programs	   and	   repertoire	   and	   develop	   relatively	  
stable	   propensities	   concerning	   priorities	   and	   perceptions	   about	   issues;	   issues	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  Harry	  Harding,	  “Competing	  Models	  of	  The	  Chinese	  Communist	  Policy	  Process.”	  	  
30	  This	  paragraph	  was	  inspired	  by	  my	  discussion	  with	  Dr.	  Xu	  Xianglin	  in	  Beijing	  and	  that	  with	  Amb.	  Susan	  




gradually	   move	   up	   from	   the	   bottom	   of	   the	   hierarchy	   when	   agreement	   between	  
agencies	  cannot	  be	  reached.	  	  When	  more	  than	  one	  organization	  is	  involved	  in	  policy-­‐
making,	   policy	   is	   not	   just	   organizational	   output,	   but	   also	   outcome	  of	   bureaucratic	  
politics.	  When	   a	   policy	   is	   competing	   for	   priority	   in	   the	   agenda,	   both	   bureaucratic	  
politics	  and	  the	  viability	  of	  ruling	  party	  emerge	  in	  the	  picture.	  	  
Searching	   for	   a	  model	  with	   these	   propositions	   to	   aid	   the	   study	   of	   Chinese	  
foreign	  policy,	  I	  walk	  across	  the	  river	  of	  Sinology,	  and	  get	  my	  feet	  wet	  in	  the	  river	  of	  
international	   relations.	   	   Graham	   Allison’s	   analytic	   paradigm	   is	   perhaps	   the	   most	  
important	  model	   in	   policy	   studies;	   it	   explicitly	   displays	  what	   have	  been	   implicitly	  
employed	  when	  conducting	  policy	  analysis	  on	  governmental	  behavior.	   	  The	  Allison	  
paradigm	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  Rational	  Policy	  Model,	  the	  Organizational	  Process	  
Model,	   and	   the	   Bureaucratic	   Politics	  Model.	   	   One	   of	   the	   great	   contributions	   is	   its	  
clear-­‐cut	   offering	   of	   these	   three	   angles	   to	   look	   into	   the	   black	   box	   of	   government	  
decision-­‐making.	  	  
The	  rational	  policy	  model	  shows	  how	  the	  purposive	  acts	  of	  a	  unified	  national	  
government	   are	   reasonable	   as	   value-­‐maximizing	   choices,	   given	   the	   strategic	  
problems	  that	  it	  faces.	  	  The	  organizational	  process	  model	  proceeds	  to	  open	  the	  black	  
box	  and	   look	  within	   the	  unitary	   actor.	   	   It	   proposes	   that	   a	  nation’s	  behavior	   is	   the	  
output	   of	   organizational	   repertoires	   and	   routines,	   featuring	   quasi-­‐independence,	  
and	  that	  a	  nation’s	  standard	  operating	  procedures	  facilitate	  and	  constrain	  decision-­‐




governments	   in	  policy	  outcomes.	   	   Internal	  bargains	   include	  compromise,	  coalition,	  
competition,	  and	  confusion	  among	  government	  officials.	  	  
The	  Allison	  paradigm	  was	  considered	  inappropriate	  for	  the	  Chinese	  politics	  
because	   it	   did	   not	   address	   ideology.	   	   However,	   after	   reviewing	   the	   models	   of	  
Chinese	  politics	  and	  discussing	  the	  relationship	  between	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy	  and	  
international	  relations,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  Allison	  model	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  Chinese	  
decision-­‐making	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  	  As	  discussed	  supra,	  disputes	  between	  competing	  
political	   philosophies	   usually	   come	   after	   an	   internal	   bargaining	   deadlock	   in	  
bureaucracy;	   ideological	   disputes	   are	   often	   used	   to	   test	   subordinates’	   loyalty	   and	  
force	   them	   to	   choose	   sides.	   	   	   In	   Chinese	   politics,	   ideology	   conflict	   is	   part	   of	  
bureaucratic	   politics,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   competition	   between	   factions	   of	   the	   Party.	  	  
Variables,	   such	   as	   ideology,	   culture,	   should	   be	   secondary	   in	   interpreting	   Chinese	  
foreign	   policy.	   	   An	   effective	   model	   should	   grasp	   the	   general	   propensities	   of	   the	  
Chinese	  policy-­‐making,	  which	  it	  shares	  with	  other	  ruling	  governments.	  	  	  
I	  agree	  with	  Dr.	  Harding’s	  proposal	  that	  the	  need	  is	  to	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  
models	  to	  “more	  manageable	  proportions.”31	  	  This	  piece	  of	  writing	  has	  no	  intention	  
to	   add	  another	  model	   to	   the	   legion	  of	  models	  on	  Chinese	  politics.	   	  To	  analyze	   the	  
making	   of	   Chinese	   foreign	   Trade	   policy,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   employ	   Graham	   Allison’s	  
analytic	  paradigm,	  which	  is	  actually	  a	  bundle	  of	  models	  –	  the	  Rational	  Policy	  Model,	  
the	  Organizational	  Process	  Model,	  and	  the	  Bureaucratic	  Politics	  Model.	  	  I	  would	  rely	  
on	  the	  structure	  of	  Dr.	  Allison’s	  policy	  analysis	  models	  and	  modify	  it	  by	  addressing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




general	   and	   special	   properties	   of	   Chinese	   policy-­‐making.	   	   In	   doing	   so,	   I	   salute	  Dr.	  
Allison	   for	   his	   classic	   works	   on	   government	   decision	   making,	   Dr.	   Harding	   who	  
suggested	   that	   these	   variables	   of	   Chinese	   politics	   –	  which	   are	   not	   competitive	   or	  
mutually	  exclusive	  –	  can	  be	  synthesized	  into	  one	  composite	  model,	  and	  Dr.	  Johnston	  
who	   argued	   that	   Chinese	   foreign	   policy	   should	   be	   a	   subfield	   of	   the	   study	   of	  
International	  relations.	  	  
Staying	  within	  Dr.	  Allison’s	  structure	  of	  models,	  my	  theoretic	  framework	  lies	  
at	   the	   intersection	   of	   three	   streams	   of	   scholarship.	   	   First,	   it	   discusses	   the	  
explanatory	   power	   of	   Rational	   Choice	   theory	   on	   decision-­‐making	   in	   trade	  
negotiations	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  China	  and	  introduces	  Bounded	  Rationality,	  which	  
compensates	   for	   the	   limitations	   of	   pure	   Rationality.	   	   Second,	   it	   discusses	   the	  
institutional	  approach,	  based	  on	  a	  comparative	  study	  of	  the	  Organizational	  Process	  
Model	   and	   the	   Garbage	   Can	   Model,	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   application	   to	   U.S.	   –	   China	  
negotiations.	  	  Finally,	  it	  discusses	  the	  bureaucratic	  school’s	  Politics	  Model,	  including	  
the	   Two-­‐level	   Game	   Theory	  Model,	   and	   attempts	   to	   go	   beyond	   static	  models	   and	  
consider	  dynamic	  models.	  	  	  
The	   advancement	   in	   relevant	   research	   after	   Allison’s	   interdisciplinary	  
offering	  of	  his	  policy	  analysis	  models	  permits	  a	  fuller	  perspective	  to	  study	  decision	  
making	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Building	  this	  theoretic	  framework	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  Dr.	  
Graham	   T.	   Allison’s	   models,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   revise	   the	   model	   by	   incorporating	  
advances	   in	   relevant	   disciplines,	   achieve	   a	   synergistic	   effect	   on	   their	   explanatory	  




studies	   of	   Chinese	  politics.	   	   By	   constructing	   this	   framework	  with	   an	   eye	   on	  U.S.	   –	  
China	   trade	   bargaining,	   I	   intend	   to	   extend	   the	   application	   of	   the	   models	   from	  
interpretations	   of	   national	   security	   crises	   to	   an	   analysis	   of	   an	   enduring	   economic	  
relationship	  and	  multiple-­‐round	  negotiations.	  
	  
Rationality	  vs.	  Bounded	  Rationality	  
	  
With	   the	  pure	   rationality	  model,	   the	   research	  on	  China	   issues	  may	   fall	   into	  
the	   pitfalls	   of	   ignoring	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   question	   of	   how	   China	   is	   to	  
behave	  rationally	  given	  its	  limitations,	  and	  the	  question	  of	  the	  rationality	  of	  China’s	  
action	   from	   the	   American	   perspective.	   	   Since	   the	   latter	   is	   not	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	  
paper,	  the	  idiosyncrasies	  of	  the	  player	  should	  be	  attended	  to.	   	  To	  study	  how	  China	  
acts	   rationally	   given	   its	   limitations,	   I	   argue	   for	   the	   replacement	   of	   pure	   rational	  
model	  with	  bounded	  rationality.	  	  
Rationality,	   as	   Allison	   claimed,	   has	   been	   implied	   in	   most	   policy	   analysis	  
works,32	  and	  as	  Schelling	  argued,	  is	  the	  assumption	  of	  the	  foundation	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  
strategy.33	  	   To	   capture	   the	   characteristics	   of	   rationality	   in	   public	   policy	   analysis,	  
Allison	  exhibited	  a	  set	  of	  assumptions	  for	  his	  rational	  policy	  model:	  (1)	  what	  must	  
be	  explained	  is	  an	  action;	  (2)	  the	  actor	  is	  the	  national	  government;	  (3)	  the	  action	  is	  
chosen	  as	  a	   calculated	   response	   to	  a	   strategic	  problem;	  and	   (4)	   the	   interpretation	  
consists	   of	   what	   goal	   the	   government	   was	   pursuing	   and	   how	   this	   action	   was	   a	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  Conceptual	  Models	  and	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis,	  689.	  




reasonable	  choice.34	  	  Therefore,	  this	  model	  features	  a	  unified	  national	  government’s	  
reasoning	   and	   action,	   as	   a	   value-­‐maximizing	   mechanism,	   given	   the	   nation’s	  
constraints,	  strategic	  problems,	  and	  objectives.	  	  	  
The	  classic	  rational	  model	  corresponds	  to	  the	  traditional	  economic	  theory	  to	  
explain	  an	  “economic	  man,”	  and	  takes	  some	  characteristics	  of	  the	  actor	  for	  granted:	  
(1)	   the	   actor’s	   knowledge	   of	   relevant	   situations,	   if	   not	   absolutely	   complete,	   is	   at	  
least	  clear	  and	  voluminous;	  (2)	  the	  actor	  has	  a	  well-­‐organized	  and	  stable	  system	  of	  
preferences;	   (3)	   the	   actor	   is	   capable	   of	   mapping	   policy	   alternatives	   to	   possible	  
outcomes	  and	  refining	  the	  mapping	  process	  continuously	  by	  information	  gathering;	  
(4)	  the	  actor	  is	  able	  to	  attach	  a	  definite	  and	  scalar	  pay-­‐off	  function	  to	  each	  possible	  
outcome;	  and	  (5)	  the	  actor	  has	  sufficient	  skill	  in	  computation	  for	  him	  to	  achieve	  the	  
highest	  attainable	  point.35	  	  	  
Herbert	  A.	  Simon	  recognized	  that	  the	  actual	  process	  could	  be	  quite	  different	  
from	   what	   the	   rules	   describe.	   	   He	   even	   pointed	   out,	   for	   example,	   that	   the	  
unconscious	  is	  a	  better	  decision	  maker	  than	  the	  conscious.36	  	  In	  his	  behavior	  model	  
of	  rational	  choice,	  he	  proposed	  that	  one	  should	  approach	  the	  problem	  by	  inquiring	  
into	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  choosing	  organism.	   	  China,	  as	  a	   far-­‐east	  country,	  has	  not	  
been	   widely	   studied	   in	   the	   past,	   unlike	   Russia,	   the	   analyses	   of	   whose	   strategic	  
moves	  were	  based	  on	  knowledge	  accumulated	  for	  centuries	  and	  multiple	  rounds	  of	  
interactions.	   	   As	   a	   new	   economic	   entity,	   China	   has	   just	   entered	   into	   the	   global	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  “Conceptual	  Models	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trading	  net	   and	   set	  out	   to	   transform	   itself	   into	   a	  market	   economy.	   	  One	  of	  Deng’s	  
famous	   sayings	  –	   “crossing	   river	  by	   touching	   stones”	   –	   exemplifies	   its	   transitional	  
feature.	   	   	   	   Both	   China’s	   general	   and	   special	   properties	   should	   be	   studied	   in	  
understanding	  its	  behaviors.	  	  
Problems	   would	   arise,	   were	   the	   pure	   rational	   model	   to	   be	   applied	   to	   the	  
study	   of	   China’s	   decision	   making	   on	   trade	   policy,	   for	   the	   following	   reasons:	   (1)	  
China’s	   knowledge	   of	   globalization	   and	   market	   economics	   is	   progressing;	   (2)	   its	  
preference	  system	  has	  been	  changing	  rapidly	  and	  tremendously,	  ever	  since	  it	  came	  
out	   of	   the	   nightmare	   of	   the	   Cultural	   Revolution;	   (3)	   in	   lacking	   knowledge	   of	   cost	  
calculation,	   its	   pay-­‐off	   function	   has	   not	   been	   completely	   ordered,	   and	   it	   has	   also	  
been	   switching	   periodically,	   due	   to	   the	   changing	  weights	   of	   factors	   in	   comparing	  
policy	   alternatives;	   and	   (4)	   its	   computation	   skills	   are	   improving,	   as	   well	   as	   its	  
capability	  to	  gather	  information	  for	  mapping	  policy	  alternatives	  to	  outcomes.	  	  Hence,	  
we	   cannot	   take	   the	   properties	   of	   this	   choosing	   organism	   for	   granted,	   nor	   can	  we	  
apply	  the	  global	  kinds	  of	  rationality	  in	  the	  classic	  model	  without	  revision	  to	  address	  
the	  actor’s	  traits.	  	  
The	  selection	  of	  a	  test	  is	  critical	  to	  decoding	  a	  nation’s	  actions.	  	  According	  to	  
Allison,	  the	  rational	  policy	  model’s	  explanatory	  power	  stems	  from	  optimality.	   	  “If	  a	  
nation	  performed	  a	  particular	  action,	  that	  nation	  must	  have	  had	  ends	  towards	  which	  
the	   action	   constituted	   an	   optimal	  means.”37	  	   However,	   optimality	  may	   not	   be	   the	  
highest	  attainable	  point	  from	  a	  player’s	  perspective.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  player,	  instead	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




of	  seeking	  for	  a	  ‘best’	  move	  or	  maximizing	  the	  pay-­‐off,	  only	  looks	  for	  a	  ‘good’	  move	  
or	  requires	  that	  the	  pay-­‐off	  exceed	  a	  given	  amount.38	  	  	  
An	   optimal	   choice	   is	   just	   one	   of	   the	   feasible	   options;	   and	   a	   feasible	   option	  
satisfies	   certain	   linear	   inequalities	   that	   are	   given	   at	   the	   outset	   (even	   when	   the	  
counterpart	  at	   the	  negotiation	   table	  does	  not	  understand	   it).	   	  Once	  an	  offer	  meets	  
the	  requirement,	  the	  actor	  would	  accept	  the	  first	  “satisfactory”	  offer	  tendered,	  and	  
would	  not	  wait	  for	  an	  alternative	  with	  a	  higher	  pay-­‐off.	  	  Although	  value	  may	  not	  be	  
maximized,	   the	  satisficing	  test	  represents	  a	  reasonable	  and	  sufficient	  approach	  for	  
rational	   decision-­‐making.	   	   In	   researching	  China’s	   trade	  policy	  making,	  we	  need	   to	  
consider	   the	   asymmetric	   interdependence	   in	   the	   bilateral	   relationship	   and	   the	  
capacity	   of	   U.S.	   negotiators	   to	   derive	   the	   leverage	   from	   America’s	   enormous	  
economic	  power.	   	  Therefore,	   it	  appears	  more	  appropriate	  to	  apply	  the	  satisfactory	  
test	  than	  the	  optimal	  test	  in	  analyzing	  the	  Chinese	  response	  to	  American	  pressure.	  	  	  
There	   are	   a	   few	   issues	   upon	  which	   Allison’s	   classic	   concepts	   of	   rationality	  
either	   do	   not	   touch	   or	   break	   down.	   	   The	   classical	   theory	   requires	   a	   complete	  
ordering	   of	   pay-­‐off	   function,	   but	   a	   number	   of	   values	   do	   not	   have	   a	   common	  
denominator.	  	  It	  does	  not	  exhibit	  an	  approach	  to	  study	  the	  incomparability	  of	  apples	  
and	  oranges.39	  	  Particularly	  in	  this	  research,	  a	  search	  for	  substitute	  goods	  will	  help	  
us	   learn	   China’s	   substitute	   moves	   –	   demands	   or	   compromises	   –	   in	   order	   to	  
understand	  why	  it	  accommodates	  U.S.	  demands	  or	  resists	  the	  pressures	  on	  certain	  
issue	  or	  at	  certain	  times.	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The	   aspiration	   level,	   a	   term	   from	   psychological	   theory	   that	   defines	   the	  
boundary	   of	   the	   acceptance	   price,	   may	   change	   over	   time.	   	   In	   searching	   for	  
alternatives,	   if	   it	   is	  easy	  to	  discover	  satisfactory	  alternatives,	  one’s	  aspiration	   level	  
rises;	  if	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  spot	  satisfactory	  alternatives,	  one’s	  aspiration	  level	  falls.	  	  The	  
aspiration	   level	  of	   time	   t	   is	  affected	  by	   the	  aspiration	   level	  of	   time	   t-­‐1.40	  	  Over	   the	  
years	   of	   negotiation,	   China’s	   aspiration	   level	   has	   not	   been	   constant	   and	   has	   been	  
adjusted	   correspondingly.	   	   Sino-­‐American	   bargaining	   has	   adopted	   a	   dynamic	  
pattern.	  	  In	  a	  lengthy	  WTO	  protocol	  negotiation,	  the	  adjustment	  of	  China’s	  aspiration	  
level	  is	  a	  dynamic	  process.	  	  	  
Allison	   visualized	   a	   nation’s	   action	   as	   “a	   steady-­‐state	   choice	   among	  
alternative	   outcomes	   rather	   than	   a	   large	   number	   of	   partial	   choices	   in	   a	   dynamic	  
stream.”41 	  	   In	   the	   research	   on	   the	   Cuban	   Missile	   Crisis,	   which	   demanded	   an	  
expeditious	   decision	   in	   thirteen	   days,42	  his	   static	   selection	   is	   completely	   justified	  
because	  thirteen	  days	  is	  a	  spot	  on	  the	  time	  axle.	   	  Nevertheless,	  a	  static	  model	  may	  
not	   suit	   the	   studies	   in	   enduring	   bilateral	   relations.	   	   China’s	   characteristics,	   as	   a	  
negotiator	  or	  player	  on	  the	  international	  stage,	  have	  been	  changing:	  its	  computation	  
skills	   are	   improving;	   its	   pay-­‐off	   function	   is	   changing;	   and	   its	   aspiration	   level	   is	  
subject	  to	  a	  dynamic	  adjustment	  process	  within	  the	  satisfactory	  test.	  
	   To	   study	   the	   interaction	   and	   friction	   between	   the	   U.S.	   and	   China	   in	   trade	  
policy,	  we	  have	  to	  distinguish	  trade	  policy	  making	  from	  a	  rapid	  decision-­‐making	  in	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times	  of	  crisis,	  and	  must	  study	  the	  idiosyncrasies	  of	  the	  players.	  	  If	  we	  accept	  global	  
rationality,	  a	  question	  would	  naturally	  arise	  whether	  we	  should	  treat	  organizational	  
features	  and	  domestic	  politics	  as	  other	  models	  or	  as	  a	  set	  of	  constraints	  within	  the	  
rational	   model.	   	   To	   conduct	   research	   of	   this	   kind,	   I	   would	   substitute	   the	   policy	  
model	   of	   global	   rationality	   with	   a	   bounded	   rationality,	   because	   the	   latter	   is	  
compatible	  with	  the	  player’s	  characteristics	  in	  this	  case.	  	  I	  also	  suggest	  replacing	  the	  
optimality	  test	  with	  the	  satisfactory	  yardstick.	  
	  
Organizational	  Process	  as	  a	  Garbage	  Can	  	  
	  
The	  study	  at	  the	  organizational	  level	  helps	  look	  at	  the	  gears	  and	  levers	  inside	  
the	  nation	  by	  looking	  at	  a	  nation’s	  decision	  making	  as	  the	  output	  of	  organizational	  
behavior	   and	   researching	   its	   patterns	   and	   tendencies.	   	   Allison’s	   second	   model,	  
organizational	   process	   model	   took	   the	   lead	   in	   analyzing	   organizations’	   standard	  
operating	   procedures	   and	   stable	   propensities,	   in	   order	   to	   open	   the	   black	   box	   of	  
government	  decision	  making.	  	  Within	  the	  unified	  government	  exists	  a	  considerable	  
gap	   between	   what	   leaders	   choose	   and	   what	   organizations	   implement.	  	  
Organizations,	   each	  with	   a	   fixed	   set	   of	   standard	   operating	   procedures,	   programs,	  
repertoire,	   act	   in	   quasi-­‐independence.	   	   As	   part	   of	   government	   decision-­‐making,	  
organizations	  have	  their	  own	  pre-­‐established	  routines	  to	   follow,	  parochial	   interest	  




Government	   behavior	   is	   considered	   as	   an	   output	   of	   organizations,	   the	  
repertoires,	  programs,	  and	  routines	  of	  which	  constrain	  as	  well	  as	  facilitate	  decision-
making.	   	   The	   standard	   notions	   of	   how	   decisions	   ought	   to	   be	   made	   at	   the	  
organizational	   level	  are	  the	  follows:	  (1)	  a	  government	  perceives	  problems	  through	  
organization	   sensors; 43 	  (2)	   alternatives	   are	   examined	   and	   estimated	   as	  
organizations	  process	   information;	   (3)	  a	  government	  comes	   to	  a	  decision	  as	   these	  
organizations	   enact	   routines.	   	   The	   classical	   model	   displays	   its	   substantial	  
explanatory	   power	   in	   a	   problem-­‐driven	   case	   where	   a	   set	   of	   stable	   constraints	  
defines	  acceptable	  performance.	   	  At	  times	  of	  emergency,	  such	  as	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  
Crisis,	   organizations	   swirl	   to	   respond	   to	   a	   critical	   situation	   and	   tackle	   the	   crisis.	  	  
Organizations	   immediately	   clarify	  preferences	   and	   goals,	  mobilize	   resources	   in	   an	  
expeditious	  manner,	  and	  assure	  participant	  involvement	  at	  a	  substantial	  level.	  	  	  
However,	   this	   model	   shows	   its	   limitation	   when	   applying	   to	   other	   cases.	  	  
Organizational	   outputs	   structure	   the	   situations,	   to	   which	   the	   state	   players	   or	  
organizations	  themselves	  have	  to	  respond.	   	  In	  words,	  organization	  procedures,	  per	  
se,	  are	  constraints	  on	  rational	  decision-­‐making.	  	  As	  Herbert	  A.	  Simon	  said,	  “Some	  of	  
the	   constraints	   that	  must	   be	   taken	   as	   givens	   in	   an	   optimization	   problem	  may	   be	  
physiological	   and	   psychological	   limitations	   of	   the	   organism	   itself.”	   	   Elements	   of	  
organizational	  structure	  and	  the	  changes	  need	  to	  be	  addressed.	   	  Furthermore,	   this	  
model	   conspicuously	   renders	   a	   problem-­‐oriented	   style	   of	   search,	   which	   limits	   its	  
explanatory	   power	   in	   those	   cases	   without	   such	   a	   characteristic.	   	   It	   is	   built	   on	  
assumptions,	   such	   as	   the	   existence	   of	   clear	   goals,	   well-­‐defined	   technology,	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




substantial	   participant	   involvement.	   	   The	   set	   of	   constraints	   on	   organizations	   is	  
relatively	   stable.	   	   In	   cases	   of	   enduring	   negotiations,	   where	   situations	   are	  
characterized	  by	  problematic	  preferences,	  unclear	  technology,	  fluid	  participation,44	  
and	   even	   changing	   constraints,	   the	   power	   of	   the	   organizational	   process	  model	   is	  
reduced.	  	  
The	  garbage	  can	  model	  exhibits	  its	  general	  relevance	  to	  explain	  and	  predict	  
variations	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   behavior	   of	   organizations.	   	   This	  model	   views	   a	  
choice	   opportunity	   as	   a	   can, 	   into	   which	   various	   kinds	   of	   garbage	   (problems,	  
solutions,	   etc.)	   are	   dumped	   by	   participants.	   	   “The	  mix	   of	   garbage	   in	   a	   single	   can	  
depends	  on	  the	  mix	  of	  cans	  available,	  on	  the	  labels	  attached	  to	  the	  alternative	  cans,	  
on	  what	  garbage	  is	  currently	  being	  produced	  and	  on	  the	  speed	  with	  which	  garbage	  
is	   collected	   and	   removed	   from	   the	   scene.” 45 	  	   Different	   from	   the	   classical	  
organizational	   process	   model,	   which	   assumes	   that	   solutions	   are	   generated	   in	  
response	  to	  a	  problem,	  the	  garbage	  can	  model	  provides	  another	  angle	  to	  open	  and	  
study	  the	  black-­‐box:	  decision	  makers	  and	  problems	  tend	  to	  track	  each	  other	  through	  
choices	  and	  to	  move	  together	  from	  choice	  to	  choice.	  	  	  
Distinguished	   from	   the	   conventional	   notions	   that	   stress	   an	   organization’s	  
standard	   operating	   procedures,	   this	   model	   perceives	   government	   institutions	   as	  
organized	  anarchies.	  	  They	  lack	  consistent	  and	  shared	  goals;	  their	  members	  learn	  its	  
processes	   from	   past	   experience,	   and	   they	   operate	   based	   on	   trial-­‐and-­‐error	   or	   on	  
pragmatic	   invention	   born	   of	   necessity.	   	   Participation	   varies	   not	   only	   in	   terms	   of	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participants’	   time	   and	   effort,	   but	   also	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   involvement	   and	   the	  
boundaries	   of	   the	   organization.46	  	   Therefore,	   an	   organization	   is	   considered	   as	  
collections	  of	  choices	  looking	  for	  problems,	  issues	  and	  feelings	  looking	  for	  decision	  
situations,	  solutions	  looking	  for	  issues,	  and	  decision	  makers	  looking	  for	  work.47	  	  	  
According	  to	  Cohen,	  March,	  and	  Olsen,	  a	  decision	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  coupling	  
several	   independent	   streams	   –	   problems,	   solutions,	   participants,	   and	   choice	  
opportunities	   –	   and	   depends	   on	   a	   relatively	   complicated	   intermeshing	   of	   these	  
elements.	  	  Elements	  of	  organizational	  structure	  influence	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  garbage	  
can	  decision	  process	  by	  affecting	  the	  time	  pattern	  of	  the	  arrival	  of	  problems,	  choices,	  
and	  solution;	  by	  determining	  the	  allocation	  of	  energy	  by	  potential	  participants;	  and	  
by	  establishing	  linkages	  among	  the	  various	  streams.	  	  The	  garbage	  can	  model	  shows	  
the	   access	   structure	   by	   mapping	   problems	   onto	   choices,	   and	   reveals	   decision	  
structure	  by	  mapping	  choices	  onto	  decision	  makers.	  	  	  
Inspired	   by	   Cohen-­‐March-­‐Olsen’s	   garbage	   can	  model,	   John	  W.	   Kingdon	   has	  
brought	   this	   idea	   to	   the	   arena	   of	   public	   policy	   analysis.	   	   In	   his	   book,	   Agendas,	  
Alternatives,	   and	   Public	   Policies,	   he	   introduces	   the	   garbage	   can	   model,	   but	  
emphasizes	   “organized”	   rather	   than	   “anarchic”	   in	   order	   to	   explain	   the	   Federal	  
government’s	  policy	  making	  and	  national	  agenda	  setting.	  	  According	  to	  his	  garbage	  
can	   model,	   decision-­‐making	   does	   not	   go	   through	   a	   prescribed	   routine;	   instead,	  
solutions	  and	  problems	  have	  equal	  status.	  	  Three	  major	  process	  streams	  –	  problem	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recognition,	   formation	  and	   refinement	  of	  policy	  proposals,	   and	  political	   streams	  –	  
run	  through	  the	  organizations,	  each	  of	  which	  has	  a	  life	  of	  its	  own.	   	  The	  coupling	  of	  
these	  streams	  at	  critical	  junctures	  produces	  agenda	  change.48	  
The	  significance	  of	  the	  garbage	  can	  model,	  Cohen-­‐March-­‐Olsen’s	  or	  Kingdon’s,	  
is	   its	   equal	   treatment	   of	   problems	   and	   solutions,	   its	   emphasis	   on	   the	   influence	   of	  
organization	   structure	   on	   the	   outcome	   of	   decision	   process,	   and	   its	   inclusion	   of	  
changing	  situations.	  	  While	  the	  organizational	  process	  model’s	  strength	  stems	  from	  
standard	  operating	  procedures,	  the	  garbage	  can	  model	  draws	  our	  attention	  beyond	  
the	  organizational	  procedures	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  problem	  can	  be	  attached	  to	  a	  
choice	   and	   why	   the	   solution	   comes	   into	   being	   at	   one	   time,	   not	   another	   time.	   	   It	  
demonstrates	   strong	   explanatory	   power	   on	   strategic	   effects	   of	   timing	   when	  
problems	  and	  solutions	   interact	  with	  each	  other,	  and	  provides	   interesting	   insights	  
towards	  questions,	  such	  as	  why	  the	  garbage	  cans	  operate	  and	  why	  the	  mix	  of	  cans	  
may	  result	  in	  different	  organizational	  behaviors	  on	  different	  issues	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  
With	   the	   aid	   of	   analysis	   of	   the	   characteristics	   of	   organizational	   structures,	   the	  
garbage	   can	   model	   assists	   in	   predicting	   variations	   in	   decision	   making	   at	   the	  
organizational	  level.	  	  
The	   Sino-­‐American	   WTO	   protocol	   negotiation,	   which	   is	   under	   discussion,	  
spanned	   more	   than	   a	   decade.	   	   In	   this	   duration,	   China	   began	   to	   engage	   with	   the	  
global	   economy	   and	   various	   reform	  measures,	   which	   was	   a	   process	   of	   gradually	  
breaking	   up	   its	   past	   standard	   operating	   procedures	   and	   committing	   itself	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




globalization.	   	   The	   gears	   and	   levers	   within	   the	   government	   collaborated	   and	  
conflicted,	  producing	  solutions	  and	  problems	  that	  were	  mixed	  together.	  	  For	  China,	  
the	  bilateral	  bargaining	  was	  a	  process	  of	  clarifying	  goals.	   	  The	   technology	  was	  not	  
well	   defined	   at	   the	   beginning,	   and	   participation	   was	   fluid	   in	   the	   duration.	   	   To	  
analyze	   how	  China	   conducted	   decision-­‐making	   in	   the	   enduring	   trade	   negotiations	  
between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  China,	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  that	  China	  was	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
steering	   away	   from	   past	   standard	   operations.	   	   Therefore,	   I	   propose	   to	   substitute	  
Garbage	  Can	  Model	  for	  Allison’s	  Organizational	  Process	  Model.	  
	  
Two-­‐level	  Games	  in	  Bureaucratic	  Politics	  	  
	   	  
Against	   the	   convention	   that	   most	   foreign	   policy	   literature	   avoided	  
bureaucratic	   politics,	  Allison	  presented	  his	  mechanism	  of	   choice:	   the	  bureaucratic	  
politics	   model.	   	   Through	   the	   lens	   of	   bureaucratic	   politics,	   students	   observe	  
government	   officials	   who	   hold	   overlapping	   interests,	   different	   intentions	   and	  
perceptions,	  considerable	  discretion,	  and	  see	  government	  behavior	  as	  the	  outcome	  
of	   internal	   bargaining,	   compromise,	   coalition,	   and	   competition.	   	   In	   policy-­‐making,	  
the	  staffs	  frame	  the	  problems,	  identify	  alternatives	  and	  push	  proposals,	  in	  order	  to	  
catch	  the	  Chief’s	  attention;	  the	  Chief	  focuses	  on	  the	  hottest	  intra-­‐national	  issues	  and	  
coalition	  building	  with	  relevant	  powers;	  and	  the	  president	  has	  limited	  time	  assigned	  




The	   focus	  of	  Allison’s	   third	  model	   is	   the	   internal	  politics	  of	  a	  government	  –	  
that	  is,	  pulling	  and	  hauling	  among	  many	  individual	  players	  positioned	  hierarchically	  
within	  the	  government.	  	  This	  model	  sees	  government	  behavior	  not	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  a	  
problem,	   but	   as	   results	   from	   compromises,	   coalition,	   competition,	   and	   even	  
confusion	  among	  players.	  	  When	  separate	  players	  and	  various	  groups	  pull	  and	  haul	  
toward	   various	   directions,	   it	  may	   yield	   a	   result	   of	   the	   triumph	   of	   one	   group	   over	  
others	   or	   a	   result	   different	   from	  which	   everybody	   intends.	   	   Therefore,	   the	   power	  
and	  skills	  of	  players	  are	  important	  drivers	  to	  move	  the	  chess	  pieces.	  	  
Foreign	   policy	   is	   conceived	   as	   a	   political	   outcome	   of	   collegial	   bargaining.	  
Each	  foreign	  policy	  player	  has	  different	  perceptions	  and	  priorities,	  which	  originate	  
from	  where	   he	   sits	   and	   the	   “baggage”	  which	   he	   brings	   to	   the	   post.	   	   According	   to	  
Allison,	  fundamental	  disagreement	  among	  players	  in	  foreign	  policy	  evolves	  not	  only	  
from	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   problems	   of	   foreign	   affairs,	   but	   also	   from	   players’	   shared	  
power,	   distinct	   objectives,	   parochial	   priorities,	   and	   different	   perceptions	   and	  
conceptions	   of	   the	   national	   interest.	   	   The	   broad	   range	   of	   foreign	   policy	   problems	  
requires	   decentralization	   of	   decisions,	   which	   guarantees	   that	   each	   player	   has	  
considerable	  discretion.49	  	  
Robert	  Putnam	  went	  further	  to	  explain	  the	  state	  of	  the	  art	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  	  
His	  famous	  two-­‐level	  game	  theory50	  has	  its	  intellectual	  roots	  in	  linkage	  politics.51	  	  By	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conducting	  a	  case	  study	  of	   the	  Bonn	  Summit	  of	  1978,	  Putnam	  sees	  that	  diplomacy	  
and	  domestic	  politics	  are	  entangled:	  	  The	  co-­‐existence	  of	  second	  image52	  and	  second	  
image	   reversed53	  ensures	   that	   domestic	   politics	   and	   international	   affairs	   interact	  
with	  each	  other	  simultaneously.	  	  	  
In	   trade	   negotiation,	   a	   move	   on	   the	   domestic	   negotiation	   table	   triggers	  
realignments	  on	  the	  international	  bargaining	  table,	  and	  vice	  versa.	   	  Due	  to	  factional	  
conflicts	   in	   industrial	   and	   political	   arenas,	   domestic	   interests	   are	   usually	  
heterogeneous.	   	   Negotiators	   may	   find	   their	   silent	   allies	   at	   their	   counterpart’s	  
domestic	  table.	  	  When	  transnational	  alignment	  comes	  into	  being,	  domestic	  division	  
may	  improve	  international	  cooperation	  and	  the	  terms	  of	  agreement.	  
According	   to	   Putnam’s	   definition,	   “win-­‐set”	   is	   the	   set	   of	   all	   possible	  
agreements	   at	   the	   international	   level,	   for	   the	  given	  domestic	   constituency.	   	  At	   the	  
international	   level,	   a	   smaller	  win-­‐set	   can	   be	   a	   great	   bargaining	   advantage	   for	   the	  
negotiator.	  	  A	  country	  with	  great	  “state	  autonomy”	  and	  “state	  strength”	  has	  a	  larger	  
win-­‐set,	   while	   a	   state	   with	   relatively	   weaker	   party	   discipline	   and	   separation	   of	  
power	  has	  a	  smaller	  win-­‐set.	  	  In	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  relations,	  China	  is	  a	  country	  with	  
strong	  party	  discipline,	  and	  its	  unitary	  bureaucratic	  system	  permits	  a	  larger	  win-­‐set	  
for	   its	   negotiators.	   	   In	   contrast,	   the	   check	   and	   balance	   and	   separation	   of	   power	  
within	  American	  government	  provide	  a	  smaller	  win-­‐set	  for	  the	  U.S.	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  Politics	  Revisited,"	  in	  Jonathan	  Wilkenfeld,	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  Conflict	  Behavior	  and	  Linkage	  Politics,	  
(New	  York:	  David	  McKay,	  1973),	  p.49.	  
52	  Regarding	  the	  domestic	  causes	  and	  international	  effects,	  please	  see	  Kenneth	  N.	  Waltz,	  Man,	  the	  State,	  and	  
War:	  A	  Theoretical	  Analysis.	  (NY:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1959)	  
53	  Regarding	  the	  international	  causes	  and	  domestic	  effects,	  please	  see	  Peter	  Gourevitch,	  “The	  Second	  Image	  
Reversed:	  The	  International	  Sources	  of	  Domestic	  Politics,”	  International	  Organization,	  Vol.	  32,	  Issue	  4	  (Autumn	  




Being	  aware	  of	  this	  potential	  bargaining	  chip,	  negotiators	  can	  enhance	  their	  
bargaining	   power	   at	   the	   international	   table.	   	   Negotiators	   make	   constructive	  
compromise54	  with	  colleagues	  and	  counterparts	  at	   the	  domestic	   table,	  so	  that	  they	  
tie	  their	  own	  hands	  by	  reducing	  the	  size	  of	  their	  win-­‐set,55	  at	  the	  international	  table.	  	  
Putnam’s	   model	   displays	   a	   dynamic	   link	   between	   domestic	   politics	   and	  
international	   bargaining	   and	   contributes	   to	   the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   school	   a	  
template	  to	  study	  the	  international	  negotiation.	  	  With	  the	  help	  of	  Putnam’s	  two-­‐level	  
game	   theory,	  we	   can	   look	   closely	  at	   the	  application	  of	  American	  pressure	  and	   the	  
Chinese	   response	   at	   international	   negotiation,	   and	   analyze	   the	   conditions	   for	  
Chinese	   decision	   on	   their	   acceptance	   and	   resistance	   to	  American	   power,	  which	   is	  




Being	  a	  rising	  power	  on	  the	  international	  stage,	  China	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  
a	   bounded	   rational	   player	   due	   to	   its	   various	   limitations.	   	   As	   the	   first	   cut,	   the	  
bounded	   rational	   model	   will	   facilitate	   our	   understanding	   about	   the	   constraints	  
when	   China	   conducted	   its	   calculation	   and	   responded	   to	   American	   pressure.	   	   The	  
impact	  of	  decision	  structure	  on	  China’s	  decision-­‐making	  in	  bilateral	  negotiation	  has	  
not	  been	  researched	  yet.	  	  Garbage	  Can	  Model	  provides	  the	  second	  cut	  to	  analyze	  this	  
domestic	  bargaining	  and	  coordination	  structure	  and	   its	  dynamics.	   	  With	   the	  aid	  of	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this	   model,	   the	   coupling	   of	   independent	   streams	   -­‐	   problems,	   policy	   streams	   and	  
political	  streams	  –	  inside	  the	  structure	  presents	  explanation	  of	  the	  deal	  conclusion	  
in	   1999.	   	   The	   third	   cut,	   two-­‐level	   game	   theory	   provides	   an	   angle	   to	   examine	   the	  
domestic	  cause	  on	  the	  international	  table	  and	  also	  international	  cause	  on	  domestic	  
bargaining	   table.	   	  With	   the	  assistance	  of	   it,	   the	   study	  of	  bureaucratic	  politics	   goes	  
beyond	  a	  steady	  state	  to	  a	  dynamic	  one.	  	  Following	  the	  analytic	  framework,	  the	  rest	  
of	   the	   dissertation	   conducts	   a	   thorough	   analysis	   of	   China’s	   decision-­‐making	   in	  
liberalizing	  its	  foreign	  trade	  policy	  and	  responding	  to	  American	  demands	  during	  the	  



















Chapter	  3:	   The	  First	  Cut	  of	  China’s	  GATT/WTO	  Bid:	  	  
Bounded	  Rationality	  
	  
China’s	  road	  to	  its	  GATT/WTO	  membership	  lasted	  more	  than	  15	  years.	  	  China	  
gained	  observer	  status	  at	  the	  GATT	  in	  1982	  and	  launched	  its	  formal	  application	  for	  
the	  GATT	   full	  membership	   in	   1986.	   	   Its	   endeavor	   to	   join	   the	  GATT	   and	  become	   a	  
founding	   member	   of	   the	   WTO	   failed	   at	   the	   end	   of	   1994.	   	   Nevertheless,	   the	  
negotiations	   resumed.	   	   The	   United	   States	   and	   China	   successfully	   concluded	   their	  
bilateral	   negotiations	   in	   November	   1999	   and	   signed	   the	   cornerstone	   document,	  
paving	  the	  way	  for	  China’s	  WTO	  entry	  in	  December	  2001.	  	  
In	  this	  lengthy	  bilateral	  negotiation,	  one	  Republican	  administration	  and	  one	  
Democratic	  administration	  were	  involved	  on	  the	  US	  side.	  	  On	  the	  Chinese	  side,	  two	  
generations	  of	  leadership	  (one	  may	  argue	  three	  generations,	  with	  the	  senior	  one	  at	  
the	  back)	  gauged	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  acceding	  this	  international	  organization.	  	  The	  
US,	  the	  power	  wielder,	  changed	  its	  demands	  at	  negotiation	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  
the	  changing	  international	  stage;	  China,	  the	  power	  recipient,	  experienced	  dramatic	  
changes	   in	   its	   economy	   and	   domestic	   politics,	   which	   affected	   its	   calculation	   and	  
decision-­‐making.	  	  To	  discuss	  the	  bounded	  rationality	  of	  China’s	  foreign	  trade	  policy-­‐
making	  and	  the	  power	  application	  in	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  bilateral	  talks,	  I	  divide	  the	  
negotiation	  into	  three	  stages,	  the	  first	  one	  from	  beginning	  to	  1989,	  the	  second	  one	  





Stage	  I:	  From	  Beginning	  to	  Summer	  1989	  
	  
No	  accurate	  record	  was	  found	  as	  to	  when	  China	  began	  its	  GATT	  speculation.	  	  
Some	  say	  that	  China	  started	  to	  speculate	  about	   its	  membership	  with	  GATT	  after	   it	  
replaced	   the	   Republic	   of	   China	   in	   the	   United	   Nations	   and	   took	   over	   the	   China	  
membership	  and	  the	  permanent	  seat	  of	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council.	  	  Others	  recall	  that	  
China	  contemplated	   its	  GATT	  bid	  after	   it	   regained	   the	  seat	  at	   the	  World	  Bank	  and	  
the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  in	  1980.	  	  Still	  others	  remember	  that	  officials	  in	  the	  
central	  government	  were	  commissioned	  to	  research	  on	  GATT	  and	  to	  analyze	  on	  the	  
pros	  and	   cons	   regarding	  China’s	   endeavor	   for	   its	  GATT	  membership	  around	  1978	  
and	  1979.	  	  	  
China’s	   GATT	   application	   originated	   from	   the	   reorientation	   of	   the	   Chinese	  
foreign	   trade.	   	  On	   the	   international	   stage,	  when	   the	  Cold	  War	  was	   extended	   from	  
Europe	  to	  Asia,	   the	  US	  embargoed	  all	   trade	  with	  China	  and	  persistently	  worked	  to	  
exclude	  it	  from	  the	  UN.	  	  China	  joined	  the	  Soviet	  bloc	  and	  was	  increasingly	  integrated	  
into	  political,	  economic	   interactions	  centered	  on	  Moscow	  and	  the	  Communist	  bloc.	  	  
Throughout	  the	  1950s,	  China’s	   trade	  had	  been	  predominant	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  
and	   the	   communist	   countries	   of	   Eastern	   Europe.	   	   Starting	   in	   1960s,	   Sino-­‐Soviet	  
relations	   turned	   sour,	   and	   the	   disagreements	   and	   disputes	  with	   the	   Soviet	   finally	  
escalated	   to	   military	   clashes	   in	   Damansky	   Island.	   	   In	   the	   years	   when	   economic	  
affairs	  were	   subordinated	   to	   security	   issues,	   Chinese	   trade	  with	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  
dropped	  sharply.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  its	  trade	  with	  Western	  countries	  began	  to	  grow	  




The	  reorientation	  of	  Chinese	  foreign	  trade	  came	  after	  the	  major	  adjustment	  
of	   Chinese	   foreign	   policy.	   	   At	   the	   time	   of	   Sino-­‐Soviet	   confrontations,	   aid	   and	  
technology	   transfer	   from	  the	  Soviet	  came	  to	  an	  end.	   	  When	  China	   fully	  paid	  off	   its	  
debt	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  by	  1966,	  Sino-­‐Soviet	  trade	  virtually	  ceased.	  	  China	  needed	  
to	  look	  to	  other	  sources	  for	  foreign	  technology	  necessary	  for	  economic	  development	  
and	  modernization.	   	  Some	  Chinese	  officials	  responsible	  for	  foreign	  affairs	  began	  to	  
contemplate	  a	  major	  adjustment	  of	   the	  country’s	   foreign	  policy.	   	   In	  “the	  week	  that	  
changed	   the	   world,”56 	  leaders	   of	   China	   and	   the	   United	   States	   found	   that	   the	  
ideological	  differences	  proved	  to	  have	  little	  relevance.	  	  With	  a	  shared	  position	  on	  the	  
international	  stage	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  with	  political	  and	  economic	  drives	  on	  both	  sides	  
of	   the	   Pacific,	   the	   two	   governments	   engaged	   in	   a	   lengthy	   discussion	   of	   China’s	  
application	   for	   membership	   in	   the	   GATT,	   which	   would	   have	   entitled	   China	   to	  
participate	  in	  multilateral	  negotiations	  on	  trade	  liberalization	  issues.	  
It	  was	   in	  China’s	   interest	  to	  resume	  economic	  and	  cultural	  ties	  with	  the	  US.	  	  
At	  the	  time,	  China	  was	  still	  a	  small	  economy	  relative	  to	  the	  US,	  but	  in	  the	  “strategic	  
triangle,” 57 	  China	   was	   geopolitically	   important	   to	   US	   foreign	   policy.	   	   A	  
rapprochement	   between	   the	   US	   and	   China	   would	   form	   a	   united	   front	   again	   the	  
Soviet	  expansion.	  	  An	  improved	  relationship	  with	  the	  US	  would	  make	  it	  possible	  for	  
China	  to	  acquire	  advanced	  American	  equipment,	  as	  well	  as	  similar	  technology	  from	  
American	  allies	  in	  Western	  Europe	  and	  Japan.	  	  Sino-­‐American	  trade	  rose	  from	  $7.7	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billion	   in	  1985	   to	  $13.5	  billion	   in	  1988,58	  and	   the	  US	  became	  China’s	   third	   largest	  
trade	   partner.	   	   The	   establishment	   of	   diplomatic	   relations	   in	   1979	   brought	   rapid	  
progress	   in	   economic	   ties	  with	   the	   US.	   	   In	   this	   period,	   China	   had	   brisk	   economic	  
growth	  and	  also	  moved	  closer	  toward	  the	  global	  trading	  net.	  	  	  
However,	  engagement	  in	  the	  global	  trading	  net	  meant	  differently	  to	  China	  in	  
the	   1980s,	   compared	   to	   the	   1970s.	   	   In	   1970s,	   China’s	   foreign	   trade	  was	   “import-­‐
driven”.	   	  When	  China	  had	   just	   launched	   its	  economic	   reform,	   the	   first	   step	  was	   to	  
draw	   up	   a	   list	   of	   imports	   regarded	   as	   necessary	   for	   the	   economic	   development.	  	  
Then	  exports	  would	  be	  projected	  sufficient	   to	  cover	  the	  costs	  of	   imports.	   	  When	  it	  
came	  to	  the	  1980s,	  the	  expansion	  of	  exports	  gained	  greater	  emphasis,	  and	  the	  focus	  
of	   foreign	   trade	   planning	   shifted	   from	   import	   to	   export.	   	   The	   first	   step	   became	  
establishing	   an	   export	   target,	   and	   then	   this	   would	   be	   used	   to	   determine	   the	  
affordable	  level	  of	  imports.	  	  At	  this	  time,	  China	  did	  not	  access	  the	  global	  trading	  net	  
only	   for	   technology	   imports.	   	   The	   Chinese	   exports	   also	   needed	   to	   access	  
international	  market	  more	  than	  before.	  	  In	  the	  1980s,	  about	  85%	  of	  China’s	  exports	  
were	   to	   the	   contracting	   parties	   of	   GATT	   and	  more	   than	   90%	   of	   its	   imports	  were	  
from	   these	   countries. 59 	  	   Participation	   in	   the	   GATT	   would	   give	   China	   certain	  
privileges	  in	  international	  trade.	  
As	   a	   government	   emerging	   from	   isolation,	   Beijing	   had	   keenly	   searched	   for	  
recognition	   not	   only	   by	   the	   developing	  world	   but	   also	   from	   developed	   countries.	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Acknowledgement	   within	   international	   society	   served	   this	   policy	   orientation.	   	   Its	  
participation	  with	  major	   international	   organizations,	   such	   as	   the	  UN,	  World	   Bank	  
and	  IMF,	  was	  a	  continuous	  endeavor	  toward	  this	  policy	  objective.	  	  Even	  when	  the	  US	  
tried	  to	  exclude	  it	  from	  the	  UN,	  Communist	  China	  perceived	  the	  UN	  as	  a	  fruit	  of	  the	  
multilateralism	  of	   the	  World	  War	   II,	  and	  requested	   its	  seat	  at	   the	  UN	   immediately	  
after	   it	  won	  the	  civil	  war	  over	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  (Kuomintang,	  KMT).	   	  Different	  
from	  the	  UN,	  China	  perceived	  that	  the	  GATT,	  an	  international	  organization	  featuring	  
free	  market	  and	  trade	  liberalization,	  as	  a	  “rich	  men’s	  club”	  and	  a	  tool	  by	  which	  the	  
developed	   world	   exploited	   the	   developing	   world.	   	   Allegedly,	   China	   rejected	   the	  
American	  suggestion	  at	   the	  time	  to	   join	  the	  GATT	  and	  considered	  it	  as	  a	  Cold	  War	  
alliance.60	  	  
After	  China	  had	  ended	  Cultural	  Revolution	  and	  reinvigorated	  the	  economy,	  it	  
has	   tremendously	   changed	   its	  perception	  of	   international	   economic	  organizations,	  
in	   particular,	   the	   three	   keystone	   international	   economic	   organizations	   (KIEOs).	  	  
China	  began	  to	  speculate	  on	  why	  Poland,	  Hungary,	  and	  Romania,	  three	  Communist	  
countries,	  joined	  the	  GATT	  in	  1960s	  and	  whether	  the	  GATT	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  
a	  concomitant	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  confrontation.61	  	  Under	  the	  encouragement	  and	  help	  
of	  the	  US,	  China	  showed	  interests	  in	  KIEOs.	  	  	  
China	  cautiously	  chose	  its	  pace	  to	  integrate	  into	  the	  world	  economic	  system.	  	  
The	  World	  Bank	   and	   IMF	  played	   crucial	   roles	   in	  providing	   financial	   and	   technical	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assistance	  and	  gave	  China	  access	   to	   advice	   and	   funds,	  while	   the	  GATT	   formulated	  
and	  supervised	  rules	  of	   international	  trade	  and	  would	  have	  China	  expose	   its	  trade	  
regime	  to	  international	  scrutiny	  and	  surveillance.	  	  China’s	  full	  participation	  in	  GATT	  
would	  have	  deeper	  impact	  than	  that	  with	  other	  KIEOs.	  	  China	  embarked	  on	  its	  entry	  
into	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  IMF	  first,	  which	  went	  smoothly	   in	  1980.	   	  After	  these	  two	  
steps,	   GATT	  was	   the	   last	   step	   left	   before	   China	  would	   complete	   its	   entry	   into	   the	  
KIEO	  and	  become	  fully	  accepted	  as	  part	  of	  the	  international	  economy.	  	  	  	  
In	  the	  early	  1980s,	  when	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  GATT	  would	  launch	  another	  round	  
of	  multilateral	  trade	  negotiations,	  China	  determined	  that	  this	  was	  a	  good	  timing	  to	  
seek	  entry.62	  	  The	  US	  wanted	  another	  round	  of	  multilateral	  trade	  negotiations,	  and	  
the	   consensus	   gradually	   formed	   among	   contracting	   parties.	   	   According	   to	   the	  
precedent	   of	   Tokyo	   Round,	   the	   new	   round	   of	   negotiations	   was	   expected	   to	   last	  
about	   five	   years.	   	   With	   the	   expectation	   that	   the	   imminence	   of	   a	   new	   round	   of	  
negotiations	   would	   force	   the	   pace	   of	   decision	   on	   China’s	   application,	   China	  
requested	   and	   gained	  permanent	   observer	   status	   in	  December	  1984	  and	  believed	  
that	   this	   status	  would	   facilitate	   the	   application.	   	   The	   speculation	  was	   China	   could	  
either	  rush	  into	  GATT	  like	  some	  developing	  countries	  or	  participate	  this	  new	  round	  
of	  multilateral	  negotiations	  as	  permanent	  observer	  and	  “graduate”	  when	  this	  round	  
was	  concluded.	  	  
Then	  the	  question	  that	  came	  to	  the	  Chinese	  decision	  makers	  was	  how	  to	  join	  
the	   GATT.	   	   The	   first	   choice	   to	  make	   was	   to	   apply	   for	   full	   membership	   or	   partial	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




membership.	   	   Full	   participation	   in	   GATT	   would	   give	   China	   certain	   privileges	   in	  
international	   trade,	  yet	  China	  would	  have	  to	   liberate	   its	   trade	  regime	  and	  open	   its	  
market	   to	   GATT	   member	   countries	   in	   turn.	   	   It	   would	   also	   have	   its	   trade	   regime	  
under	   international	   scrutiny.	   	   Alternatively,	   China	   could	   work	   on	   partial	  
membership	  first	  and	  then	  attain	  full	  membership,	  following	  the	  precedent	  of	  Japan.	  	  
However,	  it	  took	  10	  years	  for	  Japan	  to	  turn	  from	  a	  partial	  member	  to	  a	  full	  member,	  
and	   the	   GATT	   Article	   XXXV,	   non-­‐application	   term63 	  applied	   to	   Japan	   in	   this	  
duration.64	  	  	  
Between	  the	  two	  options,	  China	  chose	  to	  apply	  for	  full	  membership.	  	  Among	  
the	  reasons	  were	  the	  following:	  First,	  it	  would	  provide	  Chinese	  exports	  (e.g.	  cotton	  
and	   textiles)	   greater	   defenses	   against	   protectionism	   in	   developed	   countries,	   for	  
example	   GATT	   dispute	   settlement	   mechanisms;	   Second,	   full	   membership	   would	  
allow	   China	   to	   receive	   unconditional	   most-­‐favored-­‐nation	   (MFN)	   status	   and	  
eliminate	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  its	  possible	  removal	  by	  annual	  presidential	  certification	  
or	   congressional	   review;65	  Third,	   the	   Chinese	   full	   participation	   with	   GATT	   would	  
help	  free	  trade	  politicians	  in	  developed	  countries	  in	  their	  domestic	  political	  battles	  
against	  protectionists;	  and	  Fourth,	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  international	  obligations	  would	  
reinforce	   the	   economic	   reform	   and	   reassure	   those	   domestic	   politicians	   who	  
appeared	  to	  be	  hesitant	  about	  the	  reform.	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The	   second	   issue	  was	  on	  what	  basis	  China	   should	  accede	   the	  GATT.	   	  Tariff	  
reduction	   or	   import	   quota	   commitment?	   	   China	   turned	   to	   other	   Soviet	   allies,	  
Romania,	  Poland,	  and	  Hungary,	   for	  experience.66	  	  The	  basic	   thrust	  of	  GATT	  was	   to	  
reduce	  tariffs,	  which	  would	  decrease	  the	  price	  of	   imports	  and	   increase	  trade.	   	  The	  
leverage	   of	   price	   would	   not	   function	   in	   nonmarket	   economies	   to	   increase	   the	  
demand	   for	   foreign	   goods.	   	   The	   commitment	   for	   import	   increase	   at	   a	   certain	   rate	  
was	   a	   substitute	   arrangement	   in	   return	   for	   tariff	   concessions	   made	   by	   GATT	  
member	   countries,	   which	   were	   market	   economies.	   	   Among	   these	   Soviet	   allies,	  
Romania	   and	   Poland	   committed	   to	   increasing	   imports	   from	   GATT	   members	   at	   a	  
certain	  annual	  rate	  and	  agreed	  to	  a	  review	  process	  on	  a	  yearly	  basis.67	  	  Yet,	  Hungary	  
was	  different.	   	  Hungary	  successfully	  convinced	  the	  GATT	  member	  countries	  that	   it	  
had	  made	  sufficient	  progress	  to	  decentralize	  its	  economy	  and	  should	  accede	  to	  the	  
GATT	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   tariff	   reductions.	   	   Although	   many	   GATT	   members	   felt,	   in	  
retrospect,	  that	  Hungary	  was	  a	  precedent	  that	  should	  not	  be	  repeated,	  China	  made	  
the	  argument	  for	  tariff	  reductions	  as	  the	  central	  aspect	  of	  its	  obligations	  to	  the	  GATT	  
accession.68	  	  	  
After	   comparing	   Hungary’s	   experience	   with	   other	   Communist	   countries’,	  
China	   ruled	   out	   the	   option	   of	   import	   commitment.	   	   An	   arrangement	   of	   this	   kind	  
would	  make	  the	  GATT	  application	  easier,	  but	  it	  would	  not	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	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thrust	  of	  Chinese	  reform.	  	  The	  thrust	  of	  Chinese	  economic	  reform	  was	  to	  free	  prices	  
and	  let	  them	  adjust	  the	  demand	  and	  supply.	  	  Such	  an	  arrangement	  of	  increasing	  the	  
level	  of	  imports	  would	  be	  written	  in	  a	  state	  plan	  and	  not	  help	  set	  the	  price	  freer.69	  	  
China	   was	   also	   afraid	   that	   acceptance	   of	   a	   discriminatory	   arrangement	   would	  
prevent	   it	   from	   benefiting	   from	   the	   international	   division	   of	   labor	   and	   hurt	   its	  
exports	   in	   the	   industries	  where	   it	   had	   comparative	   advantage.70	  	   Besides,	   holding	  
Hungary	   as	   a	   precedent,	   China	   spotted	   a	   favorite,	   friendly	   international	   political	  
environment	  in	  1980s	  and	  wanted	  to	  obtain	  full	  participation	  with	  the	  commitment	  
of	  tariff	  concessions.	  	  
The	  third	  issue	  was	  whether	  this	  was	  regarded	  as	  resumption	  or	  restoration	  
of	  China’s	  GATT	  membership.	   	  At	  the	  time	  the	  GATT	  was	  established	  in	  May	  1948,	  
China	  was	  under	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  (Kuomintang,	  KMT)	  and	  became	  a	   founding	  
member	  of	  GATT.	  	  After	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  China	  (CPC)	  won	  the	  bitter	  civil	  war,	  
the	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  government	  retreated	   to	  Taiwan.	   	   In	  March	  1950,	   the	  Taiwan	  
authorities,	   following	   consultations	   with	   the	   United	   States,	   announced	   its	  
withdrawal	   from	   the	   GATT,	   citing	   its	   inability	   to	   actively	   fulfill	   its	   GATT	   treaty	  
obligations	   to	   regulate	   and	   exercise	   control	   over	   Mainland	   China’s	   borders	   and	  
trade.	   	   When	   the	   Communist	   China	   tried	   to	   enter	   into	   the	   GATT,	   it	   claimed	   that	  
Taiwan’s	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  GATT	  was	  null	  and	  void.	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In	   the	   1980s,	   upon	   the	   suggestion	   of	   His	   Excellency	   Shi	   Jiuyong,71	  China	  
argued	   that	   this	   was	   resumption,	   instead	   of	   restoration,	   of	   its	   contracting	  
membership.	  	  The	  Chinese	  negotiators	  believed	  the	  word	  of	  restoration	  implied	  that	  
China’s	  membership	   stopped,	   and	   this	  would	   be	   an	   act	   of	   bringing	   it	   back	   to	   the	  
original	   position.	   	   The	   word	   of	   resumption	   implied	   that	   China’s	   membership	   was	  
suspended	   for	   some	   reason,	   and	   this	  would	   be	   an	   act	   of	   starting	   it	   again.72	  	   They	  
believed	   that	   the	   choice	   between	   restoration	   and	   resumption	   issue	  was	   entangled	  
with	   Taiwan	   issue,	   and	   argued	   that	   resumption	   should	   apply	   to	   China	   and	   China	  
should	  resume	  the	  membership	  as	  an	  original	  contracting	  party.	  	  
The	  fourth	   issue	  was	  about	  China’s	  developing	  country	  status,	  which	  would	  
not	   only	   accord	   China	   preferential	   treatment	   without	   triggering	   discriminatory	  
clause,	  but	  also	  mitigate	  some	  difficulty	  for	  China	  caused	  by	  full	  GATT	  participation.	  	  
Under	   the	  GATT	  Article	  XVIII,	  Article	  XXVIII,	   and	  Part	   IV,	   Less-­‐Developed-­‐Country	  
(LDC)	   contracting	   parties	   may	   take	   governmental	   action	   to	   promote	   economic	  
development	  that	  would	  be	  prohibited	  to	  other	  contracting	  members,	  and	  they	  may	  
obtain	   certain	   trade	   concessions,	   such	   as	   those	   gained	   through	   the	   Generalized	  
System	   of	   Preferences	   (GSP)	   granted	   by	   industrialized	   countries,	   without	   the	  
necessity	  of	  giving	  reciprocal	  concessions.73	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Shi	  Jiuyong,	  Judge	  (1994-­‐2000),	  Vice-­‐President	  (2001-­‐2003),	  and	  President	  (2003-­‐2006)	  of	  the	  International	  
Court	  of	  Justice.	  
72	  Lv,	  Han,	  Huang,	  Shi,	  and	  Yang,	  Rushi	  Shinian	  Fazhi	  Zhongguo,	  p177.	  	  My	  interview	  with	  the	  Chinese	  
interviewee	  No.	  1	  also	  confirmed	  it.	  	  
73	  Under	  GSP	  programs	  imports	  from	  developing	  countries	  received	  preferential	  tariffs	  that	  were	  lower	  than	  





Under	   those	   articles,	   LDC	   contracting	   parties	   can	   avoid	   many	   GATT	  
obligations.	  	  LDC	  countries	  were	  allowed	  to	  protect	  “infant	  industries”,	  not	  to	  reduce	  
tariffs	  needed	  for	  economic	  development	  and	  revenue	  purposes,	   to	   impose	   import	  
restrictions	  for	  balance	  of	  payment	  reasons	  with	  little	  international	  scrutiny,	  and	  so	  
on.	   	   While	   full	   participation	   in	   GATT	   would	   have	   China	   submit	   its	   trade	   regime	  
under	   continuing	   international	   scrutiny,	   make	   tariff	   concessions,	   and	   reduce	  
protectionism	  barriers,	  developing	  country	  status	  would	  mitigate	  these	  difficulties.	  	  
In	  mid-­‐1980,	  China	  found	  that	  Mexico	  declared	  LDC	  status	  when	  it	  joined	  the	  GATT	  
and	  established	  LDC	  status	  as	  one	  of	  the	  three	  principles	  in	  its	  GATT	  application.74	  	  	  
Upon	  all	   the	   speculation	  and	  calculation,	  China	  established	   three	  principles	  
for	   itself	   on	   the	   GATT	   application:	   tariff	   reduction	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   it	   accession,	  
resumption	   of	   the	   original	   membership,	   and	   developing	   country	   status.	   	   China’s	  
original	  position	  had	  five	  issues:	  First,	  China’s	  application	  should	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  
a	  new	  application,	  but	  a	   resumption	  of	   its	  membership;	   Second,	   tariff	   concessions	  
should	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  negotiations;	  Third,	  China	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  
developing	   country;	   Fourth,	   China	   should	   receive	   unconditional	   MFN	   treatment	  
from	  the	  US;	  Finally,	  China	  should	  be	  accorded	  GSP	  treatment.	  	  
In	   stage	   I,	   China	   reached	   out	   to	   the	   GATT	   with	   cautiousness.	   	   China’s	  
understanding	   of	   organizational	   procedures	   in	   the	   international	   organizations	  
remained	   limited,	  and	   its	  officials	  recognized	  that.75	  	  China	  had	  the	  right	   judgment	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Wang	  Shichun	  (then	  an	  official	  at	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Trade,	  the	  predecessor	  of	  MOFTEC,	  later	  head	  of	  
Department	  of	  Fair	  Trade	  for	  Import	  and	  Export,	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce)	  was	  dispatched	  to	  Hungary,	  Romania,	  
Poland,	  and	  Mexico.	  	  




that	  most	  Western	   countries,	   especially	   the	  US,	  were	   interested	   in	   bringing	  China	  
into	  full	  participation	  in	  the	  GATT.	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  OECD	  members	  –	  not	  the	  US	  –	  
emphasized	  that	  the	  negotiations	  for	  China’s	  entry	  into	  GATT	  should	  be	  approached	  
on	  a	  commercial	  basis,	  rather	  than	  a	  political	  basis.	  	  However,	  China’s	  insistence	  on	  
the	   resumption	   of	   its	   original	   GATT	   contracting	   party	   status	   invoked	   controversy,	  
which	   proved	   to	   be	  meaningless	   later.	   	   In	   order	   to	   get	   the	   resumption	   as	   a	   legal	  
formality,	   China	   agreed	   that	   it	   would	   not	   inherit	   any	   rights	   or	   obligations	   from	  
China’s	  original	  contracting	  party	  status.	  	  
At	   the	  beginning,	   the	  bilateral	   talks	  were	  characterized	  as	   “a	  close	  working	  
relationship.”	   	   China	   solicited	   and	   gained	   help	   from	   the	   US	   and	   Australia.	   	   To	  
prepare	   a	   memorandum	   describing	   its	   foreign	   trade	   regime	   in	   February,	   1987,	  
China	   even	   sent	   at	   least	   one	   draft	   memorandum	   to	   US	   diplomats	   in	   Beijing	   and	  
sought	  their	  comments.	   	  The	  US	  wielded	  its	   influence	  at	   international	   level	  so	  that	  
the	   contracting	   parties	   of	   the	   GATT	   crafted	   a	   decision,	   which	   virtually	   permitted	  
China	   to	   participate	   and	   provided	   grounds	   for	   denying	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	  
Bulgaria.76	  	   The	   negotiation	  with	   the	  US	   started	   before	   the	  working	   party	   held	   its	  
first	  meeting	   and	  went	   toward	   framing	   negotiating	   issues	   by	  mid-­‐1987.	   	   The	   two	  
sides	  had	  to	  slow	  down	  and	  wait	  for	  the	  talks	  with	  other	  countries	  to	  catch	  up.	   	  In	  
1988,	  the	  US	  gave	  China	  its	  request	  list	  of	  one	  piece	  of	  paper,	  which	  was	  structured	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  The	  contracting	  parties	  decided	  that	  countries	  that	  had	  given	  formal	  notification	  “at	  a	  regular	  meeting	  of	  the	  
Council	  of	  Representatives,	  of	  their	  intention	  to	  negotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  membership	  as	  a	  contracting	  party.”	  
See	  GATT	  Newsletter;	  Focus,	  No.	  41	  (October,	  1986).	  Page	  5.	  	  See	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  this	  decision	  in	  China’s	  




based	  on	  the	  Hungary’s	  protocol	  agreement.77	  	  In	  this	  stage,	  China	  did	  not	  feel	  much	  
pressure	  from	  the	  US	  and	  expected	  a	  speedy	  accession	  with	  confidence.	  	  
	  
Stage	  II:	  From	  Summer	  1989	  to	  1994	  
	  
When	   China	   submitted	   its	   GATT	   application	   in	   July	   1986,	   the	   expected	  
application	   time	  was	  about	   five	  years	  or	  at	   least	  by	   the	  conclusion	  of	   the	  Uruguay	  
Round.	   	   However,	   when	   China	   dashed	   to	   embrace	   the	   international	   economic	  
system,	  the	  road	  to	  GATT	  proved	  to	  be	  rugged,	  bumpy,	  and	  longer	  than	  expected.	  	  In	  
this	   duration,	   the	   bilateral	   talks	  went	   into	   deadlock	   twice.	   	   First,	   the	   negotiations	  
were	  virtually	  suspended	  after	  the	  Tiananmen	  Square	  incident	  in	  1989;	  second,	  the	  
Chinese	   attempt	   to	   negotiate	   into	  GATT	  before	   the	   formation	   of	  WTO	   failed.	   	   The	  
fundamental	   change	   of	   the	   landscape	   of	   international	   relations	   affected	   the	   Sino-­‐
American	  trade	  talks.	  	  On	  the	  negotiation	  table,	  China	  was	  adjusting	  itself	  and	  trying	  
to	  understand	   its	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	   in	  relation	   to	   the	  US	   in	   the	  global	  
trading	  net.	  	  
From	   precedents	   of	   Eastern	   European	   countries	   with	   communist	  
governments,	   the	   Chinese	   expectation	  was	   set	   high.	   	   Poland	   applied	   in	   1959	   and	  
joined	   GATT	   in	   1967;	   Yugoslavia	   submitted	   application	   in	   1965	   and	   entered	   into	  
GATT	   in	  1966;	  Romania	  applied	   in	  1968	  and	  gained	  accession	   in	  1971;	  Hungary’s	  
application	  started	  in	  1969,	  and	  it	  joined	  in	  1973.	  	  China	  learned	  that	  Hungary	  made	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




an	   exception	   by	   acceding	   to	   GATT	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   making	   tariff	   reductions;	  
Yugoslavia	   negotiated	   MFN	   tariff	   rates	   to	   complete	   its	   accession	   protocol	   in	   July	  
1966.	   	   Although	   Poland’s	   non-­‐market	   trading	   practices	   were	   incompatible	   with	  
tariff	  negotiations	  and	   it	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  change	  the	  policies,78	  Poland	  agreed	  to	  
increase	  its	  imports	  from	  GATT	  members	  by	  no	  less	  than	  7	  percent	  per	  year	  for	  the	  
period	  1968	  through	  1971	  and	  undergo	  an	  annual	  review	  process.79	  	  Finally,	  Poland	  
won	   approval	   for	   its	   accession	  without	   any	   formal	   tariff	   negotiations	   under	   an	  8-­‐
page	   agreement.80	  	   Based	   on	   these	   precedents,	   China	   set	   its	   estimation	   about	   its	  
own	  accession.	  
As	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	  after	   its	   submission	   in	  1986,	  China’s	  application	  moved	  
quickly	  and	  smoothly,	  which	  made	  the	  Chinese	  optimistic.	  	  In	  February	  1987,	  China	  
submitted	   a	   300-­‐page	   memorandum	   on	   its	   domestic	   economy	   and	   foreign	   trade	  
system.	  	  Three	  months	  later	  in	  May	  1987,	  the	  GATT	  council	  established	  the	  Working	  
Party	  on	  China’s	  status	  to	  examine	  China’s	  trade	  regime.	  	  In	  February	  1988,	  the	  first	  
session	  of	  the	  working	  party	  was	  held;	  contracting	  parties81	  presented	  written	  and	  
oral	   questions,	   such	   as	  What	   is	  planned	  commerce	  economy?	  What	   is	   the	   system	  of	  
factory	   manager	   responsibility	   under	   Party	   committee?	   	   The	   Chinese	   negotiating	  
team	   prepared	   answers	   for	   circulation	   among	   contracting	   parties	   before	   the	   next	  
session.	   	   Then	   the	   Chinese	   requested	   one	  more	   session,	   and	  major	   trade	   powers,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Kazmierz	  Grzybowski,	  “Socialist	  Countries	  in	  GATT,”	  The	  American	  Journal	  of	  Comparative	  Law,	  Vol.	  28,	  No.	  4	  
(Autumn	  1980),	  p.	  547.	  
79	  GATT	  document	  L/2851.	  
80	  GATT	  document	  L/2736.	  
81	  The	  major	  members	  (US,	  EU,	  Japan)	  were	  the	  top	  three	  trade	  partners	  of	  China.	  Also	  see	  Jacobson	  and	  




including	  the	  US,	  welcomed	  China’s	  move	  to	  GATT.82	  	  In	  1988,	  three	  more	  sessions	  
were	  held,	  and	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1989,	  two	  more	  sessions.	  	  	  
At	  the	  multilateral	  talks,	  Chinese	  negotiators	  were	  thrilled	  by	  the	  curiosity	  of	  
contracting	   parties,	   the	   number	   of	   questions, 83 	  and	   most	   importantly,	   the	  
friendliness	  of	  inquirers.84	  	  Among	  the	  bilateral	  negotiations,	  China’s	  talks	  with	  the	  
US	  moved	  especially	  fast.	  	  USTR	  Clayton	  Yeutter	  said	  his	  country	  was	  “interested	  in	  
having	   this	  major	  partner.”85	  	  Douglas	  Newkirk,	   the	   first	  Assistant	  USTR	   for	  GATT	  
affairs,	  came	  to	  some	  mutual	  understanding	  with	  the	  Chinese	  chief	  negotiator,	  Vice	  
Minister	  Shen	  Jueren,86	  about	  the	  bilateral	  agreement,	  which	  touched	  only	  upon	  the	  
tariffs	   of	   a	   few	   commodities,	   other	   than	   services.	   	   In	   May	   1989,	   the	   American	  
negotiators	  and	  Chinese	  negotiators	  informally	  exchanged	  the	  draft	  protocol	  of	  the	  
bilateral	  agreement	  in	  Xiamen,	  a	  costal	  city	  in	  South	  China.87	  	  	  
In	   hindsight,	   China	  was	   optimistic,	  maybe	   too	   optimistic	   until	   the	   summer	  
1989.	   	   The	   Tiananmen	   Square	   incident	   on	   June	   4,	   1989	   was	   stunning	   to	  
international	   society	   and	   also	   fundamentally	   changed	   the	   pace	   and	   landscape	   of	  
China’s	  GATT	  application.	  	  In	  April	  1989	  the	  seventh	  session,	  the	  working	  party	  had	  
finished	   the	   review	   about	   China’s	   trade	   regime,	   but	   the	   scheduled	  meeting	   to	   be	  
held	  in	  June	  1989	  was	  cancelled.	  	  The	  next	  two	  sessions	  (the	  eighth	  and	  ninth)	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  “China	  Seeks	  GATT	  Tie,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  April	  28,	  1988.	  
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/28/business/china-­‐seeks-­‐gatt-­‐tie.html	  
83	  In	  this	  duration,	  China	  was	  asked	  to	  respond	  to	  more	  than	  3,000	  questions,	  setting	  a	  record	  number.	  	  
84	  My	  interview	  with	  the	  Chinese	  interviewee	  No	  1.	  
85	  Robert	  Thomson,	  “China	  hints	  at	  tariff	  cuts	  to	  ease	  GATT	  entry,”	  Financial	  Times,	  (July	  10,	  1986),	  p.7.	  
86	  It	  occurred	  around	  the	  end	  of	  1988	  or	  the	  beginning	  of	  1989.	  Please	  see	  Lv,	  Han,	  Huang,	  Shi,	  and	  Yang,	  Rushi	  





working	  party	   lacked	  agendas	   in	   the	  real	   sense.	   	  Actually,	   the	  working	  party	  went	  
back	   to	   review	   China’s	   trade	   regime.	   	   The	   major	   western	   contracting	   parties,	  
including	  the	  US,	  changed	  their	  attitude	  towards	  China’s	  GATT	  membership.	  	  China’s	  
GATT	  application	  went	  into	  deadlock.	  	  	  
Summer	  1989	  became	  a	   tipping	  point	   for	  China’s	  GATT/WTO	  accession.	   	   It	  
put	   to	   the	   test	   not	   only	   China’s	   GATT	   negotiations,	   but	   also	   the	   Sino-­‐American	  
relationship	  and	  the	  Chinese	  determination	  on	  economic	  reform.	   	  The	  years	  1985-­‐
91	   witnessed	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   democratization	   of	   some	   Eastern	  
European	  countries,	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  With	  the	  fundamental	  change	  of	  
the	  bipolar	  system,	  the	  strategic	  triangle	  could	  no	  longer	  function	  as	  the	  cornerstone	  
of	  the	  ties	  between	  the	  US	  and	  China.	  	  As	  Soviet-­‐U.S.	  relations	  improved,	  China	  lost	  
its	  previous	  status	  as	  a	  counterweight	  to	  Soviet	  expansion.	  	  China’s	  GATT	  accession	  
did	   not	   look	   strategically	   attractive	   to	   American	   foreign	   policy	   any	   more.	   	   The	  
advantages	  for	  its	  GATT	  application	  China	  enjoyed	  in	  the	  1980s	  disappeared	  in	  the	  
1990s.	  	  
The	  renewal	  of	  China’s	  MFN	  status	  had	  never	  been	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  1980s,	  
but	   it	  was	   not	   routine	   any	  more	   after	   Tiananmen	   Square.	   	   Unfortunately,	   China’s	  
MFN	  status	  happened	  to	  be	  scheduled	  to	  expire	  on	  June	  3,	  1989,	  the	  day	  right	  before	  
the	   Tiananmen	   Square	   incident.	   	   Right	   after	   the	   incident,	   several	   members	   of	  
Congress	   pressed	   for	   an	   immediate	   removal	   of	   China’s	  MFN	   status.	   	   Although	   the	  
Bush	  administration	  worked	  hard	  to	  defeat	  these	  bills,	  the	  renewal	  of	  China’s	  MFN	  




The	  congressional	  efforts	  escalated.	  	  The	  size	  of	  the	  majority	  in	  Congress	  in	  favor	  of	  
revocation	   of	   China’s	   MFN	   status	   or	   attachment	   of	   tough	   conditions	   aroused	  
concerns	  in	  China.	   	  Chinese	  officials	  began	  to	  signal88	  that	  they	  would	  never	  accept	  
any	  conditions	  on	  their	  MFN	  status,	  suggesting	  that	  they	  were	  preparing	  for	  serious	  
challenges	  to	  that	  status.	  
China	  disliked	   the	  uncertainty	   of	   renewal	   of	   its	  MFN	   status	   and	   listed	   it	   as	  
one	   of	   the	   original	   five	   points	   put	   forward	   to	   its	   GATT	   negotiations	  with	   the	   US.	  	  
According	   to	   the	   GATT,	   all	   contracting	   parties	   should	   be	   accorded	   unconditional	  
most-­‐favored-­‐nation	   (MFN)	   treatment.	   	  The	  US	  would	  not	  be	  able	   to	  accord	  China	  
full	  GATT	  privileges	  with	   the	   Jackson-­‐Vanik	  Amendment,	   [19	  U.S.C.	  2432(a)].	   	  The	  
US	  negotiators	  felt	  that	  if	  the	  protocol	  contained	  serious	  commitments	  from	  China,	  
the	  US	  administration	  would	  be	  in	  a	  strong	  position	  to	  persuade	  Congress	  to	  modify	  
its	   domestic	   legislation	   so	   that	   China	   could	   be	   granted	   unconditional	   MFN.	   	   This	  
important	  tacit	  understanding	  faltered	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Tiananmen	  Square.	  	  	  
Starting	  from	  late	  1980s,	  China	  began	  to	  have	  trade	  conflicts	  with	  its	  trading	  
partners,	  especially	  the	  US.	   	  In	  the	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s,	  China	  needed	  American	  
imports	  (i.e.	  technology	  imports)	  for	  its	  industrial	  modernization	  program	  after	  the	  
Sino-­‐Soviet	   relationship	   went	   sour.	   	   The	   Chinese	   set	   imports	   target	   according	   to	  
foreign	  reserves	  it	  could	  accumulate	  from	  its	  exports.	  	  As	  a	  small	  economy,	  it	  did	  not	  
have	  many	  trade	  conflicts.	   	  However,	  the	  trade	  frictions	  between	  the	  US	  and	  China	  
loomed	  since	  China	  adopted	  the	  export-­‐driven	  development	  policy	   in	   its	  economic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




reform.	   	   The	   Chinese	   exports	   exploded	   and	   needed	   to	   access	   American	   market.	  	  
From	  1985	  to	  1989,	  American	  trade	  deficits	  against	  China	  soared	  from	  $6	  million	  to	  
$6,234.3	  million.	   	  In	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1990s,	  this	  number	  almost	  tripled,	  rising	  from	  
$10,431	  million	  in	  1990	  to	  $29,505.1	  million	  in	  1994.	  (See	  the	  following	  chart)89	  	  
	  
Against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   the	   rapidly	   growing	   trade	   deficits	   with	   China,	   US	  
national	   economic	   interests	  were	   no	   longer	  willing	   to	   pay	   the	   price	   for	   American	  
geopolitical	   strategy.	   	   The	   consensus	   among	   the	   congressional	   leaders	   about	   the	  
importance	  of	  China	  to	  US	  foreign	  policy	  had	  faded	  away;	  American	  government	  did	  
not	  want	   to	   tolerate	   trade	  policies	   for	   the	   sake	  of	   foreign	  policy	  objectives.	   	  Many	  
American	  companies,	  which	  were	  injured	  by	  the	  cheap	  Chinese	  exports,	  supported	  a	  
tough	  position	  of	  the	  US	  government.	  	  In	  the	  USTR’s	  annual	  report	  of	  1991,	  it	  noted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
























































































US	  -­‐	  China	  Trade	  (1985-­‐2010)	  
The	  figures	  are	  in	  US	  $M	  on	  a	  nominal	  basis,	  not	  seasonally	  adjusted.	  




that	  Beijing’s	  administrative	  decisions	  created	  the	  trade	  imbalance.90	  	  To	  tackle	  the	  
Chinese	  market	  barrier,	  Washington	  pressured	  Beijing	   to	   reduce	   tariff	   rates,	   relax	  
import	   quota	   restrains,	   dismantle	   technical	   barriers	   to	   trade	   (i.e.	   intellectual	  
property	  infringement),	  and	  improve	  the	  transparency	  of	  its	  trade	  regulation.	  	  	  
The	  two	  rounds	  of	  bilateral	  trade	  talks	  proved	  to	  be	  unproductive	  in	  June	  and	  
August	  1991.	   	  The	  trade	  imbalance	  between	  the	  US	  and	  China	  continued	  to	  widen.	  
Facing	  contentious	  trade	  relationship	  with	  the	  US,	  China	  attempted	  to	  break	  existing	  
coalition	  with	  the	  US	  and	  build	  new	  coalitions	  with	  other	  contracting	  parties.	  	  Long	  
Yongtu	  said,	  we	  thought	  that	  GATT	  negotiation	  was	  multilateral.	   	   If	   the	  US	  did	  not	  
talk	   to	  us,	  we	   could	   go	   to	  other	   contracting	  parties,	   for	   example	   the	  EU,	   Japan,	   or	  
especially	  our	  friends	  in	  the	  third	  world.91	  	  This	  time,	  however,	  China’s	  endeavor	  to	  
employ	   its	  experience	  of	   restoring	   its	   seat	  with	   the	  UN	  did	  not	  work	  at	   the	  GATT.	  	  
When	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  negotiation	  was	  in	  deadlock,	  no	  other	  countries	  would	  like	  
to	   talk	   with	   China.92	  	   A	   Japanese	   representative	   told	   the	   Chinese	   in	   private	   that	  
Japan	   had	   to	   follow	   the	   US	   on	   this	   kind	   of	   important	   international	   issues	   for	  
historical	  and	  political	  reasons.93	  	  China	  realized	  that	  the	  US	  possessed	  the	   leading	  
power	   and	   a	   strong	   coalition	   at	   the	   GATT	   and	   that	   China’s	   accession	   negotiation	  
could	  not	  bypass	  the	  US.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  The	  USTR’s	  annual	  report	  noted	  the	  Chinese	  government	  raised	  tariffs,	  tightened	  controls	  over	  import	  
licenses,	  and	  extended	  financial	  credits	  to	  export	  sectors.	  	  The	  prison	  labor	  in	  Chinese	  exports,	  from	  tea	  to	  textile,	  
created	  a	  powerful	  political	  linkage	  between	  China’s	  trade	  surplus	  and	  its	  violations	  of	  human	  rights.	  	  Office	  of	  
the	  USTR,	  1991	  National	  Trade	  Estimate	  Report	  on	  Foreign	  Trade	  Barriers	  (GPO,	  1991),	  pp.	  43-­‐52.	  
91	  Long	  Yongtu,	  ‘’Woguo	  Fuguan	  Tanpan	  de	  Zuixin	  Qingkuang	  he	  Qiantu	  Zhanwang.”	  [Updates	  and	  Outlook	  for	  
the	  Negotiations	  for	  China’s	  GATT	  Membership	  Resumption].	  	  (Speech	  delivered	  at	  the	  Conference	  of	  Central	  
Party	  School,	  Beijing,	  China,	  October	  5,	  1993,	  from	  Selection	  of	  Central	  Party	  School	  Speeches,1994).	  	  
92	  My	  interview	  with	  the	  Chinese	  interviewee	  No.	  1.	  	  
93	  Long	  Yongtu,	  ‘’Woguo	  Fuguan	  Tanpan	  de	  Zuixin	  Qingkuang	  he	  Qiantu	  Zhanwang.”	  [Updates	  and	  Outlook	  for	  




While	  Beijing	  was	   in	   this	   deadlock,	   Taiwan	  picked	   the	   timing	   to	   submit	   its	  
GATT	  application	  in	  January	  1990.	   	  As	  a	  very	  firmly	  set	  foreign	  policy	  goal,	  Beijing	  
tried	   to	   block	   any	   of	   Taiwan’s	   attempts	   toward	   being	   recognized	   by	   the	  
international	   community;	   it	   opposed	   Taiwan’s	   move	   immediately.	   	   The	   Bush	  
administration	  changed	  the	  tone	  from	  that	  it	  favored	  the	  simultaneous	  accession	  of	  
China	  and	  Taiwan	  to	  the	  GATT	  to	  that	  it	  was	  prepared	  to	  see	  Taiwan	  enter	  the	  GATT	  
first.	   	   Beijing	   understood	   that	   it	   did	   not	   have	   upper	   hand	   with	   its	   own	   GATT	  
application	   in	  deadlock,	   and	   that	   it	   had	   to	   employ	   some	  diplomatic	   flexibility.	   	   To	  
achieve	   its	   position	   on	   Taiwan,	   Beijing	   had	   to	   negotiate	   with	   the	   US	   and	   rely	   on	  
American	  mediation.	  	  	  
In	  the	  letter	  from	  Permier	  Li	  Peng	  to	  Sir	  Arthur	  Dunkel,	  the	  Director-­‐General	  
of	  GATT,	  and	  leaders	  of	  all	  contracting	  parties,	  Beijing	  modified	  its	  positions.	  	  First,	  
PRC	  is	  the	  only	  legitimate	  government	  of	  China	  and	  Taiwan	  is	  part	  of	  China;	  second,	  
Taiwan	   could	   join	   the	   GATT	   as	   a	   separate	   customs	   territory	   only	   after	   PRC	   joins	  
GATT;	   and	   third,	   Taiwan’s	   application	  must	   be	   consulted	   and	   agreed	   by	   the	   PRC	  
government.	   	   With	   American	   involvement,	   Taiwan	   agreed	   to	   consider	   it.	   	   It	   took	  
eight	   months	   for	   the	   statement	   to	   come	   into	   being.	   	   Later,	   this	   statement	   was	  
announced	  by	  the	  GATT	  council	  chairman	  on	  September	  29,	  1992.	  
China	   began	   to	   take	   a	   cooperative	   stance	   at	   its	   negotiations	   with	   the	   US.	  	  
Three	   Sino-­‐American	   bilateral	   talks	   moved	   ahead,	   prisoner	   labor,	   intellectual	  
property	   rights,	  and	  market	  access.	   	   Some	   imports	   from	  China	   into	   the	  US	  market	  




labor	  is	  not	  an	  acceptable	  means	  of	  producing	  products	  on	  the	  international	  market,	  
beginning	  with	   the	  Tariff	  Act	   of	   1930	  Section	  307.	   	  Although	  China	  obviously	  had	  
disagreement	   with	   the	   US,	   the	   two	   countries	   signed	   a	   “Memorandum	   of	  
Understanding”	   in	   1992	   and	   a	   “Statement	   of	   Cooperation”	   in	   1994.”	   	   In	   these	  
documents,	  China	  agreed	  not	  to	  export	  goods	  made	  by	  prison	  labor	  to	  the	  US;	  the	  US	  
could	  post	  a	  US	  Customs	  official	  in	  the	  American	  Embassy	  in	  Beijing;	  and	  this	  official	  
may	  request	  to	  inspect	  facilities	  believed	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  prison	  labor.	  	  
Special	   section	   301	   of	   1988	   Omnibus	   Trade	   Act	   requires	   the	   USTR	   to	  
investigate	   countries	   that	   fail	   to	   provide	   adequate	   and	   effective	   protection	   of	   US	  
intellectual	  property	  rights.	   	   In	  April	  1991,	  China	  was	  listed	  as	  one	  of	  the	  “priority	  
foreign	   countries”	   under	   Special	   301,	   which	   were	   chosen	   for	   the	   “number	   and	  
pervasiveness”	  of	  the	  “acts,	  polices	  or	  practices”	  impeding	  US	  exports.	   	   In	  May,	  the	  
USTR	   launched	   an	   investigation	   against	   China,	   and	   in	   November,	   the	   USTR	  
threatened	  to	   impose	  $1.5	  billion	   trade	  sanctions	  should	  China	   fail	   to	  meet	   the	  US	  
demand	   on	   January	   16,	   1992.	   	   Last-­‐minute	   negotiations	   yielded	   the	   Chinese	  
commitments:	  China	  agreed	  to	  join	  the	  Berne	  Copyright	  Convention	  and	  the	  Geneva	  
Phonograms	  Convention	  and	  promised	  to	  strengthen	  its	  patent,	  copyright	  and	  trade	  
secret	  laws	  and	  improve	  protection	  of	  US	  intellectual	  property.	  	  It	  required	  China	  to	  
amend	   its	   copyright	   law	   so	   that	   computer	   software	   would	   be	   treated	   as	   literary	  
work	  and	  subject	  to	  copyright	  protection	  with	  a	  term	  of	  50	  years.94	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





After	  Japan	  and	  Taiwan,	  China	  became	  the	  country	  running	  the	  third-­‐largest	  
trade	  surplus	  against	   the	  US.	   	  Senior	  administration	  officials	  began	  to	  signal	  “their	  
desires	   to	   get	   tougher	   with	   China	   on	   the	   trade	   relationship.”95	  	   In	   August	   1991,	  
China	   pledged	   to	   begin	   reducing	   tariffs	   and	   curtailing	   licensing	   requirements	   for	  
imports.	   	   Later,	   USTR	   Carla	   Hills	   called	   the	   Chinese	   efforts	   “unsatisfactory,”	  
threatening	  with	  a	  Section	  301	  petition	   for	   “unjustifiable	  and	  unreasonable”	   trade	  
practice,	  which	  impedes	  American	  exports.96	  	  On	  August	  21,	  1992,	  USTR	  announced	  
a	  list	  of	  $3.9	  billion	  Chinese	  exports	  to	  the	  US	  that	  would	  be	  subjected	  to	  prohibitive	  
tariffs	  if	  China	  failed	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  US	  by	  October	  10,	  1992.	  	  	  
Again,	  a	  last-­‐minute	  deal	  was	  reached.	  The	  terms	  of	  this	  agreement	  were	  far-­‐
reaching.	   	   China	   agreed	   to	   lower	   tariffs	   on	   a	   series	   of	   commodities,	   gradually	  
remove	   import	  quota	  permits,	   and	   increase	   the	   transparency	  of	   trade	   regulations.	  	  
In	  exchange	  for	  so	  many	  compromises,	  the	  Chinese	  chief	  negotiator	  Tong	  Zhiguang	  
insisted	   to	   insert	   one	   sentence	   –	   “The	   U.S.	   Government	   will	   staunchly	   support	  
China’s	  achievement	  of	  contracting	  party	  status	  to	  the	  GATT.”97	  	  Amb.	  Sun	  Zhenyu,	  
China’s	  Ambassador	   to	   the	  WTO	   commented,	   “China	  made	   a	   lot	   of	   concessions	   in	  
this	   deal	   just	   in	   order	   to	   ink	   this	   in	   the	   agreement.”	  98	  	   China	   had	   understood	   the	  
asymmetric	   interdependence	   with	   the	   US	   in	   the	   global	   trading	   net.	   	   By	   getting	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  John	  Burgess,	  “Bush	  Administration	  Includes	  China	  in	  List	  of	  Trade-­‐restriction	  Offenders,”	  Washington	  Post,	  
(March	  30,	  1991),	  p.	  A14.	  
96	  US	  Warns	  China	  with	  Trade	  Investigation.	  (Oct	  16,	  1991)	  
http://www.csmonitor.com/1991/1016/16041.html	  	  See	  also	  Inside	  Trade.	  
	  
97	  See	  Article	  VIII.2,	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  Between	  The	  Government	  of	  The	  United	  States	  of	  America	  
and	  The	  Government	  of	  The	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  Concerning	  Market	  Access.	  




American	  support,	  the	  ticket	  back	  to	  the	  GATT	  negotiating	  table,	  it	  finally	  broke	  the	  
deadlock.	  
China	  would	   very	  much	   like	   dealing	  with	   an	   American	   president	   who	   had	  
biked	  on	  the	  streets	  in	  Beijing,	  rather	  than	  another	  president	  who	  called	  the	  Chinese	  
leaders	  “butchers	  of	  Beijing”	  during	  his	  campaign.	  	  	  Rather	  than	  waiting	  to	  negotiate	  
with	  Clinton,	  Beijing	  would	  feel	  more	  comfortable	  to	  strike	  deals	  with	  President	  H.	  
W.	   Bush.	   	   This	   partially	   contributed	   to	   Beijing’s	   motivation	   to	   make	   significant	  
concessions	  in	  various	  areas	  in	  the	  year	  of	  1992,	  especially	  late	  in	  that	  year99,	  and	  to	  
prepare	  for	  the	  change	  of	  presidency	  by	  putting	  American	  support	  in	  ink.	  	  
After	   the	   GATT	   council’s	   announcement	   about	   Taiwan	   in	   September	   1992	  
and	   the	   bilateral	   agreement	   on	   market	   access	   in	   October	   1992,	   China’s	   GATT	  
negotiation	   sped	   up.	   	   In	   1992,	   Deng	   Xiaoping’s	   tour	   to	   South	   China	   and	   the	  
Fourteenth	   Sessions	   of	   the	   Chinese	   Communist	   Party	   Congress	   reestablished	   the	  
economic	   reform	   policies	   and	   announced	   the	   goal	   to	   build	   a	   “socialist	   market	  
economy.”	   	   In	   1993,	   China	   took	  measures	   to	   open	   up	   its	   trade	   regime,	   including	  
lowering	  import	  tariffs	  for	  2,898	  products.	  	  The	  Chinese	  negotiators	  were	  no	  longer	  
burdened	  by	  contracting	  parties’	  questions	  and	  their	  own	  answers	  about	  “planned	  
commerce	  economy.”	  	  China’s	  political	  breakthrough	  and	  its	  successful	  conclusion	  of	  
the	   series	   of	   negotiations	   with	   the	   US	   regained	   the	   momentum	   for	   its	   GATT	  
accession.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The	  multilateral	  talks	  moved	  after	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  negotiations	  concluded	  
successfully.	   	   In	   the	   fifteenth	   session	   in	   September	   1993,	   the	   memorandum	   of	  
China’s	   economic	   and	   trade	   system	   was	   finally	   approved	   by	   the	   working	   party.	  
China	   finished	   a	   questioning	   stage.	   	   From	   October	   1992	   and	   October	   1993,	   five	  
sessions	   of	   the	   working	   party	   were	   held.	   	   When	   China	   submitted	   its	   GATT	  
application	   in	   1986,	   the	   original	   estimation	   was	   that	   it	   could	   enter	   into	   GATT	  
quickly	   like	   other	   developing	   countries	   or	   participate	   in	   the	   Uruguay	   Round	   as	  
permanent	   observer	   and	   “graduate”	   when	   this	   round	   ended.	   	   After	   tremendous	  
changes	  in	  the	  landscape	  of	  international	  relationships,	  apparently	  China	  could	  not	  
join	  GATT	  as	   former	  Soviet	   satellite	   countries	  had.	   	   Since	   the	  Uruguay	  Round	   still	  
kept	  going,	  the	  Chinese	  re-­‐estimated	  that	  they	  would	  ride	  the	  new	  momentum	  and	  
become	  a	  member	  by	  the	  end	  of	  this	  round.	  	  
Although	   China	   pushed	   efforts	   to	   enter	   into	   the	   stage	   of	   substantial	  
negotiation	  about	  tariff	  and	  non-­‐tariff	  reduction,	  the	  bilateral	  talks	  with	  the	  US	  did	  
not	  move	  as	  smoothly	  as	  before	  1989.	  	  In	  the	  1990s,	  China’s	  MFN	  status	  became	  an	  
annual	   controversy	   in	   American	   foreign	   policy.	   	   As	   president	   candidate,	   Clinton	  
criticized	  China’s	  human	  rights;	  as	  president	  in	  office,	  he	  had	  to	  look	  tough,	  at	  least	  
early	  in	  his	  term.	   	  In	  May	  1993,	  Clinton	  linked	  the	  annual	  approval	  of	  China’s	  MFN	  
status	  to	  its	  the	  progress	  on	  human	  rights.100	  	  He	  extended	  China’s	  waiver	  and	  MFN	  
status	   for	   another	   year,	   but	   in	   Executive	   Order	   12850,	   he	   set	   specific	   additional	  
conditions	   for	   the	   mid-­‐1994	   extension	   of	   the	   waiver	   and	   China’s	   MFN	   status.	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  White	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  Press	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Clinton	  was	  criticized	  on	  his	  inconsistent	  China	  policy	  by	  human	  rights	  activists.	  	  On	  
the	  Hill,	  Republicans,	   joined	  by	  some	   liberal	  Democrats,	   launched	  a	  bashing-­‐China	  
campaign,	   mainly	   focusing	   on	   four	   issues:	   Taiwan,	   Tibet,	   the	   Chinese	   exports	   of	  
military	  technology,	  and	  human	  rights.101	  	  With	  other	  priority	  agenda	  items	  at	  hand,	  
Clinton	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  look	  “soft”	  on	  China.	  	  
Across	   the	   political	   spectrum,	   a	   strong	   coalition,	   the	   so-­‐called	   “New	   China	  
Lobby,”	  was	  gradually	  formed	  to	  defend	  the	  MFN	  status	  for	  China.	   	   In	  early	  1990s,	  
the	   US	   business	   community	   began	   to	   perceive	   China	   as	   a	   rapidly	   growing	   large	  
economy,	  which	  would	  have	   large	  potential	   for	  American	  exports	  and	   investment.	  	  
Business	   people	   were	   in	   fear	   of	   big	   losses	   if	   they	   were	   shut	   out	   of	   the	   Chinese	  
market.	   	  The	   lobby	  was	  composed	  of	  American	  business	  organizations,	  such	  as	  US	  
China	   Business	   Council	   (USCBC)	   and	   Business	   Roundtable,	   the	   AmCham	   of	  
Commerce	   in	   Hong	   Kong,	   which	   spoke	   for	   a	   normal	   relationship	   with	   China.	  	  
Compared	   to	   the	   GATT	   application,	   the	   renewal	   of	   MFN	   status	   was	   an	   urgent,	  
immediate	  issue,	  approaching	  every	  year	  to	  put	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  relationship	  to	  a	  
test.	   	   Political	   capital,	  which	   could	   have	   been	   focused	   on	   China’s	   GATT	   accession,	  
had	   been	   necessarily	   diverted	   and	   spent	   on	   the	   battles	   for	   China’s	  MFN	   status	   as	  
counterbalance	  on	  the	  Hill	  and	  in	  the	  administration.	  	  	  
When	   China	   received	   a	   “Discussion	   Document	   on	   the	   Drafting	   of	   China’s	  
GATT	  Accession”	  through	  the	  American	  Embassy	  on	  June	  21,	  1993	  and	  an	  invitation	  
for	  high-­‐level	  Chinese	  delegation	  to	  Washington,	  China	  interpreted	  this	  gesture	  as	  a	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  The	  campaign	  was	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  Sen.	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  Foreign	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sign	   that	   the	   American	   wanted	   to	   conclude	   negotiations	   on	   the	   draft	   protocol	  
agreement.	   	  On	   July	  22,	  1993	   right	  before	   the	   seventh	   round	  of	  bilateral	   talks,	   the	  
Chinese	  chief	  negotiator,	  Gu	  Yongjiang	   told	   reporters	   that	   this	   round	  should	   focus	  
on	  resolving	  the	  differences	  and	  result	  in	  a	  draft	  protocol	  agreement.102	  	  	  Later,	  this	  
was	  proved	  to	  be	  over-­‐optimistic.	  	  In	  her	  opening	  remark,	  the	  new	  AUSTR	  Dorothy	  
Dwoskin	  said	  that	  she	  needed	  “a	  familiarization	  process”	  and	  wanted	  to	  “go	  through	  
every	  aspect	  of	  the	  framework”	  that	  the	  two	  negotiating	  teams	  “had	  established.”103	  	  
This	   signal	   implied	   a	   fundamental	   change	   of	   American	   negotiation	   position	   and	  
estimation	  of	  timing,	  which	  disappointed	  the	  Chinese.	  	  	  
The	  US	  insisted	  that	  the	  original	  five	  demands	  should	  be	  put	  into	  the	  protocol	  
agreement:	   First,	   a	   single	   and	   consistent	   national	   trade	   policy;	   Second,	   full	  
transparency	   of	   trade	   regulations;	   Third,	   elimination	   all	   practices	   that	   were	  
inconsistent	   with	   GATT,	   including	   non-­‐tariff	   barriers;	   Fourth,	   a	   commitment	   to	  
price-­‐based	   market	   economy;	   Fifth,	   safeguard	   mechanisms	   to	   guard	   contracting	  
parties	  from	  market	  disruptions.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  Americans	  wanted	  to	  talk	  about	  
service	  sectors,	  such	  as	  banking,	  insurance,	  telecommunication,	  etc.	  so	  that	  it	  would	  
reflect	   the	   new	   issue-­‐topics	   under	   discussion	   for	   the	   agreement	   on	   the	   Uruguay	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  P.T.	  Bangsbeg,	  “China	  Amends	  Proposal,	  Expects	  Accord	  on	  GATT	  Entry,”	  Journal	  of	  Commerce,	  (July	  27,	  
1993),	  p.	  3A.	  Also	  in	  Long	  Yongtu’s	  speech,	  “Woguo	  Fuguan	  Tanpan	  de	  Zuixin	  Qingkuang	  he	  Qiantu	  Zhanwang.”	  
103	  The	  opening	  remark	  of	  Dwoskin	  was,	  “I	  am	  new	  to	  US-­‐China	  bilateral	  negotiation	  and	  I	  need	  a	  
familiarization	  process.	  I	  will	  go	  through	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  framework	  we	  had	  established	  and	  do	  my	  home	  




Round.	  	  China	  rejected	  the	  fourth	  and	  fifth	  demands	  and	  accused	  the	  US	  of	  setting	  a	  
moving	  target	  during	  the	  negotiation.104	  	  
China	   had	   never	   expected	   that	   its	   developing	   country	   status	   would	   be	   an	  
issue	  of	  its	  GATT	  accession.	   	  The	  IMF’s	  publication	  in	  1993	  showed	  that	  China	  was	  
the	   third	   largest	   economy	   of	   the	   world,	   if	   measured	   by	   purchasing	   price	   parity	  
(PPP),	  and	  was	  projected	  to	  become	  the	  largest	  economy	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  	  
In	   the	  eighteenth	   session	  of	   the	  working	  party,	   the	  US	   requested	   that	  China	   could	  
join	  GATT	  as	  a	  developed	  country.	  	  China	  was	  surprised.105	  	  The	  US	  also	  presented	  a	  
new	   non-­‐paper	   as	   a	   guideline	   for	   the	   reforms	   China	  must	   take	   in	   order	   to	   enter	  
GATT.	   	  China	  responded	  that	  it	  was	  neither	  able,	  nor	  willing,	  to	  work	  on	  this	  basis	  
and	  pointed	  out	  ten	  areas	  that	  it	  was	  not	  prepared	  to	  discuss.106	  	  
The	   draft	   document	   for	   protocol	   agreement	   was	   “very	   rudimentary”.107	  	  
When	   the	   China	   case	   moved	   to	   the	   new	   Clinton	   administration	   USTR	   office,	   an	  
accession	   based	   on	   “viable	   commercial	   terms”	   began	   to	   be	   emphasized	   in	   the	  
bilateral	  negotiations.	   	   In	  1980s,	  OECD	  secretariat	  prepared	  a	   study	  about	  China’s	  
potential	  GATT	  accession.	  	  In	  this	  study,	  OECD	  member	  countries	  declared	  that	  they	  
wanted	   China	   in	   GATT.	   	   However,	   considering	   China’s	   potential	   economic	  
importance,	  they	  wanted	  a	  commercial	  basis	  for	  China’s	  entry,	  rather	  than	  political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  John	  Zarocostas,	  “No	  movement	  seen	  in	  negotiations	  over	  China’s	  bid	  to	  rejoin	  GATT,”	  Journal	  of	  Commerce,	  
(March	  16,	  1993),	  p.	  3A.	  	  
105	  See	  a	  news	  reporter’s	  interview	  with	  Long	  Yongtu.	  
<http://chat.eastday.com/epublish/gb/paper22/1/class002200032/hwz535051.htm>	  
106	  Sheel	  Kohli,	  “Beijing	  Attacks	  US	  Stance	  on	  GATT	  Re-­‐entry,”	  South	  China	  Morning	  Post,	  (July	  29,	  1994),	  p.	  1.	  	  
Those	  ten	  issue-­‐areas	  included	  safeguard,	  agriculture,	  government	  procurement	  on	  civil	  aircraft,	  export	  duties,	  
intellectual	  property	  protection,	  etc.	  	  




terms.	  	  When	  the	  Western	  European	  countries	  stressed	  in	  1980s	  that	  they	  were	  not	  
willing	   to	   see	   political	   considerations	   dominant	   in	   the	   negotiations	   for	   China’s	  
accession	  as	  they	  had	  been	  for	  Eastern	  European	  countries,	  the	  US	  had	  the	  strategic	  
geopolitical	   landscape	   in	   mind.	   	   With	   the	   fundamental	   change	   of	   international	  
politics	   and	   new	   administration	   coming	   into	   office,	   the	   new	  USTR	   sided	  with	   the	  
OECD	   countries	   and	   did	   not	   want	   commercial	   interests	   to	   be	   slighted.	   	   To	   the	  
Chinese,	   negotiations	   with	   the	   US	   became	   difficult,	   starting	   from	   USTR	   Mickey	  
Kantor,	  as	  a	  former	  Chinese	  negotiator	  recorded.108	  	  
However,	  China	  had	  set	  the	  GATT	  accession	  on	  its	  policy	  agenda.	  	  Beijing	  was	  
afraid	   that	   it	  would	   be	   locked	   out	   from	   rule-­‐making	   if	   it	   could	   not	   join	   the	   GATT	  
before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Uruguay	  Round	  and	  became	  a	  WTO	  founding	  member.	  	  Beijing	  
was	   “frantic”	   about	   this	   idea.109	  	   Under	   the	   time	   pressure,	   China	   moved	   to	   make	  
concessions.	  	  In	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1994,	  it	  released	  a	  series	  of	  measures	  to	  reform	  its	  
trade	  regime,	  to	  show	  its	  sincerity	  and	  determination.110	  	   In	  August,	   it	  submitted	  a	  
new	  concession	  package,	  including	  a	  pledge	  to	  reduce	  all	  agricultural	  and	  industrial	  
tariffs	  and	   to	  revoke	  90%	  of	  non-­‐tariff	  measures.	   	  This	  package	  had	  a	  preliminary	  
list	  on	  market	  access	  for	  service	  sectors.	  	  On	  November	  28,	  1994,	  China	  announced	  
its	  decision	  to	  set	  December	  31,	  1994	  as	  its	  deadline	  to	  negotiate	  a	  final	  protocol.	  	  At	  
the	  same	  time,	  Long	  Yongtu,	   the	  Chinese	  chief	  negotiator	   told	   the	  GATT	  members,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  My	  interviews	  with	  the	  Chinese	  interviewees,	  No.	  1	  and	  No.	  22,	  respectively.	  	  
109	  My	  first	  interview	  with	  the	  American	  interviewee	  No.	  10,	  in	  2008.	  
110	  These	  measures	  implemented	  in	  1994	  included	  the	  followings:	  (1)	  China	  abandoned	  the	  import	  permit	  and	  
quota	  management	  for	  283	  products,	  repealed	  253	  international	  regulations	  published	  by	  MOFTEC,	  and	  
abolished	  93	  foreign	  trade	  management	  regulations;	  (2)	  China	  enacted	  Measures	  of	  Quota	  Biddings	  for	  Export	  
Commodities,	  released	  Decisions	  on	  Further	  Deepening	  Foreign	  Economic	  and	  Trade	  System	  Reform,	  and	  enacted	  




“Unless	  a	  substantive	  agreement	  is	  reached	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  China	  is	  not	  going	  
to	  offer	  further	  concession	  and	  is	  not	  seeking	  to	  restart	  talks.”111	  	  China	  was	  playing	  
the	  game	  with	  high-­‐risk	  strategy,	  which	  proved	  to	  be	  fruitless	  in	  the	  hindsight.	  	  
In	   the	   multilateral	   negotiations,	   China	   made	   another	   attempt	   at	   a	  
breakthrough	  with	  other	  countries.	  	  It	  felt	  that	  the	  US	  did	  not	  give	  credit	  enough	  to	  
its	   reform	   measures	   and	   concessions,	   so	   China	   moved	   to	   break	   up	   the	   existing	  
coalition	  around	  the	  US	  and	  build	  a	  new	  one	  around	  itself.	   	  Again,	  it	  was	  told,	  “The	  
US	  has	  been	  entrusted	  with	  negotiating	  China’s	  protocol.	  	  There	  is	  absolutely	  no	  way	  
Beijing	   can	   get	   round	   that	   fact.”112	  	   The	   Chinese	   attempt	   to	   break	   the	   American’s	  
coalition	  failed,	  again.	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  US,	  the	  EU,	  and	  Japan	  met	  to	  discuss	  China’s	  
GATT	   accession	   and	   successfully	   built	   a	   coalition	   for	   “a	   united	  Western	   position,”	  
which	   was	   “expected	   to	   enhance	   the	   chances	   of	   nudging	   Beijing	   to	   make	   more	  
radical	   trade-­‐related	   domestic	   economic	   reforms	   and	   bigger	   market-­‐opening	  
concessions.”113	  
Holding	   the	   leading	   position	   in	   the	   international	   trade	   system,	   the	   US	  
successfully	  formed	  a	  coalition	  with	  other	  developed	  countries,	  linked	  the	  progress	  
of	   multilateral	   negotiations	   for	   China’s	   GATT	   accession	   to	   the	   Sino-­‐American	  
bilateral	   bargaining,114 	  and	   achieved	   an	   advantageous	   position	   at	   the	   bilateral	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  Guy	  De	  Jonquieres	  and	  Frances	  Williams,	  “High-­‐risk	  Strategy	  in	  Global	  Game:	  Talks	  on	  China’s	  Application	  to	  
Rejoin	  GATT	  Are	  Nearing	  a	  Climax,”	  Financial	  Times,	  (December	  19,	  1994),	  p.	  17.	  	  
112	  Geoffrey	  Crothall,	  “China	  Hints	  at	  Bypassing	  US	  in	  GATT	  Talks,”	  South	  China	  Morning	  Post,	  (March	  3,	  1994),	  
p.	  1.	  
113	  John	  Zarocostas,	  “US,	  EU,	  Japan	  discuss	  China	  GATT	  Bid	  Approach,”	  Journal	  of	  Commerce,	  (June	  20,	  1994),	  p.	  
3A.	  	  
114	  “Kantor	  Warns	  China	  Over	  Possible	  Retaliation	  in	  IPR	  Dispute”	  Inside	  US	  Trade’s	  World	  Trade	  Online.	  




negotiation	   table.	   “The	   bilateral	   and	  multilateral	   talks	   are	   obviously	   intertwined,”	  
USTR	  Kantor	  said,	  “We	  made	  that	  very	  clear	  [to	  the	  Chinese].”	  	  For	  example,	  Kantor	  
also	   made	   clear	   that	   the	   bilateral	   IPR	   talks	   were	   linked	   to	   the	   multilateral	  
discussions	  on	  China’s	  WTO	  entry.	  	  Its	  willingness	  to	  make	  concession	  to	  the	  US	  on	  
the	  bilateral	  table	  became	  an	  indication	  of	  its	  willingness	  to	  meet	  the	  requirements	  
of	  the	  multilateral	  table.	  
Although	   China	  was	   clear	   that	   it	   could	   not	   join	   the	   GATT	   as	   other	   Eastern	  
European	  countries	  did,	   it	  still	  held	   the	  expectation	  to	   join	   the	  GATT	  at	   the	  end	  of	  
Uruguay	   Round	   and	   become	   a	   founding	   member	   of	   WTO.	   	   In	   order	   to	   make	   it	  
happen,	   China	   sped	  up	  with	  more	  measures	   to	   open	  up	   its	   trade	   regime	   in	   1994.	  	  
Furthermore,	   it	   started	   to	   negotiate	   against	   its	   own	   deadline.	   	   Its	   last	   offer	   was	  
virtually	   take-­‐it-­‐or-­‐leave-­‐it.	   	   Its	   failure	   indicated	   a	   serious	   miscalculation,	   which	  
could	  have	  been	  avoided	  with	  rational	  analysis.	   	  Unfortunately,	   this	   final	  offer	  still	  
fell	  short	  of	  its	  counterpart’s	  expectation,	  especially	  in	  agriculture,	  services,	  etc.	  	  	  
At	  the	  international	  level,	  the	  risky	  strategy	  proved	  to	  be	  unsuccessful.	  	  At	  the	  
end	  of	  November,	  a	  US	  official	  said	  that	  “it	  is	  impossible	  to	  finish	  the	  negotiations	  in	  
the	   next	   two	   weeks	   even	   if	   all	   the	   outstanding	   issues	   were	   settled	   immediately.	  	  
There	   is	   no	   protocol	   text	   and	   no	  working	   party	   report,	   which	   takes	   considerable	  
time	  to	  work	  out.	  	  The	  chairman	  of	  the	  China	  working	  party	  has	  made	  it	  clear	  he	  will	  
not	  convene	  the	  group	  until	   there	   is	  a	  momentum	  in	  the	  bilateral	  negotiations.”115	  	  
At	   the	   domestic	   level,	   it	   aroused	   wide	   criticism,	   which	   implied	   that	   more	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bureaucratic	   organizations	   in	   China	  were	   involved	   in	   the	   GATT	   talks	   than	   before.	  	  
The	   trade	   talks	  were	  no	   longer	   limited	   to	  a	   small	  group	  of	  decision	  makers	  at	   the	  
very	  top.	  	  
As	  a	  bounded	  rational	  player,	  it	  took	  some	  time	  for	  China	  to	  understand	  the	  
effect	  of	  the	  end	  of	  Cold	  War	  on	  the	  trade	  talks,	  including	  the	  price	  it	  now	  must	  pay	  
to	   participate	   in	   globalization.	   	  With	   the	   new	   pay-­‐off	   function,	   its	   estimation	   –	   to	  
“graduate”	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Uruguay	  Round	  –	  did	  not	  change,	  though.	  	  Its	  aspiration	  
level	  for	  the	  participation	  with	  the	  GATT	  was	  never	  constant	  in	  stages	  one	  and	  two.	  	  
When	   American	   brought	   it	   to	   the	   table	   in	   1980s,	   China	   was	   very	   cautious.	   	   It	  
conducted	  careful	  studies	  on	  other	  East	  European	  countries.	  	  Yet,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1994,	  
it	   employed	   a	   risky	   strategy	   by	   virtually	   asking	   its	   counterparts	   to	   either	   take	   its	  
offer	   or	   leave	   it	   and	   by	   pledging	   not	   seeking	   to	   restart	   talks.	   	   In	   the	   1990s,	   the	  
incremental	  increase	  of	  trade	  surplus	  against	  the	  US	  and	  the	  ensuing	  trade	  frictions	  
became	   the	  new	   trade	  pattern	  between	   the	   two	   countries.	   	   The	   change	  of	   China’s	  
domestic	   politics	   finally	   allowed	   the	  Chinese	  negotiators	   to	   talk	   about	   its	   “market	  
economy”,	   however,	   the	   changes	   in	   the	   American	   domestic	   situation	   and	   in	  
international	  relations	  disadvantaged	  China’s	  GATT	  application.	  	  From	  its	  two	  failed	  
attempts	   of	   breaking	   the	   existing	   coalition,	   China	   learned	   that	   the	   bilateral	  
negotiation	  with	  the	  US	  would	  be	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  accession.	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In	   the	   second	   stage,	   China	   struggled	   out	   of	   one	   deadlock,	  which	   came	   into	  
being	  after	  the	  Tiananmen	  Square	  incident,	  and	  walked	  into	  another	  deadlock	  when	  
it	  failed	  to	  join	  the	  GATT	  the	  end	  of	  1994.	  	  In	  the	  third	  stage,	  China	  reflected	  on	  its	  
previous	  eagerness,	  which	  weakened	  its	  bargaining	  position	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  and	  
readjusted	   its	   negotiation	   strategies.	   	   Through	   the	   American	   business	   community	  
that	  had	   interest	   in	  China,	  China	  gained	  more	   leverage	   in	   the	   third	   stage	   than	   the	  
second,	   by	   possessing	   credible	   threats.	   	   When	   the	   economic	   struggle	   and	   the	  
impasse	  of	  SOE	  reform	  festered,	  some	  in	  the	  top	  leadership	  believed	  that	  entry	  into	  
the	  WTO	  would	  benefit	  the	  Chinese	  economy.	   	   In	  the	   late	  1990s,	  when	  the	  politics	  
and	   economic	   needs	   in	   the	   two	   countries	   pointed	   to	   the	   same	   direction,	   China	  
grabbed	  the	  opportunity.	  	  
For	   the	   WTO	   application	   and	   the	   bilateral	   talks	   with	   the	   US,	   the	   Chinese	  
president	  Jiang	  Zemin	  laid	  out	  a	  16-­‐word	  set	  of	  principles	  in	  a	  politburo	  meeting:	  Bu	  
Ji	  Bu	  Zao,	  Shun	  Qi	  Zi	  Ran,	  Yin	  Shi	  Li	  Dao,	  Shui	  Dao	  Qu	  Cheng	  (Being	  patient,	  no	  rush;	  
let	   the	   negotiation	   take	   its	   course;	   adapt	   to	   the	   circumstance,	   adroitly	  modify	   the	  
situation;	  a	  canal	  is	  formed	  when	  water	  flows).	  	  China	  started	  to	  take	  lessons	  and	  to	  
harden	  its	  position.	  	  As	  the	  first	  move,	  it	  linked	  bilateral	  trade	  relations	  with	  the	  US	  
to	   its	  multilateral	   process,	   by	   suspending	   the	   1992	  market	   access	   agreement	   and	  
claiming	  that	  the	  US	  did	  not	  keep	  the	  promise	  to	  “staunchly	  support”	  China.	  	  When	  
Clinton	  Administration	  threatened	  to	  impose	  over	  $1	  billion	  in	  trade	  sanction,	  China	  




which	  applied	  to	  establishing	  holding	  companies	  in	  China.116	  	  It	  also	  said	  that	  China	  
would	   only	   take	   up	   the	   issue	   [of	   market	   access	   in	   the	   IPR]	   “when	   negotiations	  
resume	  on	  China’s	  accession	  to	  the	  WTO.”117	  	  	  
From	  the	  1994	  MFN	  case,	  China	  learned	  that	  the	  so-­‐called	  New	  China	  Lobby	  
could	  apply	  pressure	  over	  the	  government.	  	  The	  trick	  was	  to	  let	  American	  business	  
groups	   worry	   about	   their	   interests	   in	   China,	   and	   they	   will	   move.	   	   American	  
multinational	  companies,	  especially	  in	  labor-­‐intensive	  industries,	  were	  attracted	  to	  
China’s	   vast	   reservoir	   of	   cheap	   manpower	   as	   well	   as	   its	   big	   domestic	   markets.	  	  
Initiated	   by	   shoemakers,	   the	   New	   China	   Lobby	   collected	   a	   variety	   of	   business	  
communities.118	  	   On	   March	   14,	   1994,	   they	   held	   a	   closed	   meeting	   with	   Secretary	  
Warren	  Christopher	   in	  China.	   	   	  At	  a	  March	  15,	  1994	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations-­‐
sponsored	   forum	   in	   Washington,	   they	   criticized	   linking	   human	   rights	   with	   trade	  
issues.	  	  According	  to	  Christopher,	  President	  Clinton	  was	  aware	  of	  and	  influenced	  by	  
business	  community’s	  concerns.119	  	  Christopher	  even	  warned	  that	  Clinton	  would	  be	  
blamed	   for	   “losing	   China.”120	  	   In	   May	   1994,	   Clinton	   delinked	   China’s	   MFN	   status	  
from	  human	  rights.	   	  From	  this	  experience	   in	  1994,	  China	  understood	   that	   it	   could	  
nudge	  American	  exporters	  who	  were	  seeking	  to	  export	  to	  China	  and	  multinational	  
companies,	   which	   were	   applying	   to	   establish	   subsidiaries	   in	   China.	   	   When	   China	  
selectively	  picked	  the	  targets,	  its	  threats	  became	  effective.	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   To	   the	   Chinese	   threats,	   the	   American	   response	  was	   tactical.	   	   Although	   the	  
USTR	  still	  emphasized	  on	  “commercially	  reasonable	  and	  acceptable”	  term,	  as	  usual,	  
it	   affirmed	   that	   China	   “by	   and	   large	   has	   complied	   with	   the	   1992	   market	   access	  
agreement.”	  	  It	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  China	  “has	  not	  complied	  with	  some	  important	  
aspects.”121	  	   An	   overall	   formal	   finding	   of	   non-­‐compliance	   would	   have	   placed	   the	  
USTR	  under	  the	  pressure	  to	  act	  against	  China	  according	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  Section	  
301.	  	  At	  the	  conference	  before	  departure	  for	  Beijing,	  USTR	  Kantor	  fell	  short	  of	  saying	  
that	   China	   was	   not	   complying	   with	   the	   1992	  market	   access	   agreement.122	  	  When	  
China	  attempted	  to	  link	  bilateral	  agreement	  on	  market	  access	  to	  its	  WTO	  accession,	  
Kantor	   tried	   to	   delink	   the	   bilateral	   progress	   from	   China’s	   multilateral	   talks.	   	   He	  
differentiated	  his	  bilateral	  efforts	  to	  open	  the	  Chinese	  market	  from	  negotiations	  to	  
have	  China	  join	  the	  WTO.	  “The	  US	  is	  not	  saying	  that	  clearing	  up	  the	  bilateral	  market	  
access	  issues	  is	  a	  condition	  for	  China	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  WTO.”123	  
From	  March	  9	   to	  13,	  1995,	  Kantor	  and	  Wu	  Yi	   reached	  The	  US-­‐China	  Eight-­‐
Point	   Agreement,	   which	   put	   an	   end	   to	   the	   enmity	   between	   the	   two	   nations	   over	  
China’s	   GATT/WTO	   entry.	   	   In	   this	   succinct	   accord,	   China	   agreed	   to	   “lift	   the	  
suspension	   of	   the	   1992	   market	   access	   agreement;”124	  the	   US	   agreed	   to	   “address	  
realistically	  the	  issue	  of	  China’s	  developing	  country	  status”	  and	  restated	  its	  support	  
for	   China’s	   WTO	   application.	   	   The	   US	   agreed	   to	   grant	   China	   “special	   developing	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country	  status.”	  	  China	  would	  be	  able	  to	  phase	  out	  trade	  barriers	  over	  a	  number	  of	  
years,	  according	  to	  issue-­‐by-­‐issue	  timetables	  required	  of	  more	  advanced	  countries.	  	  
China	  was	  not	  completely	  satisfied,	  but	  felt	  it	  was	  better	  than	  the	  developed	  country	  
status.	  	  Apparently,	  this	  was	  not	  a	  “best”	  move	  or	  “maximizing	  the	  pay-­‐off	  function,”	  
but	   it	   was	   “satisfactory,”	   which	   Chinese	   leaders	   opted	   to	   take.	   	   Both	   parties	   also	  
agreed	   that	   bilateral	   talks	   “will	   begin	   immediately	   upon	   resumption	   of	   WTO	  
discussions	  in	  Geneva.”125	  	  
After	   the	   negotiations	   on	   developing	   country	   status,	   China	   stepped	   up	   to	  
harden	   its	   position.	   	   Later	   that	  month	   in	   a	  meeting,	   Chinese	   officials	   contradicted	  
Kantor’s	  public	  statement	  that	  China	  would	  return	  to	  negotiations	  in	  Geneva	  in	  mid-­‐
April	  and	  to	  resume	  the	  talks	  after	  signing	  the	  Eight-­‐Point	  Agreement.126	  	  On	  April	  
11,	  1995,	  Wu	  Yi	  sent	  a	  confidential	  letter	  to	  Kantor,	  pressing	  “for	  assurances	  that	  the	  
US	  will	  extend	  unconditional	  MFN	  status…once	  it	  joins	  the	  WTO.”	  	  Comparing	  to	  its	  
position	   in	   the	   first	   and	   second	   stage	  when	   China	  wanted	   to	   join	   GATT	   first	   and	  
organize	   a	  working	  party	   to	   review	   the	   issue	   later,	   it	  was	  playing	   a	   tougher	  hand	  
now.	  	  A	  Chinese	  official	  said	  a	  week	  later,	  “China	  would	  not	  begin	  talks	  with	  the	  US	  
until	   the	   issue	  of	  non-­‐application	  raised	   in	  Wu	  Yi’s	   letter	   is	   settled.”127	  	  This	  move	  
increased	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  bilateral	  bargaining.	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  Online.	  April	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  1995.	  Also	  see	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  to	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At	  the	  time	  of	  negotiation	  stalemate,	  the	  EU	  and	  Japan	  leaned	  toward	  a	  softer	  
line	   than	   stage	   one	   and	   two.	   	   In	   March	   9,	   1995	   congressional	   testimony,	   Kantor	  
emphasized	  that	  the	  US	  demands	  on	  a	  “commercial	  basis”	  are	  backed	  by	  “almost	  all,	  
not	  all”	  US	   trading	  partners.	   	  He	  said	   that	   the	  EU	   is	   resolute	   in	   its	   support,	  but	  he	  
didn’t	   mention	   Japan.	   	   At	   the	   G-­‐7	   summit	   of	   June	   1996,	   Japanese	   Prime	  Minister	  
Ryutaro	   Hashimoto	   pressed	   other	   leaders	   to	   admit	   China	   into	   the	   WTO.128	  	   The	  
Ministry	  of	  International	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  (MITI)	  published	  a	  report	  in	  1997	  and	  
made	   an	   argument	   that	   small	   countries	   in	   Asia	   and	   elsewhere	   could	   achieve	  
bargaining	  power	  with	  China	  on	  trade	  issues	  only	  through	  the	  WTO	  once	  China	  was	  
admitted.129	  	  
The	  EU’s	  support	  for	  the	  US	  position	  gradually	  changed.	  	  When	  China	  refused	  
bilateral	  negotiations	  with	   the	  US,	  China	  welcomed	   the	   “	   very	   informal”	  meetings,	  
one	  in	  May	  and	  the	  other	  in	  July,	  organized	  by	  chairman	  of	  the	  WTO	  working	  party	  
in	   1995.130	  	   When	   the	   US	   was	   speculating	   whether	   and	   how	   to	   endorse	   Renato	  
Ruggiero	   as	   the	   new	  WTO	   director	   general,	   the	   split	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   US	  
loomed.	  	  An	  EU	  official	  “accused	  the	  US	  of	  resorting	  to	  ‘rough	  tactics’	  in	  an	  attempt	  
to	   get	   out	   of	   a	   tricky	  dilemma	  over	  whether	   and	  how	   to	   support	  Ruggiero.”131	  	   In	  
April	  1995,	  EU	  trade	  commissioner	  Leon	  Brittan	  was	  invited	  to	  Beijing.	   	  He	  “called	  
on	   all	   parties	   involved	   in	   the	   talks	   on	   China’s	   accession	   to	   the	   World	   Trade	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Organization	  to	  take	  fresh	  positions”	  and	  “urged	  flexibility”	  to	  break	  the	  deadlock.132	  	  
In	  November	  1996,	  he	  expressed	  his	   impatience	  with	   the	  US	   insistence	   that	  China	  
join	  the	  WTO	  as	  a	  developed	  rather	  than	  a	  developing	  country.	   	   “The	  prime	  target	  
for	   Sino-­‐European	   cooperation	   must	   be	   the	   early	   conclusion	   of	   long-­‐overdue	  
negotiations	  for	  Chinese	  membership.”133	  	  A	  rift	  among	  Quad	  Economies	  on	  China’s	  
WTO	  accession	  formed.	  	  
To	  make	  the	  next	  move,	  American	  negotiators	  had	  to	  weigh	  between	  the	  split	  
among	   Quad	   countries,	   the	   pressure	   from	   the	   industries,	   and	   the	   sway	   from	  
Congress.	   	   The	   swing	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   Japan	  was	   noticed	   by	   the	   US.	   	   Deputy	   USTR	  
Charlene	   Barshefsky	   told	   congressional	   staff	   that	   China’s	   “stonewalling”	   is	  
“increasing	   the	   danger	   that	   the	   EU	   and	   Japan	   will	   back	   away	   from	   their	   current	  
demands	   that	   China	   join	   on	   a	   commercially	   sound	   basis.”134	  	   The	   US	   Chamber	   of	  
Commerce	   urged	   the	  USTR	   to	   stand	   firm,	   especially	   on	   developing	   country	   status	  
and	  market	  access	   for	   foreign	  firms.135	  	  On	  the	  Hill,	  Senator	  Hank	  Brown	  (R-­‐CO),	  a	  
member	   of	   Senate	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee,	   was	   writing	   a	   resolution,	   which	  
“would	  express	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  Congress	  that	  Taiwan’s	  application	  for	  membership	  
in	  the	  WTO	  should	  not	  be	  linked	  to	  China’s	  WTO	  application.”136	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The	   split	   within	   the	   US	   government	   on	   Taiwan’s	   accession	   to	   the	   WTO	  
became	  visible.	   	  Undersecretary	  of	  State	  Joan	  Spero	  publicly	  maintained	  that	  there	  
was	  no	  linkage	  between	  the	  accession	  of	  China	  and	  Taiwan.	  	  Barshefsky	  admitted	  in	  
Beijing	   that	   there	   is	   an	   informal	   agreement	   among	  WTO	  members	   that	  China	   and	  
Taiwan	  will	  have	  to	  join	  at	  the	  same	  time.137	  	  Deputy	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Lawrence	  
Summers	  said	  in	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  American	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  that	  Taiwan	  had	  
made	  progress	  in	  its	  accession	  negotiations.138	  	  Due	  to	  the	  freedom	  in	  news	  reports	  
and	   transparency	   of	   information	   in	   the	   US,	   American	   negotiators’	   counterparts	  
would	   be	   able	   to	   observe	   the	   splits,	   calculate	   American	   negotiator’s	   domestic	  
bargaining	  position,	  and	  find	  which	  industries	  could	  be	  its	  foes	  or	  friends.	  	  
The	   USTR	   gradually	   switched	   to	   a	   “softer”	   strategy.	   	   After	   Barshefsky	   told	  
congressional	   staffers	   that	   China	   had	   threatened	   to	   block	   business	   deals	   of	   US	  
companies	   who	   advocated	   a	   tough	   stance	   by	   the	   US	   on	   China’s	   WTO	   accession,	  
Kantor	  denied	  it	  one	  week	  later.139	  	  Later,	  Barshefsky	  said	  China	  has	  done	  a	  good	  job	  
of	   implementing	   the	   1992	   market	   access	   agreement	   before	   she	   highlighted	   US	  
concerns.140	  	  She	  began	  to	  emphasize	  the	  “mutual	  goals”	  and	  American	  “facilitation”	  
to	  the	  Chinese.	  	  “China	  must	  decide	  how	  it	  wants	  to	  move	  ahead	  in	  its	  bid	  to	  join	  the	  
WTO	   before	   the	   US	   can	   decide	   how	   to	   best	   facilitate	   China’s	   accession.”	   	   “If	   it	   is	  
prepared	   to	  move	   forward,	   then	  we	  can	   turn	   to	   the	  next	   step	  of	  determining	  how	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best	  to	  achieve	  our	  mutual	  goals.”	   	  She	  delivered	  a	  “road	  map”	  to	  Wu	  Yi	  to	  outline	  
the	   basic	   issues	   to	   be	   resolved	   before	   China	   can	   join	   the	  WTO	  on	   a	   commercially	  
acceptable	  basis.141	  	  She	  also	  told	  Zhu	  Rongji	  how	  important	  the	  foreign	  competition	  
would	  be	  to	  revive	  the	  Chinese	  SOEs.142	  	  
Almost	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  China	  showed	  interest	  in	  Sir	  Leon	  Brittan’s	  proposal	  
of	  the	  “transition	  period.”	  	  Earlier,	  Sir	  Leon	  Brittan	  suggested	  the	  Quad	  economies	  to	  
grant	  China	  “provisional	  membership”	  in	  the	  WTO,	  but	  Kantor	  rejected	  the	  idea	  and	  
said	   China	  would	   not	   support	   it.143	  	   Brittan	  made	   another	   proposal	   to	  Wu	  Yi	   that	  
China	  accept	  “in	  principle”	  all	  obligations	  of	  the	  WTO,	  but	  they	  be	  implemented	  over	  
a	   negotiated	   period	   of	   time.	   	   If	   China	   agreed	   to	   a	  more	   flexible	   formula	   for	  WTO	  
admission	  proposed	  by	   the	  EU,	  Brittan	  assured	   that	  he	  would	   “take	   the	  matter	  up	  
with	   extreme	   urgency”	   to	   the	   US.144	  	   The	   compromise	   of	   phase-­‐in	  method	  would	  
protect	  those	  areas	  over	  which	  China	  had	  great	  concerns	  with	  a	  transitional	  period	  
and,	  meanwhile,	  China	  still	  had	  to	  make	  concessions	  on	  the	  rest.	  	  
Later	   at	   the	   November	   1995	   summit	   of	   the	   Asia-­‐Pacific	   Economic	  
Cooperation	   Forum	   in	   Osaka,	   Japan,	   where	   leaders	   delivered	   proposals	   for	   trade	  
liberalization,	   China’s	   offer,	   tabled	   by	   the	   Chinese	   President	   Jiang	   Zemin,	   was	  
“probably	  the	  most	  substantial”	  one.	   	  According	  to	  the	  announcement,	   in	  1996	  the	  
simple	   average	   tariff	   will	   be	   reduced	   by	   at	   least	   30%	   as	   a	   result	   of	   cuts	   on	   over	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4,000	   line	   items.	   	   In	   addition,	   China	   pledged	   to	   eliminate	   quotas	   and	   licensing	  
requirements	  on	  170	  tariff	  lines,	  or	  more	  than	  30%	  of	  commodities	  now	  subject	  to	  
those	   restrictions.145 	  	   Without	   any	   foreign	   pressure,	   China	   initiated	   this	   trade	  
liberalizing	  measure.	  	  The	  move	  indicated	  that	  the	  Chinese	  leadership	  realized	  that	  
trade	  liberalization	  was	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  China146	  and	  intended	  to	  build	  an	  image	  of	  
a	  more	  open	  member	  of	  the	  international	  community.	  	  	  
In	  the	  two	  years	  when	  bilateral	  negotiation	  was	  in	  stalemate,	  China	  engaged	  
in	   multiple-­‐track	   diplomacy	   in	   order	   to	   influence	   American	   decision-­‐making.	   	   As	  
discussed	  earlier,	  China	  had	  learned	  from	  the	  MFN	  case	  of	  the	  growing	  importance	  
of	   the	   Chinese	   market	   to	   US	   business	   interests	   and	   understood	   how	   to	   motivate	  
those	  interests	  to	  influence	  policy	  making	  in	  the	  Administration	  and	  Congress.	  	  The	  
occasional	   visits	   of	   Chinese	   officials	   to	   the	   US	   regularly	   had	   big	   buying	  missions.	  	  
Those	   purchases,	   including	   US	   grains,	   aircrafts,	   automobiles,	   etc.	   not	   only	   gained	  
considerable	  positive	  publicity,	  but	  also	   targeted	  the	  potential	  political	  support	  on	  
the	  Hill	  China	  needed	  to	  win.147	  	  China	  also	  sponsored	  expense-­‐paid	  trips	   to	  China	  
by	   congressional	  members	   and	   staff.	   	   It	   appeared	   that	   such	   efforts	   influenced	   US	  
legislators	  in	  positive	  ways	  insofar	  as	  China	  was	  concerned.	  	  In	  January	  1997,	  a	  bill	  
was	   even	   introduced	   to	   repeal	   the	   Jackson-­‐Vanik	   Amendment	   by	   House	  
International	  Relations	  Asia	  and	  Pacific	  Subcommittee	  Chairman	  Doug	  Bereuter	  (R-­‐
NE).	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On	   the	  US	   side,	   Clinton’s	   trade	   agenda	  was	   in	   stalemate,	   too,	  when	  he	  was	  
caught	   in	  between	  his	   labor	  and	  environmental	  constituency	  and	  the	  pro-­‐business	  
Republican	   votes	   he	   needed.	   	   Clinton’s	   framework	   talk	   with	   Japanese	   Premier	  
Hosokawa	  failed	  in	  1994,	  and	  later,	  the	  dispute	  almost	  led	  to	  a	  trade	  war.148	  	  Despite	  
Clinton’s	  impressive	  work	  on	  NAFTA	  in	  1993	  and	  solid	  reelection	  in	  1996,	  he	  could	  
not	  get	  enough	  support	  for	  fast	  track	  in	  1997	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  personal	  credit	  on	  both	  
isles	   of	   the	  House.	   	   The	  WTO	  Ministerial	   Conference,	   held	   in	   Seattle	   in	  December	  
1998,	   became	   an	   impasse.149	  	   Clinton	   declared	   labor	   issues	   to	   be	   an	   American	  
priority,	  which	  provoked	  broad	  concern.	  	  The	  failure	  in	  Seattle	  was	  another	  “major	  
blow	  to	  Clinton’s	  trade	  leadership.”150	  	  	  
Clinton	  administration	  proved	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  completing	  the	  trade	  work	  of	  
its	   predecessors,	   yet	   it	  was	   still	   searching	   for	   its	   own	   initiative	   and	   its	   own	   trade	  
legacy.	  	  When	  it	  came	  to	  Clinton’s	  second	  term,	  his	  trade	  presidency	  needed	  him	  to	  
switch	   his	   attention.	   	   Both	   Russia’s	   and	   China’s	   WTO	   accessions	   moved	   slowly.	  	  
When	  Clinton	  administration	  took	  initiatives,	  Russia	  seemed	  not	  very	  interested.151	  	  
Allegedly,	   Clinton	   got	   hold	   of	   Jiang	   at	   an	   APEC	   meeting	   and	   suggested	   to	   make	  
progress	   on	   the	   bilateral	   talks	   for	   China’s	   WTO	   accession.152	  	   China	   grabbed	   the	  
opportunity	  immediately.	  	  The	  Chinese	  quick	  response	  to	  Clinton’s	  initiative	  had	  its	  
economic	  causes.	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In	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   1990s,	   the	   Chinese	   economy	  was	   not	   doing	  well.	  	  
Foreign	   direct	   investment	   was	   the	   drive	   of	   China’s	   GDP	   growth;	   now	   it	   was	  
declining	   in	   terms	   of	   amount	   and	   number.	   	   The	   Asian	   financial	   crisis	   occurred	   in	  
1997,	   and	   China’s	   exports	   growth	   deteriorated.	   	   State-­‐owned	   enterprises	   (SOE)	  
were	   struggling	  with	   restructuring	   and	   privatization.	   	  With	   lack	   of	   flexibility	   and	  
profitability,	   most	   of	   SOEs	   had	   poor	   performance	   and	   incurred	   non-­‐performing	  
loans	  (NPLs).	  	  At	  the	  downside	  of	  the	  economy,	  they	  could	  not	  get	  new	  loans.	  	  This	  
was	  prevalent	  in	  textile	  industry	  as	  well	  as	  many	  other	  sectors.	  	  In	  the	  four	  quarters	  
of	  1999,	  the	  fixed	  assets	  investment	  growth	  rate	  dropped	  all	  the	  way,	  from	  23.8%,	  
to	  16.2%,	  to	  8.5%,	  and	  then	  to	  6%.	  	  	  
When	   China’s	   economic	   reform	   reached	   this	   bottleneck,	   the	   government’s	  
policy	   tools	   did	   not	   function	  well.	   	   The	   political	   reconfirmation	   for	   the	   economic	  
reform	  and	  open-­‐door	  policy	  in	  early	  1990s	  had	  revived	  the	  economy.	  	  In	  1992,	  the	  
growth	  rate	  reached	  14.2%;	  in	  1993,	  13.5%.	   	  When	  inflation	  mounted	  to	  14.7%	  in	  
1993,	   the	   Chinese	   government	   implemented	   contractionary	   monetary	   policy	   to	  
suppress	  inflation.	  	  The	  GDP	  growth	  rate	  fell	  all	  the	  way	  from	  10.5%	  in	  1995	  to	  9.3%	  
in	  1997,	  and	  to	  7.1%	  in	  1999.	  	  Inflation	  fell	  significantly	  in	  1996;	  retail	  prices	  began	  
to	  drop	  in	  1997.	  	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  government	  tried	  to	  stimulate	  the	  economy	  with	  
expansionary	  monetary	  policy,	  but	  it	  appeared	  to	  be	  ineffective.	  	  China	  had	  got	  out	  
of	  inflation,	  but	  it	  quickly	  encountered	  deflation.	  	  The	  Chinese	  government	  gave	  the	  
priority	  of	  economic	  policy	  to	  getting	  a	  GDP	  growth	  rate	  at	  7%	  or	  higher	  because	  it	  




The	  social	  issue	  was	  threatening	  China’s	  development	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  late	  
1990s.	   	   Income	   inequality,	  mainly	   the	   rural-­‐urban	   divide	   and	   regional	   disparities,	  
had	  widened	   and	  would	   deteriorate	   if	   the	   growth	   rate	   dropped,	   and	   job	   creation	  
slowed	  down.	  The	  rural	  population,	  45%	  of	  the	  labor	  force	  nationwide,	  contributed	  
just	  11.9%	  of	   the	  GDP.	   	  Unemployment	  and	  underemployment	  were	  substantial	   in	  
rural	   areas.	   	   In	   the	   cities,	   the	   supply	   of	   rural	   labor	   in	   the	   industrial	   sectors	   was	  
already	  elastic.	   	  Moreover,	   the	  cities	  had	   their	  own	  problems.	   	   In	   the	  wave	  of	  SOE	  
privatization,	  20	  to	  30	  million	  blue-­‐collar	  workers	  were	  laid	  off.	  	  Many	  of	  them	  were	  
not	   absorbed	   into	   the	   private	   sector,	   and	   their	   pensions	  were	   paid	   in	   the	  way	   of	  
“pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐go”.	   	  Laid-­‐off	  city	  workers,	  coupled	  with	  the	  oversupply	  of	  rural	   labor,	  
were	  a	  potential	  cause	  of	  social	  unrest.	  	  In	  the	  past,	  it	  was	  rapid	  growth	  that	  offered	  
the	   Chinese	   leaders	   leeway	   to	   sort	   out	   the	   inequality	   problems.	   	   When	   the	   GDP	  
growth	   rate	   slid	   downward	   late	   1990s,	   the	   stability	   of	   the	   society	   and	   even	   the	  
political	  leadership	  was	  endangered.	  	  	  
At	  this	  time,	  a	  move	  to	  the	  WTO	  looked	  beneficial.	  	  Macroeconomic	  research	  
showed	  that	   the	  economic	  boost	  caused	  by	  a	  WTO	  entry	  would	  assure	  a	  high	  GDP	  
growth	   rate	   for	   at	   least	   a	   couple	   of	   years	   after	   the	   accession.	   	   Some	   in	   the	   top	  
leadership	   believed	   that	   the	  WTO	   entry	  would	   benefit	   the	   Chinese	   economy	   as	   a	  
whole	  more	  than	  the	  harm	  it	  could	  bring	  to	  some	  industries.	  	  Allegedly,	  there	  was	  no	  
complex,	  comprehensive	  quantitative	  research	  to	  support	  this	  argument.153	  	  At	  the	  
time	  of	  SOE	  reform,	  China	  was	  in	  dire	  need	  of	  an	  active	  private	  sector,	  which	  would	  
absorb	   oversupply	   of	   the	   labor.	   	   Foreign	   investment,	   if	   allowed	   to	   access	   cheap	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Chinese	  labor	  and	  raw	  material,	  could	  be	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  job	  market.	  	  
On	  the	  flip	  side	  of	  the	  coin,	   it	  may	  compete	  with	  and	  even	  choke	  local	  business.	   	   It	  
was	  the	  forceful	  argument	  of	  the	  opponents	  and	  lasted	  even	  after	  China	  entered	  into	  
the	   WTO.	   	   Besides,	   China	   believed	   that	   another	   round	   of	   multilateral	   trade	  
negotiation	  would	  begin	  soon.	  	  If	  it	  could	  not	  join	  the	  WTO	  before	  the	  new	  round,	  it	  
was	  afraid	  that	  its	  interests,	  as	  a	  developing	  country,	  would	  not	  be	  considered.	  	  
On	  the	  two	  sides	  of	   the	  Pacific,	   the	  political	  and	  economic	  needs	  of	   the	  two	  
countries	  pointed	  to	  the	  same	  direction	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	   	   In	  October	  1997	  during	  
Jiang’s	  state	  visit	  to	  the	  US,	  the	  two	  countries	  agreed	  that	  “China’s	  full	  participation	  
in	   the	   multilateral	   trading	   system	   is	   in	   their	   mutual	   interest.”	   	   The	   two	   parties	  
agreed	  to	  intensify	  bilateral	  negotiations	  on	  market	  access	  so	  that	  “China	  can	  accede	  
to	  the	  WTO	  on	  a	  commercially	  meaningful	  basis	  at	  the	  earliest	  possible	  date.”154	  	  The	  
Chinese	   still	   emphasized	   “full	   participation”;	   the	   Americans	   stressed	   on	   “a	  
commercially	   meaningful	   basis.”	   	   Nevertheless,	   from	   then	   onward,	   bilateral	   talks	  
intensified.	   	   Jiang’s	   visit	   was	   certainly	   a	   very	   big	   buying	   mission.	   	   The	   trade	  
delegation	  signed	  contracts	  of	  $4.26	  billion	  with	  the	  US	  companies.	  	  In	  March	  1998,	  
China	  submitted	  a	  list	  of	  nearly	  6000	  products	  for	  tariff	  reduction.	  	  	  
Although	  China	  wanted	  to	  take	  the	  opportunity	  of	  Clinton’s	  visit	  to	  China	  in	  
June	   1998	   to	   conclude	   the	   talks,	   Washington	   rejected	   this	   idea	   due	   to	   domestic	  
politics.	   	   Clinton	  promised	   to	  personally	   get	   involved	   in	   the	  bilateral	  negotiations.	  	  
At	  this	  time,	  Clinton	  was	  being	  investigated	  for	  a	  political	  sex	  scandal	  with	  Monica	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Lewinsky,	  which	  led	  to	  an	  impeachment	  trial	  later.	  	  Allegedly,	  Clinton	  wrote	  a	  letter	  
to	  Jiang	  Zemin	  on	  November	  6,	  1998,	  stating	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  WTO	  issue	  could	  be	  
resolved	   in	   the	   first	  quarter	  of	  1999.	   	  On	  February	  8,	  1999,	  Clinton	   sent	  a	   second	  
letter,	   expressing	   his	   hope	   that	   the	   bilateral	   negotiations	   should	   be	   concluded	  
during	   Premier	   Zhu’s	   visit.	   	   On	   February	   12,	   a	   third	   letter	   was	   about	   the	   draft	  
package.155	  	  	  
China	  took	  all	  the	  signals	  seriously.	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  positive	  signals,	  China	  
held	  meetings	  at	   State	  Council	   level	   and	   then	  Politburo	   level	   in	  February	  1999,	   in	  
order	  to	  keep	  all	  relevant	  bureaucratic	  leaders	  in	  tune	  with	  the	  top.	  	  On	  February	  23,	  
1999,	  Clinton	  sent	  a	  large	  delegation	  to	  Beijing	  and	  held	  intensive	  negotiations.	  	  The	  
two	  parties	  reached	  consensus	  on	  many	  issues,	  including	  tariffs	  on	  industrial	  goods	  
and	   agricultural	   goods,	   and	   non-­‐tariff	   measures,	   and	   began	   to	   seek	   the	   right	  
moment	  to	  sign	  the	  deal.	  	  In	  March	  1999,	  as	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  
(NATO)	  launched	  bombing	  in	  Serbia,	  there	  was	  hesitation	  in	  the	  Chinese	  leadership	  
on	  whether	   Zhu’s	   visit	   to	   the	   US	   in	   April	   should	   be	   kept	   during	   the	   tension	   over	  
Kosovo	  and	  whether	  the	  bilateral	  talks	  for	  the	  WTO	  entry	  should	  continue.	  	  
Premier	   Zhu	   was	   hesitant	   about	   the	   trip;	   he	   was	   speculating	   whether	   he	  
would	  be	  able	  to	  bring	  home	  a	  deal	  from	  his	  visit	  to	  the	  US.	  	  On	  one	  hand,	  China	  got	  
more	   positive	   signals	   from	   the	   US.	   	   On	   March	   29,	   1999,	   Secretary	   of	   Commerce	  
William	   Daley	   told	   the	   media	   in	   Beijing	   International	   Hotel	   that	   Clinton	   came	   to	  
China	  in	  June	  1998	  against	  150	  congress	  members’	  opinion,	  and	  “it	  was	  a	  successful	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mission.”	   	  “So	  you	  just	  have	  to	  make	  the	  right	  decisions	  and	  move	  forward.”156	  	  Dr.	  
Kenneth	   Lieberthal,	   Senior	   Director	   for	   Asia	   at	   the	   NSC	   and	   USTR	   Barshefsky	  
persuaded	  their	  counterpart,	  Long	  Yongtu,	  that	  Zhu	  should	  keep	  his	  visit	  in	  April.	  	  	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   Chinese	   were	   confused	   by	   the	   opposite	   message.	  	  
Setting	  aside	  Kosovo,	   the	  Sino-­‐American	   relationship	  had	  a	   lot	  of	   tension	   in	  1999,	  
including	  the	  spying	  issue,	  the	  Cox	  report,	  human	  rights,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  From	  the	  media	  
reports,	  the	  Chinese	  learned	  of	  the	  American	  domestic	  debate	  about	  the	  trade	  deal,	  
and	  they	  knew	  that	  “in	  the	  White	  House,	  some	  are	  getting	  cold	  feet,”	  and	  that	  “some	  
wonder	   whether	   the	   Congress	   will	   torpedo	   the	   deal.”157 	  	   Eventually,	   with	   the	  
support	  of	   Jiang	  Zemin,	  Zhu	  decided	  to	  visit	   the	  US,	   in	  the	  hope	  that	  a	  deal	  will	  be	  
reached.158	  	  When	  Zhu	  was	   traveling	   across	   the	  Pacific,	   Clinton	  gave	   an	  optimistic	  
speech	  at	  United	  States	  Institute	  of	  Peace.159	  	  Dr.	  Lieberthal	  wired	  the	  transcript	  of	  
the	  speech	  to	  Zhu	  when	  he	  was	  on	  the	  plane.	  	  Zhu	  was	  satisfied.160	  	  	  	  
Although	   the	   internal	   coordination	  may	  be	  painstaking,	   the	  Chinese	   tended	  
to	   stay	  on	   the	   same	  pitch	  while	  negotiating	  with	   foreigners.	   	  At	   least,	   the	   internal	  
divides	   were	   not	   very	   visible.	   	   The	   freedom	   of	   information	   in	   the	   US	   makes	   the	  
different	  opinions	  within	  the	  American	  government	  visible	  to	  the	  general	  public,	  as	  
well	  as	   their	  negotiation	  counterpart	  overseas.	   	  The	  visibility	  may	  have	   impact	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  See	  “Daley	  Press	  Briefing	  at	  Beijing	  International	  Hotel,”	  Inside	  U.S.	  Trade’s	  World	  Trade	  Online,	  April	  1,	  
1999.	  	  
157	  David	  E.	  Sanger,	  “White	  House	  Offers	  China	  Plan”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  March	  28.	  Section	  4;	  Page	  2;	  Column	  
4	  
158	  See	  “China	  Hopes	  for	  a	  Deal	  on	  WTO	  during	  Zhu’s	  Visit,”	  Inside	  U.S.	  Trade’s	  World	  Trade	  Online,	  April	  6,	  
1999.	  
159	  William	  Clinton,	  “Remarks	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Institute	  of	  Peace,”	  April	  7,	  1999.	  
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-­‐1999-­‐book1/pdf/PPP-­‐1999-­‐book1-­‐doc-­‐pg506.pdf>	  




the	   bilateral	   negotiations.	   	   It	   could	   effectively	   transfer	   pressure	   onto	   their	  
counterpart	  and	  increase	  American	  negotiators’	  leverage;	  alternatively,	  it	  could	  also	  
send	  confusing	  signals,	  dampen	  the	  counterpart’s	  enthusiasm	  and	  willingness,	  and	  
even	   delay	   a	   deal.	   	   The	   USTR’s	   effective	   usage	   of	   congressional	   pressure	   is	   the	  
former,	  though	  what	  happened	  after	  Zhu	  came	  to	  Washington	  is	  the	  latter.	   	  Senate	  
Majority	   Leader	   Trent	   Lott	   (R-­‐MS)	   charged	   that	   the	   Clinton	   Administration	   was	  
pressing	  for	  the	  China	  WTO	  deal	  because	  it	  was	  desperate	  to	  announce	  a	  success.	  	  It	  
would	  sign	  “any	  agreement”	  during	  the	  Chinese	  premier’s	  visit.161	  	  Confronted	  with	  
domestic	  pressure,	  Clinton’s	  advisors	  divided	  on	  whether	  to	  sign	  the	  deal	  when	  Zhu	  
was	  in	  Washington.	  	  	  
On	  one	  side,	  NSC	  head	  Samuel	  Berger,	  State	  Secretary	  Madeline	  Albright	  and	  
USTR	  Charlene	  Barshefsky	  favored	  the	  deal.	   	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  Treasury	  Secretary	  
Robert	   Rubin,	   NEC	   Gene	   Sperling,	   and	   others	   worried	   about	   labor	   unions,	   the	  
congressional	  ratification,	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  China	  issue	  on	  the	  2000	  election.	  	  They	  
speculated	  that	  since	  Clinton’s	  presidency	  had	   just	  been	  weakened	   in	  1998,	  a	  deal	  
with	  China	  for	  the	  time	  being	  would	  damage	  not	  only	  Clinton’s	  presidency,	  but	  also	  
the	  Democratic	  Party.162	  	  Rubin	  has	  Clinton’s	  respect,	  and	  thus	  powerful	   influence.	  	  
Clinton	  decided	  to	  back	  out	  of	  the	  deal	  at	  the	  last	  minute,	  and	  explained	  to	  Zhu	  that	  
Congress	   would	   vote	   against	   the	   deal.	   	   Zhu	   had	   no	   better	   option	   but	   to	   agree	   to	  
conclude	  the	  deal	  a	  little	  bit	  later.	  	  The	  Clinton	  administration	  estimated	  to	  wait	  for	  
two	  weeks	   or	   so	   to	   sign	   the	   deal.	   	   In	   order	   to	   save	   face,	   they	   got	   a	   side	   deal,	   the	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Agricultural	  Cooperation	  Agreement,	  for	  Zhu	  to	  sign,	  and	  also	  invited	  Zhu	  for	  a	  state	  
dinner.163	  
On	  April	  8,	  1999,	  without	  Chinese	  permission,	  a	  joint	  statement	  was	  released	  
on	  the	  USTR	  website,	  revealing	  all	  concessions	  China	  had	  made.	  	  The	  reactions	  in	  the	  
two	   countries	  were	   different.	   	   Textile	   people	   in	  Hong	  Kong	   read	   it	   and	   sent	   their	  
anger	  to	  Beijing,	  which	  got	  hold	  of	  the	  Chinese	  delegates	  in	  the	  US.	  	  In	  Washington,	  
the	   Chinese	   furiously	   complained	   to	   the	   Americans.164	  	   The	   US	   admitted	   that	   the	  
release	  was	  a	  mistake	  and	  agreed	  to	  issue	  a	  new	  joint	  statement,	  which	  manifested	  
its	   “support	   of	   the	   common	   goal	   of	   admission	   of	   the	   PRC	   to	   the	  WTO	   on	   strong	  
commercial	  terms	  in	  1999.”165	  	  At	  the	  White	  House	  briefing	  on	  the	  next	  Monday,	  the	  
US	  business	   community	   gave	  Barshefsky	   a	   standing	  ovation	   and	   criticized	  Clinton	  
for	  losing	  the	  opportunity	  to	  wrap	  up	  a	  very	  good	  deal.166	  	  Clinton	  called	  Zhu	  when	  
Zhu	  was	  in	  Canada	  and	  offered	  to	  send	  Barshefsky	  up	  there	  to	  finish	  the	  deal.	   	  Zhu	  
refused	  and	  asked	  the	  US	  to	  send	  a	  delegation	  to	  Beijing.	  	  Later,	  China	  claimed	  that	  
the	  released	  document	  was	  simply	  the	  American	  demands.167	  
On	   May	   7,	   the	   unexpected	   NATO	   bombing	   of	   the	   Chinese	   Embassy	   in	  
Belgrade	   occurred.	   	   In	   China,	   the	   ensuring	   nationalistic	   protests	   against	   the	   US	  
spread	  widely,	  which	  made	  it	  impossible	  to	  sign	  the	  deal	  soon.	  	  When	  Clinton	  called	  
Jiang	   to	   explain	   the	   bombing	   was	   accidental,	   he	   suggested	   at	   a	   couple	   of	   times	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resuming	  the	  bilateral	  talks	  for	  China’s	  WTO	  entry.	   	   Jiang	  refused.	   	  Clinton	  granted	  
China	  MFN	  status	  on	  June	  3,	  earlier	  than	  the	  previous	  years.	  	  In	  July,	  David	  Andrews,	  
the	   legal	   advisor	   of	   the	   US	   State	   Department,	   announced	   the	   decision	   to	   make	  
“humanitarian	   payments”	   of	   $4.5	   million	   to	   the	   bombing	   victims	   and	   their	  
families.168	  	  	  
At	   risk	  were	   not	   only	   the	   bilateral	   trade	   relationship,	   but	   also	   the	   broader	  
Sino-­‐American	  relationship.	  	  To	  restore	  the	  relationship,	  Clinton	  sent	  three	  top	  aides,	  
Larry	  Summers,	  Kenneth	  Lieberthal,	  and	  Bob	  Novick,	  to	  China.	  	  They	  flew	  from	  the	  
US	   to	  China,	   from	  Beijing	   to	  Lanzhou,	   and	   finally	   got	  hold	  of	   Zhu	   for	   a	  meeting169	  
when	  Zhu	  was	  engaging	  in	  the	  project	  of	  West	  China	  Development.	  	  Apparently,	  Zhu	  
Rongji	  was	   unhappy	   about	   Clinton’s	   judgment	   in	   April,	   but	  was	   convinced	   that	   it	  
was	  a	  mistake,	  instead	  of	  a	  setup.170	  	  With	  Clinton’s	  permission,	  they	  agreed	  to	  three	  
of	   Zhu’s	   requests.	   	   Later,	   Zhu	   said	   he	   talked	   with	   Summers	   about	   the	   foreign	  
ownership	   ratio	   in	   telecommunication	   and	   insurance,171	  among	   others.	   	   After	   the	  
confidential	  Lanzhou	  Meeting,	  China	  agreed	  to	  resume	  the	  talks	  at	  the	  APEC	  summit	  
in	   Aukland,	   New	   Zealand,	   on	   the	   condition	   of	   permanent	   MFN. 172 	  	   Clinton	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  See	  “U.S.	  to	  Pay	  $4.5	  Million	  for	  Bombing	  of	  Chinese	  Embassy	  in	  Yugoslavia,”	  LA	  Times,	  July	  31,	  1999.	  <	  
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jul/31/news/mn-­‐61319>	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  My	  interview	  with	  the	  American	  interviewee,	  No.	  3.	  	  This	  has	  been	  confirmed	  by	  one	  of	  my	  interviews	  with	  
the	  Chinese	  interviewee,	  No.	  10.	  	  	  
170	  See	  Zhu	  Rongji,	  Zhu	  Rongji	  On	  The	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  (Beijing:	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  Publishing	  House),	  Vol	  3.	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  Rongji,	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  Rongji	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  (Beijing:	  People’s	  Publishing	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  Vol	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manifested	  that	  he	  was	  committed	  to	  get	   it	  passed	  by	  the	  Congress.173	  	   In	   fact,	   the	  
major	  concession	  the	  US	  made	  was	  about	  China’s	  MFN	  status.	  
On	  November	  10,	  1999,	  the	  bilateral	  negotiations	  finally	  resumed.	  	  Charlene	  
Barshefsky	   and	   Gene	   Sperling	   went	   to	   Beijing	   together.	   	   Seeing	   Sperling	   in	   the	  
delegation,	   the	   Chinese	   got	   the	   signal	   that	   the	   hesitation	   in	   the	   Clinton	  
Administration	   had	   been	   cleared	   up.174	  	   The	   last	   six	   days	   of	   negotiation	   were	  
described	  by	  the	  media	  as	  “dramatic”.	  	  At	  negotiation	  deadlocks,	  Barshefsky	  “did	  not	  
want	   the	   US	   to	   look	  weak.”175	  	   The	  US	   delegation	   threatened	   to	   leave	   a	   couple	   of	  
times	   and	   even	   checked	   out	   of	   the	   hotel.	   	   The	   Chinese	   negotiators	   called	   it	  
“Barshefsky’s	   taxi	   strategy.”176	  	   To	   break	   through	   the	   deadlock,	   Zhu	   personally	  
participated	   the	   negotiations.	   	   To	   his	   counterparts	   across	   the	   table	   and	   perhaps	  
more	   importantly	   to	   his	   colleagues	   at	   the	   same	   side	   of	   the	   table,	   he	   carefully	  
mentioned	  that	  Jiang	  urged	  him	  twice	  to	  come	  to	  the	  negotiation	  location.	  	  
The	   last	   seven	   issues	   included	   the	   foreign	   ownership	   ratio	   in	   the	  
telecommunication	   industry,	   banking,	   insurance,	   automobiles,	   anti-­‐dumping,	  
safeguard,	   and	   audiovisual	   industry.	   	   Allegedly,	   Zhu	   expressed	   his	   gratefulness	   to	  
the	  American	  for	  lifting	  quotas	  on	  Chinese	  textile	  imports	  and	  not	  insisting	  on	  51%	  
foreign	   ownership	   in	   telecom	   and	   insurance.	   	   From	   Zhu’s	   trip	   to	   the	   US	   in	   April,	  
China	   had	   gained	   sufficient	   confidence	   on	   the	   congressional	   support	   for	   the	   deal.	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  World	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Zhu	  went	  on	  to	  emphasize	  his	  difficulty	  in	  domestic	  politics	  after	  the	  April	  deal	  fell	  
apart	   and	   the	   Chinese	   concession	   on	   agriculture.	   	   Barshefsky	   stressed	   on	   the	  
American	   compromise	   on	   audiovisual	   and	   threw	   out	   a	   new	   issue,	   fertilizer,	   by	  
stressing	   that	   the	   chemical	   industry	   had	   as	   big	   political	   influence	   as	   agriculture.	  	  
With	  sufficient	  information	  about	  the	  reaction	  of	  the	  US	  business	  community	  to	  the	  
April	   document,	   China	   was	   able	   to	   sit	   tight	   this	   time.	   	   Barshefsky	   and	   Sperling	  
stepped	   out	   of	   the	   meeting	   and	   called	   Clinton.	   	   Their	   phone	   call	   dragged	   the	  
president	  out	  of	  shower	  and	  got	  them	  the	  permission	  to	  solve	  the	  fertilizer	  issue	  at	  
another	  occasion.177	  	  The	  fifteen-­‐year	  long	  bilateral	  trade	  negotiation	  finally	  came	  to	  




In	  hindsight,	  questions	  were	  asked	  about	  this	  lengthy,	  conspicuous	  bilateral	  
negotiation,	   such	   as	   Did	   China	   not	   play	   well?	   	   Was	   American	   power	   application	  
effective?	   	  As	  a	  bounded	  rational	  player,	  China	  played	  well	  and	  could	  play	  better	  in	  
the	   third	   stage.	   	   China	  made	  many	   concessions	   in	   order	   to	   grab	   opportunities	   to	  
conclude	   the	   deal,	   including	   those	   before	   Clinton’s	   visit	   in	   1998	   and	   before	   Zhu’s	  
visit	  in	  1999.	  	  The	  concessions	  in	  March	  1999	  were	  even	  a	  surprise	  to	  the	  American	  
negotiator.	   	  With	   a	   better	   judgment	   of	  American	  politics,	   China	   could	  observe	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177	  Barshefsky	  and	  Sperling	  went	  to	  a	  lady's	  room	  and	  called	  Clinton	  from	  there	  about	  the	  fertilizer	  issue.	  	  It	  was	  
an	  emergency,	  and	  they	  could	  not	  find	  a	  better	  spot	  for	  a	  secure	  conversation.	  	  She	  said,	  there	  was	  one	  lady	  in	  
the	  bathroom	  at	  that	  time.	  She	  felt	  so	  sorry	  for	  this	  lady.	  After	  they	  made	  sure	  this	  lady	  left	  and	  there	  was	  no	  one	  
in	  the	  bathroom,	  their	  called	  Clinton	  and	  got	  him	  out	  of	  shower.	  My	  two	  interviews	  with	  the	  American	  




weakness	  of	   the	  Clinton	  Administration	   in	  1998	  and	  predict	   the	   impossibility	  of	  a	  
deal	   in	   that	   year.	   	   Besides,	   the	   reaction	   of	  American	   business	   community	   in	  April	  
1999	   proved	   that	   both	   governments’	   calculations	   were	   wrong.	   	   Ideally,	   they	  
understood	  the	  strength	  of	  American	  business	  support	  for	  the	  deal	  Zhu	  brought	  to	  
Washington,	  they	  could	  have	  concluded	  a	  deal	  then.	  	  
In	  the	  third	  stage,	  the	  Chinese	  understanding	  of	  the	  bilateral	  negotiations	  and	  
domestic	  politics	   and	  pressure	   in	   the	  US	  was	   tremendously	  enhanced.	   	   Seeing	   the	  
American	  business	   community	   that	  had	   interest	   in	  China	  as	   its	  natural	   ally,	   China	  
used	   it	   as	   a	   counterbalance	   to	   those	   opponents	   in	   the	   US.	   	   Threats	   against	   those	  
American	  interests	  in	  China	  significantly	  increased	  China’s	  leverage	  in	  international	  
bargaining	   in	  the	  third	  stage	  compared	  to	  the	  second	  stage.	   	  Beyond	  the	  executive	  
branch,	  China	  began	  to	  interact	  with	  various	  dimensions	  of	  American	  politics.	  	  In	  the	  
third	   stage,	   the	   Chinese	   engagement	   in	  multiple-­‐track	   diplomacy	   and	   the	   sway	   of	  
Europe	  and	  Japan	  also	  weighed	  in.	  	  	  
Considering	  that	  information	  about	  conflicting	  opinions	  within	  the	  American	  
government	   is	   available	   in	   the	   media,	   this	   visibility	   can	   strengthen	   American	  
negotiators’	   position	   or	  weaken	  American	   threats.	   	   For	  most	   time	   of	   the	   bilateral	  
negotiation,	   American	   negotiators	   used	   congressional	   pressure	   to	   increase	  
American	   leverage	   and	   effectively	   pressed	   China	   at	   the	   international	   negotiation.	  	  
When	  Kantor	  succeeded	  Ron	  Brown	  as	  Secretary	  of	  Commerce,	  Barshefsky	  assumed	  




communication	  with	  Republican	  easier.178	  	  She	  spent	  a	  tremendous	  amount	  of	  time	  
talking	   with	   people	   on	   the	   Hill	   and	   was	   aware	   of	   the	   votes	   she	   needed	   to	   work	  
for.179	  	  China,	  without	  abundant	  knowledge	  about	  the	  US	  Congress,	  was	  susceptible	  
to	  the	  congressional	  pressure	  that	  American	  negotiator	  transferred.	  	  However,	  when	  
the	  Chinese	  had	  sufficient	  information	  about	  congressional	  support	  at	  the	  very	  end	  
of	   the	   negotiation,	   China	   was	   able	   to	   reject	   American	   pressure.	   	   The	   American	  
threats	  at	  this	  time	  turned	  to	  be	  not	  credible.	  	  
In	   contrast	   to	   threats,	   appeal	   to	   self-­‐interest	  was	  very	  effective	   to	  bounded	  
rational	  players,	  such	  as	  China.	   	   In	  the	   late	  1990s,	   the	  Chinese	  motivation	  to	  make	  
concessions	   at	   the	   international	   negotiation	   table	   and	   enter	   into	   the	   WTO	   was	  
mainly	   driven	   by	   its	   economic	   development,	   especially	   that	   in	   the	   SOE	   reform.	  	  
Barshefsky’s	   persuasion	   that	   foreign	   competition	   would	   stimulate	   SOE’s	  
performance180	  was	   very	   appealing	   to	   Zhu	   and	   confirmed	   some	   top	   leaders	   belief	  
that	   entry	   into	   the	  WTO	  would	   benefit	   the	   Chinese	   economy.	   	  When	  most	   of	   the	  
SOEs	  were	  in	  the	  mud	  of	  non-­‐performing	  loans	  in	  late	  1990s,	  it	  was	  widely	  believed	  
that	   inefficient	   management	   caused	   their	   poor	   performance.	   	   Foreign	   companies	  
had	   advanced	   knowledge	   and	   experience	   in	   management,	   which	   the	   Chinese	  
companies	   did	   not.	   	   After	   China	   implemented	   the	   open-­‐door	   policy,	   the	   liberal-­‐
minded	   Chinese	   aspired	   to	   learn	   from	   foreigners	   and	   foreign	   companies.	   	   “If	   you	  
don’t	  open	  the	  door	  to	  the	  foreign	  companies,	  how	  would	  you	  learn	  from	  them?”181	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  American	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American	  negotiators	  persuasion	  that	   focused	  on	  the	  Chinese	  own	  interest	  proved	  
























Chapter	  4:	   The	  Second	  Cut	  of	  China’s	  GATT/WTO	  Bid:	  	  
The	  Decision	  Structure	  and	  Garbage	  Can	  Model	  
	  
As	  Graham	  Allison	  puts	  it,	  “a	  government	  consists	  of	  a	  conglomerate	  of	  semi-­‐
feudal,	   loosely	   allied	   organizations,	   each	   with	   a	   substantial	   life	   of	   its	   own.”182	  	  
Organizations	  have	  their	  own	  fixed	  sets	  of	  standard	  operating	  procedures,	  parochial	  
interests	  and	  pre-­‐established	  routines.	   	  To	   further	   look	   into	  government	  decision-­‐
making,	  we	  acknowledge	  that	  organizations	  act	  in	  quasi-­‐independence	  and	  consider	  
government	   behavior	   as	   an	   output	   of	   organizations.	   	   As	   the	   second	   cut	   of	   Dr.	  
Allison’s	  classic	  decision-­‐making	  model,	  the	  organizational	  process	  model	  looks	  into	  
organizations’	  standard	  operations,	  programs,	  and	  repertoires,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  own	  
perceptions	  and	  parochial	  interests.	  	  	  
While	   the	   classic	   model	   shows	   significant	   explanatory	   power	   in	   problem-­‐
driven	   cases,	   it	   exhibits	   its	   limitation	  when	   it	   applies	   to	   other	   cases.	   	   In	  problem-­‐
driven	  cases,	  a	  set	  of	  stable	  constraints	  defines	  acceptable	  performance,	  such	  as	  the	  
existence	   of	   clear	   goals,	   well-­‐defined	   technology,	   and	   substantial	   participant	  
involvement.	   	   However,	   when	   cases	   that	   evolve	   over	   a	   number	   of	   years	   are	  
characterized	   by	   problematic	   preferences,	   unclear	   technology,	   fluid	   participation,	  
and	  even	  changing	  constraints,	  the	  model’s	  explanatory	  power	  is	  reduced.	  	  Internal	  
constraints	   on	   decision-­‐making,	   such	   as	   organizational	   structure	   and	   its	   changes,	  
need	   to	   be	   addressed.	   	   Therefore	   in	   Chapter	   II,	   I	   proposed	   to	   replace	   the	  
organizational	  process	  model	  with	   the	  garbage	   can	  model,	  which	  displays	   general	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




relevance	   to	   interpret	   the	   organizational	   behaviors	   in	   the	   government	   decision-­‐
making.	  	  	  	  
To	   lay	   a	   good	   foundation	   to	   understand	   the	   decision	   structure	   and	  
organizational	   factors	   in	   China’s	   decision	   on	   GATT/WTO	   accession,	   this	   chapter	  
starts	  with	   the	   structure	   of	   Chinese	   government.	   	  Up	   to	  now,	   top-­‐notch	  American	  
scholars	   such	   as	   Kenneth	   Lieberthal,	  Michel	   Oksenberg,	   and	  David	   Lampton	   have	  
done	  excellent	  works	  on	   this	   subject,	   yet	   I	  decide	   to	   adopt	   a	  Chinese	   scholar,	   Zhu	  
Guanglei’s	   research	   on	   this	   structure.	   	   With	   this	   structure	   to	   study	   the	  
Party/government	   relationship	   and	   functions	   in	   decision-­‐making,	   I	   tend	   to	   agree	  
with	   Dr.	   Susan	   Shirk	   and	   other	   scholars’	   adoption	   of	   the	   language	   of	   Western	  
institutional	   economics	   –	   the	   principal	   and	   the	   agent.183	  	   I	   admire	   the	   thorough	  
research	  of	  Dr.	  Margaret	  Pearson	   in	  The	  Case	  of	  China’s	  Accession	  in	  GATT/WTO,184	  
and	  agree	  with	  her	  conclusion,	   “Opposition	  within	  China	  was	  not	  won	  over,	  …	  but	  
rather	  run	  over.”	   	  Different	   from	  her	   findings	  about	   the	  organizational	  structure,	   I	  
discovered	   the	   three-­‐tier	   structure	   for	   decision-­‐making	   on	   the	   GATT/WTO	  
accession;	  based	  on	  my	  interview	  data	  from	  two	  trips	  to	  Beijing,	  China,	  I	  discovered	  
that	  there	  was	  no	  WTO	  Leadership	  Small	  Group.	  	  This	  chapter,	  featuring	  institutions	  
and	  processes	  in	  China’s	  policy-­‐making	  on	  GATT/WTO	  accession,	  discusses	  decision	  
structure,	  unequal	  powers	  of	  ministries,	   internal	  balance,	  and	  established	  rules	  for	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bargaining	  and	  decision,	  which	  makes	  it	  a	  perfect	  case	  to	  support	  Dr.	  Shirk’s	  theory	  
about	  decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  Chinese	  government,	  delegation	  by	  consensus.185	  	  	  	  
Beyond	   the	   organizational	   process,	   the	   garbage	   can	   model	   perceives	   the	  
Chinese	   government’s	   decision	   making	   from	   a	   broader	   perspective,	   captures	   the	  
dynamic	  evolution	  of	  problems	  and	  proposals	  and	  the	  change	  in	  decision	  structure,	  
and	  interpret	  well	  about	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  agreement.	  	  In	  Agendas,	  Alternatives,	  and	  
Public	  Policies,	  Dr.	  John	  W.	  Kingdon’s	  revised	  the	  Cohen-­‐March-­‐Olsen’s	  garbage	  can	  
model	  of	  organizational	  choice	  and	  proposed	  that	  for	  an	  issue	  to	  get	  on	  the	  political	  
agenda,	   three	   streams	   must	   come	   together.	   	   These	   three	   streams	   are	   problems,	  
policies,	   and	   politics.	   	   At	   the	   time	   of	   the	   appearance	   of	   compelling	   problems	   or	  
happenings	   in	   the	   political	   stream,	   opportunities	   emerge	   for	   pushing	   for	   policy	  
proposals	  or	  conceptions	  of	  problems.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  policy	  window	  opens.186	  	  
The	  problems	  capture	  the	  attention	  of	  decision	  makers	  when	  some	  more	  or	  
less	  systematic	  indicator	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  problem.	  	  The	  change	  of	  this	  indicator	  
is	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   change	   in	   the	   state	   of	   a	   system	   and	   can	   have	   exaggerated	  
effects	  on	  policy	  agendas.	   	  A	  countable	  problem	   is	  powerful,	   and	  a	   failure	   to	  meet	  
goals	   set	   by	   administrators	   usually	   brings	   problems	   to	   their	   attention.	   	   Proposals	  
that	   survive	   in	   the	   policy	   community	   are	   compatible	   with	   the	   values	   of	   the	  
specialists.	   	   It	   takes	   a	   long	   period	   of	   softening	   up	   for	   the	   policy	   community	   to	   be	  
receptive	  to	  a	  new	  idea.	  	  A	  proposal	  that	  meets	  some	  criteria	  and	  becomes	  capable	  
of	  being	   implemented	  moves	   into	  a	  short	   list	  produced	  by	   the	  policy	  stream.	   	  The	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political	  stream	  flows	  along	  independently	  of	  the	  problems	  and	  policy	  streams.	  	  The	  
balance	  of	  organized	  forces	  has	  powerful	  effects	  on	  agendas.	   	  Events	   in	  any	  one	  of	  
the	   three	   streams	   occur	   independently	   of	   two	   other	   streams.	   	   At	   some	   critical	  
junctures,	   these	   three	   separate	   streams	   –	   problems,	   policies	   as	   the	   solutions,	   and	  
political	   forces	   –	   joined	   together.	   	  When	   the	   three	   streams	   are	   coupled	   together,	  
significant	  movement	  is	  much	  more	  likely.187	  	  
Under	   the	  garbage	   can	  model,	  decision	  makers	  and	  problems	   tend	   to	   track	  
each	  other	  through	  choices	  and	  to	  move	  together	  from	  choice	  to	  choice.	  	  It	  facilitates	  
our	  understanding	  how	  a	  problem	  was	  attached	  to	  a	  choice	  in	  the	  bureaucracy,	  and	  
why	  the	  solution	  comes	  into	  a	  being	  at	  one	  time,	  not	  another	  time.	  	  In	  the	  enduring	  
bilateral	   negotiation	   on	   China’s	   GATT/WTO	   accession,	   China	   went	   through	   a	  
process	   of	   clarifying	   goals,	   in	   which	   the	   technology	   was	   not	   well	   defined,	  
participation	   was	   fluid,	   fundamental	   restructuring	   occurred	   in	   the	   bureaucracy.	  	  
Therefore,	  the	  organizational	  process	  model	  loses	  its	  explanation	  power.	  	  Instead,	  I	  
apply	   the	   garbage	   can	   model	   to	   the	   Chinese’	   decision	   making	   during	   the	   Sino-­‐
American	  negotiation,	   in	  order	   to	  study	   the	  organizational	   factors,	  especially	   their	  
changes,	   not	   the	   routines,	   which	   influenced	   the	   Chinese	   foreign	   economic	   policy	  
making	  in	  1990s.	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To	  understand	  American	  trade	  politics,	  we	  need	  to	  look	  at	  the	  US	  Congress’s	  
constitutional	  authority	  to	  “regulate	  commerce	  with	  foreign	  nations,”	  its	  delegation	  
of	  power	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  United	  State	  
Trade	  Representative	  (USTR)	  under	  and	  representing	  the	  President	  in	  negotiations	  
with	   Congress	   as	   well	   as	   foreign	   nations.	   	   In	   American	   trade	   politics,	   both	   the	  
authority	  to	  bargain	  at	  the	  international	  and	  domestic	  tables	  and	  the	  power	  of	  check	  
and	  balance	  lie	  in	  this	  structure	  of	  power	  sharing	  and	  delegation.	  	  Similarly	  to	  some	  
extent,	  understanding	  the	  structure	  of	  Chinese	  government	  is	  very	  essential	  to	  build	  
understanding	   of	   Chinese	   foreign	   trade	   policy,	   as	   a	   kickoff	   of	   this	   dissertation’s	  
organizational	  analysis	  on	  Chinese	  trade	  decision-­‐making.	  
Scholars	   have	   examined	   the	   structure	   of	   authority	   within	   the	   Chinese	  
government,	  and	  have	  used	  words	  such	  as	  centralized,	  hierarchical	  and	  fragmented,	  
to	   describe	   the	   power	   allocation	   within	   the	   institution.	   	   To	   understand	   the	  
bargaining	   process	   by	  which	   Chinese	   trade	   policies	  were	  made	   requires	  mapping	  
the	  bureaucratic	  terrain.	  	  It	  may	  touch	  upon	  a	  series	  of	  issues,	  such	  as	  the	  structure	  
of	   the	   Chinese	   government,	   the	   commissions	   and	   departments	   within	   the	   State	  
Council,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  China	  (CPC)	  and	  the	  state	  
and	   between	   local	   government	   and	   central	   government,	   and	   the	   delegation	   and	  
accountability,	  etc.	  	  
Modern	  Chinese	  politics	  has	  four	  primary	  components:	  the	  party,	  executive,	  
military,	  and	  court.	  	  On	  these	  four	  factors,	  the	  power	  structure	  features	  the	  so-­‐called	  




under	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1975	  and	  later	  reinstated	  by	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1982.	  	  The	  
President	  of	  PRC	  is	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  figurehead	  of	  the	  nation.	  	  The	  “2”	  points	  to	  the	  
judiciary	   system:	   the	   Supreme	   People’s	   Court	   and	   the	   Supreme	   People’s	  
Procuratorate.	  	  The	  “6”	  organs	  of	  leadership	  are	  listed	  as	  followings:	  	  
1.CPC’s	   Central	   Committee	   (including	   Political	   Bureau	   (a/k/a	   Politburo),	   the	  
Standing	   Committee	   of	   the	   Politburo,	   and	   the	   Secretariat	   of	   the	   Central	  
Committee)	  	  
2.	  Central	  Commission	  for	  Discipline	  Inspection	  (CCDI)	  of	  Central	  Committee	  
3.	  National	  People’s	  Congress	  (NPC)	  and	  its	  Standing	  Committee	  
4.	  State	  Council	  
5.	  Military	  Commission	  of	  the	  CPC	  Central	  Committee	  (CMC)	  
6.National	  Committee	  of	  the	  Chinese	  People’s	  Political	  Consultative	  Conference	  
(CPPCC)188	  
	  
The	  original	  design	  of	  the	  1982	  Constitution	  was	  to	  separate	  power	  between	  
the	  General	  Secretary	  of	   the	  CPC	  Central	  Committee,	   the	  branch	  to	  develop	  policy,	  
and	  the	  Premier	  of	  State	  Council,	   the	  branch	  to	  execute	  and	   implement	   the	  policy,	  
and	   to	   prevent	   a	   cult	   of	   personality	   from	   forming	   as	   it	   did	   under	   Mao	   Zedong’s	  
ruling.	   	   The	   President,	   which	   evolved	   from	   the	   state	   Chairman,	   held	   formal	  
responsibilities,	  such	  as	  greeting	  heads	  of	  foreign	  countries,	  should	  not	  intervene	  in	  
state	  affairs,	  and	  was	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  figurehead	  of	  the	  state.	  	  
Among	   the	   six	   organs,	   the	   Party’s	   Central	   Committee	   is	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	  
power	  structure.	  	  The	  1982	  Constitution	  stipulates	  that	  the	  NPC	  is	  the	  highest	  organ	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of	   state	   authority	   power	   and	   legislative	   power,	   and	   that	   the	   State	   Council	   shall	  
operate	  under	  and	  be	  responsible	  to	  the	  NPC.	  	  The	  NPC	  plenary	  session,	  which	  lasts	  
about	   two	   weeks,	   is	   held	   once	   a	   year.	   	   When	   the	   NPC	   is	   not	   in	   session,	   the	   CPC	  
Central	   Committee	   implements	   its	   resolution	   and	   takes	   the	   lead	   in	   all	   the	   work.	  	  
Under	  this	  structure	  design,	  the	  actual	  power	  rests	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  CPC	  Central	  
Committee	  and	  the	  State	  Council.	  	  The	  former	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  policy	  decision,	  and	  the	  
latter	  responsible	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  decisions.	  	  
Within	   the	   Central	   Committee,	   the	   Politburo	   Standing	   Committee	   is	   the	  
center	   of	   policy	   making.	   	   When	   the	   Central	   Committee	   is	   not	   in	   session,	   the	  
Politburo	   and	   its	   standing	   committee	   exercise	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   Central	  
Committee.	  	  Since	  the	  year	  of	  1987,	  the	  Politburo	  has	  held	  meetings	  roughly	  once	  a	  
month,	  and	  the	  members	  of	  its	  standing	  committee	  hold	  meetings	  frequently.	  	  From	  
about	   200	   Central	   Committee	  members	   are	   elected	   about	   20	   Politburo	  members,	  
from	  whom	   in	   turn	  are	  elected	   roughly	   five	   to	   seven	  members	   to	   sit	   on	  Politburo	  
Standing	  Committee	  (PSC),	  which	  sits	  at	  the	  top	  of	  this	  unitary	  system	  and	  pyramid	  
structure.	   	   Its	   authority	   comes	   from	   two	   delegations,	   one	   from	   the	   NPC	   to	   CPC	  
Central	  Committee,	  the	  other	  from	  the	  Central	  Committee	  to	  its	  PSC.	   	  Therefore,	   in	  
any	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  making,	  Politburo	  Standing	  Committee	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  highest	  decision	  body,	  and	  the	  State	  Council	  executes	  its	  decisions	  and	  report	  to	  
it.	  	  
In	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   China’s	   GATT	   application,	   two	   other	   decision	   bodies	  




Commission.	   	   Central	   Advisory	   Commission	   (CAC)	   was	   created	   as	   a	   transition	   to	  
resolve	   the	   retirement	   problem	   of	   leaders	   of	   the	   revolutionary	   generation.	   	   The	  
1982	  Constitution	   stipulates	   that	  CAC	  members	   can	  participate	   in	  meetings	  of	   the	  
Party’s	   Central	   Committee	   and	   the	  members	   of	   the	   CAC	   Standing	   Committee	   can	  
participate	  in	  meetings	  of	  the	  Politburo.	  	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  
advisory,	   the	  CAC	   influenced	  decision-­‐making	   through	   the	  Central	   Committee	   and	  
overshadowed	   the	  Politburo	  Standing	  Committee.	   	  During	   the	  CAC’s	   lifespan	   from	  
1982	  to	  1992,	  the	  structure	  of	  Chinese	  government	  had	  the	  7	  organs	  of	  leadership,	  
instead	  of	  6	  organs.	  When	   the	   revolutionary	  generation	   faded	   from	   the	   scene,	   the	  
seniority	   issue	   was	   not	   heated	   any	   more.	   	   The	   CAC	   was	   abolished	   by	   the	   CPC	  
Fourteenth	   National	   Congress	   in	   1992,	   and	   its	   influence	   on	   Sino-­‐American	  
negotiations	  ceased	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  
The	  Military	   Commission	   of	   the	   CPC	   Central	   Committee	   (CMC)	   is	   a	   classic	  
example	   for	   “two	   plaques	   for	   one	   team”	   in	   Chinese	   government	   structure.	   	   The	  
Central	  Military	  Commission	  refers	  to	  both	  the	  Central	  Military	  Commission	  of	   the	  
CPC	  and	  the	  Central	  Military	  Commission	  of	  PRC.	   	  Since	  the	  end	  of	  Mao’s	  time	  and	  
the	   Cultural	   Revolution,	   the	   leadership	   restored	   order	   and	   preferred	   collective	  
decision.	   	  Thus,	  China	  perceivably	  had	   four	  main	   leaders:	  Hu	  Yaobang,	   the	  Party’s	  
General	   Secretary;	   Zhao	   Ziyang,	   the	   Premier	   of	   the	   State	   Council;	   Li	   Xiannian,	   the	  
President;	  and	  Deng	  Xiaoping,	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  CMC.	   	  As	  the	  paramount	  leader,	  
Deng	  applied	  his	  influence	  on	  various	  policies,	   including	  foreign	  economic	  policies,	  
through	  the	  CAC	  and	  CMC	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s.	  	  By	  the	  year	  of	  1993,	  Jiang	  




of	   CMC,	   and	   the	  President	   and	  possessed	   these	   three	   top	  positions	   for	   the	   rest	   of	  
1990s.	  	  As	  an	  organization,	  the	  CMC’s	  impact	  on	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  faded	  away.	  	  
As	  the	  cabinet,	  the	  State	  Council	  acts	  as	  the	  major	  organization	  to	  execute	  the	  
decisions	   which	   come	   from	   the	   highest	   decision	   body;	   it	   also	   monitors	   policy	  
implementation	  at	  the	  provincial	  level	  or	  by	  ministries,	  issues	  its	  own	  decisions,	  and	  
formulate	  administrative	  measures.	   	  It	  has	  authority	  over	  its	  subordinate	  agencies,	  
which	   are	   commissions	   and	   ministries	   organized	   mainly	   by	   sector	   (such	   as	  
agriculture)	  or	  function	  (such	  as	  trade	  and	  commerce);	  the	  premier,	  vice	  premiers,	  
secretary-­‐general,	   and	   state	   councilors	   sit	   on	   the	   Standing	  Committee	  of	   the	   State	  
Council,	   supervising	   the	   daily	   operation	   of	   the	   government.	   	   Ministries	   are	  
responsible	   for	   issues	   in	   specific	   sectors,	   and	   commissions	   enjoy	   broader	  
responsibilities	   for	   cross-­‐sectorial	   issues,	   thus	   supra-­‐ministerial	   rank. 189 	  	   Yet,	  
commissions	   do	   not	   have	   final	   authority.	   	   Therefore,	   when	   economic	   sectorial	  
ministries	  cannot	  agree,	  commissions	  become	  the	   lowest	   level	   in	  the	  hierarchy	  for	  
internal	  bargaining,	   and	   the	  State	  Council,	   as	   the	   functional	   center	  of	   state	  power,	  
acts	  as	  the	  clearinghouse	  for	  government	  initiatives	  from	  various	  levels.	  	  	  
To	  sum	  up,	  in	  this	  “6+1+2”	  system,	  the	  Party’s	  Central	  Committee	  possesses	  
the	  top	  position	  of	  the	  pyramid	  power	  structure;	  its	  Politburo	  Standing	  Committee	  
is	  located	  at	  the	  center	  for	  decision-­‐making	  through	  two	  power	  delegations,	  the	  first	  
from	  the	  NPC	  to	  CPC	  Central	  Committee	  and	  the	  second	  from	  the	  latter	  to	  Politburo	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  Commissions	  are	  regarded	  to	  have	  at	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  half	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  ministries	  in	  terms	  of	  bureaucratic	  rank,	  
especially	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  Michel	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Standing	  Committee.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  at	  least	  at	  the	  apex	  of	  this	  government	  structure,	  
the	   chains	   of	   authority	   appear	   to	   converge	   upon	   a	   single	   command	   structure.	  	  
Therefore,	  in	  any	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  making,	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  especially	  
its	  Politburo,	  acts	  as	  the	  highest	  decision	  body	  by	  integrating	  various	  interests	  and	  
maintaining	   internal	   balance	   by	   coordination,	   and	   the	   State	   Council	   executes	   its	  
decisions	  and	  report	  to	   it.	   	  This	  “6+1+2”	  system	  lays	  the	  foundation	  to	  explore	  the	  
chain-­‐of-­‐command	   within	   the	   Party/government	   system,	   and	   how	   domestic	  
bargaining	  and	  consensus	  are	  made.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Three-­‐tier	  Decision	  Structure	  
	  
To	   understand	   American	   trade	   politics,	   we	   need	   to	   look	   at	   the	   three-­‐level	  
structure	  for	  administrative	  decision-­‐making:	  the	  Principals	  Committee	  for	  cabinet	  
secretaries,	   the	   Deputies	   Committee	   for	   deputy	   and	   under	   secretaries,	   and	   the	  
Interagency	  Working	  Groups	   (“I-­‐wigs”)	   for	   assistant	   secretaries.190	  	  A	   lot	   of	   issues	  
are	  discussed	  and	   resolved	  at	   the	   lower	   level	  meetings,	   and	  only	   issues,	  on	  which	  
agreement	   cannot	   be	   entered	   at	   the	   lower	   level,	   move	   up	   to	   the	   higher	   level	   for	  
discussion	   and	   coordination.191	  	   In	   the	   process	   of	   China’s	   GATT/WTO	   application	  
and	  negotiation,	  a	  similar	  three-­‐tier	  structure	  existed	  for	  internal	  coordination	  and	  
decision-­‐making	   within	   the	   Chinese	   bureaucracy.	   	   Coordination	   (“xietiao”)	   is	   a	  
surrogate	   word	   widely	   used	   by	   many	   of	   my	   Chinese	   interviewees	   to	   describe	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  Ivo	  H.	  Daalder	  and	  I.	  M.	  Destler,	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  the	  Oval	  Office:	  Profiles	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  the	  National	  Security	  Advisers	  and	  
the	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  They	  Served	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  From	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  to	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  Bush.	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  York:	  Simon	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  2009)	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domestic	  bargaining	  within	  bureaucracy.	  	  Issues	  moved	  from	  the	  bottom	  to	  the	  top	  
of	  these	  coordination	  forums	  for	  bargaining	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  
	  
State	  Council	  Committee	  on	  Inter-­‐Ministerial	  Coordination	  on	  GATT	  
	  
The	  State	  Council	  established	  an	  ad	  hoc	  interagency	  body	  for	  negotiation	  and	  
coordination	  at	  the	  ministry	  level,	  as	  the	  lowest	  level	  forum	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  
structure.	   	   At	   the	   very	   beginning,	   only	   “two	  ministries	   and	   one	   administration”	   –	  
Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Economic	   Relations	   and	   Trade	  
(MOFERT)192,	   and	   the	   General	   Administration	   of	   Customs	   –	   participated	   in	   GATT	  
affairs.193	  	   With	   more	   and	   more	   industrial	   issue-­‐topics	   involved	   in	   the	   bilateral	  
negotiations,	   liberal	   trade	   policies	   made	   at	   the	   international	   negotiating	   table	  
needed	  domestic	  support	  from	  industrial	  ministries	  for	  implementation.194	  	  In	  1986,	  
the	  Inter-­‐Ministerial	  Coordination	  Group	  on	  GATT	  negotiation	  was	  initially	  formed	  
under	  the	  State	  Council.	  	  It	  was	  lead	  by	  State	  Councilor	  Zhang	  Jinfu,	  who	  also	  headed	  
State	  Economic	  Commission.	   	   In	  1988,	   this	  body	  was	  reorganized	  and	  renamed	  as	  
State	  Council	  Committee	  on	  Inter-­‐Ministerial	  Coordination	  on	  GATT,	  headed	  by	  Vice	  
Premier	  Tian	  Jiyun.	  	  	  
In	   the	   early	   stage	   of	   China’s	  GATT/WTO	  application,	   this	   interagency	   body	  
convened	  once	  a	  month	  or	  once	  every	  other	  month,	  and	  it	  effectively	  resolved	  many	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  1993,	  MOFERT	  was	  renamed	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  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	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issues	   at	   the	   ministry	   level.195	  	   In	   the	   later	   stage,	   it	   convened	   according	   to	   the	  
schedule	  of	   international	  negotiations.	   	  At	   least	  one	  meeting	  was	  called	  before	  any	  
international	   negotiation.196	  	   After	   a	   consensus	   was	   formed	   in	   the	   top	   leadership	  
that	   market	   economy	   would	   replace	   planned	   economy,	   the	   State	   Economic	  
Commission	   (SEC,	   the	   predecessor	   of	   the	   State	   Economic	   and	   Trade	   Commission,	  
SETC)	  was	  on	   the	  rise.	   	   In	   the	  year	  of	  1992,	  SEC	  was	   formed	  mainly	  based	  on	   the	  
original	   State	   Economic	   Commission	   and	   was	   separated	   from	   the	   powerful	   State	  
Planning	   Commission	   (SPC).	   	   Since	   then,	   SEC	   gradually	   took	   over	   the	  GATT/WTO	  
affairs	   from	  the	  SPC.197	  	  Holding	  supra-­‐ministerial	  rank,	  SEC	  took	  the	   lead	   in	  these	  
inter-­‐ministerial	   coordination	   meetings,	   and	   one	   of	   its	   associate	   directors	   was	  
assigned	  to	  be	  in	  charge.	  
Participation	  in	  these	  inter-­‐ministerial	  coordination	  meetings	  was	  very	  fluid,	  
depending	   on	   the	   relevancy	   of	   the	   issue-­‐topic.	   	   On	   average,	   a	  meeting	   assembled	  
officials	   from	   eight	   to	   ten	   ministries,	   and	   this	   number	   was	   never	   fixed.	   	   The	  
associate	   director	   of	   SEC,	   who	   presided	   over	   the	  meeting,	   was	   the	   only	   one	   that	  
attended	  all	  the	  meetings.	  	  When	  an	  issue	  under	  discussion	  was	  not	  important	  to	  a	  
ministry,	  an	  official	  of	  department	  or	  bureau	  level	  was	  usually	  sent	  by	  his	  ministry	  
for	   the	   meeting.	   Instead	   of	   participating	   in	   the	   discussion,	   he	   would	   simply	   put	  
down	  notes	  about	  other	  ministries’	  positions	  in	  order	  to	  report	  to	  higher	  officials	  in	  
his	  ministry.	   	  When	  an	   issue	  at	   the	  meeting	  was	   important	   to	  a	  ministry,	   it	  would	  
make	   sure	   that	   its	   official	   of	   vice-­‐minister	   level	   participate	   it	   and	   present	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195	  My	  interview	  with	  the	  Chinese	  interviewee,	  No.	  20.	  
196	  My	  interview	  with	  the	  Chinese	  interviewee,	  No.	  23.	  




ministry’s	  positions.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  auto	  issues	  were	  under	  discussion,	  a	  vice-­‐
minister	  of	  Ministry	  of	  Machinery	  Building	  Industry	  attended	  the	  meetings.198	  	  	  	  
The	   mechanism	   for	   tariff	   negotiation	   and	   coordination	   was	   a	   little	   bit	  
different	  from	  other	  issue-­‐topics.	   	  Before	  China’s	  GATT/WTO	  application,	  the	  State	  
Council	   had	   already	   formed	   the	   Customs	   Tariff	   Commission,	   a	   well-­‐functioning	  
mechanism	  on	   inter-­‐agency	  coordination	   for	   tariffs.	   	  As	  a	  decision-­‐making	  body,	   it	  
was	   set	   up	   as	   an	   ad	   hoc	   agency,	   but	   it	   has	   existed	   ever	   since.	   	   During	   China’s	  
GATT/WTO	   application,	   it	   became	   the	  major	   forum	   to	   discuss	   tariffs.	   	   The	  major	  
agency	   players	   were	   the	   Ministry	   of	   the	   Treasury,	   the	   General	   Administration	   of	  
Customs,	   MOFTEC,	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Agriculture	   and	   more	   than	   10	   industrial	  
ministries.199	  	  Its	  office	  was	  originally	  located	  at	  General	  Administration	  of	  Customs,	  
then	  SETC,	  and	  now	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Treasury200	  after	  the	  dissolution	  of	  SETC.	   	  The	  
decisions	  made	  on	  tariffs	  were	  reported	  at	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Inter-­‐
Ministerial	  Coordination	  for	  GATT/WTO.201	  
The	  Customs	  Tariff	  Commission	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  
application	  when	   tariffs	  were	   the	   focus	   and	   China’s	   goal	  was	   to	   restore	   its	   GATT	  
membership.	   	   More	   than	   thirty	   GATT	   member	   countries	   requested	   that	   China	  
reduce	   tariffs,	   and	   the	   requests	   were	   sent	   by	   the	   Customs	   Tariff	   Commission	   to	  
various	  industrial	  ministries,	  specifically	  the	  department	  of	  industry	  planning	  under	  
each	  ministry.	   	  The	  ministries	  would	  make	  responses	  and	  gave	   their	  bottom	   lines.	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At	  the	  Customs	  Tariff	  Commission,	  bottom	  lines	  for	   international	  negotiation	  were	  
made	   based	   on	   various	   positions	   and	   then	   reported	   to	   the	   Committee	   on	   Inter-­‐
ministerial	  Coordination	   for	  GATT/WTO.	   	   In	  every	   line	  of	   the	  Chinese	  negotiators’	  
notebook	   were	   the	   item	   code,	   foreigners’	   asking	   percentage,	   the	   Chinese	   biding	  
percentage,	  and	  the	  real	  bottom-­‐line.202	  	  	  
Occasionally	  at	  these	  meetings,	  the	  associate	  director	  of	  SEC	  invited	  in	  one	  or	  
two	  economic	  experts,	  and	  let	  these	  experts	  lecture	  in	  front	  of	  high	  officials	  sent	  by	  
industrial	  ministries	  on	  what	  kind	  of	  government	  regulation	  of	  a	  specific	  industry	  or	  
about	  whether	  specific	  protection	  suited	  the	  market	  economy	  theory.203	  	  Therefore,	  
the	  Chinese	  GATT/WTO	  negotiation,	  either	  at	  the	  domestic	  level	  or	  the	  international	  
level,	   was	   closely	   associated	   with	   its	   prioritized	   decision	   to	   develop	   a	   market	  
economy,	   which	   was	   determined	   by	   the	   very	   top	   leadership.	   	   At	   the	   domestic	  
bargaining	  table,	  pro-­‐trade	  agencies	  strategically	  tied	  the	  liberal	  trade	  policy	  to	  the	  
market	   economy	   theme,	   in	   order	   to	   promote	   GATT/WTO	   accession.	   	   Most	   of	  
industrial	   ministries	   were	   not	   against	   the	   market	   economy	   and	   shared	   the	  
consensus	  that	  relaxing	  government	  protection	  would	  be	  the	  trend.	  	  Their	  different	  
opinions	  focused	  on	  how	  to	  relax	  protection	  measures	  step	  by	  step,	  and	  the	  internal	  
bargaining	   at	   the	   domestic	   table	   centered	   on	   how	   many	   years	   it	   would	   take	   to	  
abolish	  the	  protection	  policy	  and	  liberalize	  trade.	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The	  Premier	  Working	  Meeting	  
	  
Above	   the	   Committee	   on	   Inter-­‐Ministerial	   Coordination	   on	   GATT	   in	   the	  
decision-­‐making	  structure	  was	  the	  intermediate	  level	  forum,	  the	  decision-­‐making	  at	  
the	   premier	   and	   vice	   premier	   level.	   	   According	   to	   all	   the	   relevant	   ministries’	  
positions	  presented	  at	  meetings	  of	  Committee	  on	  Inter-­‐Ministerial	  Coordination	  on	  
GATT	   ministry-­‐level	   coordination,	   the	   associate	   director	   of	   SEC	   came	   up	   with	   a	  
scheme	  for	  international	  negotiation	  and	  reported	  to	  officials	  at	  the	  premier	  level.204	  	  
Thus,	  the	  agreement	  and	  disagreement	  at	  the	  ministry	  level	  moved	  up	  to	  the	  heads	  
of	   the	   State	   Council,	   the	   agreement	   of	   ministries	   waiting	   for	   ratification,	   and	   the	  
disagreements	  for	  dispute	  resolution.	  
On	  many	  occasions	  when	   the	   issues	  were	  not	   significant	   or	   solutions	  were	  
easy	   to	   find,	   the	   associate	   director	   of	   SEC	   simply	   reported	   to	   the	   vice	   premier	   in	  
charge	   of	   the	   GATT/WTO	   affairs	   for	   ratification	   or	   instruction.	   	   After	   the	   vice-­‐
premier	   ratified	   the	   negotiation	   plan,	   this	   plan,	   along	   with	   the	   vice-­‐premier’s	  
instruction,	  would	  be	  directed	  to	  the	  MOFTEC	  and	  its	  negotiating	  team	  for	  the	  next	  
round	  bargaining.	  	  The	  associate	  director	  revealed	  that	  roughly	  about	  70	  percent	  of	  
the	  reports,	  formed	  based	  on	  coordination	  at	  the	  ministry	  level,	  ended	  up	  with	  the	  
vice	  premier’s	  ratification	  and	  his	  instruction.205	  	  	  
The	  rest	  went	  to	  the	  Premier	  Working	  Meeting.206	  	  There	  are	  three	  kinds	  of	  
meetings	  held	  at	  State	  Council	  for	  the	  premier’s	  decision-­‐making	  in	  1990s.	  	  The	  first	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two	   kinds	   of	   meetings,	   the	   Plenary	   Meeting	   and	   its	   Executive	   Meeting,	   are	   two	  
decision	   formats	   stipulated	  by	   the	  1982	  Constitution	  and	   the	  Organization	  Law	  of	  
the	  State	  Council.	   	  The	  plenary	  meeting	  consists	  of	  all	   the	  component	  members	  of	  
the	   State	   Council,	   premier,	   vice	   premier,	   state	   councilors,	   ministers,	   directors	   of	  
various	  commissions,	  president	  of	   the	  People’s	  Bank	  of	  China,	  auditor-­‐general	  and	  
secretary-­‐general.	   	   The	   executive	  meeting	   consists	   of	   premier,	   vice	   premier,	   state	  
councilors,	   and	   secretary-­‐general.207	  	   The	  premier	  working	  meeting,	   not	   regulated	  
by	  law,	  had	  no	  required	  participants.	  	  
There	   is	  no	   specific	  provision	  on	   the	  division	  of	  work	  between	   the	  plenary	  
meeting	  and	  executive	  meeting.	  	  The	  plenary	  meeting	  is	  usually	  held	  once	  every	  five	  
or	   six	   month,	   for	   assigning	   and	   drawing	   conclusion	   about	   important	   state	  
administrative	  work.	  	  Generally,	  it	  is	  not	  used	  for	  decision-­‐making.	  	  In	  the	  1990s,	  the	  
plenary	  meeting	  had	  a	  quorum	  of	  56	   in	  1993	  and	  38	   in	  1998,	  while	   the	  executive	  
meeting	  had	  a	  smaller	  quorum	  of	  15	  in	  1993	  and	  10	  in	  1998.	  	  The	  executive	  meeting	  
convenes	   more	   frequently	   than	   the	   plenary	   meeting,	   about	   once	   in	   less	   than	   a	  
month.208	  	  With	  a	  smaller	  quorum,	  this	  kind	  of	  meeting	  is	  designed	  for	  the	  premier	  
to	   widely	   collect	   various	   positions	   from	   relevant	   administrative	   organs	   and	   for	  
discussion	  and	  decision	  on	  specific	   issues.	   	  Only	  when	  the	   issues	  under	  discussion	  
are	   related	   to	   the	   missions	   of	   the	   ministries,	   ministers	   from	   these	   relevant	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ministries	   participate	   the	   executive	   meeting.	   	   Ministers	   present	   the	   positions	   of	  
their	  ministries,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  have	  voting	  power.209	  	  
In	   comparison	   with	   these	   two	   formats	   of	   meetings,	   the	   premier	   working	  
meeting	  was	  not	  regulated	  by	  law.	  	  In	  practice,	  it	  became	  the	  most	  frequently	  used	  
decision	  mechanism	  at	   the	  State	  Council	   in	   the	  1990s.	   	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   the	  State	  
Council	  does	  not	  have	  committees	  or	  commissions,	  as	  a	  deliberative	  assembly,	   for	  
decision-­‐making	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   State	   Council,	   yet	   the	   premier	   is	   personably	  
responsible	   for	   NPC	   regarding	   all	   decisions	   made	   at	   State	   Council.	   	   Thus,	   the	  
premier	  has	  highest	  authority	  within	   the	  State	  Council	  and	  heads	  all	   its	  staffs.	   	  On	  
the	   other	   hand,	   the	   Organization	   Law	   of	   the	   State	   Council	   does	   not	   stipulate	   any	  
details,	   such	   as	   quorum,	   jurisdiction,	   and	   frequency,	   about	   the	   premier	   working	  
meeting.	   	  Therefore,	   the	  premier	  working	  meeting	  provided	  so	  much	  flexibility	   for	  
the	  premier	  to	  apply	  his	  authority	  on	  decision-­‐making	  –	  he	  can	  collect	  selective	  high	  
officials	  and	  call	  for	  a	  premier	  working	  meeting	  at	  any	  time	  –	  that	  it	  became	  legally	  
questionable.	   	   Later,	   it	   was	   abolished	   in	   the	   year	   of	   2004.210	  	   But	   it	   proved	   very	  
effective	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  negotiation.	  	  
	  The	   premier	   working	   meeting	   gradually	   evolved	   into	   the	   most	   effective,	  
frequent	   forum	   for	   discussion	   and	   decision-­‐making	   at	   the	   State	   Council. 211	  	  
Especially	  in	  1990s,	  Zhu	  Rongji	  empowered	  the	  premier	  working	  meeting212	  so	  that	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it	   was	   widely	   used	   for	   daily	   operation	   and	   emergency,	   etc.	   	  When	   agreement	   on	  
GATT/WTO	  affairs	  could	  not	  be	  reached	  after	  coordination	  at	   the	   inter-­‐ministerial	  
level,	   issues	  needed	   to	  move	  one	   level	  up.	   	  The	  associate	  director	  of	  SEC	   revealed	  
that	   about	   20	   to	   30	  percent	   of	   his	   reports,	   formed	   after	   coordination	  meetings	   at	  
ministry	  level,	  moved	  to	  the	  premier	  working	  meeting,	  where	  the	  premier	  and	  the	  
vice	   premier	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   GATT/WTO	   affairs	   had	   discussion	   and	   made	  
decisions.213	  	  The	  premier	  has	  the	  final	  say	  at	  the	  premier	  working	  meeting.	  
	  
Central	  Committee	  Finance	  and	  Economic	  LSG	  
	  
When	  the	  issues	  under	  negotiation	  were	  out	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  
or	  at	  some	  critical	  point	  of	  international	  negotiation,	  the	  report	  about	  international	  
negotiation	  plan	  needed	  to	  move	  above	  the	  State	  Council	  to	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  the	  
decision	   structure,	   the	   CPC	   Central	   Committee	   Finance	   and	   Economic	   Leadership	  
Small	  Group	  (LSG).214	  	  As	  Dr.	  Lieberthal	  remarks,	   “Leadership	  small	  groups	   form	  a	  
bridge	  between	  the	  top	  leaders	  of	  the	  political	  system	  and	  the	  major	  bureaucracies	  
that	  generate	  information	  and	  implement	  policy.	  	  Each	  of	  the	  major	  leadership	  small	  
groups,	  which	  are	   the	  apex	  of	   their	   related	   functional	  portfolios,	   leads	  an	  array	  of	  
related	   party,	   government,	   and/or	   military	   bureaucracies.” 215 	  	   My	   interviews	  
revealed	   that	  Central	  Committee	  Finance	  and	  Economic	  LSG,	   an	  executive	  body	  of	  
the	   party	   system,	   occupied	   the	   top	   level	   of	   the	   decision	   structure	   in	   China’s	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GATT/WTO	   case,	   and	   that	   it	   demonstrated	   the	   principal	   and	   agent	   relationship	  
between	  the	  Party	  and	  the	  government.	  	  
The	   leadership	  small	  groups	  play	  a	  very	   important	  role	   in	  policy	  making	   in	  
China.	   	  Given	   that	   they	  are	   largely	  hidden	   from	  the	  public	  view,	   they	  appear	   to	  be	  
mysterious	   to	   the	  west.	   	  When	  most	  western	   literature	  discusses	   leadership	  small	  
groups,	  the	  focus	  has	  been	  on	  the	  Central	  Committee’s	  leadership	  small	  groups,	  the	  
small	  groups	  at	  the	  highest	  level.	  	  Actually,	  as	  an	  inter-­‐agency	  mechanism	  for	  policy-­‐
making	  and	  coordination,	  small	  groups	  exist	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  government.	  	  For	  
example,	  within	  China’s	  unitary	  system,	  under	  the	  central	  government	  at	   the	  state	  
level	  are	  provincial	  government,	  city	  government,	  and	  district	  government.	   	  At	  the	  
time	   of	   writing	   this	   dissertation,	   there	   are	   Guangdong	   Province	   Real	   Estate	  
Registration	  Leadership	  Small	  Group,	  Shenzhen	  City	  Anti-­‐counterfeiting	  Leadership	  
Small	  Group,216	  Shenzhen	  City	  Nanshan	  District	  Human	  Resource	  Leadership	  Small	  
Group.217	  	  
Among	   all	   leadership	   small	   groups,	   the	   title	   before	   the	   LSG	   manifests	   the	  
level	  of	  this	  LSG	  in	  the	  party/government	  system.	  	  Guangdong	  Province	  Real	  Estate	  
Registration	  Leadership	   Small	  Group	   is	   at	   the	  provincial	   level.	   	  Within	   the	   central	  
government,	  titles	  starting	  with	  “the	  State	  Council”	  or	  “National”	  indicate	  that	  they	  
are	  an	  administrative	  body	  of	  the	  State	  Council.	  	  For	  example,	  State	  Council	  LSG	  on	  
Western	  Region	  Development	  and	  National	  Economic	  Census	  LSG.	  	  Titles	  beginning	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216	  Shenzhen	  City	  enjoys	  the	  associate	  provincial	  level	  because	  it	  is	  special	  economic	  zone.	  	  Different	  from	  many	  
cities,	  its	  government	  is	  associate	  provincial	  government.	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  does	  not	  affect	  this	  example.	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  It	  also	  varies	  depending	  on	  the	  province.	  For	  example,	  Hainan	  Province	  clarified	  that	  its	  cities	  and	  





with	   Central	   Committee,	   such	   as	   Central	   Committee	   Finance	   and	   Economic	  
Leadership	   Small	   Group,	   indicate	   that	   it	   is	   an	   executive	   body	   of	   the	   CPC	   Central	  
Committee.	  
Totally,	   there	   are	   three	   kinds	   of	   small	   groups,	   Working	   Small	   Group,	  
Coordination	  Small	  Group,	   and	  Leadership	  Small	  Group	   (LSG),	   and	   the	  LSG	  enjoys	  
the	   highest	   authority.	   	   Examples	   are	   National	   Working	   Small	   Group	   on	   Inter-­‐
Ministerial	   Coordination	   for	   Deepening	   Health	   Care	   System	   Reform,	   Central	  
Committee’s	   Xinjiang	   (Uyghurs)	   Affairs	   Coordination	   Small	   Group,	   and	   Central	  
Committee’s	  Finance	  and	  Economic	  LSG.	  	  After	  the	  National	  Working	  Small	  Group	  on	  
Inter-­‐Ministerial	   Coordination	   for	   Deepening	   Health	   Care	   System	   Reform	   was	  
formed	  in	  2006,	  the	  health	  care	  reform	  was	  delayed	  due	  to	  red	  tape.	   	   In	  2008,	  the	  
State	  Council	  restructured	  and	  renamed	  it	  as	  Health	  Care	  Reform	  Leadership	  Small	  
Group.	  	  Then	  vice-­‐premier	  Li	  Keqiang	  led	  it.	  	  After	  its	  change	  from	  a	  working	  small	  
group	  to	  a	  leadership	  small	  group,	  the	  Xinhua	  News	  immediately	  reported	  that	  the	  
health	  care	  reform	  rode	  into	  the	  fast	  lane.218	  
In	  general,	  a	  LSG	  of	  central	  government	  has	  a	  team	  leader	  whose	  full	  position	  
is	   based	   either	   in	   the	   CPC	   Central	   Committee	   or	   the	   State	   Council.	   	   This	   leader’s	  
highest	   position	   in	   the	   Party/state	   hierarchy	   indicates	   the	   level	   of	   the	   LSG	   in	   the	  
Party/state	   system.	   	   All	   LSG	   members	   of	   central	   government	   have	   their	   full	  
positions	   at	   other	   party	   bodies	   or	   central	   government	   agencies	   and	   hold	   the	  
concurrent	  post	  at	  LSGs.	  	  It	  has	  one	  or	  two	  associate	  team	  leaders,	  and	  the	  number	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




of	   its	   team	   members	   is	   not	   fixed.	   	   Usually,	   LSGs	   do	   not	   have	   fixed	   staff,	   official	  
stamps,	   or	   independently	   issue	   administrative	   paper.	   	   LSGs	   operate	   relying	   on	  
associated	   government	   agencies,	  which	   are	   permanently	   institutionalized,	   such	   as	  
commissions	  or	  ministries,	  one	  of	  which	  takes	  the	  lead	  of	  the	  task	  and	  becomes	  the	  
location	   of	   the	   LSG.	   	   In	   some	   cases,	   a	   LSG	   does	   not	   even	   have	   an	   office	   location.	  	  
Some	   LSGs	   are	   set	   up	   either	   for	   specific	   task,	   such	   as	   Central	   Committee	  Nuclear	  
Energy	   Work	   LSG,	   or	   for	   coordination,	   such	   as	   Central	   Committee	   Finance	   and	  
Economic	  LSG.	  	  If	  an	  LSG	  was	  set	  up	  for	  a	  task	  during	  a	  specific	  period,	  it	  would	  be	  
abolished	  afterwards.	  	  Others	  run	  permanently.	  	  
Different	   from	  most	   central	   level	   LSGs,	   Finance	   and	   Economic	   LSG	   has	   its	  
own	  office,	   located	   in	  Zhongnanhai,219	  that	   runs	  on	  daily	  base.	   	  Central	  Committee	  
Finance	   and	   Economic	   Office	   once	   shared	   its	   office	   with	   The	   Office	   of	   Central	  
Committee	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (for	  Central	  Committee	  Foreign	  Affairs	  LSG);	  later	  when	  
the	   Office	   of	   Central	   Committee	   Agriculture	   Affairs	   (for	   Central	   Committee	  
Agriculture	  Affairs	  LSG)	  was	   initiated,	   it	   shared	  office	  with	  Finance	   and	  Economic	  
Office.	  	  The	  Office	  of	  Central	  Committee	  Finance	  and	  Economic	  Affairs,	  ministry-­‐level	  
in	   the	   hierarchy,	   has	   6	   department-­‐level	   divisions,	   Complex	   Division,	   Secretary	  
Division,	   Macroeconomics	   Division,	   Finance	   and	   Trade	   Division,	   Economics	   and	  
Trade	   Division,	   and	   Agriculture	   Division.	   	   Smaller	   divisions	   have	   3	   or	   4	   on	   staff,	  
bigger	   ones	   5	   or	   6	   on	   staff.	   	   Directors	   of	   this	   office	   has	   been	   Li	   Zhisheng,	   Jiang	  
Guanzhuang,	  Zeng	  Peiyan,	  Hua	   Jianmin,	  Wang	  Chunzheng,	  Zhu	  Zhixin	  and	   for	  now	  
Liu	  He.	  	  Zeng	  led	  the	  office	  during	  China’s	  GATT/WTO	  negotiation	  in	  1990s.	  	  Starting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




from	  Zeng,	  directors	  also	  hold	  the	  associate	  director	  of	  State	  Planning	  Commission	  
(later	  National	  Development	  Reform	  Committee,	  NDRC).	  
Central	   Committee	   Finance	   and	  Economic	   Leadership	   Small	   Group	  was	   led	  
by	   Zhao	   Ziyang	   as	   vice-­‐premier,	   premier,	   and	   general	   secretary	   of	   Central	  
Committee	   in	   1980s.	   	   With	   the	   rise	   of	   Zhao,	   this	   LSG	   rose	   to	   one	   of	   the	   most	  
important	  LSGs,	  an	  LSG	  led	  by	  the	  CPC	  Central	  Committee’s	  General	  Secretary.	  	  This	  
tradition	  has	  been	  kept	  after	  the	  political	  reshuffle	  in	  1989,	  and	  its	  team	  leader	  has	  
always	   been	   the	   general	   secretary	   of	   Central	   Committee.	   	   Staring	   in	   1990s,	   Jiang	  
Zemin	   presided	   the	   meetings	   as	   the	   General	   Secretariat	   of	   Central	   Committee	   as	  
well	   as	   the	  President.	   	   Its	   associate	   team	   leader	  was	   the	  Premier	  of	   State	  Council,	  
and	   its	  members	  were	  part	  of,	  not	  all,	  Politburo	  members,220	  including	  a	   few	  Vice-­‐
Premiers,	   State	   Council	   Secretariat,	   Secretary	   of	   Treasury,	   Governor	   of	   People’s	  
Bank	   of	   China,	   etc.	   	   In	   terms	   of	   agency	  mission,	   Finance	   and	   Economic	   LSG	   looks	  
similar	  with	   SPC	   then	   (NDRC	   now);	   nevertheless,	   Finance	   and	   Economic	   LSG	   has	  
much	   higher	   authority	   in	   coordination	   across	   different	   agencies,	   considering	   the	  
high	  bureaucratic	  rank	  its	  members	  possess.	  	  	  
Issues	  that	  were	  carried	  above	  the	  State	  Council	  up	  to	  Finance	  and	  Economic	  
LSG	  were	  very	   rare.	   	   “Decisions	  made	  at	   this	   level	  were	  only	   about	  very	  ultimate,	  
fundamental	  issues.	   	  On	  the	  difficult	  issues,	  China	  can	  draw	  back	  from,	  insist	  on	  its	  
position,	   or	   find	   middle	   ground.	   	   It	   was	   rarely	   about	   concrete	   numbers.”221	  	   The	  
associate	  director	  of	  SEC	  (later	  SETC)	  recalled	  that	  from	  1993	  to	  1998,	  he	  was	  asked	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to	   report	   in	   front	   of	   the	   Finance	   and	   Economic	   LSG	   only	   twice.	   	   For	   example,	  
safeguard	   had	   almost	   all	   industries’	   interests	   involved	   and	   was	   regarded	   as	  
important	   to	   the	   development	   of	  market	   economy.	   	   As	   a	   very	   important	   issue,	   it	  
moved	   to	   Finance	   and	   Economic	   LSG.222	  	   According	   to	   the	   decisions	  made	   on	   the	  
highest	   level,	   the	  associate	  director	  of	  SEC	  would	  work	  on	   the	  negotiation	  scheme	  
again	  and	  send	  the	  instruction	  to	  MOFTEC’s	  negotiators.	  	  	  
When	  the	  MOFTEC	  negotiators	  bring	  the	  American	  pressure	  back	  home,	  on	  
the	   Chinese	   domestic	   table	   existed	   three-­‐tier	   coordination	   structure	   for	   decision-­‐
making:	   	   State	   Council	   Committee	   on	   Inter-­‐Ministerial	   Coordination	   on	   GATT,	  
including	  the	  Customs	  Tariff	  Commission	  under	  it,	  the	  premier	  working	  meeting	  in	  
the	  middle,	   and	   the	  Central	   Committee	   Finance	   and	  Economic	   LSG	   at	   the	   top.	   	   As	  
internal	   bargaining	   and	   decision-­‐making	   mechanism,	   this	   three-­‐tier	   decision	  
process	   functioned	   through	  most	   of	   the	   time	  when	  China	   conducted	   international	  
negotiations	   with	   the	   US	   and	   other	   GATT/WTO	   member	   countries.	   	   Many	  
interviewees	  stated	  that	  there	  was	  no	  WTO	  leadership	  small	  group.	  	  	  
Dr.	   Susan	   Shirk	   described	   one	   feature	   of	   decision-­‐making	   in	   Chinese	  
bureaucracy	   as	   delegation	   by	   consensus	   and	   assimilated	   it	   with	   management	   by	  
exception	  in	  corporate	  management.	   	  “Those	  who	  sit	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  
hierarchy	  delegate	   the	  authority	   to	   reach	  an	  agreement	  and	  come	   to	  a	  decision	   to	  
their	  subordinates.	   	  If	  their	  subordinates	  can	  build	  consensus,	  the	  superior	  leaders	  
ratify	  the	  decision.	   	   If	  their	  subordinates	  cannot	  come	  to	  a	  consensus,	  the	  superior	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




leaders	   intervene	  or	  have	   the	   issue	   tabled.	   	  Delegation	  by	  consensus	   is	  practice	  at	  
each	   level	   of	   the	   organizational	   hierarchy.”223	  	  My	   research	   reveals	   that	   regarding	  
the	   issue-­‐topic	   for	   international	   negotiation	   for	   GATT/WTO	   accession,	   when	   a	  
consensus	  was	  formed	  at	  the	  Inter-­‐ministerial	  Coordination	  meetings,	   it	  moved	  up	  
to	   vice-­‐premier	   or	   premier	   for	   ratification.	   Otherwise,	   it	   went	   to	   the	   premier	  
working	  meeting	  for	  decisions.	  	  Very	  rarely,	  an	  issue	  of	  significance	  went	  all	  the	  way	  
up	   to	   the	   Central	   Committee	   Finance	   and	   Economic	   LSG.	   	   This	   case	   of	   China’s	  
GATT/WTO	  accession	  confirms	  and	  supports	  Dr.	  Susan	  Shirk’s	  theory	  of	  delegation	  
by	  consensus.	  
	  
The	  Representation	  of	  Ministries	  
	  
When	  foreign	  pressure	  was	  sent	  by	  MOFTEC	  negotiators	  back	  home,	  various	  
ministries	   of	   interests	   participated	   domestic	   bargaining	   in	   the	   process	   named	   as	  
coordination.	   	  Decisions	  were	  not	  made	  by	  majority	  rule,	  and	  voting	  was	  very	  rare	  
in	  policy	  process	  when	  the	  leaders	  were	  deadlocked	  and	  could	  not	  agree	  with	  each	  
other.224	  	   As	   discussed	   supra,	   coordination	   (“xietiao”)	   is	   a	   preferable	  word	  within	  
bureaucracy	   to	   describe	   internal	   bargaining	   because	   it	   emphasizes	   solidarity.	  
Within	   the	   Party/government	   system	   existed	   a	   three-­‐tier	   decision	   structure,	   for	  
aggregating	   and	   balancing	   various	   interests,	   reaching	   dispute	   resolutions,	   and	  
eventually	  making	  decision.	   	   In	   this	   coordination	  structure,	  different	   interests	  had	  
their	  own	  representatives,	  the	  supervising	  ministries.	   	  In	  the	  Chinese	  regime,	  what	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interests	   did	   ministry	   officials	   represent	   on	   the	   domestic	   bargaining	   table?	   How	  
were	  the	  interests	  of	  ministries	  and	  major	  industry	  players	  in	  line	  with	  each	  other?	  	  
At	   the	   meetings	   for	   inter-­‐ministerial	   coordination	   for	   China’s	   negotiation	  
positions	   for	   GATT/WTO,	   ministry	   officials	   were	   supposed	   to	   present	   their	  
ministries’	  perspectives.	  	  Actually,	  the	  interests	  of	  industrial	  ministries	  were	  in	  line	  
with	   the	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	   (SOEs)	   under	   their	   supervision.	   	   Ministries’	  
revenue	  was	  related	  to	  the	  profits	  of	  those	  companies	  run	  under	  them.	   	  Given	  that	  
private	  enterprises	  were	  minority	  and	  SOEs	  were	  the	  major	  leaders	  of	  each	  industry	  
in	   the	   1990s,	   the	   interests	   of	   SOEs	   were	   regarded	   as	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   whole	  
industry.	   	   Instead	   of	   through	   lobbying	   groups	   outside	   the	   government,	   industrial	  
groups	  promoted	  their	  interests	  through	  ministries	  that	  supervised	  them.	  
As	   discussed	   supra,	   the	   State	   Council’s	   commissions	   and	   ministries	   are	  
organized	  mainly	  by	  sector	  or	  function.	  	  This	  structure	  design	  allows	  that	  ministries	  
represent	   industrial	   groups	   by	   economic	   sector.	   	   Actually,	   major	   SOEs	   and	   their	  
supervising	  ministry	  were	  regarded	  as	  the	  same	  xitong,	  or	  “system.”	   	  Officials	  rose	  
up	  the	  career	  ladder	  either	  in	  the	  ministry	  (including	  the	  provincial	  and	  local	  offices	  
with	   professional	   relationship	  with	   the	  ministry)	   or	  major	   SOEs	  within	   the	   same	  
xitong.	   	  Most	  officials	  spent	  their	  entire	  careers	  in	  one	  xitong,	  and	  this	  bureaucracy	  
design	  reinforced	  organizational	  allegiances	  and	  officials’	  particular	  ideology	  of	  that	  
organization.	   	   Personnel	   transfer	   and	   relocation	   happens	  mostly	  within	   the	   same	  




industry.225	  	   When	   officials	   speak	   in	   the	   meetings,	   especially	   the	   meetings	   for	   all	  
kinds	   of	   coordination,	   they	   speak	   on	   behalf	   of	   their	   agencies,	   not	   necessarily	   on	  
behalf	  of	  themselves	  as	  individuals.	  	  
The	  automobile	  tariff	  is	  an	  example.	  	  China’s	  auto	  tariff	  was	  as	  high	  as	  220%,	  
and	   then	   the	  Chinese	   government	   took	   initiative	   to	   reduce	   it	   to	   180%,	  150%	  and	  
then	  120%	  at	   the	   time	  of	   joining	   the	  WTO.	   	   For	  quite	   a	  while,	   the	   extremely	  high	  
tariff	  rate	  encouraged	  smuggling.	  	  After	  comparing	  data	  with	  Japanese	  Customs,	  the	  
director-­‐general	   of	   General	   Administration	   of	   Customs	   Department	   of	   Tariffs	  
realized	   that	   for	   the	   same	   year,	   Japanese	   Customs	   recorded	   exports	   of	   300K	  
automobiles,	  and	  the	  Chinese	  Customs	  recorded	  imports	  of	  100K	  automobiles.	  	  Due	  
to	  China’s	   long	  seashore,	   it	  was	  impossible	  for	  the	  Administration	  to	  send	  security	  
guards	   in	   most	   places	   where	   boats	   can	   be	   anchored.226	  	   The	   Administration	   was	  
burdened	  by	  the	  work	  to	  crack	  down	  on	  smuggling,	  which	  the	  military	  participated	  
to	   quite	   extent.227	  	  With	   tariff	   reduction,	   more	   imports	   would	   be	   reported	   to	   the	  
Customs,	  and	  its	  tariff	  contribution	  to	  the	  central	  government	  would	  be	   improved.	  	  
Thereby,	   the	   Customs	   supported	   tariff	   reduction	   and	   liberal	   trade	   policy.	   	   Tariffs,	  
collected	   by	   the	   central	   government,	   were	   not	   of	   much	   concern	   to	   local	  
governments.	  	  
On	   the	   other	   side,	   the	   productivity	   and	   competitiveness	   of	   the	   Chinese	  
domestic	  auto	  industry	  was	  very	  low	  in	  early	  1990s.	  	  Afraid	  of	  foreign	  competition,	  
the	   six	   large	   auto	   companies	   (the	   so-­‐called	   “three	   big,	   three	   small”)	   requested	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protection	   policy.	   	   They	   played	   the	   card	   of	   nationalism,	   claiming	   that	  machinery-­‐
building	   industry	   should	   independently	   produce	   machines,	   including	   vehicles,	  
otherwise	  it	  would	  endanger	  the	  whole	  country’s	  economic	  independence.	  	  Both	  the	  
ministry	   and	   the	   auto	   industry	   argued	   their	   positions	   in	   terms	   of	   broad	   national	  
interests.228	  
Due	   to	   the	   strong	   connection	   between	   SOEs	   and	   the	   supervising	   industrial	  
ministries,	  SOEs	  did	  not	   incur	  much	  government	  relations	  spending.	   	  The	  heads	  of	  
these	   SOEs	   held	   vice-­‐minister	   rank,	   and	   they	   could	   easily	   find	   high	   officials	   at	  
Ministry	   of	   Machinery	   and	   Electronics	   Industry	   (later,	   Ministry	   of	   Machinery	  
Building).	   	   Actually	   most	   high	   officials	   rose	   to	   this	   Ministry	   from	   these	   auto	  
companies.229	  	  Most	  officials	  worked	  within	  one	  xitong	  (system)	  for	  all	  his	   life,	  and	  
they	  deeply	  shared	  viewpoints	  and	  ideology	  of	  this	  xitong.	   	  At	  domestic	  bargaining	  
table,	  a	  ministerial	  official	  was	  obliged	  to	  represent	  the	  perspectives	  of	  the	  ministry	  
and	   relevant	   SOEs,	   even	   when	   they	   are	   different	   from	   his	   own	   opinion.230	  	   The	  
strong	  connection	  between	  SOEs	  and	  the	  supervising	   industrial	  ministries	  was	  the	  
same	  for	  all	  industries,	  including	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Textile	  Industry.231	  	  	  
When	  a	  GATT/WTO	  related	  issue	  was	  brought	  on	  to	  the	  domestic	  bargaining	  
table,	   organizational	   actors’	   different	   positions	   was	   presented	   from	   their	   own	  
perceptions,	   implying	   their	   own	   parochial	   interests.	   	   In	   China,	   the	   institutional	  
design	  had	  built	  the	  strong	  connection	  between	  the	  industrial	  ministries’	  authority,	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workload	   and	   revenue	   with	   each	   industry’s	   interests,	   such	   as	   profit,	   policy	  
preference,	   competitiveness	   and	   development.	   	   When	   these	   industrial	   ministries	  
made	  internal	  bargaining,	  they	  represented	  not	  just	  the	  organizational	  perceptions	  
and	  interests,	  but	  also	  the	  interests	  of	  SOEs	  under	  their	  supervision.	  	  
	  
The	  Unequal	  Bargaining	  Power	  and	  Internal	  Balance	  
	  
When	   all	  ministries	   present	   their	   positions	   on	   the	   same	   table,	   they	   do	   not	  
have	  equal	  bargaining	  power.	   	  By	   institutional	  arrangements,	   the	   long-­‐term	  policy	  
preference	  in	  China	  has	  tilted	  toward	  industry	  over	  agriculture,	  and	  heavy	  industry	  
over	   light	   industry.232	  	  Only	  a	   few	  ministries	  were	  concerned	  with	  agriculture,	  but	  
approximately	  fifteen	  industrial	  ministries	  existed	  in	  the	  bureaucracy.	   	  A	  variety	  of	  
light	   industrial	   sectors	   were	   combined	   under	   one	   ministry,	   Ministry	   of	   Light	  
Industry,	  and	  the	  only	  exception	  was	  that	  textiles	  had	  its	  own	  ministry.	  	  In	  contrast,	  
each	   heavy	   industry	   had	   its	   own	   representation	   in	   the	   bureaucracy	   in	   the	   1990s,	  
such	  as	  chemicals,	  coal,	  petroleum,	  nuclear	  power,	  aviation,	  railways,	  electric	  power,	  
machinery,	   electronics,	   iron	   and	   steel,	   etc.	   	   The	   administrative	   structure	   was	  
designed	   to	   have	   unequal	   bureaucratic	   voice,	   giving	   the	   strongest	   voice	   to	   heavy	  
industry	  and	  policy	  favors	  to	  industry	  over	  agriculture.	  	  
The	   pro-­‐heavy	   industry	   bias	   was	   perpetuated	   in	   the	   priority	   of	   economic	  
reform	   and	   development,	  which	   has	   been	   transformed	   to	   these	   industries’	   higher	  
status	  and	  political	  influence.	  	  In	  heavy	  industries,	  major	  enterprises	  were	  SOEs,	  run	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




directly	   under	   heavy	   industrial	   ministries;	   whereas	   light	   industry	   and	   textile	  
factories	   were	   managed	   by	   provincial	   and	   local	   government,	   in	   lack	   of	   direct	  
connection	  to	  ministries	  and	  the	  State	  Council.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  First	  to	  Sixth	  State-­‐
owned	  Cotton	  Factories	  in	  Zhengzhou	  was	  run	  by	  Zhengzhou	  City	  Government	  and	  
Henan	   Provincial	   Government.	   	   Without	   enterprises	   directly	   under	   their	   control,	  
officials	   in	  the	  ministries	  of	   light	   industry,	  textile,	  and	  agriculture	  were	  considered	  
political	   lightweights.	   	  The	  need	  of	   the	  military	  modernization,	   combined	  with	   the	  
need	  of	  other	  ministries	  for	  heavy	  industries’	  cooperation	  to	  provide	  inputs	  in	  short	  
supply,	   all	   gave	   these	   priority	   industries	   leverage	   at	   the	   bargaining	   table	   over	  
output	  quotas,	  investment	  allocations,	  and	  protection	  policies.	  	  
Furthermore,	  China’s	  public	  finance	  system	  reinforced	  the	  pro-­‐industry	  bias	  
by	  creating	  a	  rich	  industry	  and	  poor	  agriculture	  system.	  	  Agricultural	  products	  were	  
assigned	   low	   prices,	   and	   manufactured	   goods	   were	   assigned	   high	   prices.	   	   The	  
industry	   bias	   transformed	   to	   urban	   bias,	   which	   was	   built	   into	   Chinese	   political	  
institutions	   and	   reflected	   in	   policy	   outcome.	   	   With	   the	   monopoly	   and	   low	  
productivity,	  it	  was	  hard	  for	  the	  consumers	  to	  buy	  manufactured	  goods	  in	  the	  1980s	  
and	   most	   of	   the	   time	   in	   1990s.233	  	   The	   high	   price	   of	   products	   and	   cheap	   raw	  
materials	  added	  up	  to	  high	  profits	  for	  manufacturing	  industries.	  	  The	  lion’s	  share	  of	  
state	   revenues	   came	   from	   the	   profits	   of	   the	   industrial	   enterprises. 234 	  	   The	  
dependence	   of	   the	   central	   government	   on	   the	   financial	   health	   of	   these	   industries	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shored	  up	  their	  political	  weights.	  	  In	  contrast,	  this	  system	  has	  given	  agriculture	  only	  
a	  feeble	  bureaucratic	  voice.	  
On	   the	   domestic	   table	   for	   the	   GATT/WTO	   application,	   each	   ministry	  
displayed	   its	   structural	   strength	   or	   weakness.	   	   The	   Chinese	   Communist	   regime	  
claims	   that	   it	   represents	   the	   interests	   of	   peasantry	   so	   that	   rural	   dwellers	   do	   not	  
have	  any	  agricultural	  association	  to	  represent	  their	  interests	  or	  lobbying	  groups	  to	  
work	  on	   it.235	  	  Due	   to	   the	  policy	  disfavor,	   agriculture	  was	  a	  poor	   industry	  without	  
much	   government	   subsidies,	   and	   rural	   dwellers	   remained	   a	   disenfranchised	  
majority.	   	   Ministry	   of	   Agriculture	   could	   not	   contribute	   much	   to	   the	   central	  
government’s	  revenue,	  nor	  did	  it	  enjoy	  a	  big	  budget,	  nor	  did	  it	  have	  authority	  on	  the	  
imports	   and	   exports	   of	   agricultural	   products.236	  	   As	   a	   weak	   player,	   perhaps	   the	  
weakest	  player,	  on	   the	  domestic	  bargaining	   table,	   the	  ministry	  did	  not	  have	  much	  
leverage	  itself.	  	  	  
As	  a	  group	  disenfranchised	  from	  the	  policy	  process,	  agriculture	  is	  less	  likely	  
to	   be	   satisfied	  with	   the	   policies	   that	   are	   chosen.	   	   The	   Customs	  Tariff	   Commission	  
was	  in	  charge	  of	  agricultural	  tariffs,	  whereas	  the	  major	  issue	  was	  agriculture	  quota.	  	  
The	  real	  decision-­‐makers	  on	  this	  were	  the	  State	  Planning	  Commission	  (SPC)	  and	  the	  
few,	  major	  state-­‐own	  import-­‐export	  companies,	  which	  was	  run	  under	  MOFTEC.	  	  The	  
former	   had	   authority	   on	   agricultural	   imports,	   and	   the	   latter	   on	   agricultural	  
exports.237	  	  On	  the	  negotiation	  table,	  however,	   it	  did	  not	  seem	  appropriate	  to	  have	  
either	  SPC	  or	  MOFTEC	  represent	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture.	   	  Thereby,	  Agriculture	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had	  a	  division	  chief	  sit	  on	  the	  domestic	  table.238	  	  As	  discussed,	  a	  director-­‐general	  of	  
department	  level	  would	  be	  sent	  for	  negotiation	  and	  coordination	  if	  the	  issues	  were	  
not	  critical	  to	  his	  ministry,	  and	  a	  vice-­‐minister	  would	  sit	  for	  negotiation	  if	  the	  issues	  
were	   relevant.	   	   In	   the	  hierarchical	  bureaucracy,	   a	  division	   chief,	  who	  held	  a	  much	  
lower	  bureaucratic	  rank	  than	  his	  colleagues	  around	  the	  table,	  did	  not	  have	  leverage	  
over	   the	   policy	  making.	   	   As	   early	   as	   1994,	   China’s	   tariffs	   on	   agricultural	   products	  
were	  lower	  than	  many	  developed	  countries	  and	  significantly	  lower	  than	  developing	  
countries.239	  	  
By	   contrast,	   the	   automobile	   industry	   enjoyed	   policy	   preference,	   so	   did	   its	  
supervising	   organizations.	   	   The	   auto	   industry	   was	   emphasized	   because	   it	  
represented	  a	  country’s	  productivity	  in	  machine	  building,	  could	  ensure	  the	  stability	  
of	  the	  steel	  industry	  and	  was	  also	  related	  to	  toll	  charge	  and	  petrol	  consumption.240	  	  
The	  production	  of	  automobile,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  machinery,	  was	  regarded	  as	  a	  critical	  
part	   of	   heavy	   industry	   and	   a	   vital	   component	   for	   the	   development	   of	   industry	  
modernization.241	  	  As	  discussed	  supra,	   the	  auto	   industry’s	   favorable	   treatment	  and	  
priority	  was	  transformed	  to	  the	  higher	  status	  and	  political	   influence	  of	  auto	  xitong	  
(system),	  including	  Ministry	  of	  Machinery	  Building	  Industry	  and	  National	  Mechanic	  
and	  Electronic	  Import	  and	  Export	  Office.	   	  National	  Mechanic	  and	  Electronic	  Import	  
and	   Export	   Office,	   an	   agency	   in	   charge	   of	   auto	   import	   approval	   under	   the	   State	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Council,	  was	   the	   strongest	   opponent	   for	   liberalizing	   auto	   trade.242	  	  Had	   it	   lost	   the	  
authority	   to	  approval	  auto	  and	  auto	  parts	   import,	   it	  would	  be	  confronted	  with	  the	  
question	  of	   its	  necessity.243	  	  The	  concerns	  these	  agencies	   laid	  out	  on	  the	  table	  was	  
that	   foreign	   competition	   would	   injure	   China’s	   own	   auto	   productivity	   and	   thus	  
endanger	  the	  machinery	  building	  capacity.	  	  
In	  the	  days	  when	  China	  had	  extremely	  high	  auto	  tariffs,	  such	  as	  220%,	  it	  was	  
very	  difficult	  to	  nudge	  the	  auto	  system.	  	  On	  the	  domestic	  table	  for	  auto	  negotiation	  
were	   SPC’s	   Department	   of	   Industry	   and	   Department	   of	   Machinery,	   National	  
Mechanic	  and	  Electronic	   Import	  and	  Export	  Office,	  Ministry	  of	  Machinery	  Building	  
Industry,	  MOFTEC,	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  General	  Administration	  of	  Customs,	  
etc.244	  	  Foreign	  pressure	  became	  a	  concrete	  bargaining	  chip	  for	  pro-­‐trade	  officials	  to	  
break	   this	   trade-­‐threatened	   ministry’s	   resistance.	   	   The	   Customs	   officials	   actually	  
were	  very	  happy	  when	  they	  heard	  a	   foreign	  country’s	  request	   for	   tariff	  deduction.	  	  
They	  used	  Customs	  Tariff	   Commission	   as	   a	  media	   to	   send	   foreign	   requests	   to	   the	  
Ministry’s	   Department	   of	   Industry	   Planning.245	  	   This	   department	   passed	   on	   the	  
foreign	  requests	  to	  the	  auto	  companies	  and	  collection	  opinions	  from	  them.	  
Confronted	   by	   strong	   resistance	   in	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Machinery	   Building	  
Industry,	  the	  State	  Economic	  and	  Trade	  Commission	  (SETC)	  stepped	  in	  for	  internal	  
balance	   and	   coordination.	   	   In	   early	   1990s,	   only	   few	   state	   trading	   companies	   had	  
MOFTEC’s	  approval	  and	  thus	  rights	  to	  conduct	  international	  trade.	  	  MOFTEC	  argued	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that	   should	   it	   relax	   trading	   rights,	   companies	   with	   trading	   rights	   would	   resale	  
imports	  on	  domestic	  market	  to	  others,	  in	  lack	  of	  supervision.246	  	  Ministry	  of	  Internal	  
Trade247	  claimed	  that	  foreign	  enterprises	  and	  joint	  ventures	  enjoyed	  trading	  rights,	  
which	   was	   supra-­‐national	   treatment	   and	   hurt	   domestic	   companies.	   	   The	   SETC	  
realized	  that	  trading	  companies	  had	  made	  trade	  very	  inefficiency,	  and	  the	  associate	  
director	  made	  a	  case	  that	  with	  the	  trading	  companies	  in	  the	  middle,	  the	  inefficiency	  
cost	  Chinese	  walking	  tractor’s	  market	  share	  on	  the	  international	  market	  place.248	  
The	   associate	   director	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   GATT/WTO	   coordination	   gave	   his	  
priority	   to	   help	   machinery-­‐building	   factories,	   which	   were	   the	   ancestors	   of	   major	  
auto	  companies,	  gain	  trading	  rights,	  against	  the	  interest	  of	  pro-­‐trade	  MOFTEC.	  	  For	  
example,	   China’s	   walking	   tractor	   had	   good	   quality	   and	   low	   price,	   one	   of	   the	   few	  
machine	   equipment	   that	   China	   could	   sell	   overseas	   in	   1990s,	   yet	   it	   had	   never	  
occupied	  a	  significant	  market	  share.	  	  Those	  trading	  companies’	  sales	  representatives	  
did	  not	  have	  sufficient	  training	  in	  engineering	  and	  were	  slow	  to	  respond	  to	  foreign	  
customers’	  questions	  and	  requests	  because	  they	  always	  needed	  to	  ask	  and	  wait	  for	  
answers	   from	   the	   factories.	   	   Moreover,	   trading	   companies	   could	   not	   take	   care	   of	  
after-­‐sale	   customer	   services;	   and	   when	   customers	   could	   not	   contact	   factories	  
directly,	   the	   payment	   for	   after-­‐sale	   services	   were	   an	   issue	   kicked	   by	   all	   relevant	  
parties.249	  	  Without	  trading	  rights,	  the	  Chinese	  machinery	  lost	  market	  share.	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Upon	   the	   support	   of	   vice	   premier	   Li	   Lanqing,	   the	   Foreign	   Trade	   Law	  was	  
enacted	   in	   1994.	   	   It	   stipulated	   that	   the	   trading	   approval	   should	   gradually	   be	  
abolished	  and	  replaced	  by	  trading	  registration.	  	  In	  December	  1993,	  Wu	  Yi,	  minister	  
of	   MOFTEC	   reported	   to	   the	   NPC	   Standing	   Committee	   Conference	   and	   explained	  
about	   the	   needed	   transition	   from	   trading	   approval	   to	   trading	   registration. 250	  	  
MOFTEC	   officials	   claimed	   that	   MOFTEC	   sacrificed	   its	   own	   authority	   over	   trading	  
approval	   and	   it	   did	   not	   promote	   GATT/WTO	   accession	   for	   the	   agency’s	   own	  
benefits.251	  	   On	   the	   other	   side,	   with	   trading	   rights,	   officials	   at	   the	   Ministry	   of	  
Machinery	  Building	  Industry	  saw	  the	  benefits	  of	  liberal	  trade	  policy.	  	  
However,	   when	   Ministry	   of	   Machinery	   Building	   Industry’s	   Department	   of	  
Industry	   Planning	   communicated	   with	   the	   major	   auto	   companies	   about	   the	   60%	  
threshold	   for	   place	   of	   origin,	   they	  were	   very	   dissatisfied.	   	   In	   order	   to	   qualify	   for	  
lower	  tariff	  on	  imported	  parts,	  the	  auto	  firms	  must	  produce	  cars	  that	  contain	  at	  least	  
60%	   Chinese-­‐origin	   parts	   and	   components,	   otherwise	   the	   firms	   will	   incur	   tariff	  
surcharge	   penalty.	   	   As	   reaction,	   these	   SOEs	   conducted	   an	   open	   bidding	   for	   the	  
resolution.	  	  The	  auto	  system	  was	  affluent	  with	  funding	  so	  that	  it	  was	  capable	  to	  send	  
people	  to	  Germany	  for	  training.	  	  With	  policy	  preference,	  more	  capable	  cadres	  were	  
attracted	  to	  heavy	  industry	  and	  relevant	  ministries,	  where	  the	  payment	  and	  benefits	  
were	  better.	  	  With	  sufficient	  funding	  and	  better	  human	  resources,	  First	  Automobile	  
Works,	   especially	   its	   Sales	   Department,	   took	   lead,	   and	   Second	   Automobile	  Works	  
(later	   renamed	  as	  Dongfeng)	   and	  Shanghai	  Automobile	  Works	   (SAIC)	  participated	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this	  initiation.	  	  This	  open	  bidding	  of	  these	  companies	  became	  the	  first	  marketization	  
of	  research	  projects	  in	  China.252	  
A	  group	  of	  researchers	  bid	  the	  project,	  and	  they	  sought	  resolution	  under	  the	  
60%	   Chinese	   content	   requirement,	   aiming	   to	   design	   a	   plan	   to	   encourage	   foreign	  
auto	   companies	   to	   transfer	   technology	   to	   China,	   instead	   of	   selling	   cars.	   	   They	  
discovered	   that	  domestic	   auto	   companies	  kept	   a	  mature	  and	   comprehensive	   sales	  
network	  nationwide,	  yet	  foreign	  auto	  companies	  did	  not	  have,	  based	  on	  which	  they	  
successfully	  sold	  the	  idea	  of	  “exchanging	  market	  for	  technology.”	  	  The	  investment	  on	  
sales	  would	  cost	  roughly	  RMB	  50	  Million	  plus	  human	  resources	  training	  for	  a	  couple	  
of	  months.	  	  Most	  foreign	  shareholders	  did	  not	  look	  positively	  at	  the	  Chinese	  market	  
at	   that	   time,	   and	   these	   companies	   were	   not	   willing	   to	   invest	   in	   sales	   network	  
because	  they	  would	  incur	  big	  loss	  if	  sales	  did	  not	  catch	  up	  immediately.	   	  This	  plan	  
designed	   a	   set	   of	   regulations	   and	   policies	   to	   encourage	   joint	   ventures	   for	   the	  
Chinese	   auto	   companies	   to	   offer	   the	   sales	   network	   in	   exchange	   of	   the	   technology	  
spill-­‐over	  and	  50%	  of	  the	  joint	  ventures’	  profits.	  	  Upon	  the	  government’s	  acceptance	  
of	  this	  plan,	  the	  auto	  companies	  took	  the	  60%	  Chinese	  content	  requirements.	  	  After	  
the	  implementation	  of	  this	  plan,	  Toyota	  and	  Mercedes-­‐Benz	  set	  out	  a	  breakthrough	  
in	  their	  cooperation	  with	  Chinese	  local	  companies.253	  
The	  domestic	   bargaining	  was	   affected	  by	   the	  bureaucratic	   structure,	  which	  
favored	  heavy	   industry	  over	   light,	   industry	  over	  agriculture.	   	  Therefore,	  ministries	  
had	   unequal	   bureaucratic	   voice	   on	   the	   domestic	   table.	   	   By	   institutional	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arrangements,	   heavy	   industry	   enjoyed	   more	   representation	   and	   stronger	  
bargaining	   power	   than	   light	   industry;	   agricultural	   ministry	   was	   the	   most	  
disadvantaged	   in	   the	   administrative	   structure.	   	   The	   coordination	   for	   China’s	  
GATT/WTO	   accession	   demonstrated	   development	   priority,	   structural	   imbalance,	  
and	   thereby	  unequal	  bargaining	  power	  of	   each	  ministry.	   	  As	  perhaps	   the	  weakest	  
player,	  Ministry	   of	  Agriculture	  had	   a	  division	   chief	   sit	   on	   the	  domestic	   bargaining	  
table,	  who	  had	   lower	   rank	   than	  officials	   of	   other	  ministries.	   	  As	  one	  of	   the	   strong	  
players,	  Ministry	   of	  Machinery	  Building	   Industry	  was	   offered	   side	  payment	   at	   the	  
cost	  of	  MOFTEC,	  the	  most	  active	  advocate	  of	  GATT/WTO.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  major	  auto	  
companies	  were	  able	  to	  command	  on	  its	  resources	  and	  drive	  a	  hard	  bargain	  on	  its	  
own.	  	  Therefore,	  structurally	  unequal	  power	  of	  each	  ministry	  was	  an	  organizational	  
attribute	  in	  the	  process	  of	  internal	  coordination	  and	  balance.	  	  
	  
The	  Established	  Rules	  of	  Internal	  Bargaining	  Game	  
	  
When	   the	  MOFTEC	  negotiators	   brought	   the	  American	  pressure	  back	  home,	  
an	   issue	  would	   go	   on	   to	   the	  domestic	   bargaining	   table.	   	   In	   the	   three-­‐tier	   decision	  
structure,	   relevant	  ministries	  and	   industries	  did	  not	  have	  equal	  bargaining	  power.	  	  
In	   the	   process	   of	   aggregating	   and	   balancing	   various	   interests,	   reaching	   dispute	  
resolutions,	   and	   eventually	   deciding	   on	   a	   policy,	   we	   would	   naturally	   have	   the	  
questions	  about	  the	  established	  traditions	  or	  rules	  for	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
First,	   the	   bureaucratic	   rank	   of	   an	   organization	   is	   extremely	   important	   for	  




bargaining	  table	  as	  equals,	  and	  organizations	  with	  higher	  rank	  play	  as	  mediator	  and	  
coordinator.	  	  The	  most	  significant	  example	  is	  that	  commissions	  are	  regarded	  as	  half	  
level	  higher	  than	  ministries	  because	  ministries	  take	  responsibility	  of	  administering	  
one	   sector	   of	   the	   economy,	   whereas	   commissions	   are	   in	   charge	   of	   cross-­‐sector	  
issues.	  	  Any	  large	  project	  inevitably	  requires	  the	  active	  cooperation	  of	  other	  bodies,	  
yet	   an	   industrial	   ministry	   lacks	   the	   power	   to	   compel	   other	   organizations	   for	  
cooperation	   and	   implementation.	   	   Then	   the	   supra-­‐ministerial	   commissions	  have	   a	  
crucial	   role	   to	   play.	   	   In	   China’s	   GATT/WTO	   case,	   the	   SETC	   led	   the	   meetings	   of	  
Committee	   of	   Inter-­‐Ministerial	   Coordination	   and	   moderated	   the	   negotiations	  
between	  ministries.	   	   Its	   leverage	  over	   this	  policy	  process	  depended	  directly	  on	   its	  
formal	  rank,	  which	  was	  higher	  than	  ministries.	  	  	  
Second,	   the	   bureaucratic	   rank	   of	   officials	  would	   also	   affect	   the	   negotiation	  
outcome.	   	  As	   discussed,	  when	  Ministry	   of	  Agriculture	   sent	   a	   division	   chief	   for	   the	  
coordination	   meetings,	   across	   the	   table	   were	   vice	   ministers	   or	   director-­‐generals	  
from	  other	  ministries.	   	   Presumably,	   he	  was	  not	   there	   to	  weigh	   in	   the	  positions	  of	  
Agriculture.	   	   Moreover,	   MOFTEC’s	   officials	   actively	   sought	   the	   advice	   of	   other	  
ministries	   and	   lobbied	   them	   for	  pro-­‐trade	  policies	  when	   it	   attempted	   to	   shape	   its	  
proposal	  –	   this	  process	  common	   in	   the	  Chinese	  bureaucracy	  has	   its	   term,	  paowen.	  	  
For	  example,	  Long	  Yongtu	  took	  his	  subordinates	  to	  relevant	  offices	  of	  other	  agencies	  
and	   tried	   to	   persuade	   them.254	  	  MOFTEC’s	   tactic	  was	   to	   send	   its	   own	  officials	   one	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




level	   higher	   than	   the	   officials	   at	   other	   agencies,	   in	   order	   to	   show	   the	   respect	   to	  
others,	  and	  more	  importantly	  to	  gain	  leverage	  at	  internal	  coordination.255	  	  	  
Third,	   the	  process	  of	  building	  a	  consensus	  begins	  early	  before	  coordination	  
meetings,	   yet	   the	   decision	   process	   turns	   to	   coordination	   meetings	   only	   when	  
disagreement	  rises.	  	  For	  any	  project	  that	  requires	  cooperation	  of	  different	  ministries,	  
a	  ministry,	  even	   if	   it	   takes	   the	   lead,	   lacks	   the	  power	   to	  compel	  other	  ministries	  or	  
agencies	  to	  provide	  the	  necessary	  resources	  and	  facilities	  for	  implementation.	  	  The	  
ministry	  involved	  must	  consult	  with	  other	  relevant	  bodies	  in	  the	  course	  of	  decision-­‐
making	   and	   consensus	   building.	   	   Therefore,	   the	   process	   of	   consensus	   building	  
begins	  in	  the	  initial	  drafting	  stage.	  	  	  
When	  the	  draft	  proposal	  is	  sent	  to	  various	  leaders,	  the	  leaders	  in	  charge	  or	  at	  
bodies	  with	  authority	  over	  the	  issue	  put	  down	  opinions	  and	  advice,	  as	  is	  called	  pishi,	  
and	  other	   leaders	  draw	  a	  circle,	   implying	  their	  agreement,	  as	   is	  called	  quanyue.	   	   If	  
there	   is	   no	   dispute	   and	   all	   relevant	   leaders	   build	   a	   consensus,	   at	   the	   margins	   of	  
documents	  were	  either	  the	  signed	  opinions	  or	  circles,	  as	  is	  called	  huiqian.	  	  However,	  
when	  there	   is	  disagreement,	   this	  process	  of	  consensus	  building	  stops.	   	  This	   leader	  
with	  disagreement	  does	  not	  draw	  a	  circle	  or	  put	  down	  his	  opinions	  or	  concurrence,	  
instead	   he	   orally	   reports	   to	   his	   superior.	   	   The	   process	   turns	   into	   meetings	   for	  
internal	   coordination,	   as	   this	   chapter	   discusses.	   	   After	   consensus	   is	   built	   through	  
coordination	  meetings,	  all	  the	  leaders	  should	  either	  put	  down	  his	  advice	  or	  draw	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




circle.	   	   Thus,	   the	   process	   goes	   back	   to	   huiqian.256	  	   On	   the	   paperwork	   shows	   only	  
consensus,	  built	  after	  coordination	  meetings.	  	  
Fourth,	   along	   with	   the	   state	   bureaucracy	   is	   the	   Party	   system,	   which	   also	  
affects	  the	  decision	  structure.	  	  Heads	  of	  ministries	  are	  not	  just	  the	  representatives	  of	  
their	  organizations,	  but	  also	  Party	  members.	  	  The	  Central	  Committee’s	  Organization	  
Department	   is	   in	   charge	   of	   appointment	   of	   civilian	   officials.	   	   While	   they	   are	  
encouraged	  to	  think	  from	  the	  perspectives	  of	  and	  present	  the	  position	  of	  their	  own	  
organizations,	  these	  high	  officials,	  as	  individuals,	  look	  to	  Party	  leaders	  and	  the	  Party	  
system	   for	   career	   advancement.	   	   When	   a	   bureaucrat	   repeatedly	   refuses	   to	  
compromise	  with	  other	  administrative	  bodies,	  he	  certainly	  will	  not	  be	  popular	  with	  
his	  superiors	  as	  well	  as	  his	  peer	  bureaucrats	  or	  even	  pay	  the	  price	  to	  hold	  out	  and	  
force	  the	   intervention	  of	   the	  higher	   levels.	   	  For	  example,	   the	  chief	  negotiator	  Long	  
Yongtu	   did	   not	   gain	   popularity	   inside	   the	   bureaucracy	   for	   being	   a	   vigorous	   trade	  
advocate.	   	   He	   was	   not	   promoted	   to	   minister	   of	   MOFTEC	   after	   he	   completed	   the	  
bilateral	  negotiation	  with	  the	  Americans,	  but	  he	  retired	  to	  Boao	  Forum	  after	  China	  
entered	   into	   the	  WTO.257	  	   In	   contrast,	   pressure	  would	   form	   on	   those	  with	   strong	  
position	   for	  protection	  policy,	  when	  other	  ministries	  withdrew.258	  	  No	  one	  wanted	  
to	   be	   perceived	   as	   uncooperative	   or	   willing	   to	   sacrifice	   the	   national	   interests	   in	  
favor	  of	  his	  own	  organization.	  	  
	  Officials	  need	  to	  balance	  whether	  they	  should	  hold	  out	  without	  compromise	  
or	   accept	   coordination	   and	   a	   less-­‐than-­‐optimal	   decision.	   	   In	   order	   to	   anticipate	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leaders’	  decision,	  the	  agency	  representatives	  seek	  information	  and	  try	  their	  best	  to	  
make	   informed	   judgment	   and	   speculation.	   	   This	   is	   called	   chuaimo,	   pointed	  out	   by	  
many	   interviewees.259	  	  When	   leaders	   are	   clear	   and	   unified,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   the	   top	  
leadership	  knows	  exactly	  what	   they	  want	  and	  can	  agree	  on	  a	  policy	  preference	  or	  
the	  priority,	   organizations	   are	  motivated	   to	   compromise	   and	   accept	   for	   less-­‐than-­‐
optimal	   option.	   	   When	   leaders	   are	   unclear,	   ministries’	   perspectives	   effectively	  
provide	   information	  and	  even	  education	   for	   top	   leadership.	   	  When	   leaders	  are	  not	  
unified,	  their	  subordinates	  spot	  opportunities	  and	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  uncertainty	  
by	  holding	  out	  for	  their	  organizational	  interests.	  	  	  
In	  most	  of	  the	  time	  during	  China’s	  GATT/WTO	  accession	  in	  1990s	  (except	  the	  
very	  end),	  no	  clear	  and	  unified	  signal	  of	  their	  policy	  preferences	  was	  sent	  out	  from	  
the	  top;	  thus	  there	  was	  no	  focal	  point	  for	  bureaucratic	  consensus.	   	  However,	  when	  
the	  top	  leadership	  came	  to	  consensus	  in	  the	  late	  1990s,	  CPC	  leaders	  demonstrated	  
again	  their	  political	  authority,	  and	  domestic	  coordination	  between	  agencies	  became	  
effective.	   	  This	  has	  been	  described	  as	  the	  popular	  saying,	   “If	   the	  state	  system	  does	  
not	  work,	  use	  Party	  system.”	  (zhengwu	  xitong	  zou	  bu	  tong,	  zou	  dangwu	  xitong)260	  
Fifth,	   although	   the	   top	   leaders	   have	   authority	   to	   veto	   policies	   they	   oppose	  
and	   nominate	   subordinates	   they	   favor,	   they	   are	   constrained	   by	   reciprocal	  
accountability.	   	   The	   term	   reciprocal	   accountability	  was	   used	   to	   describe	   that	   in	   a	  
Communist	  country,	  government	  officials	  are	  both	  the	  agents	  and	  the	  constituents	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of	   Party	   leaders	   so	   that	   the	   lines	   of	   accountability	   run	   in	   both	   directions.261	  	  
Bureaucrats	   hold	   their	   positions	   and	   get	   promotion	   at	   the	   pleasure	   of	   the	   Party	  
leaders,	   whereas	   Party	   leaders	   hold	   their	   positions,	   select	   their	   protégé,	   and	  
implement	   policies	   at	   the	   pleasure	   of	   the	   officials	   in	   the	   selectorate,	  which	   is	   the	  
CPC’s	  Central	  Committee	   in	  China.	   	  While	   ordinary	   citizens	   are	   excluded	   from	   the	  
politics,	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  as	  a	  whole,	  holds	  the	  formal	  authority	  for	  ratifying	  
major	  decisions.	   	   Thereby,	   the	  Party	   leaders’	   decision	   should	  be	   acceptable	   to	   the	  
officials	   of	   the	   Central	   Committee,	   the	   selectorate. 262 	  	   Due	   to	   reciprocal	  
accountability,	  neither	  side	  has	  a	  definitive	  right	  in	  this	  relationship.	  	  
In	  the	  power	  game	  and	  policy	  process,	  top	  leaders	  need	  to	  take	  into	  account	  
opinions	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  members,	  though	  they	  still	  have	  more	  leeway	  to	  
turn	  the	  tide	  in	  their	  favor.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  top-­‐down	  authority	  is	  much	  stronger	  
than	   bottom-­‐up	   authority	   in	   the	   reciprocal	   accountability,	   and	   top	   leaders	   have	  
much	  more	  leverage	  over	  officials	  of	  Central	  Committee,	  as	  discussed	  supra.	  	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  leaders	  do	  not	  want	  to	  alienate	  their	  bureaucratic	  constituents	  because	  
leaders	  need	  their	  political	  support.	   	  Thus,	  the	  control	  over	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  
Central	  Committee	  provides	  an	  element	  of	  flexibility.	  	  	  
Since	  the	  Central	  Committee	  or	   its	  Politburo	   is	   the	   final	  veto	  gate	   in	  policy-­‐
making	   and	  makes	  decisions	  by	  majority	   rule,	   leaders	   can	   consolidate	   support	   by	  
changing	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  selectorate	  and	  expanding	  the	  size	  of	  meetings	   in	  
order	  to	  bring	  new	  groups	  into	  it.	  	  When	  top	  leaders	  are	  confronted	  with	  opposition	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from	   central	   bureaucrats,	   they	   turn	   to	   provincial	   officials,263	  which	   constitute	   the	  
largest	   bloc	   in	   the	   Central	   Committee.	   	   In	   China’s	   decision	   process	   on	   the	   WTO	  
accession,	   President	   Jiang	   asked	   provincial	   officials	   to	   express	   their	   viewpoints	  
about	  the	  WTO	  affairs,264	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  political	  support.	  	  Later	  in	  February	  1999,	  
an	  enlarged	  Politburo	  meeting	  was	  held	  to	  approve	  concessions	  needed	  for	  bilateral	  
negotiations	  for	  China’s	  WTO	  membership.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  Party	  system	  penetrated	  
and	   controlled	   the	   government	   apparatus,	   specifically	   the	   State	   Council,	   for	  
decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  “6+1+2	  system.”	  	  
	  
Inside	  the	  Garbage	  Can	  	  
	  
Chinese	   decision-­‐making	   has	   established	   a	   three-­‐tier	   structure,	   which	   is	  
similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	  US.	  	  Different	  from	  trade	  politics	  in	  the	  US,	  industrial	  ministries	  
represented	  the	  interests	  of	  each	  industry	  under	  their	  supervision	  and	  control,	  and	  
ministries	  did	  not	  share	  equal	  bargaining	  power.	  	  On	  every	  tier	  or	  forum	  for	  internal	  
bargaining	  and	  coordination,	  established	  rules	  and	  tradition	  influenced	  the	  process	  
of	   aggregating	   and	   balancing	   various	   interests,	   reaching	   dispute	   resolutions,	   and	  
eventually	  deciding	  on	  a	  policy.	   	  For	   the	  organizational	  process,	  Allison	  says,	   “The	  
constraints	  are	  relatively	  stable.	  …	  The	  stability	  of	  these	  constraints	  is	  dependent	  on	  
such	   factors	   as	   rules	   for	   promotion	   and	   reward,	   budgeting	   and	   accounting	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procedures,	  and	  mundane	  operating	  procedures.”265	  	  However,	  the	  constraints	  were	  
not	  stable	  in	  the	  China	  case.	  	  
The	  Sino-­‐American	  WTO	  protocol	  negotiation	  spanned	  more	  than	  a	  decade.	  	  
For	  China,	  it	  was	  a	  process	  of	  clarifying	  goals;	  the	  technology	  was	  not	  well	  defined	  at	  
the	  beginning;	  and	  participation	  was	  fluid	  in	  the	  period.	  	  One	  American	  interviewee	  
stated	   that	   the	   Chinese	   negotiators’	   knowledge	   of	   American	   politics	   improved	  
during	  the	  negotiation	  process.266	  	  The	  Chinese	  negotiators	  thought	  that	  USTR	  was	  
part	  of	  the	  cabinet	  and	  National	  Economic	  Council	  belonged	  to	  the	  White	  House	  and	  
that	  their	  different	  access	  to	  the	  president	  explained	  the	  different	  positions	  between	  
NEC	   Advisor	   Gene	   Sperling	   and	   USTR	   Charlene	   Barshefsky.267	  	   The	   Chinese	   team	  
gave	   Sperling	   a	   nickname,	   Party	   Representative,	   which	   demonstrated	   the	   lack	   of	  
understanding	  American	  trade	  politics	  and	  government	  structure.268	  	  	  
Inside	   the	   Chinese	   negotiating	   team,	   some	   believed	   that	   the	   bilateral	  
agreement	  with	  the	  US	  was	  simply	  a	  door	  to	  the	  WTO.	   	  Commitment	  made	  for	  the	  
agreement	   was	   not	   very	   important;	   failure	   to	   fulfill	   the	   promise	   would	   not	   have	  
serious	   consequences.269	  	   When	   American	   negotiators	   asked	   to	   increase	   import	  
quota	   for	   soybean,	   the	  Chinese	   speculation	  was	   that	   since	  China	  National	   Cereals,	  
Oils	  and	  Foodstuffs	  Corporation	  (COFCO)	  was	  the	  only	  company	  with	  authorization	  
to	   import	   soybean,	   it	   would	   be	   easy	   to	   call	   and	   ask	   COFCO	   not	   to	   buy	   American	  
soybean.	   	   Therefore,	   the	   acceptance	   of	   American	   demand	   would	   not	   cause	   any	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problem.	   	   Not	   long	   after	   accommodating	   this	   American	   demand,	   the	   Chinese	  
negotiators	  found	  American	  trade	  negotiators	  pushed	  efforts	  on	  SOE	  trading	  rights,	  
and	  then	  six	  Chinese	  companies	  were	  authorized	  soybean	  import.270	  	  	  
Ideologically	   speaking,	   the	   Chinese	   government	   has	   claimed	   that	   it	   is	   the	  
representative	  of	  the	  Chinese	  working	  class	  and	  believed	  that	  the	  Chinese	  working	  
class	   should	   have	   no	   interest	   conflict	   with	   American	   working	   class,	   opposite	   to	  
American	  business,	  which	  should	  symbolize	  American	  capitalism	  and	   imperialism.	  	  
The	  Chinese	  trade	  experts	  endured	  the	  confusion	  of	  American	  labor	  organizations’	  
pursuit	   of	   trade	   protectionism	   until	   the	   very	   end	  when	   people	   joked,	   “We	   finally	  
understand	  that	  we	  defeat	  American	  working	  class.”271	  	  
From	   stories	   as	   above,	   we	   learn	   that	   China’s	   GATT/WTO	   accession	   was	   a	  
dynamic	   process.	   	   China’s	   understanding	   about	   the	   GATT/WTO	   and	   bilateral	  
negotiation	   changed;	   decision	   makers’	   recognition	   of	   the	   problems	   changed;	   the	  
organizational	   participants	   on	   the	   domestic	   bargaining	   table	   changed;	   the	   trade	  
promoting	  organizations	  and	  protectionist	  agencies	  had	  structural	  change.	  	  With	  the	  
aid	   of	   garbage	   can	   model,	   we	   will	   be	   able	   to	   adventure	   beyond	   the	   standard	  
procedures	   and	   established	   rules,	   explore	   the	   changing	   internal	   constrains	   and	  
dynamics,	  and	  discover	  how	  the	  various	  streams	  joined	  together	  for	  the	  conclusion	  
of	  the	  bilateral	  negotiation.	  	  
First,	  the	  GATT/WTO	  accession	  had	  never	  been	  regarded	  as	  an	  independent	  
crisis	  or	  problem	  seeking	  for	  solutions,	  instead	  it	  had	  been	  recognized	  as	  part	  of	  the	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economic	  reform	  in	  the	  late	  1980s,	  the	  development	  of	  market	  economy	  in	  the	  early	  
1990s,	  and	  later	  as	  a	  potential	  solution	  for	  the	  reform	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  in	  
the	   late	   1990s,	   which	   will	   be	   detailed	   in	   the	   next	   chapter.	   	   At	   the	   top	   level,	   the	  
significance	   of	   the	   GATT/WTO	   accession	   had	   been	   attached	   to	   different	   issues,	  
which	   indicated	   that	   Chinese	   top	   leaders’	   perception	   of	   the	  GATT/WTO	  accession	  
progressed	   with	   the	   bilateral	   trade	   negotiation	   with	   the	   US	   government	   moving	  
forward.	  	  
Inside	   Chinese	   bureaucracy,	   the	   understanding	   of	   GATT/WTO	   affairs,	  
bilateral	   negotiation	   and	   agreement	   was	   initially	   rudimentary.	   	   The	   negotiation	  
became	  a	  learning	  process.	  	  One	  interviewee	  revealed	  that	  no	  thorough	  quantitative	  
research	  was	  ever	  conducted	   to	  study	   the	   impact	  of	  any	  compromise	   to	  American	  
demands	  on	  the	  Chinese	  economy.272	  	  The	  GATT/WTO	  accession	  was	  regarded	  as	  a	  
tariff	   issue.	   	   Since	   the	   tariff	   has	   been	   revenue	   for	   the	   central	   government,	   it	   has	  
never	  concerned	  the	  provincial	  interests.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  whole	  negotiation	  process	  
did	  not	  touch	  upon	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  central	  government	  and	  provincial	  
government,	   except	   that,	   as	   discussed	   supra,	   provincial	   leaders	   were	   involved	   to	  
provide	   political	   support	   late	   in	   Stage	   Three.	   	   In	   estimating	   the	   cost	   of	   political	  
support,	   local	  government	  gradually	  realized	   the	   importance	  of	  understanding	   the	  
impact	  of	  WTO	  accession	  on	  the	  local	  economy	  and	  started	  to	  set	  up	  WTO	  consulting	  
centers.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




In	   the	  1990s,	   the	  consensus	  gradually	   formed	  that	  China	  needed	  to	  make	  8	  
percent	   or	   higher	   growth	   rate	   in	   GDP	   in	   order	   to	   keep	   social	   stability. 273	  	  
Constructing	   this	   indicator	  acceptable	   to	  different	   factions	   in	  politics	  and	  different	  
positions	   in	   the	   bureaucracy	   took	   some	   time,	   but	   in	   the	   late	   1990s,	   both	   the	  
reformists	  who	  wanted	  economic	  development	  and	  the	  conservatives	  who	  pursued	  
the	   governance	   stability	   of	   the	   Communist	   regime,	   both	   the	   trade	   liberalists	   and	  
protectionists	   in	   the	   State	  Council	   agreed	   to	   the	   goal	   for	   a	  healthy	   economy	  –	   the	  
GDP	  growth	  rate	  of	  8%.	  	  As	  a	  countable	  problem	  which	  “acquires	  a	  power	  of	  its	  own	  
that	   is	  unmatched	  by	  problems	   that	   are	   less	   countable,”274	  this	   concrete	   indicator,	  
8%	  of	  GDP	  growth,	  has	  become	  very	  powerful	  ever	  since.	   	  It	  functions	  as	  index	  for	  
macroeconomic	  policy	  decision	  at	  the	  central	  level	  and	  as	  a	  threshold	  for	  promotion	  
and	   reward	   in	   the	   bureaucracy	   in	   localities.	   	   Policy	   makers	   began	   to	   consider	   a	  
change	   in	   this	   indicator	   to	  be	  a	  change	   in	   the	  state	  of	   system	  and	   interpret	   it	  as	  a	  
symbolic	  of	  something	  larger	  which	  requires	  a	  move.	  	  
Problems	  capture	  the	  attention	  of	  decision	  makers	  when	  the	  indicator	  simply	  
shows	   that	   there	   is	   a	   problem,	   and	   the	   determination	   that	   a	   problem	   exists	   is	   a	  
matter	  of	  interpretation.	  	  Starting	  from	  1995,	  the	  Chinese	  GDP	  growth	  rate	  fell,	  from	  
10.5%	  in	  1995	  to	  9.3%	  in	  1997,	  and	  then	  to	  7.1%	  in	  1999,	  and	  the	  retail	  price	  fell	  
almost	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  The	  market	  full	  of	  laid-­‐off	  workers	  from	  SOE	  privatization	  
did	   not	   respond	   to	   the	   government’s	  monetary	   policy.	   	   A	   lower	  GDP	   growth	   rate,	  
less	   than	  8%,	  was	   interpreted	  as	  not	  only	  an	  economic	  problem,	  but	  also	  an	   issue	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about	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  regime,	  which	  may	  cause	  a	  crisis	   if	  nothing	  would	  be	  done.	  	  
Once	   the	   economic	   problem	   was	   put	   into	   the	   category	   of	   political	   stability,	   it	  
possessed	  high	  priority.	  	  The	  negotiation	  for	  WTO	  accession,	  which	  was	  ongoing	  for	  
more	  than	  a	  decade,	  looked	  more	  attractive	  than	  before	  for	  its	  potential	  to	  boost	  the	  
economy.	  	  	  
About	   the	   same	   time,	   Zhu	   Rongji,	   the	   new	   head	   of	   the	   State	   Council,	   was	  
confronted	  with	  difficulty	  in	  his	  SOE	  reform	  and	  needed	  foreign	  pressure	  to	  counter	  
resistance	   inside	   the	   State	   Council.	   	   The	   State	   Council	   under	   Zhu’s	   leadership	  
recognized	   reinvigorating	   the	   economy	   and	   modernizing	   the	   SOEs	   as	   the	   top	  
priority.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  order	  to	  introducing	  modern	  technology	  and	  upgrade	  the	  
manufacturers	  in	  textile	  industry,	  the	  total	  spindles	  nationwide	  were	  reduced	  from	  
50	   million	   to	   30	   million. 275 	  	   Weakening	   the	   SOEs	   equals	   diminishing	   their	  
representatives	  in	  the	  bureaucracy.	  	  For	  better	  cooperation	  and	  coordination	  in	  the	  
Ministry	   of	   Textile	   Industry,	   an	   associate	   director	   of	   the	   SETC,	   Shi	  Wanpeng,	  was	  
relocated	   to	   head	   this	  ministry	   around	   1997-­‐1998.276	  	   From	  his	   administration	   of	  
the	  SOE	  privatization	  program,	  Zhu	  became	  aware	  of	  this	  tremendous	  obstacle	  –	  the	  
bureaucratic	  resistance	  from	  industrial	  ministries	  inside	  the	  State	  Council.277	  	  When	  
the	  SOE	  reform	  reached	  an	  impasse,	  the	  mismatch	  between	  the	  observed	  condition	  
and	   Zhu’s	   conception	   of	   an	   ideal	   state	   of	   domestic	   enterprises	   presented	   him	   a	  
problem	  to	  resolve.	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Although	   the	   WTO	   accession	   did	   not	   look	   interesting	   earlier,	   the	   foreign	  
competition	  that	  it	  would	  introduce	  was	  now	  regarded	  as	  leverage	  in	  pressing	  SOEs	  
to	  become	  efficient	  and	  make	  reforms.	   	  Against	  the	  backdrop	  that	  the	  GDP	  growth	  
rate	  slipped	  down	  enough	  to	  set	  off	   the	  alarm,	   the	  decision	  makers	  and	  problems,	  
tracking	   each	   other,	   converged	   on	   an	   existing	   idea,	   the	   WTO	   accession.	   	   The	  
GATT/WTO	  accession,	  which	  was	  part	  of	  the	  grand	  strategies,	  economic	  reform	  and	  
the	  development	  of	  market	  economy,	  was	  redefined	  as	  a	  potential	  solution	  for	  these	  
two	  urgent	  problems.	  	  
Second,	  the	  idea	  of	  GATT/WTO	  accession	  began	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  survived	  in	  
the	  1990s.	   	  By	   the	  end	  of	  1990s,	   it	  was	  no	   longer	  a	  new	  idea,	  but	  one	  that	   floated	  
around	  in	  policy	  community	  for	  more	  than	  a	  decade.	  	  As	  a	  proposal	  that	  associated	  
with	   economic	   development,	   it	   had	   the	   right	   type	   of	   policy	   direction.	   	   China’s	  
economic	   reform	  brought	   not	   only	   an	   economic	  miracle	   in	   this	   period,	   but	   also	   a	  
substantial	   change	   of	   the	   value.	   	   The	   value,	  which	   only	   pro-­‐trade	   advocates	   held,	  
gradually	   spread	   to	   the	   policy	   communities,	   in	   which	   less	   tended	   to	   be	   inertia-­‐
bound	   and	   resistant	   to	   major	   changes,	   and	   more	   see	   the	   trade	   liberalization	   in	  
similar	  ways	  and	  approve	  of	  approaches	  to	  liberalize	  trade	  and	  economy.	  	  
When	  many	  proposals	  coexisted	  in	  the	  “policy	  primeval	  soup,”	  the	  selection	  
process	  was	  evolutionary.	   	   In	  this	   lengthy	  process,	   the	  origin	  of	  GATT	  accession	  in	  
the	   Cold	  War	  was	   no	   longer	   important.	   	   This	   proposal	   survived	   the	   processes	   of	  
mutation	   and	   recombination:	   It	   survived	   Tiananmen	   Square	   incident	   and	   revived	  




the	  priority	  to	  other	  proposals,	  such	  as	  the	  Three	  Gorges	  Dam	  project;	  it	  suffered	  the	  
setback	  caused	  by	  the	  failure	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  GATT	  by	  1994;	  and	  it	  was	  held	  off	  of	  a	  
policy	   agenda	   for	   a	   considerable	   amount	   of	   time	  while	   internal	   coordination	   and	  
balance	   occurred,	   for	   example,	   the	   associate	   director	   of	   SEC	   pushed	   MOFTEC	   to	  
open	   trading	   rights	   for	   auto	   industry	   and	   its	  ministry.	   	   In	   the	   same	   period,	   trade	  
advocates	  and	  liberal	  minds	  had	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  “right”	  type	  of	  policy	  direction,	  and	  
it	  was	  finally	  recombined	  with	  the	  SOE	  reform	  and	  became	  acceptable	  to	  the	  policy	  
communities.	  
The	   proposal	   of	   GATT/WTO	   accession	   floated	   in	   the	   policy	   community	   for	  
more	   than	  a	  decade.	   	  Trade	  advocates	   tried	   to	   soften	  up	  both	  policy	   communities	  
and	   the	   general	   public.	   	   As	   discussed	   earlier	   about	   the	   term	   paowen	   inside	   the	  
bureaucracy,	  MOFTEC	  sent	  its	  higher	  officials	  to	  other	  industrial	  ministries,	  trying	  to	  
coordinate	   and	   persuade	   them	   in	   shaping	   its	   own	   policy	   proposals.	   	   Moreover,	  
around	  1992	  and	  1993,	  MOFTEC	  waged	  a	   campaign	   to	  educate	   the	  general	  public	  
about	   the	   GATT,	   which	   will	   be	   detailed	   in	   the	   next	   chapter.	   	   Although	   these	  
measures	  did	  not	  prove	  to	  be	  effective,	   it	  paved	  the	  way	  to	  get	  the	  relevant	  public	  
ready	  for	  the	  accession	  when	  the	  timing	  came	  later.	  	  
The	   pro-­‐trade	   agencies	   and	   coalition	   came	   into	   being	   in	   the	   same	   period.	  	  
The	   leading	   trade-­‐promoting	   agency	   had	   structural	   changes	   in	   the	   process	   of	   the	  
GATT/WTO	  accession	  and	  came	  into	  being.	  	  Change	  began	  in	  the	  year	  of	  1978,	  when	  
Chen	  Muhua,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Ministry	  of	  Economic	  Relations	  with	  Foreign	  Countries	  




When	  this	  pro-­‐trade	  ministry	  was	  headed	  directly	  by	  a	  vice	  premier,	  it	  elevated	  the	  
importance	   and	   status	   of	   this	   ministry	   in	   the	   organizational	   structure,	   thus	   it	  
facilitated	  the	  pro-­‐trade	  agencies.	  	  A	  few	  years	  later	  in	  1982,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  
Trade,	   Ministry	   of	   Economic	   Relations	   with	   Foreign	   Countries,	   State	   Import	   and	  
Export	   Regulation	   Commission,	   and	   Foreign	   Investment	   Regulation	   Commission	  
were	  merged	  into	  one	  ministry,	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Economic	  Relations	  and	  Trade	  
(MOFERT).	   	   The	   combination	   of	   various	   trade-­‐related	   agencies	   and	   human	  
resources	   empowered	   the	   pro-­‐trade	   coalition	   by	   eliminating	   cross-­‐agency	  
coordination.	   	   In	  March	  1993,	  MOFERT	  was	  renamed	  to	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Trade	  
and	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  (MOFTEC).	  	  In	  this	  way,	  MOFTEC	  came	  to	  resemble	  the	  
USTR	  on	  international	  negotiations.	  
At	  the	  beginning	  there	  was	  no	  specific	  office	  for	  the	  GATT	  or	  WTO	  inside	  the	  
MOFTEC.	   	   Instead,	   a	   team	   for	   international	   relations	   took	   the	   responsibility	   of	  
international	  trade	  issues.278	  	  With	  more	  and	  more	  important	  workload,	  it	  gradually	  
rose	   to	   department	   level	   and	   became	   Department	   of	   International	   Trade	   and	  
Economic	  Affairs.279	  	  This	  department	   took	   lead	  of	   trade	  negotiations	  with	   foreign	  
countries	  and	  international	  organizations,	  under	  which	  were	  founded	  new	  divisions.	  	  
The	  Second	  Division,	   the	  so-­‐called	  GATT	  Division,	  was	   founded	  specifically	   for	   the	  
GATT	  application	  around	  1986,	  and	  mainly	   in	  charge	  of	   trade	  negotiations	   for	   the	  
GATT/WTO	  accession.	  	  The	  GATT	  Division	  started	  from	  seven	  staff	  members,	  much	  
smaller	  than	  other	  divisions.280	  	  With	  the	  rising	  importance	  of	  its	  mission,	  this	  small	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division	   was	   eventually	   separated	   from	   Department	   of	   International	   Trade	   and	  
Economic	  Affairs	  and	  evolved	  into	  Department	  of	  WTO	  Affairs,	  with	  seven	  divisions	  
and	  one	  office	  under	   it.	   	  While	  rising	   in	   the	  bureaucracy	  chart,	   this	  agency	  and	   its	  
bureaucrats	  had	  the	  incentives	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  Americans	  and	  promote	  liberal	  
trade	  policy	  for	  promotion	  of	  personal	  career,	  agency	  expansion,	  the	  enlargement	  of	  
bureaucratic	  turf.	  	  
The	   pro-­‐trade	   coalition	   not	   only	   formed	   and	   but	   also	   became	   intertwined	  
and	   stronger.	   	   The	   inter-­‐personal	   exchange,	   between	   MOFTEC,	   General	  
Administration	  of	  Customs,	  and	  the	  SETC,	  also	  facilitated	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  pro-­‐
trade	  coalition	  in	  this	  policy	  community	  of	  specialists.	  	  For	  instance,	  GATT	  Division’s	  
first	   division	   chief	   was	   promoted	   to	   director-­‐general	   of	   Department	   of	   Tariffs	   at	  
Customs	  and	  acted	  as	  an	  important	  member	  of	  Custom	  Tariff	  Commission.	   	  One	  of	  
MOFTEC’s	   assistant	   to	   the	   minister	   transferred	   to	   the	   SETC.	   	   He	   acted	   as	   the	  
associate	   director	   in	   charge	   of	   Committee	   on	   Inter-­‐Ministerial	   Coordination	   on	  
GATT/WTO	  and	  presided	  the	  coordination	  meetings.	  	  
The	   value	   acceptability	   was	   another	   criterion	   for	   the	   proposal’s	   survival.	  	  
Scholars	   like	   Dr.	   Lieberthal	   have	   pointed	   out	   the	   fragmentation	   in	   the	   regime	   of	  
Communist	  China.	  	  Unlike	  a	  more	  closely	  knit	  community	  which	  generates	  common	  
outlooks,	   orientations,	   and	  ways	   of	   thinking,	   the	   Chinese	   policy	   community	   is	   not	  
tightly	   knit.	   	   Compared	  with	   their	   peers	   in	   the	   bureaucracy,	   officials	   in	   pro-­‐trade	  




door	   policy	   would	   benefit	   the	   country.281	  	   From	   my	   interviews,	   I	   found	   many	   of	  
these	   trade	   officials,	   even	   the	   experts	   invited	   to	   coordination	   meetings,	   were	  
exposed	   to	   foreign	   education,	   work	   experience	   overseas	   (mostly	   in	   Geneva),	   or	  
numerous	  foreign	  travels.	   	  Their	  views	  on	   issue-­‐topics	  at	   international	  negotiation	  
directly	  affected	  the	  alternatives	  they	  proposed.	  	  By	  interacting	  with	  other	  agencies,	  
they	  spread	  these	  values	  within	  the	  Chinese	  bureaucracy.	   	   In	  the	   late	  1990s,	  some	  
top	   leaders,	   for	   example	   Zhu	   Rongji	   and	   Li	   Peng,	   had	   already	   taken	   the	   concepts	  
conveyed	   by	  western	   literature,	   such	   as	   absolute	   advantage	   in	   Adam	   Smith’s	  The	  
Wealth	  of	  Nations	   and	   comparative	   advantage	   in	  David	  Ricardo’s	  The	  Principles	  of	  
Political	  Economy	  and	  Taxation.282	  	  
With	  the	  gradual	  change	  in	  the	  values	  of	  bureaucrats,	  the	  measures	  that	  were	  
compatible	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  GATT/WTO	  membership	  became	  more	  and	  more	  
acceptable	  within	   the	  Chinese	  bureaucracy.	   	   In	  1992,	  China	   tactically	  used	  market	  
access	   to	   exchange	   for	   American	   support	   –	   “The	   U.S.	   Government	   will	   staunchly	  
support	  China’s	  achievement	  of	  contracting	  party	  status	  to	  the	  GATT.”283	  	  Later,	  high	  
officials	   at	   the	   State	   Council	   dropped	   limitation	   on	   market	   access	   on	   their	   own	  
initiative.	   	   China	   permitted	   limited	   market	   access	   for	   international	   supermarket	  
groups:	   One	   company	   could	   not	   run	  more	   than	   10	   stores	   in	   Beijing.	   	   In	   order	   to	  
research	  the	  operation	  of	  supermarket,	  the	  associate	  director	  of	  the	  SETC	  opened	  a	  
small	  supermarket	  next	  to	  the	  SPC.	  	  He	  recalled	  it	  was	  very	  hard	  to	  figure	  out	  when	  
to	  put	  what	  on	   the	   shelf	   and	  when	   to	   take	  what	  off	   the	   shelf.	   	   From	  his	  hands-­‐on	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experience,	  he	  drew	   the	  conclusion	   that	   the	  business	  model	  of	   supermarket	   could	  
only	  operate	  well	  when	  it	  formed	  a	  chain.	  	  If	  foreign	  supermarket	  chains	  could	  run	  
well,	  we	  should	  not	  prohibit	  it.	  	  Upon	  this	  suggestion,	  Wu	  Yi,	  as	  the	  State	  Councilor	  
in	   charge	   of	   trade,	   met	   with	   the	   heads	   of	   international	   supermarket	   chain	  
companies	  which	  violated	  their	  market	  access	  permission,	  and	  made	  clear	  that	  they	  
would	  not	  be	  investigated.284	  	  
In	  the	  “policy	  primeval	  soup”	  of	  many	  proposals,	  the	  proposal	  of	  GATT/WTO	  
accession,	  which	  floated	  in	  the	  policy	  community	  more	  than	  a	  decade,	  finally	  rode	  in	  
the	  “right”	  policy	  direction	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  It	  benefited	  from	  the	  rise	  of	  MOFTEC	  and	  
its	  trade	  negotiation	  division,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  formation	  of	  pro-­‐trade	  coalition.	   	  After	  
years	   of	   softening	   up,	   it	   not	   only	   survived	   the	   lengthy	   selection	   process,	   but	   also	  
entered	  into	  a	  short	  list	  of	  ideas	  when	  top	  leaders	  and	  bureaucrats	  were	  receptive	  to	  
values	  promoted	  by	  the	  free	  global	  trading	  net.	   	  As	  a	  viable	  alterative	  available	  for	  
economic	  impasses,	  it	  achieved	  the	  high	  placement	  on	  policy	  agenda.	  	  In	  March	  1998,	  
China	   submitted	   a	   list	   of	   nearly	   6000	   products	   for	   tariff	   reduction	   on	   its	   own	  
initiative.	  	  	  
Third,	  independently	  of	  the	  problems	  and	  policy	  streams,	  the	  political	  stream	  
has	   its	   own	  dynamics	   and	   can	  be	   an	   important	   promoter	   or	   inhibiter	   for	   a	   policy	  
proposal.285	  	   In	   China’s	   GATT/WTO	   accession,	   agenda	   change	   occurred	   in	   both	   of	  
these	   two	  ways:	   Incumbent	   in	   positions	   of	   authority	   changed	   their	   priorities	   and	  
pushed	   for	   this	   proposal’s	   agenda	   status;	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   personnel	   in	   the	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State	  Council	  were	  restructured,	  and	  new	  priorities	  were	  brought	  onto	  the	  agenda	  
by	  virtue	  of	  this	  government	  turnover.	  	  The	  standard	  operating	  procedures	  that	  the	  
organizational	  process	  model	  emphasizes	  help	  us	  understand	  the	  routine	  operation	  
of	   the	   Chinese	   government,	   yet	   the	   garbage	   can	   model	   shows	   its	   strengths	   in	  
explaining	  changing	  situations	  and	  constraints.	  	  	  
A	  change	  of	  top	  personnel	  in	  an	  administrative	  agency	  substantially	  changed	  
the	  agenda.	  	  In	  the	  year	  of	  1998,	  Zhu	  Rongji	  was	  promoted	  to	  the	  Premier.	  	  Acting	  as	  
Premier,	   Zhu’s	   view	   about	   the	   impact	   of	   foreign	   competition	   on	   domestic	  
enterprises	  was	  different	  from	  that	  during	  his	  vice	  premier	  tenure.	  	  His	  new	  priority	  
was	   to	   implement	  SOE	   reform.	   	  As	   early	   as	   in	  1986,	   then	  Vice	  Premier	  Tian	   Jiyun	  
remarked	  at	  a	  meeting,	  “The	  overall	  reform	  of	  the	  economic	  structure	  is	  in	  a	  sense	  a	  
readjustment	   of	   power	   and	   interest,	   in	   which	   a	   large	   amount	   of	   contradictions	  
exists.”	  	  Confronted	  with	  vested	  interests	  in	  the	  SOEs	  and	  industrial	  ministries,	  Zhu	  
tried	  to	  leverage	  foreign	  pressure	  to	  push	  for	  SOE	  reform.	  	  Details	  will	  be	  discussed	  
in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
A	   government	   turnover,	   which	   aimed	   at	   its	   own	   causes	   in	   economic	  
development	  and	  domestic	  politics,	  showed	  powerful	  effects	  on	  the	  agenda,	  and	  the	  
WTO	  case	  became	  a	  collateral	   issue,	  which	  benefited	   from	  this	   turnover.	   	   In	  1998,	  
the	  State	  Council	  underwent	  a	  major	   reform	  of	   its	   structure,	  which	   fundamentally	  
changed	   the	   bureaucratic	   rank	   of	   numerous	   agencies,	   correspondingly	   their	  




about	  half	  of	  its	  bureaucrats.286	  	  Fifteen	  ministries	  or	  commissions	  were	  abolished,	  
among	  which	  many	  were	  powerful	  heavy	   industrial	  ministries.	   	  Ten	  of	   them	  were	  
first	   downgraded	   from	   a	  ministry	   under	   the	   State	   Council	   to	   a	   bureau	   under	   the	  
SETC,	   and	   a	   few	   years	   later,	   they	   transformed	   from	   governmental	   agency	   to	  
industry	   association.	   	   For	   instance,	   Ministry	   of	   Machinery	   Building	   Industry	   was	  
downgraded	  to	  Bureau	  of	  Machinery	  Building	  Industry	  under	  the	  SETC,	  and	  later	  it	  
became	   China	  Machinery	   Industry	   Federation.	   	   Ministry	   of	  Metallurgical	   Industry	  
was	   downgraded	   to	  Bureau	   of	  Metallurgical	   Industry	   under	   the	   SETC,	   and	   then	   it	  
became	  Metallurgical	  Industry	  Association.	  	  	  
In	   contrast,	   pro-­‐trade	   agencies	   such	   as	   the	   General	   Administration	   of	  
Customs	   and	   MOFTEC	   maintained	   their	   bureaucratic	   ranks.	   	   Thus,	   protectionist	  
agencies	   had	   lower	   bureaucratic	   rank	   than	   pro-­‐trade	   agencies	   after	   the	  
restructuring.	  	  As	  discussed	  supra,	  bureaucratic	  rank	  of	  an	  organization	  is	  extremely	  
important	  for	  domestic	  negotiation	  and	  its	  outcome.	  	  When	  they	  were	  downgraded	  
to	  industrial	  bureaus	  under	  the	  SETC,	  it	  was	  understood	  that	  they	  were	  to	  transform	  
to	   industrial	   association	   and	   abolished	   from	   the	   bureaucracy	   eventually.	   	   The	  
demotion	   of	   these	   heavy	   industrial	   ministries	   in	   the	   organizational	   chart	  
significantly	   decreased	   their	   bargaining	   power	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   pro-­‐trade	   agencies	   inside	  
the	  State	  Council.	  	  This	  change	  of	  relative	  hierarchical	  status	  and	  bargaining	  power	  
between	   pro-­‐trade	   agencies	   and	   protectionist	   agencies	   gave	   an	   advantage	   to	   the	  
WTO	  proposal.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Having	  many	  heavy	  industrial	  ministries	  ranked	  as	  bureaus	  underneath,	  the	  
SETC	  had	  been	  awarded	  greater	   authority	   and	   leeway	   to	  bargain	  with	   them.	   	  The	  
SETC	  became	  the	  new	  representative	  and	  supervising	  agency	  over	  many	  industries.	  	  
As	   a	   commission	   of	   supra-­‐ministerial	   rank,	   it	   was	   half	   level	   higher	   than	   those	  
protectionist	  industrial	  ministries;	  now	  it	  had	  significantly	  higher	  bureaucratic	  rank	  
than	   these	   industrial	   bureaus.	   The	   combination	   of	   SETC’s	   dual	   identity,	   the	  
coordinator	   for	   the	  WTO	   accession	   and	   the	   new	   supervising	   agency	   of	   industrial	  
interests,	   facilitated	   the	   progress	   of	   internal	   coordination	   and	   turned	   the	   tide	  
toward	   to	   the	   WTO	   accession.	   	   The	   State	   Council	   reorganization	   fundamentally	  
changed	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  on	  the	  domestic	  bargaining	  table	  for	  the	  WTO	  case.	  	  	  
Moreover,	   the	   three-­‐tier	   decision	   structure	   was	   changed	   correspondingly.	  	  
After	   most	   industrial	   ministries	   were	   reorganized	   into	   the	   SETC,	   Committee	   on	  
Inter-­‐Ministerial	  Coordination	  on	  GATT/WTO,	  the	  lowest	  forum	  for	  bargaining	  and	  
coordination	  between	  ministries	  was	  abolished,287	  allegedly	  for	  Premier	  Zhu	  to	  take	  
direct	  control	  over	  the	  WTO	  affairs.	  	  As	  widely	  reported,	  Premier	  Zhu	  stepped	  in	  at	  
the	   very	   end	   and	   negotiated	   across	   the	   table	   with	   Ambassador	   Barshefsky.	   	   The	  
organizational	   process	   followed	   for	   internal	   coordination	   for	  more	   than	   a	   decade	  
was	  changed.	  	  The	  following	  story	  of	  a	  phone	  call	  manifested	  the	  chain-­‐of-­‐command	  
in	  the	  late	  Stage	  Three	  of	  bilateral	  negotiation.	  	  	  
An	   interviewee	   recalled	   one	   night	   of	   bilateral	   negotiation,	   the	   MOFTEC	  
Minister	  Shi	  Guangsheng	  visited	  the	  Chinese	  staff’s	  conference	  room	  with	  pajamas	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




on	  and	  told	  them	  a	  story:	  	  When	  Shi	  was	  on	  the	  phone	  with	  Wu	  Yi	  (State	  Councilor	  in	  
charge	  of	  trade),	  Premier	  Zhu	  called	  Wu.	  	  Wu	  said	  to	  Shi,	  the	  Premier	  wanted	  to	  talk	  
to	   you.	   	   You	   should	   report	   to	   him	   directly.	   	   At	   this	   time,	   President	   Jiang	   called	  
Premier	   Zhu,	   and	   Zhu	   turned	   around	   and	   asked	   Shi	   to	   report	   straight	   to	   the	  
president.288	  	  From	  this	  story,	  we	  learn	  that	  at	  the	  very	  end,	  the	  proposals	  moved	  up	  
from	  MOFTEC	  minister	  to	  State	  Councilor,	  then	  to	  the	  Premier,	  and	  eventually	  to	  the	  
General	  Secretary/the	  President.	   	  After	  Zhu	  rose	  to	   the	  Premier	  and	  took	  over	   the	  
WTO	  affairs,	  the	  established	  three-­‐tier	  decision	  procedure	  was	  no	  longer	  followed.	  	  
It	   allowed	   the	   pro-­‐trade	   agencies’	   proposals	   to	   gain	   advantages	   in	   the	   selection	  
process	  and	  showed	  the	  powerful	  effect	  on	  the	  agenda.	  	  
The	   end	   of	   the	   1990s	   became	   a	   critical	   juncture	   where	   three	   streams	   –	  
problems,	  policy,	  and	  political	  stream	  –	  came	  together.	  	  Having	  floating	  in	  the	  policy	  
stream,	  this	  idea	  of	  GATT/WTO	  accession	  became	  a	  worked-­‐out,	  viable	  proposal	  by	  
softening-­‐up.	   	   It	  was	  compatible	  with	   the	  substantial	   change	  of	  values	   in	  1990s	   in	  
the	  bureaucracy	  and	  rode	  in	  policy	  direction	  of	  the	  right	  type.	  	  Although	  it	  floated	  in	  
the	   policy	   community	   for	   quite	   a	   while,	   only	   in	   the	   end	   of	   1990s	   did	   it	   become	  
coupled	  to	  prominent	  problems,	  the	  slow-­‐down	  of	  domestic	  economy	  and	  the	  SOE	  
reform.	   	  At	   the	  same	   time,	   it	  was	  attached	   to	   these	  problems	  as	  a	   solution	   for	   the	  
foreign	   pressure	   that	   it	   could	   bring	   to	   SOE	   for	   better	   performance.	   	   The	  
development	  in	  the	  political	  stream,	  the	  significant	  turnover	  inside	  the	  State	  Council	  
in	  1998,	  provided	  a	  receptive	  climate	  for	  the	  WTO	  accession.	   	  This	  combination	  of	  
the	   solution	   and	   problems	   finally	   found	   sufficient	   support	   in	   the	   political	   stream.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




From	  the	  organizational	  perspective,	  when	  the	  coupling	  of	   three	  streams	  occurred	  




As	   Dr.	   Kingdon	   argued,	   “In	   contrast	   to	   a	   problem-­‐solving	  model,	   in	   which	  
people	   become	   aware	   of	   a	   problem	   and	   consider	   alternative	   solutions,	   solutions	  
float	  around	   in	  and	  near	  government,	   searching	   for	  problems	   to	  which	   to	  become	  
attached	  or	  political	  events	  that	  increase	  their	  likelihood	  of	  adoption.”289	  	  Different	  
from	  Cuba	  Missile	  Crisis,	  China’s	  decision-­‐making	  on	  WTO	  accession	  was	  a	  lengthy	  
process,	  in	  which	  this	  policy	  alternative	  had	  constantly	  existed	  in	  the	  policy	  stream	  
for	  more	  than	  a	  decade.	  	  After	  years	  of	  softening-­‐up,	  the	  value	  that	  trade	  advocates	  
promoted	  spread	  to	  the	  bureaucracy,	  and	  even	  to	  the	  top	  leaders.	   	  It	  was	  suddenly	  
elevated	  on	  the	  agenda	  because	  it	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  pressing	  problems	  
in	  economy.	  	  	  
In	   this	   case,	   the	   organizational	   process	   model	   shows	   its	   limitation,	   while	  
garbage	  can	  model	  demonstrates	  strong	  explanation	  power.	  	  In	  the	  lengthy	  process,	  
the	   reorganization	   inside	   Chinese	   government	   heavily	   affected	   the	   internal	  
bargaining	   table.	   	   On	   one	   side,	   the	   pro-­‐trade	   agencies	   became	   stronger,	   and	   the	  
trade	   coalition	   gradually	   formed	   among	   MOFTEC,	   the	   General	   Administration	   of	  
Customs,	  and	  SETC.	   	  On	  the	  other,	  many	  industrial	  ministries	  were	  downgraded	  to	  
bureau	  level	  and	  eventually	  transformed	  to	  industrial	  associations.	  	  The	  government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




restructuring	   tilted	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   on	   domestic	   bargaining	   table,	   which	  
benefited	   the	   pro-­‐trade	   agencies’	   pursuit.	   	   The	   decision	   procedure	   of	   three-­‐tier,	  
which	   functioned	   for	   years	   for	   tariff	   issues	   and	   trade	   negotiations,	   were	   not	  
followed	  after	   the	  government	   turnover.	   	  With	   the	  help	  of	   the	  garbage	  can	  model,	  
we	   have	   a	   better	   understanding	  when	   the	   problem,	   policy,	   politics	   stream	   are	   all	  
coupled	   together	   by	   the	   year	   of	   1998,	   the	   Sino-­‐American	   trade	   negotiation	  




















Chapter	  5:	  	  The	  Third	  Cut	  of	  China’s	  GATT/WTO	  Bid:	  	  
Bureaucratic	  Politics	  in	  the	  Two-­‐level	  Game	  
	  
In	  Chapter	  III,	  I	  have	  built	  my	  analytical	  framework,	  relying	  on	  the	  structure	  
of	  Dr.	  Allison’s	   policy	   analysis	  models.	   	   The	   analytical	   framework	   addresses	   three	  
different	  aspects	  of	  one	  policy	  outcome.	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  the	  focus	  of	  analysis	  shifts	  
to	   how	   bureaucratic	   politics	   affect	   China’s	   decision	   on	   its	   negotiation	   for	  
GATT/WTO	   accession,	   featuring	   the	   internal	   bargaining,	   international	   bargaining,	  
and	  their	  interplay	  with	  each	  other.	  
There	   is	   no	   separate,	   open	   sphere	   of	   politics	   in	   China	   as	   there	   is	   in	  
democracies	  for	  internal	  bargaining	  over	  policies.	  	  Group	  interests,	  which	  are	  denied	  
overt	   channels	   of	   expression,	   are	   fed	   into	   the	   bureaucratic	   politics.	   	   In	   the	   policy	  
process,	  these	  interests	  look	  to	  ambitious	  officials	  to	  take	  up	  their	  pursuits.	   	  At	  the	  
domestic	   bargaining	   table,	   struggles	   over	  policy,	   or	   even	  policy	   orientation,	   go	   on	  
concurrently	  with	  the	  struggle	  for	  power.	  	  China’s	  accession	  to	  the	  GATT/WTO,	  as	  a	  
liberal	   trade	   policy,	   was	   intertwined	   with	   internal	   power	   competition	   and	  
succession	  politics	  in	  the	  three	  stages.	  	  
The	   fifteen	   years	   of	   China’s	   accession	   negotiation	   to	   enter	   the	   GATT/WTO	  
coincided	  with	   the	  power	   transition	   from	   the	   second-­‐generation	   leadership	   to	   the	  
third.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  institutional	  election,	  the	  transition	  from	  one	  generation	  of	  
leadership	  to	  the	  next	  is	  often	  accompanied	  by	  faction	  competition.	  	  In	  the	  factional	  
competition	  for	  power,	  communist	  officials	  cannot	  openly	  campaign	  for	  leadership	  




between	   factions	   is	   hidden	   in	   the	   bureaucratic	   policy	   process.	   	   The	   CPC’s	  
bureaucratic	   politics	   features	   the	   balance	   between	   factional	   competition	   and	   the	  
consensus	  to	  maintain	  party	  unity.	  
The	  strong	  link	  between	  policy	  and	  power	  in	  communist	  systems	  means	  that	  
succession	   struggles	   create	   opportunities	   for	  policy	   innovation.	   	   In	   the	   succession	  
competition,	  taking	  a	  particular	  policy	  position	  can	  enable	  a	  potential	  candidate	  to	  
appeal	  to	  groups	  within	  the	  selectorate,290	  and	  it	  also	  can	  facilitate	  a	  power	  seeker	  
going	   on	   the	   offensive	   against	   a	   rival.	   	   Generally	   speaking,	   the	   opportunities	   for	  
innovation	   are	  welcome	   in	   communist	   systems,	  which	   can	   obtain	   consensus	   only	  
with	  conservative	  policies	  that	  preserve	  every	  group’s	  original	  share	  of	  the	  pie.	  	  	  
Regarding	   bureaucratic	   politics	   and	   bargaining	   at	   the	   domestic	   table,	   the	  
significance	   of	   China’s	   decision	   on	   accession	   to	   the	   GATT/WTO	   varied	   in	   three	  
stages.	  	  In	  Stages	  I	  and	  II,	  China’s	  decision	  on	  the	  GATT	  was	  associated	  with	  China’s	  
economic	   reform	   policy	   and	   the	   development	   of	   market	   economy.	   	   Bureaucratic	  
struggles	   over	   economic	   reform	   policy	  were	   tremendously	   affected	   by	   the	   power	  
transition	   and	   succession	   politics.	   	   At	   the	   time,	   China’s	   decision-­‐making	   on	   its	  
accession	   to	   the	  GATT	  was	   confined	   to	   a	   limited	  number	   of	   bureaucratic	   officials,	  
mainly	  the	  power	  players	  at	  the	  very	  top	  level.	  	  MOFTEC	  negotiators	  at	  the	  working	  
level	  were	  also	  included.	  	  Domestic	  bargaining	  about	  the	  GATT,	  subordinated	  to	  the	  
internal	   debates	   on	   economic	   reform,	   went	   on	   concurrently	   with	   domestic	  
competition	   in	   power	   succession.	   	   In	   Stage	   III,	   power	   of	   the	   third-­‐generation	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  Central	  Committee,	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  contrast	  to	  elected	  




leadership	   had	   been	   consolidated.	   	   The	   economic	   reform	   was	   no	   longer	   under	  
question.	  	  At	  the	  domestic	  bargaining	  table	  for	  China’s	  WTO	  accession,	  bureaucratic	  
units,	   in	  pursuit	  of	   their	  organizational	   interests,	   acted	  as	  basic	  building	  blocks	  of	  
China’s	   internal	   politics	   on	  WTO	   affairs.	   	   Policy	   coordination	   seemed	   to	   not	  work	  
well,	   so	   top-­‐down	   authority	   played	   the	   key	   role,	   though	   it	   cannot	   dominate	   the	  
domestic	  bargaining	  table.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Politics	  in	  Stage	  I	  
	  
Dr.	   Putnam’s	   two-­‐level	   game	   theory	   reveals	   the	   entanglement	   of	   domestic	  
politics	  and	  international	  relations.	  	  He	  points	  out	  that	  the	  “agreement	  [at	  the	  Bonn	  
summit	   of	   1978]	   was	   possible	   only	   because	   a	   powerful	   minority	   within	   each	  
government	   actually	   favored	   on	   domestic	   grounds	   the	   policy	   being	   demanded	  
internationally.”	   	   Therefore,	   “without	   domestic	   resonance,	   international	   forces	  
would	  not	  have	  sufficed	  to	  produce	  the	  accord.”291	  	  Except	  at	  the	  very	  end,	  the	  first	  
stage	   of	   bilateral	   negotiation	   witnessed	   a	   core	   leadership	   leaning	   toward	   liberal	  
economic	  policy.	  	  
The	   core	   of	   the	   Party	   is	   regarded	   as	   the	   top	   leader	   who	   possesses	   the	  
greatest	  political	  leverage	  and	  reputation.	  	  For	  example,	  Mao	  is	  regarded	  as	  the	  core	  
of	   the	   first-­‐generation	   leadership,	   and	   Deng,	   the	   core	   of	   the	   second-­‐generation	  
leadership.	   	   A	   core	   of	   leadership	   comes	   into	   being	   when	   he	   and	   his	   supporters	  
achieve	  victory	   in	   factional	  contests	  during	   leadership	  transition.	   	  Then,	   the	  policy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




preference	   of	   the	   core	   of	   the	   Party	   becomes	   the	   official	   guideline	   in	   the	   policy	  
agenda	  because	  he	  possesses	  great	  political	   leverage.	   	  He	  would	  also	  maximize	  his	  
power	  and	  make	  his	  policy	  preference	  prevail	  over	  that	  of	  his	  rivals.	  	  In	  contrast,	  his	  
rivals	  may	  criticize	  certain	  policy	  that	  is	  usually	  associated	  with	  this	  top	  leader,	  with	  
the	   intention	   to	   undermine	   his	   capacity,	   power	   and	   reputation.	   	   Policy-­‐making	   in	  
large	  part	  hinges	  on	  the	  contest	  of	  political	  strength	  between	  party	  factions.	  	  	  
Leadership	  succession	  and	  power	  transitions	  present	  opportunities	  for	  party	  
factions	  to	  compete,	  and	  the	  policy	  orientation	  of	  the	  country	  and	  the	  policy	  over	  the	  
GATT	  accession	  were	  affected	  significantly.	   	   In	   the	  power	   transition	   from	   the	   first	  
generation	   to	   the	   second,	   Deng	   Xiaoping	   succeeded	   in	   maneuvering	   the	   attacks	  
against	   Hua	   Guofeng,	   Mao’s	   designated	   successor,	   and	   replaced	   him	   as	   the	  
paramount	   leader	  of	   the	  CPC,	   though	  Deng	  did	  not	  hold	  the	  chairman	  position.	   	   In	  
the	   efforts	   to	   erode	   Hua’s	   capacity	   in	   policy-­‐making	   and	   leadership	   in	   ideology,	  
Deng	  cooperated	  with	  Chen	  Yun,	  another	  Party	  elder.	  	  Chen	  held	  the	  post	  of	  deputy	  
party	   chairman	   and	   maintained	   membership	   in	   the	   Standing	   Committee	   of	   the	  
Politburo.	   	   In	   the	   ensuring	   years,	   Deng	   was	   credited	   as	   the	   architect	   of	   China’s	  
economic	   reform,	  while	  Chen	  had	  made	  his	   contribution	   in	  planned	  economy	  and	  
his	  political	  base	  in	  the	  planning	  system.	  
On	   the	   turf	  of	  economic	  policy,	   the	   top	   leadership	  were	  never	  unified	   in	   its	  
view:	   Deng	   was	   regarded	   as	   reformist,	   yet	   Chen,	   conservative.	   	   The	   policy	  
orientation	   of	   Chinese	   reformists	   under	   Deng	   was	   to	   emphasize	   a	   high	   rate	   of	  




economy	  into	  the	  world	  economy.	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  faction	  under	  Chen	  promoted	  a	  
more	   conservative	   policy	   orientation.	   	   They	   claimed	   that	   China	   should	   pursue	  
economic	  reform	  within	  the	  basic	  framework	  of	  the	  planned	  economy	  and	  that	  the	  
market	  should	  supplement	  the	  plan.	  	  He	  stressed	  that	  the	  state	  should	  maintain	  the	  
leading	  position	  of	  the	  SOEs,	  and	  that	  integrating	  China	  into	  the	  world	  market	  would	  
lead	  to	  economic	  and	  political	  dependence	  on	  the	  outside	  world.	  	  
These	   two	  CPC	   factions	   led	  by	   these	   two	   top	   leaders	  became	   the	  drivers	  of	  
internal	  contest	  and	  compromise	  in	  the	  arena	  of	  economic	  policy.	  	  In	  the	  early	  1980s,	  
their	  differences	  emerged,	  especially	  after	  Deng	  rejected	  Chen’s	  approach	  to	  urban	  
reform.292	  	   In	  principle,	  Chen	  never	  objected	  to	  Deng’s	  reform,	  but	  he	  opposed	  the	  
way	   that	   unban	   reform	   was	   carried	   out.	   	   Although	   the	   gap	   gradually	   enlarged	  
between	   the	   two	   factions,	   Chen	   never	   challenged	   Deng’s	   power.	   	   Instead,	   Chen	  
strategically	   used	   economic	   hardship,	   staged	   protests	   against	   the	   radical	   reform	  
programs,	   and	  pushed	  Deng	   to	   lean	   toward	  his	  policy	  orientation.	   	   In	   the	  ensuing	  
years,	  the	  two	  factions	  waxed	  and	  waned	  in	  their	  compromise	  and	  contest	  with	  each	  
other,	   creating	   the	   rounds	   of	   the	   economic	   policy	   cycle,	   which	   also	   shaped	   the	  
dynamics	  of	  internal	  politics	  for	  China’s	  GATT/WTO	  accession.	  
At	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	   first	   stage,	  China’s	   accession	   to	   the	  GATT	  benefited	  
from	   the	   powerful,	   reform-­‐minded	  minority.	   	   At	   the	   top,	   the	   core	   of	   the	   second-­‐
generation	   leadership	   endorsed	   it,	   as	   it	  was	   regarded	   as	   part	   of	   liberal	   economic	  
reform.	  	  At	  the	  State	  Council,	  Premier	  Zhao	  Ziyang	  and	  his	  allies	  promoted	  it.	  	  In	  the	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  World	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year	   of	   1978,	   Chen	  Muhua,	   then	  Minister	   of	  Ministry	   of	   Economic	   Relations	  with	  
Foreign	  Countries,293	  was	   promoted	   to	  Vice	   Premier,	  which	   indicated	   the	   growing	  
importance	  of	  foreign	  trade	  in	  the	  Chinese	  economy,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rising	  weight	  of	  
the	   pro-­‐trade	   political	   coalition	   within	   the	   center	   of	   top-­‐level	   decision-­‐making	   in	  
China.	  	  At	  the	  working	  level,	  liberal	  minded	  officials,	  such	  as	  those	  with	  the	  MOFERT,	  
supported	  it.	  	  
In	   1986,	   the	   State	   Council	   Inter-­‐Ministerial	   Coordination	   Group	   on	   GATT	  
Negotiation	   was	   established	   for	   policy	   coordination.	   	   State	   Councilor	   Zhang	   Jinfu	  
served	   as	   its	   head,	   and	   vice	   directors	   included	   the	   Minster	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	  
Minister	   of	   Foreign	   Trade,	   and	   General	   Director	   of	   Customs.	   	   In	   1988,	   this	  
coordination	  group	  was	  renamed	  the	  State	  Council	  Committee	  on	  Inter-­‐Ministerial	  
Coordination	   on	   GATT	   to	   coordinate	   with	   relevant	   ministries.	   	   With	   the	   name	  
change	   from	   “coordination	   group”	   to	   “committee,”	   it	   began	   to	   include	   more	  
members	  from	  various	  agencies,	  and	  the	  lead	  role	  was	  played	  by	  a	  vice	  premier	  now.	  	  
Tian	  Jiyun,	  the	  vice	  premier	  in	  charge	  of	  it,	  was	  promoted	  by	  Zhao,	  was	  known	  as	  his	  
protégé,	  and	  enjoyed	  better	  access	  to	  Zhao.	   	  At	  the	  time,	  he	  ran	  meetings	  regularly	  
once	  a	  month.294	  	  
Reportedly	   under	   Zhao’s	   instruction,	   the	   reformist	   bureaucrats	   at	   the	  
working	  level	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  launched	  deliberations	  on	  China’s	  GATT	  accession.	  	  
Officials	  with	   the	  Department	  of	   International	  Organization	  and	  Conference	  of	   the	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  Commerce.	  




Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Economic	   Relations	   and	   Trade	   (MOFERT) 295 	  were	  
commissioned	   to	   write	   a	   report	   about	   the	   pros	   and	   cons	   on	   China’s	   GATT	  
accession.296	  	  This	  report	  suggested	  that	  China	  should	  move	  toward	  openness,	  and	  
Zhao	  agreed	  and	  approved	   it.	   	  Zhao	  also	   invited	  the	  Director-­‐General	  of	   the	  GATT,	  
Sir	  Arthur	  Dunkel,	   to	  visit	  China	   in	   January	  1986.	   	  He	  personally	   informed	  Dunkel	  
that	   China	  would	   apply	   to	   rejoin	   the	  GATT	   and	   assured	   him	   that	   China’s	   planned	  
commodity	  economy	  could	  integrate	  in	  this	  global	  trading	  net	  without	  damaging	  it.	  	  
The	   young	   bureaucrats	   at	   the	   working	   level	   were	   pro-­‐trade	   and	   pro-­‐
openness.	   	   In	   the	   first	   stage,	  only	  a	   limited	  number	  of	  bureaucratic	  agencies	  were	  
involved,	  mainly	   the	   Department	   of	   International	   Organization	   and	   Conference	   of	  
MOFERT.	  	  Most	  of	  its	  young	  bureaucrats	  joined	  the	  Party	  after	  the	  PRC	  was	  founded	  
and	  had	  no	  combat	  experience	   from	  wartime.	   	  Their	  educations	  and	  careers	  were	  
negatively	   impacted	   by	   the	   Cultural	   Revolution,	   and	   then	   benefited	   from	   Deng’s	  
measures	   to	   restore	   the	   order	   of	   society	   after	   he	   return	   to	   power.	   	   After	   Deng	  
promoted	  professionalization,	  emphasized	  formal	  education	  and	  technical	  training,	  
and	   stressed	   “rejuvenation”	   (nianqinghua)	   in	   recruitment	   and	   promotion,	   their	  
career	   flourished.	   These	   young	   bureaucrats	   at	   MOFERT	  were	   in	   particularly	   pro-­‐
trade.	   	   In	   September	  1984,	  MOFERT	  even	  gave	  up	   some	  of	   its	   own	  authorities	  on	  
foreign	  trade	  approval	  and	  regulation.	  	  Importers	  and	  exporters	  were	  not	  required	  
to	  choose	  the	  MOFERT-­‐licensed	  foreign	  trade	  corporation	  to	  work	  as	  their	   trading	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agents.	   	  Only	  imports	  that	  were	  classified	  as	  restricted	  category	  needed	  MOFERT’s	  
approval.	  	  
Holding	  a	  strong	  tie	  to	  the	  policy	  of	  economic	  reform,	  China’s	  accession	  to	  the	  
GATT	  was	  considerably	  affected	  by	  Zhao’s	  rise	  and	  fall.	   	  Zhao’s	  bureaucratic	  career	  
became	  notable	  around	  1951	  when	  he	  worked	  in	  Guangdong	  province.	  	  Initially,	  he	  
followed	  an	  ultra-­‐leftist	   leader,	  Tao	  Zhu	  and	  worked	  on	   land	   reform	  and	   later	   the	  
People’s	   Commune.	   	   From	   1958	   to	   1961,	   Mao’s	   Great	   Leap	   Forward	   created	   an	  
artificial	  famine.	  	  This	  experience	  led	  both	  Tao	  and	  Zhao	  gradually	  lean	  toward	  Deng	  
Xiaoping	   and	   support	  moderate	   political	   and	   economic	   policies.	   	   Consequentially,	  
Tao	   was	   attacked	   and	   dismissed	   during	   the	   Cultural	   Revolution.	   	   Without	   Tao’s	  
protection,	   Zhao	   was	   dismissed	   from	   all	   official	   positions	   and	   spent	   four	   years	  
working	  as	  a	  mechanic	  fitter	  in	  Hunan	  Province.	  	  Zhao’s	  political	  exile	  ended	  in	  1971.	  	  
Under	  the	  direction	  of	  Premier	  Zhou	  Enlai,	  Zhao’s	  political	  career	  rocketed.	  	  He	  was	  
appointed	   to	   Deputy	   Party	   Secretary	   of	   Inner	   Mongolia	   in	   1972,	   the	   First	   Party	  
Secretary	   of	   Guangdong	   Province	   in	   1974,	   and	   then	   Party	   Secretary	   of	   Sichuan	  
Province,	  Deng’s	  home	  province,	  in	  1975.	  	  	  
In	   Sichuan,	   Zhao	   made	   a	   significant	   mark	   in	   his	   term.	   	   He	   successfully	  
implemented	   a	   series	   of	   free-­‐market	   reforms,	   and	   increased	   industrial	   output	   by	  
81%	   and	   agricultural	   production	   by	   25%	  within	   three	   years.297	  	   The	   conspicuous	  
achievements	  caught	  the	  attention	  of	  Deng,	  who	  was	  born	  in	  Sichuan	  and	  rose	  to	  the	  
core	  of	  top	  leadership	  at	  that	  time.	  	  Deng	  advocated	  Zhao’s	  “Sichuan	  Experience”	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





a	   model	   for	   Chinese	   economic	   reform	   and	   promoted	   Zhao	   to	   the	   top	   leadership.	  	  
Zhao	  became	  a	  full	  member	  of	  Politburo	  in	  1979,	  replaced	  Hua	  Guofeng	  as	  Premier	  
in	  1980,	  and	  joined	  the	  Politburo	  Standing	  Committee	  in	  1982.	  	  Zhao	  rose	  to	  power,	  
as	  Deng’s	  protégé.	  	  	  
After	  Zhao	  took	  the	  premier	  position,	  China’s	  agricultural	  production	  rose	  by	  
50%.	   	   The	   success	   in	   agriculture	   strengthened	   Zhao’s	   political	   base	   in	   the	   central	  
government	   to	   implement	   economic	   reforms.	   	   He	   advocated	   the	   privatization	   of	  
SOEs,	   promoted	   the	   separation	   of	   the	   Party	   and	   the	   state,	   sought	   to	   streamline	  
China’s	  bureaucracy,	  and	  implemented	  bold	  economic	  reform	  programs.	  	  Zhao	  also	  
played	  the	  key	  role	   in	  China’s	  GATT	  affairs.	   	  He	  approved	  the	  MOFERT’s	  pro-­‐trade	  
report,	  invited	  Dunkel,	  the	  GATT’s	  director	  general,	  to	  visit	  China,	  and	  his	  ally,	  Tian	  
Jiyun,	  led	  the	  State	  Council	  Committee	  on	  Inter-­‐Ministerial	  Coordination	  on	  GATT.	  
Zhao	  rose	  to	  the	  national	  scene	  from	  the	  provincial	  level,	  and	  he	  did	  not	  have	  
strong	  political	  connections	  within	  the	  top	  leadership.	  	  At	  the	  central	  government	  he	  
relied	  on	  Deng’s	  support	  to	  implement	  his	  reform	  policies.	  	  Reportedly,	  Hu	  Yaobang,	  
another	   protégé	   of	   Deng,	   conveted	   the	   chairmanship	   of	   the	   Military	   Affairs	  
Commission	  (MAC)	  and	  was	  regarded	  to	  be	  too	  anxious	  to	  seize	  power.	  	  In	  January	  
1987,	   without	   any	   required	   plenary	   session	   of	   CPC	   Central	   Committee,	   he	   was	  
deposed	  by	  a	  group	  of	  Party	  elders	  from	  the	  post	  of	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Party.	  	  
Thereafter,	  Deng	  promoted	  Zhao	   to	   the	  CPC	  General	   Secretary,	   the	  highest	  official	  
position,	   virtually	   putting	   him	   the	   first	   in	   line	   to	   succeed	   Deng	   in	   the	   paramount	  




policy	   in	   order	   to	  mobilize	   support	   for	   himself.298	  	  However,	   neither	  Hu	  nor	   Zhao	  
was	  made	   the	   head	   of	   the	  Military	  Affairs	   Committee	   (MAC),	   the	   chairmanship	   of	  
which	  was	  still	  held	  by	  Deng.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  premiership	  was	  filled	  in	  by	  Li	  
Peng	  –	  Premier	  Zhou	  Enlai’s	  adopted	  son	  –	  who	  was	  regarded	  as	  a	  conservative	  by	  
media	  outside	  China.	  	  	  
When	  the	  powerful	  minority	  within	  the	  government	  wanted	  to	  boost	  foreign	  
trade	  and	  investment	  for	  economic	  development,	  re-­‐entry	  into	  the	  GATT	  seemed	  to	  
be	   in	   line	   with	   the	   open-­‐door	   policy.299	  	   However,	   Zhao’s	   bold	   economic	   reform	  
programs,	   especially	   price	   reform,	   led	   to	   high	   inflation	   and	   extra-­‐budgetary	  
investment	  in	  late	  1980s.	  	  The	  hybrid	  system	  of	  market	  forces	  and	  planned	  economy	  
encouraged	   corruption	   among	   those	   with	   official	   positions	   or	   with	   official	  
connections.	   	   The	   economic	   hardship	   and	   the	   societal	   inequality	   offered	   the	  
conservatives	   an	   opportunity	   in	   1988.	   	   By	   condemning	   Zhao’s	   measures,	   they	  
justified	  their	  requests	  to	  tighten	  central	  control,	  reduce	  investment,	  and	  cool	  down	  
the	  economy.	   	  The	  conservatives	  called	  Zhao	  a	  revisionist	  of	  Marxism.	   	  Among	  the	  
Party	  seniors,	  Chen	  Yun	  and	  Li	  Xiannian	  were	  allegedly	  critical	  about	  Zhao’s	  policies.	  	  
At	   the	   State	   Council,	   Zhao	  was	   confronted	  with	   the	   conservative	   faction	   led	   by	   Li	  
Peng	  and	  Yao	  Yilin.	  
Deng’s	  support	  was	  critical,	  and	  losing	  it	  was	  detrimental.	   	  The	  death	  of	  Hu	  
Yaobang	   triggered	   a	   nation-­‐wide	   protest,	   demanding	   on	   an	   end	   to	   Party’s	  
corruption.	   	   The	   Party’s	   seniors	   grabbed	   the	   opportunity	   and	   claimed	   that	   Zhao’s	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  Shirk,	  The	  Political	  Logic	  of	  Economic	  Reform	  in	  China,	  p.	  89	  




rapid	   reform	   caused	   the	   confusion	   and	   frustration	   among	   college	   students.	   	   At	   a	  
meeting	  in	  May	  1989	  with	  Soviet	  leader	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev,	  Zhao	  made	  a	  statement,	  
which	  implied	  that	  Deng	  still	  had	  the	  final	  say	  in	  major	  decision-­‐making	  although	  he	  
did	  not	  hold	  any	  high	  position.	   	  On	  Tiananmen	  Square,	  college	  students	  on	  protest	  
shouted	  “	  down	  with	  China’s	  regent.”	  	  Deng	  was	  furious.	  	  On	  May	  18,	  1989,	  Politburo	  
Standing	  Committee	  was	  called	  for	  a	  meeting	  to	  endorse	  martial	  law,	  and	  Zhao	  was	  
marginalized.	  	  On	  May	  19,	  Zhao	  appeared	  on	  Tiananmen	  Square.	  	  Perhaps	  with	  the	  
intention	  to	  rally	  support,	  he	  delivered	  his	  famous	  speech	  and	  showed	  his	  sympathy	  
to	   students.	   	   A	   day	   afterwards,	   Premier	   Li	   Peng	   declared	  martial	   law.	   	   Zhao	  was	  
stripped	  of	  all	  positions	  and	  put	  under	  house	  arrest.	  	  	  
On	  June	  4,	  1989,	  the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  took	  control	  of	  the	  Tiananmen	  
Square	  from	  the	  students.	  	  The	  Tiananmen	  Square	  incident	  had	  significant	  impact	  on	  
China’s	   participation	   on	   the	   international	   stage,	   and	   this	   political	   earthquake	  
fundamentally	   changed	   the	   Chinese	   political	   landscape.	   	   The	  World	   Bank	   and	   the	  
Asian	  Development	  Bank	  suspended	  loans	  to	  China;	  foreign	  direct	  investments	  were	  
cancelled.	   	   Deng’s	   influence	   in	   the	   Party	   had	   been	   weakened,	   and	   many	   reform-­‐
minded	   leaders	  were	   put	   on	   house	   rest,	   temporarily	   or	   permanently.	   	   The	   end	   of	  
Zhao’s	  political	  career	  directly	  affected	  the	  economic	  reform	  programs	  he	  promoted,	  
including	   China’s	   GATT	   accession.	   	   When	   the	   conservatives,	   with	   their	   stress	   on	  
preventing	  peaceful	  evolution300,	  returned	  to	  the	  center	  of	  power,	  the	  orientation	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300	  The	  theory	  of	  “peaceful	  evolution”	  was	  formulated	  by	  former	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  during	  
the	  Cold	  War.	  	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  alleged	  attempt	  to	  peacefully	  effect	  a	  political	  transformation	  in	  China.	  	  Chinese	  




economic	   policies	   had	   been	   reversed.	   The	   reformists	   became	   a	   crippled	  minority,	  
and	  international	  openness	  lost	  its	  domestic	  resonance.	  	  
In	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   China’s	   GATT	   accession,	   the	   domestic	   political	   contest	  
between	  the	  pro-­‐trade	  reformists	  and	  the	  conservative	  faction	  was	  the	  major	  driver	  
of	  the	  size	  of	  its	  win-­‐set.	  	  With	  political	  endorsement	  of	  the	  core	  leader	  of	  the	  Party,	  
the	   GATT	   policy	  was	   regarded	   as	   one	   of	   the	   liberal	   approaches	   to	   rejuvenate	   the	  
economy	  and	   realize	   the	  Four	  Modernizations301.	   	  At	   the	   international	   level,	  Deng	  
and	  his	  economic	  reform	  were	  highly	  applauded	  by	   the	  Americans,302	  and	  Chinese	  
trade	   negotiators	   felt	   friendly	   encouragement	   and	   even	   help	   from	   the	   US,	   rather	  
than	   strong	   American	   pressure. 303 	  	   However,	   the	   Tiananmen	   Square	   events	  
tremendously	   changed	   the	   political	   landscape	   in	   China.	   	   With	   reformists	  
marginalized,	  the	  conservatives	  returned	  to	  the	  center	  of	  power	  and	  possessed	  the	  
advantage	   in	   policy	   decisions.	   	   Without	   knowing	   whether	   China	   would	   continue	  
with	  the	  reform	  measures,	  the	  pro-­‐trade	  officials	  were	  not	  concerned	  about	  whether	  
the	   deal	   could	   be	   ratified,	   but	   confused	   about	   whether	   they	   should	   continue	   the	  
GATT	  talks	  with	  the	  westerners.	  	  
	  
The	  Politics	  in	  Stage	  II	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301	  The	  Four	  Modernizations	  were	  a	  policy	  objective	  set	  by	  Zhou	  Enlai	  in	  1963	  and	  enacted	  by	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  in	  
1978.	  	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  realize	  modernization	  in	  agriculture,	  industry,	  national	  defense,	  and	  science	  and	  
technology.	  	  
302	  Deng	  appeared	  multiple	  times	  on	  the	  cover	  of	  Time	  magazine,	  for	  example	  on	  January	  1,	  1979,	  September	  23,	  
1985,	  and	  January	  6,	  1986.	  




At	   least	   in	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   power	   transition	   in	   China	   has	   lacked	  
institutionalization,	  and	  the	  dilemma	  has	  existed	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  top	  
leader	   and	   his	   successor-­‐designate.	   	   As	   in	   all	   the	   dynasties	   before,	   the	   succession	  
politics	   contributes	   enormously	   to	   the	   political	   chaos	   in	   Communist	   China,	   and	  
dominates	  the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  for	  policy-­‐making	  at	  the	  domestic	  level.	  	  How	  a	  
successor–designate	   handles	   the	   succession	   dilemma	   is	   critical	   for	   the	   policy	  
orientation	  in	  the	  transition	  period.	  	  China’s	  GATT	  accession,	  as	  a	  policy	  with	  liberal	  
orientation,	  was	  inevitably	  disrupted	  and	  affected	  by	  the	  succession	  politics	  in	  this	  
duration.	  	  The	  power	  transition	  from	  the	  second-­‐generation	  leadership	  to	  the	  third	  
revealed	   the	   succession	   problem	   again,	   and	   the	   dramatic	   end	   of	   Zhao’s	   political	  
career	  became	  a	  lesson	  for	  his	  political	  successors.	  	  	  
Every	   top	   leader	   sought	   to	   choose	   his	   successor,	   who	   was	   supposed	   to	  
continuously	  show	  fidelity	  to	  his	  sponsor.	  	  The	  death	  of	  a	  top	  leader	  was	  the	  demise	  
of	  his	   clan’s	  power.	   	   If	   the	  protégé	  began	   to	   consolidate	  power	  after	  his	   sponsor’s	  
death,	  he	  might	  have	  been	  safe	  when	  his	   sponsor	  was	  alive	  but	   fail	   to	   survive	   the	  
political	   competition	   later,	   such	   as	  Hua	  Guofeng	   as	  Mao’s	  designated	   successor.304	  	  
When	  this	   top	   leader	  was	  still	  alive,	  his	  successor-­‐designate	  would	   try	   to	  build	  up	  
his	  own	  power	  base	  so	  that	  he	  could	  survive	  and	  compete	  after	  his	  sponsor	  passed	  
away.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  top	  leader	  might	  perceive	  his	  protégé’s	  activities	  as	  a	  plan	  
to	  seize	  power	  too	  soon	  or	  even	  unseat	  him.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  he	  risked	  being	  suspected	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  Kenneth	  Lieberthal,	  Governing	  China:	  From	  Revolution	  Through	  Reform,	  2nd	  Edition.	  (New	  York	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  London:	  




and	   purged	   by	   his	   own	   sponsor.	   	   Examples	   are	   Lin	   Biao	   as	   Mao’s	   designated	  
successor,	  and	  Hu	  Yaobang	  and	  Zhao	  Ziyang	  as	  Deng’s	  designated	  successor.	  	  
Following	   the	   fall	   of	   Zhao,	   Jiang	   Zemin,	   the	   general	   secretary	   of	   CPC’s	  
Shanghai	   Committee,	   was	   promoted	   to	   be	   the	   replacement	   for	   the	   General	   Party	  
Secretary	   of	   China.	   	   He	   held	   the	   highest	   position	   of	   the	   Party	   from	   June	   1989	   to	  
November	  2002	  and	  the	  office	  of	  the	  President	  from	  March	  1993	  to	  March	  2003,	  the	  
period	  when	  the	  US	  and	  China	  intensively	  negotiated	  and	  concluded	  the	  agreement	  
for	   China	   to	   enter	   into	   the	   GATT/WTO.	   	   In	   hindsight,	   it	   has	   been	   widely	  
acknowledged	   that	   Jiang	  was	   a	   liberal	  minded	   leader,	   at	   least	   in	   economic	   policy.	  	  
The	   policies	   of	   integrating	   China	   into	   globalization,	   especially	   accession	   to	   the	  
GATT/WTO,	  obtained	  his	  enormous	  support.	   	  However,	   in	   the	  second	  stage	  of	   the	  
negotiation	  process,	  the	  orientation	  of	  his	  economic	  policy	  seemed	  to	  be	  vague,	  and	  
even	  appeared	  to	  be	  conservative.	  	  	  
The	  chaos	  in	  Mao’s	  final	  decade	  unsettled	  the	  whole	  country.	  	  From	  this	  Deng	  
became	   aware	   of	   the	   succession	   problem	   and	   attempted	   to	   avoid	   it.	   	   Deng	  
emphasized	  in	  1981	  that	  failure	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  rejuvenating	  the	  party’s	  
leadership	   ranks	   would	   immediately	   lead	   to	   chaos	   after	   veteran	   leaders	   passed	  
away	  or	  became	   incapacitated.	   	   In	   step	  with	  promoting	  younger	  bureaucrats	  with	  
formal	  education	  and	  administrative	  experience,	  Deng	  revoked	   the	   lifetime	   tenure	  
of	  Party	  leaders	  and	  created	  Central	  Advisory	  Commission	  (CAC)	  as	  a	  transition	  to	  




Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   CAC	   was	   supposed	   to	   be	   advisory,	   its	   power	  
surpassed	   the	   Politburo	   Standing	   Committee,	   in	   practice.	   	   The	   Constitution	   of	   the	  
CPC	  of	  1982	  stipulated	  that	  CAC	  members	  can	  participate	  in	  meetings	  of	  the	  Party’s	  
Central	  Committee,	  and	  the	  members	  of	  the	  CAC	  standing	  committee	  can	  participate	  
meetings	   of	   Politburo.	   	   The	  membership	   of	   CAC	  was	   offered	   exclusively	   to	   those	  
with	   forty	  years	  or	  more	  of	  service.	   	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  acted	  as	   its	   first	  director	   from	  
1982	  to	  1987;	  Chen	  Yun	  served	  as	  the	  second	  and	  last	  director	  from	  1987	  to	  1992.	  	  
Although	  Deng	  conceived	  of	  the	  CAC	  as	  a	  temporary	  device,	  until	  it	  was	  abolished	  at	  
the	  Fourteenth	  National	  Congress	  of	  the	  CPC	  in	  1992,	  it	  overshadowed	  the	  Politburo	  
and	   its	  Standing	  Committee	  and	  applied	  tremendous	   influence	   in	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
By	   contrast,	   the	  Politburo	  evolved	   into	   a	   committee	  of	  protégés	  who	  answered	   to	  
the	   real	   power	   players	   of	   CAC.	   	   During	   the	   purges	   of	   Hu	   and	   Zhao,	   important	  
decisions	   were	   made	   by	   the	   CAC	   Party	   elders,	   instead	   of	   formal	   meetings	   at	  
Politburo.	   	   Although	  Deng	  was	   fully	   aware	   of	   the	   succession	  problem	  and	  pushed	  
efforts	  to	  build	  blocks	  for	  a	  stable,	  predictable	  succession,	  the	  deposition	  of	  his	  two	  
designated	  successors,	  Hu	  in	  1987	  and	  Zhao	  in	  1989,	  demonstrated	  the	  collapse	  of	  
his	  succession	  strategy.	  	  	  
For	   a	   subsequent	   designated	   successor	   trying	   to	   resolve	   the	   succession	  
dilemma,	  the	  deposition	  of	  Hu	  and	  Zhao	  became	  a	  lesson	  of	  losing	  support	  of	  their	  
patrons.	  	  Besides,	  Jiang	  was	  confronted	  by	  another	  quandary.	  	  As	  general	  secretary,	  
he	   was	   put	   the	   first	   in	   line	   to	   be	   the	   successor	   to	   Deng,	   who	   leaned	   toward	  
reformists.	  	  However,	  on	  his	  road	  from	  Shanghai	  to	  Beijing,	  the	  center	  of	  power,	  he	  




were	   considered	   to	   be	   conservatives.	   	   Between	   reformists	   and	   conservatives,	   his	  
choices	  of	  priority	  and	  the	  changes	  of	  his	  choices	  in	  the	  agenda	  of	  economic	  policy	  
reflected	  how	  he	  handled	  these	  dilemmas	  and	  his	  consolidation	  of	  power.	  	  	  
At	   the	   time	   of	   his	   promotion,	   Jiang’s	   own	   political	   base	   in	   the	   center	   was	  
weak.	   	   Jiang’s	  previous	  work	  experience	  at	   the	  central	  government	  was	  short.	   	  He	  
served	   as	   vice	  minister	   of	   the	   electronics	   industry	   in	   1982	   and	  minister	   in	   1983,	  
before	   he	   acted	   as	   mayor	   of	   Shanghai	   in	   1985.	   	   Chinese	   Communist	   leaders	  
consolidate	   their	  political	  support	  by	  changing	  members	  of	   the	  Central	  Committee	  
of	  the	  CPC	  or	  expanding	  the	  Central	  Committee	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  new	  members	  in	  it.	  	  
Jiang	  was	  allowed	  to	  bring	  only	  one	  of	  his	  subordinates	  in	  Shanghai	  to	  Beijing,	  and	  
this	  political	  ally,	  Zeng	  Qinghong,	  did	  not	  even	  obtain	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  Central	  
Committee,	  which	  demonstrated	  that	   Jiang’s	  political	  base	  at	   the	  center	  was	  weak.	  	  
In	  the	  ensuing	  years,	  nevertheless,	  Zeng	  helped	  Jiang	  consolidate	  his	  power,	  which	  
proved	  that	  this	  choice	  was	  a	  wise	  one.	  	  
On	  Jiang’s	  policy	  agenda,	  the	  top	  priority	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1990s	  was	  to	  
maintain	  his	  position	  at	  the	  center.	   	  His	  promotion	  started	  with	  the	  nomination	  by	  
the	  conservative	  leaders,	  Chen	  and	  Li,	  who	  became	  influential	  after	  the	  Tiananmen	  
Square	  incident.	  	  The	  inconsistent	  actions	  of	  Deng	  on	  his	  initial	  support	  for	  and	  later	  
ouster	   of	   Hu	   and	   Zhao	   diluted	   his	   political	   prestige.	   	   To	   effectively	   maintain	   his	  
position,	   he	   could	   not	   risk	   threatening	   either	   Deng	   or	   Chen,	   and	   he	   attempted	   to	  
take	   policy	   stances	  which	  would	   not	   alienate	   any	   factions.	   	   Allegedly,	   Li	   Xiannian	  




among	   the	   nine	   he	   sent	   to	   Jiang	   between	   in	   1989	   and	   1991.	   	   At	   a	   meeting	   of	  
Politburo	  Standing	  Committee,	  Jiang	  criticized	  his	  predecessor	  of	  being	  “hard	  on	  the	  
economy,	  soft	  on	  politics.”	   	  Reportedly	  upon	  the	  suggestion	  of	  Zeng,	   Jiang	  chose	  to	  
lean	  toward	  the	  conservatives.	  
The	   bilateral	   talks	   for	   China’s	   GATT	   accession	   held	   in	   this	   duration	   were	  
unproductive.	  	  Under	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  conservatives,	  the	  Fifth	  Plenary	  Session	  of	  
13th	  Central	  Committee	  of	  CPC	  enacted	  the	  economic	  policy	  objective,	  “improvement	  
and	  rectification”305	  (Zhili	  Zhengdun).	  	  Both	  the	  leaders	  at	  the	  top	  and	  officials	  at	  the	  
working	   level	   took	   a	   hard	   line	   on	   politics	   and	   reforms.	   	   Bold	   economic	  measures	  
halted;	  open-­‐door	  policies	  were	  put	  on	  hold	  due	  to	  their	  potential	  connection	  with	  
“peaceful	  evolution.”	  	  In	  line	  with	  conservatives,	  Jiang’s	  economic	  policy	  featured	  the	  
efforts	   to	   stabilize	   the	   economy,	   tighten	  monetary	  policy,	   and	   control	   inflation.	   	  A	  
politician	  with	  political	  standing	  at	  home	  high	  enough	  to	  win	  ratification	  for	  foreign	  
initiatives	  did	  not	  exist.	  
It	  was	  also	  not	  politically	  acceptable	   to	  make	  any	  significant	  concessions	  to	  
the	   Americans	   at	   the	   GATT	   negotiating	   table.	   	   Under	   the	   influence	   of	   the	  
conservative	  faction,	  the	  policy	  orientation	  of	  economic	  reform	  and	  open-­‐door	  was	  
under	  question.	   	  Making	   compromises	   to	  Americans	   seemed	   to	  be	   like	  yielding	   to	  
capitalist	  power.	  	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  political	  missteps,	  the	  Chinese	  trade	  negotiators	  
were	   not	   able	   to	   look	   soft.	   	   In	   describing	   its	   economy	   system,	   Chinese	   trade	  
negotiators	   made	   a	   request	   to	   the	   State	   Commission	   on	   Restructuring	   Economic	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System	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  using	  the	  term	  of	  “market	  economy”	  and	  got	  a	  negative	  
response.306	  	   They	   had	   to	   walk	   the	   line	   between	   the	   two	   factions	   by	   cautiously	  
choosing	  the	  word,	  “commerce	  economy,”	  a	  term	  which	  confused	  their	  international	  
counterparts	   and	   left	   themselves	  with	  many	   questions	   to	   answer	   at	   international	  
negotiations.	  	  	  
As	  discussed	   in	  Robert	  Putnam’s	  Diplomacy	  and	  Domestic	  Politics:	  The	  Logic	  
of	   Two-­‐level	   Game,	   second	   image	   reversed	   depicts	   that	   international	   sources	   of	  
pressure	   can	   reverberate	   within	   domestic	   politics.	   	   Negative	   reverberation	   of	  
international	  pressure,	  although	  rare,	  can	  create	  a	  domestic	  backlash	  if	  its	  source	  is	  
viewed	   by	   domestic	   audiences	   as	   an	   adversary	   rather	   than	   an	   ally.307	  	   When	  
Americans	   no	   longer	   had	   to	   tolerate	   national	   economic	   interests	   for	   their	  
geopolitical	   strategy,	   the	   US	   government	   took	   a	   tough	   position	   on	   trade	   policy	  
toward	  China.	   	  In	  1991,	  the	  USTR	  launched	  a	  Section	  301	  investigation,	  threatened	  
to	   impose	   sanctions,	   and	  announced	  potential	  prohibitive	   tariffs.	   	  This	  offered	   the	  
conservatives	   the	   rhetoric	   to	  portrait	  American	   imperialism	  and	   to	  oppose	  Deng’s	  
economic	  reform.	  	  Chinese	  bureaucrats,	  including	  trade	  negotiators,	  were	  under	  the	  
influence	  of	  conservatives,	  and	  the	  bilateral	  talks	  became	  deadlocked.	  	  	  
In	  the	  year	  of	  1992,	  the	  balance	  between	  two	  factions	  tilted	  again,	  this	  time	  in	  
favor	  of	  the	  reformists.	  	  The	  changed	  political	  landscape	  in	  China	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  
reform-­‐oriented	  measures,	   including	   decisions	   to	   revive	   the	   bilateral	   negotiations	  
with	   the	   US.	   	   First,	   Li	   Xiannian,	   one	   of	   the	   top	   conservative	   leaders	   was	   first	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hospitalized	  and	  then	  died	  in	  June	  1992.	  	  As	  discussed	  supra,	  the	  power	  that	  derives	  
from	  a	  top	  leader	  dies	  off	  when	  he	  passes	  away.	  	  His	  death	  became	  a	  major	  blow	  to	  
the	  conservative	  faction	  and	  Jiang,	  as	  he	  had	  nominated	  and	  promoted	  Jiang	  and	  had	  
been	  his	  patron	  at	   the	  central	  government	  ever	   since.	   	  On	   the	  contrary,	  Li’s	  death	  
became	   an	   opportunity	   to	   restore	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   reformist	   faction.	   	   Second,	  
Deng	  launched	  an	  inspection	  trip	  in	  South	  China	  in	  January	  and	  February	  1992	  and	  
intensely	   campaigned	   for	   economic	   reform.	   	  The	   trip	   rallied	   sufficient	   support	   for	  
him	   from	   provincial	   and	   local	   governments,	   revitalized	   the	   economic	   reform	   and	  
open-­‐door	  policy,	  and	  also	  cleared	  the	  way	  for	  China’s	  GATT	  accession.	  	  
Against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  growing	  influence	  of	  the	  conservative	  faction,	  Deng	  
delivered	  a	  speech	  in	  Shanghai	  in	  January	  1991.	   	  He	  urged	  the	  country	  to	  pursue	  a	  
market	  economy	  and	  continue	  the	  open-­‐door	  policy.	  	  Reportedly	  under	  the	  support	  
of	   then	   Shanghai	   Major	   Zhu	   Rongji,	   a	   group	   of	   authors	   in	   Shanghai	   published	   a	  
series	   of	   editorials	   in	  Liberation	  Daily,	   under	   a	   pseudo	   name,	  Huangpu	  Ping308,	   to	  
endorse	  Deng’s	   speech.	   	  These	  editorials	   set	  off	   a	  nationwide	  debate	   in	   the	  media	  
about	   whether	   economic	   reform	   is	   socialist	   or	   capitalist	   and	   whether	   market	  
economy	  is	  capitalist.309	  	   	  Given	  Deng’s	  weakened	  position	  at	  the	  center,	  it	  aroused	  
severe	   criticism	   by	   the	   conservatives	   and	   did	   not	   get	   expected	   support	   from	   the	  
central	  government.	   	  One	  of	   the	   few	  exceptions	  was	   then	  Vice	  Premier	  Tian	   Jiyun,	  
who	  was	   Zhao	   Ziyang’s	   ally	   and	   acted	   as	   the	   head	   of	   State	   Council	   Committee	   on	  
Inter-­‐Ministerial	  Coordination	  on	  GATT.	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As	  a	  result,	  Deng	  launched	  the	  southern	  trip	  in	  the	  early	  1992,	  to	  rally	  local	  
support	  and	  campaign	  for	  economic	  reform	  policy.	  	  It	  became	  another	  tipping	  point,	  
which	   fundamentally	   changed	   China’s	   policy	   direction	   from	   “left”	   to	   “right.”310	  	  
Initially,	  official	  media	  of	  the	  center	  did	  not	  even	  report	  the	  trip,	  and	  Jiang	  showed	  
little	   support.	   	   However,	   Deng’s	   political	   and	   policy	   rhetoric	   in	   many	   speeches	  
delivered	  on	  the	  trip	  generated	  large	  local	  support	  for	  reform,	  which	  proved	  again	  
that	  he	  was	  still	   the	  most	  powerful	  man	   in	  China.	   	  Allegedly,	  Deng	  said,	   “Whoever	  
rejects	  the	  reform	  should	  be	  deposed,”	  as	  the	  toughest	  ultimatum	  to	  people	  within	  
the	  center	  government	  who	  were	  siding	  with	  the	  conservatives.	  	  In	  the	  second	  half	  
of	   1992,	   Jiang	   changed	   sides	   and	  delivered	   speeches	   to	   endorse	   economic	   reform	  
and	  open-­‐door	  policy.	   	  Rallying	  behind	  reformists	   solidified	  his	  position	  as	  Deng’s	  
successor.	   	   Behind	   the	   media	   spotlight,	   Deng	   helped	   his	   reformist	   supporters	   to	  
climb	  to	  the	  apex	  of	  national	  power.	  	  Zhu	  Rongji	  was	  promoted	  to	  be	  Vice	  Premier	  in	  
charge	  of	   the	  economy.	   	  Thereby,	  he	  entered	   into	  the	  scene	  of	  China’s	  GATT/WTO	  
accession	  as	  another	  important	  player	  later.	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  the	  two-­‐level	  game	  theory,	  domestic	  causes	  and	  international	  
factors	   interact	  simultaneously	  with	  each	  other.	   	  The	  second	   image	  describes	  how	  
separate	  discussion	  within	  each	  group	  of	  constituents	  about	  domestic	  ratification	  of	  
an	   international	  agreement	  can	  affect	  negotiation	  at	   the	   international	   level.	   	  When	  
the	  liberal	  economic	  policy	  regained	  its	  momentum	  in	  the	  year	  of	  1992,	  open-­‐door	  
policy	   had	   been	   endorsed	   by	   both	   Party	   elders	   of	   the	   second	   generation,	   such	   as	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Deng,	   and	   Party	   leaders	   of	   the	   third	   generation,	   such	   as	   Jiang	   and	   Li.	   	   It	   was	  
politically	  possible	  from	  the	  Chinese	  side	  to	  step	  out	  of	  the	  deadlock	  of	  the	  bilateral	  
negotiation,	   and	   the	   Sino-­‐American	   negotiation	   on	   the	   GATT	   affairs	   indeed	  made	  
significant	  progress	  in	  the	  same	  year.	  	  	  
The	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  on	  Market	  Access	  was	  signed	   in	  1992,	  
and	  this	  break-­‐through	  agreement	  got	  China’s	  GATT	  accession	  back	  on	   track.	   	  The	  
USTR	   set	   October	   10,	   1992,	   as	   the	   deadline	   to	   conclude	   the	   market	   accession	  
agreement	  with	  China.	  	  The	  failure	  to	  reach	  it	  would	  incur	  prohibitive	  tariffs	  on	  $3.9	  
billion	  Chinese	  exports	  to	  the	  US.	   	  The	  two	  parties	  intensively	  negotiated	  for	  seven	  
days	  in	  Washington,	  DC	  and	  concluded	  the	  deal	  fifteen	  minutes	  before	  the	  deadline.	  	  
At	  the	  time	  of	  this	  round	  of	  negotiation,	  the	  domestic	  political	  landscape	  had	  clearly	  
shifted	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  reformists.	  It	  was	  obvious	  to	  all	  Chinese	  that	  economic	  reform	  
and	  open-­‐up	  policy	  would	  resume.	  	  Based	  upon	  the	  consensus	  within	  the	  Party,	  the	  
Chinese	  negotiating	  team	  was	  able	  to	  make	  a	  lot	  of	  concessions	  at	  the	  international	  
table,	  even	  including	  the	  tariffs	  and	  quotas	  of	  automobiles	  and	  auto	  parts.	  	  
Before	   Deng’s	   southern	   trip	   in	   1992,	   domestic	   resistance	   against	   China’s	  
concession	   for	   entering	   the	   GATT	   rallied	   behind	   the	   conservative	   faction,	   which	  
questioned	  economic	  reform	  and	  the	  open-­‐door	  policy	  in	  general.	  	  After	  the	  central	  
government	  reestablished	  the	  economic	  reform	  policy	  in	  the	  year	  of	  1992,	  the	  policy	  
orientation	  –	  building	  socialist	  market	  economy	  –	  became	  a	  general	  consensus.	  	  On	  
October	  12,	  1992,	  two	  days	  after	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  MOU	  on	  Market	  Access,	  the	  




protests,	  was	   held	   in	  Beijing.	   	   It	   stipulated	   the	   decision	   that	   China	  was	   to	   build	   a	  
socialist	  market	   economy.	   	   The	   policy	   of	   joining	   the	   GATT,	   as	   further	   opening-­‐up	  
policy,	   was	   politically	   linked	   to	   the	   decision	   on	   socialist	   market	   economy.311	  	   On	  
October	   21,	   1992,	   Chinese	   chief	   negotiator,	   Tong	   Zhiguang,	   announced	   in	   Geneva	  
that	  under	  socialist	  market	  economy,	  China’s	  economic	  structure	  and	  policy	  would	  
move	   toward	   the	   GATT’s	   requirement.312	  	   At	   the	   international	   negotiating	   table,	  
Chinese	   negotiators	   were	   able	   to	   throw	   away	   the	   awkward	   term,	   “commerce	  
economy,”	   and	   comfortably	   use	   the	   term	   “market	   economy”	  without	   any	   political	  
cost	  back	  home.	  
However,	  unanimity	  about	  concessions	  regarding	  some	  specific	  industries	  or	  
commodities	  was	  never	  easily	  reached.	  	  On	  the	  way	  to	  negotiate	  into	  the	  GATT,	  what	  
China	  needed	  to	  do	  essentially	  was	  to	  reduce	  tariffs	  and	  quotas,	  reduce	  and	  clarify	  
internal	   regulations	  on	   trade,	   lift	   bars	  on	  market	   access	  of	   foreign	   companies	   and	  
commodities,	  and	  so	  on,	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  the	  qualification	  of	  the	  global	  trading	  net.	  	  
Domestically,	   tariffs,	  quotas	  and	   internal	  regulations	  on	  every	  commodity	  were	  on	  
the	   turf	   of	   different	   bureaucratic	   agencies,	   which	   had	   their	   own	   organizational	  
interests	   attached.	   	   “Internal	   coordination,”	   a	  word	   almost	   all	  my	   interviewees	   in	  
Beijing	  used,	  was	  essentially	  domestic	  bargaining	  between	  relevant	  agencies.	   	  The	  
power	  balance	  between	  the	  top	  leadership	  and	  the	  bureaucracy	  came	  into	  the	  play.	  
“Politicians	  may	   be	  willing	   to	   risk	   a	   few	   of	   their	   normal	   supporters	   in	   the	  
cause	  of	  ratifying	  an	  international	  agreement,	  but	  the	  greater	  the	  potential	  loss,	  the	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greater	   their	   reluctance.”313	  	   In	  determining	  how	  much	  support	  he	   should	  provide	  
for	  the	  GATT	  deal,	  Jiang	  needed	  to	  calculate	  his	  potential	  loss.	  	  After	  switching	  to	  the	  
reformist	   faction,	   Jiang	  played	  his	  cards	  cautiously	  and	  regained	  Deng’s	  trust.	   	  The	  
Fourteenth	  National	  Congress	  of	  the	  CPC	  in	  1992	  formalized	  Jiang’s	  position	  as	  the	  
general	  secretary	  of	  the	  CPC.	  	  Having	  successfully	  maintained	  his	  title	  and	  position,	  
Jiang	  set	  out	  to	  consolidate	  his	  power	  at	  the	  top.	  	  He	  abolished	  the	  CAC,	  the	  board	  of	  
revolutionary	  party	   elders.	   	  With	   the	   aid	  of	  his	   subordinates	   (i.e.	   Zeng	  Qinghong),	  
Jiang	  successfully	  weakened	  his	  potential	   competitors	  within	   the	  reformist	   faction	  
and	  their	  supporters	  among	  Party	  elders	  (i.e.	  Yang	  Shangkun).	  	  Tian	  Jiyun,	  who	  was	  
Zhao	  Ziyang’s	  protégé,	  was	  moved	  from	  State	  Council	   to	  serve	  as	  vice	  chairman	  of	  
the	  Standing	  Committee	  of	  the	  National	  People’s	  Congress.	   	  Jiang	  began	  to	  relocate	  
his	   supporters	   from	   Shanghai	   to	   Beijing	   and	   promoted	   his	   allies	   in	   the	   central	  
government.	   	   Li	   Lanqing,	   Jiang’s	   political	   ally,	   was	   elevated	   from	   Minister	   of	  
MOFERT	  to	  Vice	  Premier,	  in	  charge	  of	  State	  Council	  Committee	  on	  Inter-­‐Ministerial	  
Coordination	  on	  GATT.	  
Jiang	   became	   increasingly	   vocal	   in	   his	   support	   for	   China’s	   accession	   to	   the	  
GATT,	   but	   he	   did	   not	   push	   hard	   for	   it.	   	   The	   designation	   of	   Hu	   Jintao	   as	   Jiang’s	  
successor	   clearly	   set	   the	   deadline	   for	   his	   tenure	   and	   made	   him	   the	   first	   general	  
secretary	   with	   a	   fixed	   term	   in	   CPC	   history.	   	   His	   leadership	   was	   believed	   to	   be	  
transitional,	   and	   he	   was	   considered	   to	   be	   an	   unlikely	   candidate	   for	   real	   power.	  	  
When	  advocates	  of	   the	  GATT	  participation	  argued	   that	  China	  would	  have	   to	  make	  
far	  greater	  commitments	  in	  order	  to	  be	  admitted	  into	  the	  WTO	  later	  if	  China	  could	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




not	  join	  the	  GATT	  by	  1994,	  the	  negotiating	  team	  sent	  up	  a	  report	  for	  approval	  of	  a	  
bigger	  win-­‐set.	   	   Jiang	   sanctioned	   the	   strategy	  of	  moving	  quickly	  before	   the	   end	  of	  
1994,	   but	   he	   did	   not	   feel	   comfortable	   about	   taking	   political	   risks	   for	   the	   deal	  
because	  this	  strategy	  encountered	  bureaucratic	  resistance	  from	  the	  State	  Council.	  	  	  
In	  the	  State	  Council,	  Li	  Peng	  succeeded	  to	  the	  premiership	  from	  Zhao	  Ziyang	  
in	   1988	   and	   became	   a	   powerful	   player	   afterwards.	   	   As	   an	   adopted	   son	   of	   former	  
Premier	  Zhou	  Enlai,	  he	  enjoyed	  a	  close	  network	  with	  Party	  elders.	  	  Rising	  from	  the	  
bureaucratic	  agencies	  of	  the	  energy	  sector,	  he	  possessed	  abundant	  knowledge	  and	  
management	   skills	   regarding	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   State	   Council.	   	  Within	   the	   State	  
Council,	   Li	   was	   highly	   praised	   by	   personnel	   and	   endorsed	   by	   these	   bureaucratic	  
interests.314	  	  In	  turn,	  he	  represented	  and	  supported	  bureaucratic	  interests.	  	  As	  Susan	  
Shirk	   wrote	   in	   The	   Political	   Logic	   of	   Economic	   Reform	   in	   China,	   	   “group	   interests,	  
denied	   over	   channels	   of	   expression,	   are	   fed	   into	   the	   bureaucratic	   policy	   process,	  
where	  they	  seek	  ambitious	  officials	  who	  will	  take	  up	  their	  cause.”315	  	  Agencies,	  who	  
perceived	  their	  authorities	  were	  to	  diminish	  and	  their	   interests	   in	   the	  SOEs	  under	  
their	  supervision	  were	  to	  decline,	  rallied	  within	  the	  State	  Council.	  	  	  
Reportedly,	  Li	  used	  his	  position	  as	  the	  head	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  to	  effectively	  
blocked	   concessions	   by	   ensuring	   that	   they	   fell	   short	   of	   American	   demands.316	  	  
Previously	  a	  hydraulic	  engineer,	  Li	  was	  interested	  in	  the	  construction	  project	  of	  the	  
Three	  Gorges	  Dam	  and	  considered	  it	  as	  his	  life	  work.	  	  In	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  bilateral	  
talks,	  this	  megaproject	  was	  under	  heated	  debate	  and	  possessed	  his	  attention.	  	  With	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Li’s	   political	   capital	   spent,	   this	   megaproject	   finally	   set	   off	   in	   December	   1994.	  	  
Apparently,	   compared	   to	   the	   Three	   Gorges	   Dam	   project,	   GATT	   accession	  was	   not	  
prioritized	  on	  the	  State	  Council’s	  policy	  agenda.	  
Zhu	   Rongji	   was	   elevated	   to	   vice	   premier	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   economy	   and	  
governor	   of	   the	   People’s	   Bank	   of	   China.	   	   At	   this	   time,	   he	   appeared	   to	   be	   more	  
interested	   in	   domestic	   economic	   policy,	   including	   cooling	   down	   the	   overheated	  
Chinese	  economy,	  the	  problems	  of	  inflation,	  etc.	  	  With	  conspicuous	  achievements	  in	  
successfully	   clearing	   the	   so-­‐called	   triangle	   debts317,	   he	  was	  widely	   acclaimed	   as	   a	  
capable	  economic	  administrator,	  which	  paved	  his	  way	  to	  be	  premier	  later.	  	  With	  the	  
domestic	  economy	  and	  the	  problems	  of	  SOEs	  on	  his	  policy	  agenda,	  Zhu	  viewed	  the	  
foreign	  competition	  that	  would	  come	  with	  the	  GATT/WTO	  membership	  as	  likely	  to	  
worsen	   these	   existing	   economic	   problems.	   	   In	   his	   calculus	   of	   the	   GATT/WTO	  
accession,	  he	  weighed	  domestic	  protectionist	  interests	  more	  heavily.	  	  Therefore,	  as	  a	  
member	  of	  State	  Council	  Committee	  on	  Inter-­‐Ministerial	  Coordination	  on	  GATT,	  Zhu	  
treated	  GATT	  accession	  with	  caution.	  	  
As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   IV,	   the	   term	   of	   reciprocal	   accountability	   describes	  
the	  line	  of	  accountability	  in	  the	  hierarchy	  within	  the	  CPC.	  	  Neither	  Party	  leaders	  nor	  
bureaucrats	   have	   definitive	   power	   over	   the	   other	   group.	   	  When	   consensus	   is	   not	  
formed	  among	  leaders,	  their	  subordinating	  bureaucrats	  would	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  
uncertainty	   by	   holding	   out	   for	   their	   organizational	   interests.	   	   Late	   in	   the	   second	  
stage,	   unanimity	   was	   not	   reached	   at	   the	   top	   level.	   	   Without	   help	   of	   top-­‐down	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authority,	  pro-­‐trade	  advocates	  at	  the	  working	  level	  had	  to	  face	  domestic	  resistance	  
on	  their	  own.	  	  	  
In	   order	   to	   generate	   public	   support	   and	   counterbalance	   the	   domestic	  
resistance,	  bureaucrats	  of	  MOFTEC	  adopted	  the	  strategy	  of	  waging	  a	  campaign	   for	  
the	  GATT	  accession	  in	  1992	  and	  1993.	  	  Through	  press	  and	  media,	  they	  attempted	  to	  
educate	   the	  mass	   public	   in	   China	   about	   the	   benefits	   of	   GATT	   accession	   and	   rally	  
support	   from	   the	   general	   public. 318 	  	   In	   American	   trade	   politics,	   trade-­‐injured	  
interests	  are	  concentrated,	  easily	  organized,	  and	  vocal,	  while	  trade	  beneficiaries	  are	  
diffuse	   and	   tend	   to	   be	   free-­‐rider.319	  	   Pro-­‐trade	   campaigns	  were	   organized	   for	   the	  
collaboration	  among	  trade	  beneficiaries.	  	  	  
However,	   this	   experience	   did	   not	   work	   in	   China.	   	   First,	   the	   Chinese	  
consumers	  of	  1990s	  were	  not	  able	  to	  realize	  their	  benefits	  from	  the	  GATT	  and	  were	  
not	  an	  independent,	  vocal	  societal	  group.	  	  Second,	  the	  private	  sector	  was	  a	  minority	  
of	  the	  Chinese	  economy,	  and	  the	  portion	  of	  private	  sector	  which	  benefited	  from	  the	  
access	  to	  foreign	  market	  was	  even	  smaller.	  	  Third,	  the	  industries	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  
for	   example	   textiles,	   which	   benefited	   from	   exports,	   were	   struggling	   with	  
restructuring,	  privatization,	  and	  mass	   lay-­‐offs,	  and	   they	  held	  negative	  views	  about	  
liberal	  economic	  policy	  in	  general.	  	  Fourth,	  information	  about	  the	  GATT	  negotiation	  
was	  confined	  to	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  bureaucrats,	  but	  the	  campaign	  revealed	  some	  
of	  it	  and	  stirred	  up	  negative	  views	  about	  it	  among	  the	  interested	  public.	  	  Last,	  open	  
campaigning	   has	   not	   been	   a	   strategy	   welcomed	   in	   Communist	   China	   after	   Mao’s	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time.	  	  When	  communist	  officials	  openly	  campaign	  for	  leadership	  positions,	  they	  are	  
deemed	   to	   break	   the	   consensus	   to	   maintain	   party	   unity.	   	   MOFTEC’s	   campaign	  
alienated	   its	   officials,	   especially	   enthusiastic	   advocates	   such	   as	  Long	  Yongtu,	   from	  
his	   peer	   bureaucrats	   in	   other	   agencies	   and	   exposed	   him	   to	   attacks	   in	   the	  
bureaucracy.	  
Later,	  when	  the	  four	  chief	  negotiators	  accepted	  interviews	  by	  Beijing	  Youth	  
Daily	  on	   the	  eve	  of	  China’s	   formal	  accession	   to	   the	  WTO,	   they	  all	   talked	  about	   the	  
strong	   domestic	   resistance.	   	   Gu	   Yongjiang,	   the	   third	   chief	   negotiator,	  who	   led	   the	  
Chinese	  negotiating	  team	  in	  the	  year	  of	  1994,	  recalled,	  
“I	   faced	   more	   internal	   pressure	   than	   external	   pressure.	   	   One	  
international	  newspaper	  in	  Beijing	  had	  a	  series	  of	  reports	  on	  how	  our	  
delegation	   betrayed	   China’s	   national	   interests.	   	   I	   was	   very	   sensitive	  
because	  I	  was	  the	  head	  of	  the	  delegation	  and	  I	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  
consequences.”320	  
The	  fourth	  chief	  negotiator	  Long	  Yongtu	  served	  as	  assistant	  to	  the	  minister	  of	  
MOFTEC	   and	   worked	   in	   the	   negotiating	   team	   at	   that	   time.	   	   When	   he	   was	   asked	  
about	   the	   reasons	   that	   China	   failed	   to	   accede	   the	   GATT	   by	   the	   end	   of	   1994,	   he	  
shared	  the	  same	  opinion,	  
“I	   was	   trying	   my	   best	   to	   solve	   this	   negotiation.	   Actually	   it	   was	   not	  
totally	   impossible	   to	  achieve	  our	  goal	  at	   the	   time.	   	  Unfortunately	  we	  
did	   not	   have	   enough	   support	   and	   coordination	   among	   different	  
ministries.	  	  I	  failed	  to	  make	  concessions	  I	  should	  have	  made	  because	  I	  
did	  not	  have	  authority	  to	  do	  so.	  	  This	  was	  the	  major	  reason	  we	  failed	  
to	  win	  negotiation	  as	  planned	  to	  a	  large	  extent.”321	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





The	   agreement	   was	   possible	   only	   when	   a	   powerful	   minority	   within	   each	  
government	  actually	  favored	  on	  domestic	  grounds	  the	  policy	  being	  demanded.322	  	  As	  
chief	  negotiators	  on	  the	  Chinese	  side,	  they	  were	  confronted	  with	  misunderstanding	  
and	  resistance	  by	  people	  on	  the	  same	  side	  of	  international	  negotiating	  table.	  	  Some	  
of	   them	  complained	  that	  domestic	  resistance	  applied	  more	  pressure	  on	  them	  than	  
American	  power.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  second	  stage,	  this	  minority	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  deal	  was	  
not	  powerful	  enough	  to	  surmount	  the	  opposition	  of	  agencies.	  
	  
The	  Politics	  in	  Stage	  III	  
	  
In	   the	   last	   stage,	   the	   transition	   of	   leadership	   had	   been	   completed,	   so	   that	  
succession	  politics	  no	  longer	  affected	  the	  bilateral	  negotiation.	  	  WTO	  accession	  had	  
been	   attached	   to	   the	   development	   of	   market	   economy	   and	   open-­‐door	   policy,	  
established	   as	   the	   policy	   orientation	   sound	   enough	   against	   challenge.	   	   The	  
bureaucratic	  interests	  took	  another	  basis	  for	  criticism,	  nationalism,	  to	  protect	  their	  
interests.	   	   In	   the	  power	  balance	  between	   the	   top	   leadership	   and	  bureaucracy,	   the	  
top-­‐down	   authority	   proved	   to	   be	   decisive	   when	   top	   leaders	   were	   unified.	   	   This	  
happened	  only	  after	  the	  minority	  who	  favored	  the	  deal	  finished	  power	  consolidation	  
and	   formed	  consensus	  over	  WTO	  affairs.	   	  While	   the	  domestic	   cause	   facilitated	   the	  
progress	  of	  international	  negotiations,	  what	  occurred	  on	  the	  international	  table	  had	  
tremendous	   reverberation	   on	   domestic	   politics	   in	   China,	   as	   it	   could	   empower	   as	  
well	  as	  weaken	  the	  pro-­‐trade	  Chinese	  officials.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Agency	  Ownership,	  Parochial	  Interests,	  and	  Overlapping	  Jurisdictions	  
At	   that	   time,	   some	   joked	   that	   the	  Chinese	  economy	  was	  agency	  ownership,	  
rather	   than	   state	   ownership.	   	   Industrial	   agencies	   had	   founded	   those	   SOEs	   and	  
collected	   revenue	   from	   them.	   	   In	   every	   industry,	   SOEs	  were	   under	   the	   control	   of	  
relevant	   industrial	   bureaus	   and	   ministries	   in	   the	   State	   Council.	   	   Comparing	   to	  
American	   trade	   politics	   where	   the	   trade-­‐injured	   interests	   can	   be	   concentrated	  
geographically,	   in	   China’s	   trade	   politics	   trade-­‐injured	   interests	  were	   concentrated	  
system-­‐wide	   (by	   Xitong)323.	   	   In	   one	   system,	   for	   example	   auto	   system,	   industrial	  
agencies	  had	  their	  interests	  in	  line	  with	  the	  SOEs	  under	  their	  supervision.	  	  The	  auto	  
industry	   had	   three	   major	   auto	   enterprises:	   First	   Automobile	   Works,	   Second	  
Automobile	  Works	   (later	   renamed	  as	  Dongfeng),	   and	  Shanghai	  Automobile	  Works	  
(SAIC).	   	   They	   were	   administered	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Machinery	   and	   Electronics	  
Industry	   (later	   Ministry	   of	   Machinery	   Building	   Industry).	   	   Any	   concessions	   that	  
might	   hurt	   the	   auto	   industry	  would	  directly	   affect	   the	   interests	   of	   the	  Ministry	   of	  
Machinery	  and	  Electronics	  Industry.	  	  	  
As	  building	  blocks	  of	  political	  interests	  in	  the	  bureaucracy,	  agencies	  had	  their	  
interests	   in	   line	  with	   the	   SOEs	  under	   their	   supervision.	   	   They	  were	   responsive	   to	  
and	   represented	   their	   constituency	   on	   the	   domestic	   bargaining	   table.	   	   When	   an	  
industry	   might	   be	   injured	   by	   foreign	   competition,	   SOEs	   in	   this	   industry,	   the	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predominant	  part	  of	  the	  Chinese	  economy,	  would	  be	  the	  biggest	  group	  of	  potential	  
victims.	   	   Different	   from	   the	   interest	   groups	   lobbying	   in	   the	   US	   Congress,	   Chinese	  
industries	   “lobbied”	   through	   their	   supervising	   agencies	   in	   the	   bureaucracy.	   	   SOEs	  
and	   their	   supervision	   agencies	   had	   frequent	   personnel	   exchange,	  which	   provided	  
informational	  channel	  for	  the	  “lobby.”	  	  Details	  have	  been	  given	  in	  Chapter	  IV.	  	  
Furthermore,	  agencies	  had	  their	  own	  parochial	  interests	  injured	  because	  the	  
economic	   reform	  policy,	   in	   nature,	  was	   to	   reduce	   governmental	   regulatory	  power	  
and	   let	   the	   market	   take	   more	   control	   of	   the	   economy.	   	   So	   agencies	   were	   also	  
motivated	   to	  bargain	   for	   the	  preservation	  of	   their	  own	  authorities.	   	   In	  negotiating	  
into	   the	   GATT/WTO,	   relevant	   industrial	   agencies	   had	   to	   rescind	   their	   regulatory	  
authority	  over	  SOEs’	  economic	  decisions,	  which	  was	  detrimental	   to	   the	   interest	  of	  
these	  agencies,	  too.	   	  They	  were	  downgraded	  from	  ministry-­‐level	  to	  bureau-­‐level	  or	  
even	  lower,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  IV.	  	  The	  job,	  position,	  and	  job-­‐related	  benefits	  of	  
every	  employee	  in	  these	  agencies	  hinged	  on	  the	  bargaining	  of	  the	  agency’s	  head	  at	  
the	   domestic	   table.	   	   When	   an	   agency’s	   head	   fought	   for	   all	   his	   subordinates,	   who	  
were	  also	  his	  constituency,	  he	  confessed,	  in	  private,	  that	  his	  own	  agency	  should	  be	  
abolished	  in	  the	  market	  economy.324	  	  Although	  some	  of	  the	  heads	  of	  agencies,	  even	  
their	  subordinates	  of	  the	  agencies,	  perceived	  liberal	  trade	  policy	  as	  beneficial	  to	  the	  
country,325	  they	  had	  to	  bargain	  for	  protectionism	  under	  pressure	  from	  the	  agency	  as	  
a	   whole.	   	   The	   representative	   agencies	   were	   empathetic	   with	   each	   other	   and	  
naturally	  formed	  a	  strong,	  united	  coalition.	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The	  domestic	   bargaining	   involved	   agencies	  with	   overlapping	   authority	   and	  
jurisdiction.	   	   Western	   scholars	   coin	   the	   term	   “fragmented	   authoritarianism”:	   	   In	  
multilateral	  nationwide	  bureaucracy,	  officials	  of	  any	  given	  office	  in	  a	  locality	  answer	  
to	  more	   than	  one	   superior	   agency,	   due	   to	   the	   coexistence	  of	   vertical	   coordination	  
between	   the	   central	   and	   local	   governments	   (tiao)	   and	   horizontal	   coordination	  
within	   the	   locality	   (kuai).326	  	   The	   nature	   of	   this	  matrix-­‐like	   organization	   structure	  
(tiao	  and	  kuai)	  lies	  in	  the	  issue	  of	  dividing	  power	  between	  central	  government	  and	  
local	  government.327	  	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  define	  the	  central	  government	  strictly	  by	  
the	   famous	   “fragmented	   authoritarianism”	  model	   and	   the	   terms	   of	   tiao	   and	   kuai.	  	  
Perhaps,	  it	  is	  more	  appropriate	  to	  consider	  authority	  as	  fragmented	  in	  a	  general	  way.	  	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   GATT/WTO	   negotiation,	   the	   focus	   is	   on	   the	   central	  
government,	  where	   the	   overlapping	   of	   jurisdictions	   exists.	   	   Under	   the	   very	   top	   of	  
Chinese	  political	   system,	   an	   agency,	   even	   an	  office	  within	   an	   agency,	  may	  need	   to	  
answer	  to	  more	  than	  one	  boss.	   	  At	   the	  time	  of	   the	  bilateral	  negotiation,	  one	   issue-­‐
topic	   always	   fell	   on	   the	   turf	   of	   various	   agencies.	   	   Take	   tariffs	   as	   an	   example.	   	  The	  
State	  Council	  Commission	  on	  Tariffs,	  which	  was	  responsible	  for	  tariffs,	  was	  affiliated	  
first	   with	   the	   General	   Administration	   of	   Customs,	   later	   the	   State	   Economic	   and	  
Trade	   Commission	   (SETC),	   and	   then	   the	   Ministry	   of	   the	   Treasury	   Department	   of	  
Tariffs.	   	   In	  terms	  of	  tariffs	   for	  a	  specific	  commodity,	   industrial	  agencies	  had	  strong	  
power	  in	  narrow,	  specific	  issue-­‐topics	  because	  of	  their	  expertise	  on	  the	  turf.	  	  So	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326	  For	  description	  of	  tiao	  and	  kuai,	  please	  see	  Kenneth	  Lieberthal,	  Governing	  China:	  From	  Revolution	  Through	  
Reform,	  2nd	  Ed.	  Page	  218.	  	  Also	  see	  Kenneth	  Liberthal	  and	  David	  Lampton,	  eds.	  Bureaucracy,	  Politics	  and	  Decision	  
Making	  in	  Post-­‐Mao	  China.	  (Berkeley	  and	  Los	  Angeles:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1992).	  	  
327	  Zhou	  Zhenchao,	  Research	  on	  Contemporary	  China	  Government’s	  Tiao	  and	  Kuai	  Relationship,	  (Tianjin:	  Tianjin	  




would	   be	   consulted,	   too,	   specifically	   each	   industrial	   ministry’s	   Department	   of	  
Planning.	   	   When	   many	   agencies	   held	   overlapping	   jurisdictions	   on	   one	   issue,	   the	  
internal	  coordination	  became	  extremely	  difficult.	  
Due	  to	  the	  overlapping	  jurisdictions	  in	  the	  Chinese	  political	  system,	  resolving	  
a	   matter	   generally	   requires	   building	   a	   consensus	   among	   an	   array	   of	   pertinent	  
officials.	   	  Take	  auto	   tariffs	  as	  an	  example.	   	  Among	   the	   three	  agencies	   listed	  above,	  
State	  Council	  Commission	  on	  Tariffs	  took	  the	  lead	  role	  in	  decision-­‐making	  on	  tariffs,	  
and	   General	   Administration	   of	   Customs	   had	   more	   responsibility	   in	   policy	  
implementation.328	  	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Machine	  Building	  Industry,	  as	  industrial	  agency,	  
was	  consulted	  for	  industry	  policy,	  and	  its	  Department	  of	  Planning	  represented	  this	  
ministry	   on	   the	   domestic	   bargaining	   table.	   	   In	   turn,	   the	   Department	   of	   Planning	  
conducted	   consensus	   building	   with	   the	   major	   auto	   SOEs,	   which	   were	   under	   the	  
control	  of	  Ministry	  of	  Machine	  Building	  Industry.	  
	  
The	  Coordination	  Body,	  MOFTEC,	  and	  SETC	  
	  
Without	  the	  Trade	  Promotion	  Authority	  as	  in	  the	  US,	  China	  does	  not	  have	  an	  
effective	  mechanism	  to	  tie	  the	  hands	  of	  protectionist	  agencies.	   	  Therefore,	  Chinese	  
policy	  making	  is	  characterized	  by	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  discussion	  and	  bargaining	  
among	   officials.	   	   Confronted	   with	   pressures	   from	   industrial	   agencies,	   which	   had	  
their	  own	  agenda	  to	  protect	  domestic	  industries,	  the	  State	  Council	  established	  an	  ad	  
hoc	  body	  for	  GATT	  policy	  coordination	  at	  ministerial	  level.	  	  The	  State	  Council	  Inter-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Ministerial	   Coordination	   Group	   on	   GATT	   negotiation	   was	   formed	   in	   1986	   and	  
reorganized	   in	   1988	   as	   the	   State	   Council	   Committee	   on	   Inter-­‐Ministerial	  
Coordination	  on	  GATT.	   	  The	  Committee	  provided	  a	   forum	  for	  domestic	  bargaining	  
between	  pro-­‐trade	  agencies,	  such	  as	  MOFTEC	  and	  protectionist	  industrial	  agencies.	  	  
What	  is	  important	  to	  successfully	  push	  for	  a	  policy	  innovation	  is	  to	  bring	  the	  
right	   people	   and	   the	   right	   agency	   on	   board.329	  	   At	   the	   base	   level	   of	   the	   decision	  
structure,	   this	  ad	  hoc	  body	  was	  headed	  by	  pro-­‐trade	  high	  officials:	   	  The	   first	  head	  
was	  State	  Councilor	  Zhang	  Jinfu,	  who	  also	  led	  State	  Economic	  Commission,	  and	  the	  
second	   head	   Vice	   Premier	   Tian	   Jiyun,	   political	   ally	   of	   then	   Premier	   Zhao	   Ziyang.	  	  
Vice	  Premier	   Li	   Lanqing,	   political	   ally	   of	   President	   Jiang	  Zemin,	  was	   the	   last	   head	  
before	   it	   was	   dissolved	   in	   1998.	   	   In	   constructing	   a	   consensus	   there,	   relevant	  
agencies	  did	  not	  have	  an	  equal	  bargaining	  power	  (as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  IV).	  	  The	  
State	  Planning	  Commission	   (SPC)	   and	   the	   SEC	   (later	   renamed	  as	   SETC)	   enjoyed	   a	  
higher	  rank	  than	  industrial	  ministries,	  which	  were	  often	  assigned	  to	  be	  mediators.	  	  
In	   the	   GATT/WTO	   case,	   the	   SEC/SETC	   played	   this	   role.	   	   Its	   associate	   director	  
presided	  at	  the	  meetings	  on	  this	  forum,	  listened	  to	  each	  side,	  and	  pushed	  efforts	  to	  
build	   consensus.	   	   There	   most	   decisions	   were	   made	   about	   the	   bottom-­‐line	   for	  
negotiating	  with	  the	  Americans.	  
Regarding	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  its	  coordination	  function,	  my	  interviewees	  had	  
conflicting	   comments.	   	   One	   official	   remarked	   that	   the	   Committee	   operated	  
effectively	  and	  resolved	  many	  problems.330	  	  Another	  official	  revealed	  that	  as	  an	  ad	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hoc	   interagency	  body,	   the	  Committee	  had	  no	   fixed	  schedule	   for	  meetings.	   	  Most	  of	  
participants	   were	   minister-­‐level	   officials,	   but	   participants	   in	   a	   meeting	   were	  
typically	  not	   fixed,	  depending	  on	   the	   issue	   to	  be	  discussed.331	  	   Scholars	  noted	   that	  
this	   Committee	   did	   not	   work	   effectively.	   	   The	   protection-­‐oriented	   State	   Planning	  
Commission	  (SPC)	  was	  the	  most	  powerful	  supra-­‐ministerial	  player	  within	  the	  State	  
Council.	   	   Its	   officials	   were	   not	   included	   in	   the	   list	   of	   Committee’s	   vice	   chairmen,	  
which	   weakened	   the	   coordination	   function.	   	   The	   Committee	   did	   not	   have	   a	  
secretariat	  with	  sufficient,	  permanent	  staff	  support.	  	  It	  had	  difficulty	  in	  organizing	  a	  
meeting,	  and	  sessions	  were	  usually	  short.332	  	  	  
When	   more	   issue-­‐topics	   were	   involved	   in	   the	   bilateral	   negotiation,	   the	  
Committee’s	  membership	  expanded,	  including	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  the	  Ministry	  
of	  Machine	   Building	   Industry,	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Posts	   and	   Telecommunications,	   the	  
Ministry	   of	   Textile	   Industry,	   the	   State	   Council	   Office	   of	   Import	   and	   Export	   of	  
Mechanical	   and	   Electronic	   Products,	   and	   so	   on.	   	   In	   1998,	   this	   Committee	   was	  
dissolved.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  under	  the	  restructuring	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  led	  by	  the	  
newly	   promoted	   Premier	   Zhu	   Rongji,	   many	   industrial	   agencies	   were	   annulled	   or	  
downgraded	  to	  a	  bureau	  under	  the	  State	  Economic	  and	  Trade	  Commission	  (SETC).	  	  
The	   inter-­‐ministerial	   coordination	   and	   negotiation	   turned	   to	   be	   intra-­‐agency	  
discussion	   and	   decision.	   	   Apparently,	   the	   SETC	   grew	   powerful,	   and	   the	   pro-­‐trade	  
coalition	  gained	  upper	  hand.	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On	  this	  decision	  forum,	  the	  most	  fervent	  pro-­‐trade	  force	  was	  MOFTEC.	  	  Trade	  
negotiators	  responded	  to	  concerns	  at	  the	  international	  table	  and,	  in	  turn,	  advocated	  
liberal	  trade	  policy	  on	  the	  domestic	  table.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  fourth	  chief	  negotiator	  
Long	  explained	  to	  officials	  at	  other	  agencies	  that	  the	  Bank	  of	  China	  was	  allowed	  to	  
conduct	   currency	   business	   in	   the	   US.	   	   If	   China	   did	   not	   approve	   American	   banks	  
doing	  RMB	  business	   in	  China,	   the	   Industrial	  and	  Commercial	  Bank	  of	  China	  would	  
not	  be	  allowed	  in	  the	  US,	  according	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  reciprocity.333	  	  	  
The	   first	  Chief	  Negotiator	  Shen	   Jueren,	  a	  MOFTEC	  high	  official,	   initiated	   the	  
strategy	  of	  including	  the	  affected	  industrial	  agencies	  in	  the	  Chinese	  negotiating	  team,	  
which	   was	   followed	   by	   the	   next	   three	   chef	   negotiators.334	  	   Shen	   joked	   that	   those	  
“who	  are	  the	  parents	  of	  the	  kids	  should	  carry	  them	  away,”335	  figuratively	  asserting	  
issue-­‐topics	  were	   the	  kids,	   and	   industrial	   agencies,	   their	  parents.	   	   At	   the	  Working	  
Party	  meeting	  sessions,	  the	  Chinese	  team	  was	  asked	  to	  explain	  China’s	  trade	  regime	  
and	   answer	   written	   and	   oral	   questions.	   	   The	   officials	   of	   relevant	   agencies	   were	  
responsible	   for	   answering	   the	   question	   if	   it	   belonged	   to	   the	   jurisdictions	   of	   their	  
agencies.	  	  If	  they	  could	  not	  answer	  it,	  they	  reported	  to	  their	  bosses	  back	  home	  after	  
they	  travelled	  back	  to	  China	  and	  prepared	  for	  the	  next	  session.	  	  In	  this	  process,	  the	  
expertise	  from	  the	  affected	  industrial	  agencies	  helped	  MOFTEC’s	  negotiators	  at	  the	  
international	   table.	   	  What	  was	  more	   important	  was	   that	   it	   effectively	   transferred	  
international	  pressure	  back	  to	  the	  domestic	  table.	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However,	  this	  strategy,	  with	  the	  intention	  to	  transfer	  international	  pressure	  
back	  home,	  became	  a	  major	  obstacle	  later.	   	  It	  allowed	  domestic	  resistance	  to	  affect	  
the	  progress	  of	  international	  negotiation	  and	  exposed	  the	  Chinese	  negotiating	  team	  
directly	  to	  domestic	  pressure.	  	  It	  diluted	  MOFTEC’s	  authority	  as	  the	  lead	  negotiator	  
at	  the	  international	  table.	  	  As	  discussed	  supra,	  all	  chief	  negotiators	  talked	  about	  their	  
difficulty	  due	  to	  the	  domestic	  pressure.	  	  After	  the	  failed	  attempt	  in	  1994,	  the	  Chinese	  
official	   media	   had	   to	   criticize	   the	   US	   for	   “raising	   the	   bar,”	   partly	   to	   protect	   the	  
MOFTEC	   advocates.	   	   In	   1995	   and	   1996,	   MOFTEC	   also	   stopped	   its	   strategy	   of	  
educating	  the	  public	  about	  WTO	  affairs	  to	  avoid	  domestic	  criticism.	  
In	   the	   Chinese	   bureaucracy,	   the	   need	   of	   building	   consensus	   predisposes	  
officials	  to	  negotiate	  with	  other	  relevant	  officials	  at	  an	  early	  point,	  even	  before	  the	  
formal	   coordination	  meetings.	   	  A	   former	  official	   of	  MOFTEC’s	  WTO	  Office	   recalled	  
that	   Long	   actively	   took	   them	   to	   other	   agencies’	   relevant	   offices	   of	   the	   same	  
administrative	  rank	  and	  tried	  to	  convince	  them,	  a	  kind	  of	  internal	  lobbying	  defined	  
as	   paowen.	   	   Trying	   to	   persuade	   industrial	   agencies,	   MOFTEC	   tactically	   sent	   its	  
officials	  holding	  the	  administrative	  rank	  higher	  than	  those	  officials	  at	  the	  industrial	  
agencies.336	  	  For	  example,	  they	  sent	  a	  deputy	  director-­‐general	  to	  talk	  with	  a	  director	  
of	   a	   division	   at	   an	   industrial	   agency.	   	   To	   industrial	   agencies,	  MOFTEC	   showed	   its	  
respect,	   and	   the	   higher	   rank	   came	   with	   reputation	   and	   authority	   and	   also	   made	  
persuasion	  easier.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Another	   major	   force	   on	   the	   domestic	   bargaining	   table	   was	   the	   State	  
Economic	   Commission	   (SEC).	   	   It	  was	   separated	   from	   the	   powerful	   State	   Planning	  
Commission	   in	  1993	  and	  became	  an	  agency	  of	  supra-­‐ministerial	  rank,	   the	  same	  as	  
the	  SPC.	  	  Between	  1993	  and	  1998,	  the	  State	  Economic	  Commission,	  as	  a	  new	  agency	  
whose	   mission	   was	   for	   macroeconomic	   regulation	   and	   control,	   struggled	   for	   its	  
bureaucratic	   power	   and	   jurisdictions	  within	   the	   State	   Council.	   	   It	  was	   confronted	  
with	   the	   issue	   of	   how	   to	   distinguish	   itself	   from	   other	   macroeconomic	   control	  
agencies,	  especially	  SPC.	  	  In	  this	  period,	  it	  was	  regarded	  weak	  in	  both	  reputation	  and	  
bureaucratic	  power.	  	  	  	  
SEC	   was	   responsible	   for	   domestic	   bargaining	   table	   through	   calling,	  
organizing,	  and	  presiding	  inter-­‐ministerial	  meetings.	   	  The	  associate	  director	  of	  SEC	  
in	  charge	  of	  policy	  coordination	  meetings	  had	  work	  experience	  with	  MOFTEC	  and	  
the	  Office	  of	  LSG	  on	  Finance	  and	  Economic	  Affairs,	  which	  helped	  communication	  and	  
coordination.	  	  It	  reported	  to	  the	  vice	  premier-­‐level	  State	  Councilor	  in	  charge	  of	  WTO	  
(i.e.	  Wu	  Yi)	  and	  even	  Premier	  Zhu	  Rongji.	   	  When	  necessary,	   it	   reported	   to	  Central	  
Committee	  Leadership	  Small	  Group	  (LSG)	  on	  Finance	  and	  Economic	  Affairs.	  
At	   the	   vice-­‐premier	   level,	   Wu	   Yi	   made	   tremendous	   efforts	   for	   internal	  
coordination.	  	  Before	  she	  acted	  as	  vice	  premier-­‐level	  State	  Councilor	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  
WTO	  affairs,	  she	  worked	  as	  vice	  minister	  and	  then	  minister	  of	  MOFTEC.	  	  When	  Tong	  
Zhiguang,	   the	   second	  chief	  negotiator,	  was	   sick	   in	  November	  1991,	  Wu	  briefly	   led	  




strong	  tie	  with	  MOFTEC	  and	  her	  authority	  over	  WTO	  affairs	  benefited	  the	  pro-­‐trade	  
liberals	  and	  SEC’s	  inter-­‐ministerial	  coordination.	  	  
The	   restructuring	   of	   the	   State	   Council	   changed	   its	   power	   structure	   and	  
awarded	   the	  State	  Economic	  Commission	  more	  power	  and	   jurisdictions.	   	   In	  1998,	  
the	  State	  Economic	  Commission	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Internal	  Trade	  merged	  together	  and	  
formed	   the	   State	   Economic	   and	   Trade	   Commission	   (SETC).	   	   Its	   mission	   was	   to	  
promote	  the	  market	  economy.	  	  More	  than	  10	  industrial	  agencies	  were	  downgraded	  
from	  ministry-­‐level	  to	  bureau-­‐level	  agencies	  under	  the	  control	  of	  SETC.	  	  At	  this	  time,	  
the	   head	   of	   industrial	   agencies	   became	   the	   subordinates	   of	   SETC.	   	   SETC	   grew	  
powerful	   in	   industrial	   policy-­‐making	   and	   thus	   became	   a	  major	   participant	   at	   the	  
domestic	  bargaining	  table	  on	  WTO	  affairs.	  	  	  
Labor	  was	  generally	  divided	  between	  SETC	  and	  MOFTEC,	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  
SETC	   was	   in	   charge	   of	   domestic	   bargaining	   and	   coordination,	   and	   the	   MOFTEC,	  
international	  negotiation.	  	  There	  was	  complaint	  that	  the	  coordination	  structure	  was	  
duplicative	  and	  unnecessary.	   	  Most	  of	  my	  interviewees	  who	  worked	  with	  MOFTEC	  
believed	   that	   MOFTEC	   played	   the	   most	   important	   role	   in	   internal	   coordination.	  	  
Those	  who	  worked	  at	  the	  SETC	  stressed	  on	  the	  role	  of	  SETC,	  but	  they	  admitted	  that	  
SETC	   members	   were	   short	   of	   experience	   in	   negotiating	   with	   foreigners.	   	   In	  
describing	   the	   role	   of	   SETC,	   SETC	   officials	   joked	   that	   they	   were	   “chefs	   in	   the	  
kitchen,”337	  implying	   that	   they	  had	   to	  balance	  different	  domestic	   interests	   in	  a	  pot	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




and	  also	  that	  its	  efforts	  at	  the	  backstage	  were	  not	  exposed	  as	  much	  to	  the	  media	  as	  
MOFTEC.	  	  	  
Regarding	  the	  role	  of	  SETC,	  I	  have	  got	  dramatically	  different	  interpretations,	  
generally	  along	  the	  line	  between	  agencies.	   	  Undoubtedly,	  some	  of	  these	  differences	  
were	   merely	   self-­‐serving.	   But	   I	   believe	   that	   most	   came	   from	   honest	   perception	  
because	   where	   you	   stand	   depends	   on	   where	   you	   sit.	   	   Therefore,	   I	   do	   not	   regard	  
SETC	  as	  conservatives,	  as	  some	  former	  MOFTEC	  officials	  claimed.	  	  This	  mechanism	  
of	   dual	   controls	   proved	   its	   advantage,	   but	   the	   division	   of	   labor	   became	   a	   major	  
drawback.	   	   In	   dealing	  with	   the	   sense	   of	   belonging	   in	   the	   two	  organizations,	   some	  
one	  even	  suggested	  that	  SETC	  was	  to	  coordinate	  on	  services	  issues,	  and	  MOFTEC	  on	  
manufacturing	  goods.	  	  
In	   the	   late	   1990s,	   policy	   coordination	   at	   the	   domestic	   table	  was	   slow,	   and	  
protectionists	  were	  hard	   to	  nudge.	   	   For	  efficient	  policy	   coordination,	  meetings	   for	  
internal	  bargaining	  were	  moved	   from	  Beijing	   to	  Washington	  D.C.,	   right	  before	   the	  
scheduled	   negotiation	   time	   with	   the	   Americans.338	  	   This	   tactic	   was	   intended	   to	  
reduce	  the	  time	  for	  internal	  bargaining	  and	  trump	  domestic	  resistance	  by	  having	  a	  
firm	   and	   imminent	   deadline	   for	   consensus	   building.	   	   Although	   domestic	  
compromises	   were	   reluctantly	   achieved	   at	   those	   meetings	   in	   D.C.,	   officials	   from	  
industrial	   agencies	   wrathfully	   complained	   that	   they	   could	   not	   report	   to	   and	   get	  
directions	  from	  their	  bosses	  back	  home.	  	  This	  tactic	  was	  widely	  criticized.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Domestic	  Debate:	  Nationalists	  vs.	  liberals	  
	  
After	  the	  core	  leader	  reconfirmed	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  socialist	  market	  economy,	  
China’s	   WTO	   accession,	   attached	   to	   this	   firm	   national	   policy,	   benefited	   from	   the	  
substantial	   change	   of	   political	   landscape.	   	   Challenges	   against	   it	   would	   incur	  
substantial	  political	  risk	   for	  any	  agency	  or	   individual.	   	  Agencies	  needed	  to	  strike	  a	  
balance	   between	   showing	   support	   to	   the	   WTO	   accession	   policy	   in	   principle	   and	  
protecting	   their	   own	   authorities	   and	   interests	   in	   certain	   industries	   in	   particular.	  	  
Domestic	   resistance	   against	   liberal	   economic	   policy	   and	   China’s	   WTO	   entry	   took	  
another	   form	   –	   economic	   nationalism.	   	   Questions	   were	   raised:	   	   Would	   the	  
concessions	  endanger	  economic	  sovereignty?	  	  How	  many	  concessions	  should	  China	  
make	  on	  specific	   issue-­‐topics?	   	  Should	  China	  enter	   into	   the	  WTO	   later	   rather	   than	  
sooner?	  	  
The	  advocates	  of	  economic	  nationalism	  conceded	  that	  economic	  reform	  was	  
the	   needed	   approach	   for	   China,	   but	   foreign	   companies	   were	   profit	   oriented,	   and	  
they	   did	   not	   share	   the	   goal	   of	   strengthening	   the	   Chinese	   economy.	   	   Foreign	  
investors	  emphasized	  the	  protection	  of	  patent,	  trademark	  and	  copyright	  and	  would	  
never	   transfer	   advanced	   technology	   to	   Chinese	   enterprises.	   	   Foreign	   companies	  
controlled	   technology	   and	   know-­‐how	   and	   had	   decisive	   economic	   power	   in	   the	  
market.	   	  When	   foreign	   goods	   and	   services	   accessed	   the	   Chinese	  market,	   it	  would	  
injure	   SOEs,	   the	   foundation	   of	   the	   Chinese	   economy,	   and	   endanger	   the	   country’s	  
economic	  sovereignty	  and	  security.	   	   In	   the	  process	  of	   forming	   joint	  ventures,	   local	  




The	  properties	  of	  Chinese	  enterprises	  were	  undervalued.	  	  The	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  
of	   1997	   demonstrated	   the	   danger	   of	   economic	   globalization.	   	   Nationalists	   believe	  
that	   the	   government	   should	   prevent	   foreign	   direct	   investment	   (FDI)	   from	  
dominating	  strategic	  industries.	  	  	  
Liberals	  argue	  for	  industrial	  integration	  and	  the	  strategy	  of	  trading	  markets	  
for	   technology.	   	  The	   local	   content	  of	   a	  product	  and	   share	  of	  ownership	  determine	  
the	  market	  power.	   	   They	   also	   claim	   that	  China	  would	  use	  FDI	   to	   create	   jobs,	   gain	  
access	   to	   foreign	   capital,	   and	   obtain	   foreign	   experience	   about	   the	   international	  
market,	   management	   skills,	   and	   know-­‐how.	   	   Granted	   market	   access,	   foreign	  
investors	   would	   transfer	   technology	   to	   joint	   ventures.	   	   Liberals	   perceive	   the	  
majority	  ownership	  of	  FDI	  as	  a	  natural	   capital	   inflow	  and	  seek	  a	  balance	  between	  
economic	  openness	  and	  security.	  	  
In	   the	   last	   stage,	   when	   the	   negotiation	   on	   the	   international	   table	   moved	  
ahead,	  policy	  coordination	  on	  the	  domestic	  table	  became	  very	  difficult.	  	  The	  support	  
for	   economic	   nationalism	   came	   from	   many	   industrial	   agencies	   within	   the	   State	  
Council,	   and	   they	   joined	   behind	   the	   powerful	   State	   Development	   and	   Planning	  
Commission	  (previously	  State	  Planning	  Commission,	  SPC).	  	  The	  liberals	  had	  support	  
from	  Commission	  on	  Economic	  Restructuring,	  which	  dwindled	  after	  the	  deposition	  
of	   Zhao	   Ziyang.	   	   Afterwards,	   the	   pro-­‐trade	   agencies	  were	   not	   unanimous.	   	   As	   the	  
chief	   negotiating	   agency,	   MOFTEC	   protected	   the	   national	   interest	   on	   the	  
international	   bargaining	   table	   and	   argued	   for	   pro-­‐trade	   policy	   at	   the	   domestic	  




and	   SETC,	   opinions	   inside	   MOFTEC	   were	   divided.	   	   In	   the	   process	   of	   liberalizing	  
trade	   some	   departments	   of	   MOFTEC	   would	   also	   have	   their	   regulatory	   power	  
diminished,	   for	   example	   regulatory	   power	   over	   state	   trading	   corporations.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  officials	  of	  MOFTEC	  had	  been	  exposed	  to	  the	  international	  world	  
and	   possessed	   better	   understanding	   of	   international	   trade	   and	   openness.339	  	   This	  
agency	   as	   a	   whole	   was	   keen	   for	   trade	   liberalization.	   	   Confronted	   with	   industrial	  
agencies’	   tough	  positions	  on	  domestic	  table,	   trade	  agencies	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  
an	  advantage.	  	  The	  intervention	  from	  the	  top-­‐down	  authority	  broke	  this	  deadlock.	  	  
	  
Jiang’s	  Power	  consolidation	  
	  
Jiang	   Zemin’s	   greater	   consolidation	   of	   power	   in	   the	   late	   1990s	   gave	  more	  
confidence	   to	   those	   favoring	   GATT	   accession.	   	   After	   Jiang	   clearly	   delivered	   the	  
messages	   about	   his	   endorsement	   of	   liberal	   economic	   policy,	   Deng	   gradually	  
transferred	  most	  power	  in	  the	  state,	  party	  and	  military	  to	  him.	  	  Neither	  Hu	  Yaobang	  
nor	  Zhao	  Ziyang	  had	  been	  made	  head	  of	   the	  MAC,	   and	  both	  were	  defeated	  by	   the	  
conservative	   faction.	   	  Deng	   finally	   realized	   that	   a	   successor	  without	   full	   authority,	  
especially	  authority	  over	  the	  military,	  was	  a	  lame	  duck.	  	  Deng	  made	  Jiang	  head	  of	  the	  
PRC’s	   MAC	   in	   November	   1989	   and	   head	   of	   CPC’s	   MAC	   in	   March	   1990,	   which	  
facilitated	   Jiang’s	   power	   consolidation.	   	   In	   March	   1993,	   Jiang	   succeeded	   Yang	  
Shangkun,	  another	  Party	  elder	  and	  Deng’s	  ally,	  and	  became	  the	  President	  of	  China.	  	  
By	  this	  time,	  Jiang	  possessed	  the	  offices	  of	  CPC’s	  general	  secretary,	  chairman	  of	  MAC,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




and	  President	  of	  China,	  the	  three	  major	  offices	  at	  the	  top	  of	  CPC’s	  decision-­‐making	  
system.	  
In	  terms	  of	  power	  succession,	  Jiang	  was	  fortunate.	  	  In	  April	  1995,	  Chen	  Yun,	  a	  
Party	   elder	   in	   the	   conservative	   faction,	   died.	   	   Deng	  was	   feeble	   but	   outlived	   Chen,	  
which	  offered	  Jiang	  a	  favorable	  opportunity.	  	  On	  one	  hand,	  Jiang	  was	  designated	  by	  
Deng	   as	   his	   successor,	   a	   decision	  which	  was	   still	   honored	   inside	   CPC	  when	  Deng	  
stayed	  alive.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Deng’s	  incapacitation	  made	  it	  impossible	  for	  him	  to	  
seek	  a	  replacement	  of	  Jiang	  within	  the	  reformist	  camp.	  	  From	  Chen’s	  death	  in	  1995	  
to	  Deng’s	  passing	  in	  1997,	   Jiang	  moved	  adroitly	  to	  outmaneuver	  his	  key	  rivals	  (i.e.	  
Chen	  Xitong	  in	  1995).	  
From	   late	   1994	   to	   1997,	   the	   new	   collective	   leadership	   formed,	   including	  
Jiang,	  Li	  Peng,	  Zhu	  Rongji,	  and	  Qiao	  Shi	  sitting	  at	  the	  top.	  	  Without	  much	  interference	  
from	  higher-­‐level	  Party	  elders,	  they	  worked	  and	  collaborated	  reasonably	  well.	  	  With	  
the	  aid	  of	  Zeng	  Qinghong,	   Jiang	  had	  maneuvered	  deftly	   to	  significantly	  consolidate	  
his	  power	  and	  became	  the	  first	  among	  equals	  in	  the	  Politburo	  Standing	  Committee.	  	  
Jiang	  began	  to	  promote	  many	  of	  his	  supporters	  from	  Shanghai	  to	  high	  positions	  of	  
the	   central	   government	   in	   Beijing	   (e.g.	   Zeng	   Peiyan,	   Chen	   Zhili,	   Huang	   Ju,	   etc).	  	  
Gradually	   the	   so-­‐called	   Shanghai	   Clique	   formed	   within	   the	   central	   government.	  	  
When	  Deng	  died	  in	  February	  1997,	  Jiang	  was	  already	  in	  firm	  control,	  achieving	  the	  
first	  peaceful	  succession	  between	  two	  generations	  of	  leaders	  since	  the	  Communists	  




Claimed	  as	  the	  third-­‐generation	  core	  leader,	  Jiang	  successfully	  acted	  as	  a	  new	  
power	  broker	  after	  Deng.	   	  At	  the	  National	  People’s	  Congress	  (NPC)	  in	  March	  1998,	  
Qiao	  Shi	  was	  forced	  into	  retirement	  due	  to	  his	  age.	  	  Li	  Peng	  took	  over	  Qiao’s	  position	  
and	   acted	   as	   the	   head	   of	  NPC.	   	   Reportedly,	   Li	   kept	   his	   second	   ranking	   in	   the	  CPC	  
Politburo	  –	  which	  is	  usually	  occupied	  by	  the	  premier	  –	  in	  exchange	  for	  his	  handing	  
over	  the	  State	  Council	  to	  Zhu,	  the	  new	  premier.	  	  Within	  the	  State	  Council,	  Li	  Lanqing,	  
Jiang’s	   strong	   political	   ally	   who	   headed	   the	   Committee	   on	   Inter-­‐Ministerial	  
Coordination	  on	  GATT,	  became	  the	  first-­‐ranking	  vice	  premier.	  	  As	  discussed	  supra,	  a	  
policy	   initiative	   can	   be	   negatively	   affected	   by	   the	   demotion	   or	   deposition	   of	   the	  
politician	  who	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  it.	  	  On	  the	  flip	  side,	  a	  policy	  initiative	  can	  also	  move	  up	  
on	  the	  policy	  agenda	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  politician	  in	  charge	  of	  it,340	  
especially	  when	  this	  politician	  has	  access	  to	  the	  core	  leader.	  	  	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	   the	  process	  of	   Jiang’s	  power	  consolidation	  was	  parallel	   to	  
China’s	  GATT/WTO	  accession.	  	  While	  he	  was	  consolidating	  power	  and	  solidifying	  his	  
political	  base,	   the	  bilateral	  negotiation	  was	  unproductive	   in	  1995	  and	  1996.	   	  After	  
he	   successfully	   firmed	   up	   his	   position	   in	   1997	   and	   had	   sufficient	   allies	   and	  
endorsement	   within	   the	   central	   government	   by	   1998,	   China	   made	   substantial	  
concessions	   on	   the	   international	   bargaining	   table,	   and	   the	   bilateral	   negotiation	  
moved	  ahead	   substantively.	   	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   “participation	  on	   the	  world	   stage	  
normally	   gives	   a	   head	   of	   government	   a	   special	   advantage	   vis-­‐a-­‐via	   his	   or	   her	  
domestic	  opposition.”341	  	   In	  his	  tenure,	   Jiang	  went	  to	  APEC	  meetings	  every	  time.342	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He	  demonstrated	  great	  interest	  in	  participation	  on	  the	  international	  stage,	  so	  a	  deal	  
to	   sail	   China	   into	   the	   global	   trading	   net	   would	   apparently	   allow	   him	   to	   reap	   the	  
“transaction	  benefits”343	  and	  solidify	  his	  position	  in	  domestic	  politics.	  	  
	  
Zhu’s	  Switched	  Interest	  on	  the	  WTO	  Accession	  
	  
Another	  major	  player,	  Zhu	  Rongji,	  did	  not	   show	  much	   interest	   in	   the	  GATT	  
accession	   when	   he	   was	   vice	   premier	   in	   the	   second	   stage,	   but	   when	   he	   rose	   to	  
premier,	   his	   switched	   interest	   in	   WTO	   affairs	   and	   tremendously	   facilitated	   the	  
bilateral	  negotiation	  in	  the	  third	  stage.	  	  	  
It	   is	  arguable	  whether	  Zhu	  should	  be	  categorized	  as	  a	  reformist	  or	  whether	  
he	   leaned	   toward	   the	  planned	  economy.	   	  Generally	  he	  was	  regarded	  as	  one	  of	   the	  
reformist	   faction	  and	  a	  politician	  with	   liberal	  economic	  policy,	  especially	  by	  media	  
outside	  China.	   	   In	  his	   tenure	  of	  Shanghai	  major,	  he	  promoted	  Pudong	  New	  Area,	  a	  
Special	  Economic	  Zone	  of	  semi-­‐province	  level.	  	  In	  1991,	  Zhu	  endorsed	  Deng	  when	  he	  
advocated	  economic	  reform	  and	  the	  open-­‐door	  policy	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  tried	  to	  steer	  
economic	  policy	  away	  from	  the	  conservative	  planned	  economy.	  	  With	  Zhu’s	  support,	  
a	  group	  of	  authors	  in	  Shanghai	  published	  a	  series	  of	  editorials	  in	  Liberation	  Daily	  to	  
underpin	  Deng’s	  speech.	  	  A	  few	  months	  later,	  he	  was	  promoted	  to	  vice	  premier	  and	  
relocated	  from	  Shanghai	  to	  Beijing.	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  detailed	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However,	   former	   officials	   and	   scholars	   in	   China	   argued	   otherwise.	   	   They	  
claimed	   that	   Zhu	   leaned	   toward	   a	   planned	   economy,	   which	   was	   founded	   on	   his	  
earlier	  record.344	  	  Zhu	  Rongji	  worked	  at	  local	  government	  briefly,	  and	  then	  in	  1952	  
he	   started	   his	   career	  with	   the	   powerful,	   conservative	   State	   Planning	   Commission,	  
which	   supported	   economic	  nationalism.	   	   Between	  1979	   and	  1987,	   Zhu	  worked	   at	  
the	  State	  Economic	  Commission	  when	  it	  was	  restored	  and	  just	  partitioned	  from	  the	  
Planning	  Commission.	  	  In	  his	  vice	  premier	  tenure,	  Zhu	  also	  served	  as	  the	  governor	  of	  
People’s	   Bank	   of	   China	   and	   held	   the	   posts	   of	   directors	   for	   Production	   Office	   and	  
Economic	  and	  Trade	  Office	  at	  the	  State	  Council.	  	  Although	  he	  was	  a	  member	  of	  Inter-­‐
Ministerial	   Coordination	   Committee,	   he	   did	   not	   show	   interest	   in	   the	   GATT/WTO	  
affairs.	  	  	  
Trying	  to	  revive	  the	  SOEs,	  he	  focused	  on	  industry,	  agriculture	  and	  finance.	  	  In	  
the	  early	  1990s,	  he	  launched	  the	  drive	  to	  clear	  the	  triangle	  debts	  between	  SOEs	  and	  
enacted	   tough	  macroeconomic	  contraction	  policy	   to	  curb	   inflation.	   	  Because	  of	  his	  
achievements	   on	   these,	   he	   rose	   to	   the	   first	   ranking	   vice	   premier	   and	   one	   of	   the	  
seven	   members	   of	   Politburo	   Standing	   Committee	   in	   the	   Fourteenth	   CPC	   Party	  
Congress	  of	  1992.	   	   In	  1994,	  Zhu	   implemented	  a	  series	  of	   reform	  measures,	  one	  of	  
which	  was	  the	  taxation	  reform.	   	   It	  was	  to	  reassign	  the	  proportion	  of	   tax	  collection	  
between	   central	   and	   local	   governments.	   	   The	   central	   government	   increased	   its	  
revenue,	  and	  the	  local	  governments	  had	  a	  shrunk	  proportion.	  	  In	  effect,	  this	  measure	  
empowered	   the	   central	   government	   over	   local	   governments,	   SOEs,	   and	   then	   the	  
market.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




On	   GATT/WTO	   affairs,	   Zhu	   seemed	   to	   be	   less	   interested	   than	   Jiang	   and	   Li	  
Lanqing.	  	  During	  his	  vice	  premier	  tenure,	  Zhu	  believed	  that	  the	  foreign	  competition	  
from	  market	  opening	  would	  undermine	  the	  already	  crippled	  domestic	  enterprises.	  	  
In	  1998,	   Jiang	  nominated	  him	   for	   the	  position	  of	  premier	  of	   the	  State	  Council.	   	  As	  
Premier,	   Zhu	  pushed	  efforts	  on	  SOE	   reform,	  which	  was	   to	   expunge	   low-­‐tech,	   low-­‐
competitive	   SOEs,	   for	   example	   those	   in	   textile	   industry.	   	   In	   the	   wave	   of	   SOE	  
privatization,	  20-­‐30	  million	  blue-­‐collar	  workers	  were	   laid	  off,	  most	  of	  which	  were	  
not	  skilled	  worker	  and	  could	  not	  be	  reemployed	  in	  the	  growing	  private	  sector.	  	  With	  
legions	   of	   unemployed	   workers	   and	   nearly	   bankrupted	   SOEs,	   the	   supervising	  
ministries	  became	  very	  discontented	  due	  to	  the	  vested	  interest	  on	  their	  turfs.	   	  The	  
SOE	  reform	  confronted	  a	  severe	  setback.	  
According	   to	   Putnam’s	   two-­‐level	   game	   theory,	   occurrences	   on	   the	  
international	   table	   are	   cited	   by	   participants	   to	   domestic	   audiences	   as	   a	   way	   of	  
legitimizing	  their	  policies.	   	  Against	  resistance	  inside	  the	  State	  Council,	  Zhu	  came	  to	  
see	  foreign	  competition	  as	  leverage	  in	  pressing	  SOEs	  to	  become	  efficient	  and	  make	  
reforms.	  	  Zhu	  said,	  “Competition	  arising	  from	  such	  a	  situation	  will	  promote	  the	  more	  
rapid	  and	  healthy	  development	  of	  China’s	  national	  economy.”345	  	  Even	  though	  it	  was	  
debatable	  whether	  he	  was	  a	   liberal	  or	  nationalist,	  Zhu	  switched	  his	   interest	   to	   the	  
WTO	   accession	   and	   prioritized	   it.	   	   The	   State	   Council’s	   Committee	   on	   Inter-­‐
Ministerial	   Coordination	   on	   GATT	   –	   an	   agency	   traditionally	   headed	   by	   a	   vice	  
premier	  –	  ceased	  in	  1998,	  reportedly	  in	  order	  for	  Zhu	  to	  take	  over	  this	  function	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Li	   Lanqing.	   	   This	   is	   one	   of	   the	   examples	   of	   Zhu’s	   hands-­‐on	   style,	  which	  would	   be	  
proved	  again	  by	  his	  personal	  involvement	  in	  negotiating	  with	  the	  Americans	  in	  1999.	  	  
On	  the	  Chinese	  domestic	  bargaining	  table,	  WTO	  accession	  gained	  favor	  from	  
the	  first-­‐	  and	  third-­‐ranking	  leaders	  of	  Politburo	  of	  the	  CPC	  Central	  Committee	  (Jiang	  
and	   Zhu)	   and	   the	   first-­‐	   and	   second-­‐ranking	   leaders	   of	   State	   Council	   (Zhu	   and	   Li).	  	  
Jiang	  and	  Zhu	  had	   forged	  a	  reasonably	  good	  working	  relationship	  during	   their	  co-­‐
governance	  in	  Shanghai	  in	  1980s,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  convincing	  to	  say	  that	  they	  were	  fully	  
united.	  	  Nevertheless,	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  end	  of	  1998	  they	  shared	  the	  same	  policy	  
objective	  on	  WTO	  affairs,	  and	  both	  were	  in	  favor	  of	  pushing	  forward	  Sino-­‐American	  
negotiation	   for	   China’s	   WTO	   accession.	   	   On	   the	   international	   level,	   the	   bilateral	  
negotiation	  stepped	  out	  of	  impasse	  and	  regained	  its	  momentum	  in	  1998.	  	  
	  
The	  Year	  of	  1999	  
	  
When	   Jiang	   and	   Zhu’s	   positions	   on	   the	   WTO	   accession	   converged,	   efforts	  
were	   combined.	   	   Zhu	   lacked	   a	   broad	   network	   of	   national	   political	   support.	   	   He	  
gained	   unpopularity	   in	   Chinese	   bureaucracy	   because	   of	   the	   reform	   programs	   he	  
implemented:	   	  His	  SOE	  reform	  had	  millions	  of	  workers	   laid	  off	   and	  brought	  many	  
SOEs	   to	   the	   verge	   of	   bankruptcy;	   The	   government	   restructuring	   impacted	   central	  
government	  officials,	   and	  his	  hands-­‐on	  style	  did	  not	  make	  him	  popular	  within	   the	  
State	  Council;346	  His	  taxation	  reform	  in	  1994,	  discussed	  supra,	  left	  local	  government	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a	   shrunk	   proportion	   of	   revenue	   collection.	   	   Nor	   did	   his	   anti-­‐corruption	   program	  
help	  build	  his	  popularity	  among	  bureaucrats.	   	   In	  contrast,	   Jiang	  enjoyed	  a	  broader	  
political	   network	   after	   years	   of	   power	   consolidation.	   	   To	   push	   forward	   the	   Sino-­‐
American	  negotiation,	  Zhu	  needed	  Jiang’s	  political	  support.	  
When	  policy	  coordination	  was	  confronted	  with	  resistance	  within	  the	  central	  
government,	  Jiang	  spent	  his	  political	  capital,	  employed	  the	  top-­‐down	  authority,	  and	  
set	  out	  to	  rally	  support	  from	  local	  government.	   	  In	  light	  of	  Jiang’s	  support	  for	  WTO	  
entry,	   some	   bureaucrats	   at	   the	   central	   government	   apparently	   muted	   their	  
opposition.	   	   In	   order	   to	   counterbalance	   the	   resistance	   at	   the	   central	   government,	  
Jiang	  rallied	  enough	  support	  from	  local	  government	  and	  asked	  provincial	  leaders	  to	  
voice	   their	   opinions.	   	   Not	   surprisingly,	   the	   leaders	   of	   Shanghai,	   which	   was	   his	  
political	  base,	  were	  very	  responsive	  and	  showed	  staunch	  support.347	  
When	   enough	   support	   was	   rallied	   and	   could	   be	   counted,	   an	   expanded	  
Politburo	  meeting	  was	  held	   in	  early	  1999.	   	  With	  more	  participants	  at	   the	  meeting,	  
the	  top-­‐down	  authority	  proved	  effective,	  and	  a	  consensus	  was	  successfully	  built.	  	  It	  
approved	   broad-­‐gauged	   concessions	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   achieve	   WTO	   accession.	  	  
Therefore,	   Zhu	   was	   able	   to	   tell	   Alan	   Greenspan,	   the	   chairman	   of	   the	   US	   Federal	  
Reserve,	   that	   China	   was	   prepared	   to	   offer	   substantial	   concessions.	   	   At	   the	  
international	  negotiating	  table,	  bilateral	  talks	  significantly	  moved	  ahead	  so	  that	  the	  
speculation	   appeared	   that	   Zhu’s	   state	   visit	   in	   April	   1999	   was	   the	   timing	   for	   the	  
conclusion	  of	  this	  deal.	  	  At	  the	  domestic	  table,	  once	  a	  consensus	  at	  the	  top	  leadership	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




was	   built,	   challenges	   against	   it	   could	   be	   difficult,	   but	   not	   impossible.	   	   NATO’s	  
bombing	  on	  Serbia	  brought	  hesitation,	  but	  Zhu	  went	  ahead	  on	  his	  scheduled	  trip	  to	  
the	  US,	  with	  Jiang’s	  support.	  	  	  
During	  Zhu’s	   state	  visit	   in	  April,	  Clinton	  backed	  out	  of	   the	  deal.	   	  When	   this	  
international	   deal	   fell	   apart,	   it	  made	   “international	   pressures	   ‘reverberate’	  within	  
domestic	   politics,	   tipping	   the	   domestic	   balance	   and	   thus	   influencing	   the	  
international	  negotiations.”348	  	  In	  China,	  it	  gave	  the	  nationalists	  momentum	  to	  fight	  
against	   the	   deal.	   	   The	   leaders	  who	   fought	   for	   the	   deal	   at	   the	   domestic	   table	  were	  
notably	  undermined;	  the	  pro-­‐trade	  officials	  had	  to	  change	  their	  tone	  about	  the	  deal.	  	  
The	  original	  expectation	  was	   to	  have	   the	  deal	   signed	  shortly	  after	  Zhu	   left	   the	  US,	  
and	  this	  reverberation	  within	  Chinese	  political	  arena	  completely	  changed	  about	  the	  
schedule.	  	  	  
The	  White	  House	  release	  of	  the	  draft	  of	  the	  protocol	  agreement	  increased	  the	  
cost	  of	   ratification	   in	  China.	   	  The	  Hong	  Kong	   textile	  businessmen	  read	   the	  draft	  of	  
the	   deal	   on	   the	  White	   House	  website.349	  	   Their	   complaint	   revived	   the	   opposition,	  
which	   had	   been	   reluctantly	   muted	   earlier.	   	   Countless	   articles	   appeared	   on	   the	  
Internet,	   questioning	   the	   compromises	   China	  made	   to	   the	  US.	   	   In	   public,	   Zhu	  was	  
mercilessly	  criticized	  and	  labeled	  a	  “traitor.”	  	  In	  the	  bureaucracy,	  the	  Minister	  of	  the	  
Information	   Industries	   reportedly	   tendered	   his	   resignation	   to	   show	   his	   protest	  
against	  the	  deal.	   	  Those	  officials	  who	  pushed	  efforts	  to	  support	  the	  deal	  cautiously	  
lowered	   their	   voices.	   	   State	   Councilor	  Wu	   Yi	   told	   reporters	   that	   the	   government	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should	  solicit	  opinions	  from	  various	  big	  enterprises.350	  	  Shortly	  after,	  NATO	  bombed	  
the	   Chinese	   Embassy	   in	   Yugoslavia	   on	   May	   8.	   	   It	   added	   fuel	   to	   the	   flame.	   	   The	  
bilateral	  negotiation	  became	  a	  casualty	  of	  the	  diplomatic	  crisis.	  	  
It	  is	  questionable	  that	  Zhu	  was	  bashed	  because	  he	  exceeded	  his	  authorization	  
when	   he	   made	   compromises	   to	   the	   US	   in	   April.	   	   The	   criticism	   may	   lie	   in	   his	  
unpopularity	   among	   the	   Chinese	   bureaucracy,	   and	   this	   failed	   deal	   of	   April	   simply	  
offered	  a	  convenient	  opportunity	  for	  the	  bureaucrats	  whose	  interests	  were	  severely	  
injured	   by	   various	   measures	   of	   Zhu’s	   to	   get	   together.	   	   Reportedly	   at	   a	   Politburo	  
meeting	  after	   the	  embassy	  bombing,	  Zhu’s	  opponents	  got	   together	  behind	  Li	  Peng	  
and	   castigated	   Zhu.	   	   Their	   accusations	   included	   that	   Zhu	   did	   not	   listen	   to	   his	  
subordinates	  at	  the	  State	  Council;	  he	  pursued	  reform	  too	  quickly;	  and	  government	  
restructuring	  hurt	  good	  CPC	  cadres.	   	  Beijing	  was	  rife	  with	  a	  rumor	  that	  Zhu	  might	  
step	  down.	  	  	  
Some	  Chinese	  observers	  believed	   that	   criticism	  of	   Jiang	  was	  deflected	  onto	  
Zhu.	   	   However,	   Jiang	   deftly	   maneuvered	   and	   recovered	   quickly.	   	   When	   Li	   Peng	  
criticized	   Zhu	   at	   Politburo	  meetings,	   he	   tactically	   expressed	   his	   complete	   support	  
for	   Jiang.	   	   Reportedly	   Jiang	   defended	   Zhu	   by	   saying	   that	   “he	   has	   not	   made	  
concessions	   that	   give	   up	   the	   principle,	   nor	   has	   he	   deviated	   from	   the	   Politburo’s	  
bottom	   lines.”	   	  Meanwhile,	   to	  calm	  down	  the	  opponents	  and	  protect	  himself,	   Jiang	  
said,	  “Zhu	  might	  have	  done	  it	  a	  bit	  fast	  and	  early,	  and	  [taking	  the	  low	  bottom	  line]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




might	  have	  left	  some	  kind	  of	  influence.”351	  	  At	  an	  internal	  meeting,	  Jiang	  stated	  that	  
China	   had	   waited	   for	   13	   years	   and	   could	   wait	   for	   another	   13	   years	   for	   WTO	  
membership.352	  	  Again,	  Jiang	  played	  as	  a	  power	  broker	  while	  carefully	  staying	  out	  of	  
disputes.	   	   In	   this	   duration,	   the	   editorial	   articles	   of	   the	   CPC’s	   official	   newspaper	  
adopted	   a	   tough	   tone	   toward	   the	   US,	   which	   indicated	   the	   difficulty	   of	   pro-­‐trade	  
leaders.	   	   Nevertheless,	   Jiang’s	   recovery	   salvaged	   political	   support	   so	   that	   the	  
bilateral	  talk	  could	  move	  on	  later.	  	  
As	  the	  head	  of	  LSG	  on	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Jiang	  had	  interests	  in	  foreign	  relations,	  
especially	  that	  with	  the	  US.	  	  His	  domestic	  position	  could	  be	  weakened	  by	  worsened	  
foreign	   relations	   due	   to	   the	   “transaction	   cost”,	   and	   the	   flip	   side	   is	   that	   improved	  
foreign	   relations	   could	   also	   strengthen	   his	   position	   because	   of	   the	   “transaction	  
benefits”.	   	  WTO	  accession	  would	  not	  only	  bring	  China	   stable	   foreign	   relationships	  
and	   affirm	   China’s	   market	   economy	   by	   the	   recognition	   from	   the	   international	  
community,	  it	  would	  also	  make	  China’s	  top	  leader	  an	  international	  player	  and	  leave	  
a	   remarkable	   foreign	   policy	   legacy	   for	   his	   presidency	   as	   it	   approached	   its	   end	   in	  
2002.	   	   Given	   that	   Jiang	   had	   showed	   particular	   interest	   in	   APEC	   meetings	   and	  
seemed	  attracted	  to	  the	  prestige	  that	  resulted	  from	  a	  warm	  Sino-­‐US	  relationship,	  he	  
would	   like	   to	   reap	   the	   transaction	   benefits	   from	   this	   deal.	   	   After	   the	   financial	  
settlement	  of	  the	  bombing	  incident,	  Clinton	  and	  Jiang	  met	  at	  the	  summit	  meeting	  of	  
APEC	  in	  New	  Zealand	  and	  decided	  to	  continue	  the	  WTO	  talks.	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The	   talks	   resumed	   in	   September	   1999.	   	   American	   negotiators	   found	   that	  
Long	  Yongtu	  was	  not	  on	   the	  other	  side	  of	   the	   table.	   	  The	  Minister	  of	  MOFTEC,	  Shi	  
Guangsheng	  led	  the	  team.	  	  The	  negotiations	  had	  been	  scheduled	  for	  two	  days,	  but	  it	  
turned	  out	  to	  be	  was	  extremely	  brief.	  	  Thereafter,	  Clinton	  and	  Jiang	  talked	  over	  the	  
phone	   twice.	   	   Clinton	   promised	   to	   deny	   the	   Taiwanese	   President	   Lee	   Teng-­‐hui’s	  
“special	   state-­‐to-­‐state”	   relationship	  with	  PRC	  and	  urged	   the	  resumption	  of	   serious	  
talks.353	  	  This	  occurrence	  on	  the	  international	  level	  helped	  further	  strengthen	  Jiang’s	  
domestic	   position.	   	   In	   turn,	   it	   facilitated	   Jiang’s	   assertion	   on	   WTO	   affairs	   at	   the	  
domestic	   table,	   and	   thus	   benefited	   the	   bilateral	   negotiation.	   	   Sometime	   around	  
October,	   Jiang	   replaced	   Zhu	   as	   the	   head	   of	   LSG	   on	   Finance	   and	   Economy.	   	   Zhu	  
became	  the	  vice	  director	  of	  this	  LSG.	  	  This	  sent	  a	  strong	  signal	  to	  every	  member	  of	  
the	  CPC’s	  Central	  Committee,	  especially	  provincial	  governors.	  
Publications	   aiming	   at	   educating	   the	  mass	   public	   about	   the	  WTO	   began	   to	  
flourish	   on	   the	   market.	   	   Books,	   articles,	   and	   TV	   programs	   shared	   the	   optimistic	  
viewpoint	   that	   the	   WTO	   membership	   will	   boost	   the	   Chinese	   economy,	   and	   that	  
China	   should	   integrate	   into	  globalization	  by	  entering	   into	   the	  WTO.	   	  The	  personal	  
image	  of	  American	  chief	  negotiator	  Charlene	  Barshefsky	  was	  boosted,	  too.	  	  Through	  
TV	  program,	  the	  Chinese	  public	  got	   to	  know	  that	  she	  was	  a	  very	  capable	  attorney,	  
and	   she	   liked	   Chinese	   silk	   scarves.	   	   Allegedly,	   the	   Chinese	   leadership	   ordered	   the	  
media	   to	  avoid	   “sensational”	  and	   “exaggerated”	  coverage	  of	   the	  WTO	  accession.354	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353	  Barshefsky	  confirmed	  that	  “Jiang	  Zemin	  and	  President	  Clinton	  had	  a	  number	  of	  private	  conversations	  in	  
advance	  of	  my	  going	  out	  to	  China.”	  See	  “Online	  Newshour:	  Trade	  Dealer,”	  The	  Newshour	  with	  Jim	  Lehrer,	  PBS,	  
November	  18,	  1999.	  	  




The	  intellectual	  and	  professional	  critique	  was	  confined	  within	  the	  academic	  sphere.	  	  
All	  of	  these	  efforts	  assisted	  to	  increase	  the	  win-­‐set	  on	  the	  China	  side.	  
After	  April,	  Zhu	  was	  significantly	  weakened	  in	  the	  leadership.	   	  Allegedly,	  he	  
tendered	   his	   resignation	   three	   times,	   all	   of	   which	   were	   rejected.	   	   Although	   Zhu	  
stayed	  in	  his	  position	  as	  premier,	  he	  appeared	  to	  exercise	  less	  authority	  in	  his	  own	  
right.	   	   The	   SOE	   reform	   program,	   which	   occupied	   the	   priority	   of	   his	   agenda,	   was	  
taken	  over	  by	  Vice	  Premier	  Wu	  Bangguo.	   	  For	  Zhu,	  had	   the	  deal	  been	  successfully	  
concluded,	   it	   would	   present	   him	   an	   opportunity	   to	   restore	   his	   domestic	   status,	  
enhance	  his	  standing	  at	  the	  domestic	  level,	  and	  shift	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  favor	  of	  
his	  domestic	  policy	  agenda.	  	  	  
The	  potential	  impact	  of	  an	  international	  deal	  on	  domestic	  politics	  could	  be	  a	  
strong	  motivation.	   	   In	   the	   final	   round	   of	   negotiations,	   Zhu	   appeared	   twice	   at	   the	  
negotiation	  table,	  on	  November	  13	  and	  15.	  	  He	  sat	  down	  and	  personally	  engaged	  in	  
the	  bilateral	   talks	  with	   the	  Americans.	   	  His	  personal	   intervention	  helped	   the	   talks	  
move	   ahead	   and	   finally	   reach	   a	   successful	   outcome.	   	   This	   time,	   he	   told	   his	  
counterpart	  –	  as	  well	  as	  those	  sitting	  on	  the	  same	  side	  of	  the	  table	  –	  that	  “President	  
Jiang	   asked	   me	   to	   come	   twice,”	   implying	   that	   he	   was	   siding	   with	   Jiang	   and	   had	  
sufficient	  political	  support	  and	  authority.	  	  His	  frequent,	  personal	  involvement	  at	  the	  
international	  negotiation	  table	  for	  a	  successful	  deal	  helped	  restore	  his	  authority	  and	  
facilitated	  the	  improvement	  of	  his	  domestic	  position.	  	  	  
The	   year	  1999	  was	  dramatic.	   	   At	   the	   international	   table,	   the	   two	   countries	  




domestic	   bargaining	   table	   in	   China,	   top-­‐down	   authority	   appeared	   to	   be	   very	  
effective	  for	  decisions	  on	  policy	  initiative.	  	  Nevertheless,	  pro-­‐trade	  leaders’	  domestic	  
position	  were	  hurt	  or	  boosted	  by	  the	  occurrences	  at	  the	  international	  table.	  	  In	  the	  
end,	  at	  urgent	  meetings	  of	  the	  Standing	  Committee	  of	  the	  Politburo	  and	  the	  Standing	  
Committee	  of	  the	  State	  Council,	  held	  respectively	  on	  November	  9	  and	  November	  13,	  
15,	   the	   combined	   efforts	   from	   the	   top	   leaders	   effectively	  marginalized	   and	  muted	  




In	   the	   Communist	   polity	   where	   power	   and	   policy	   are	   intertwined,	   policy	  
initiatives	   can	   be	   used	   to	   pursue	   power	   and	   also	   be	   subordinate	   to	   power	  
competition.	   	   The	   succession	   politics	   had	   great	   impact	   on	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	  
domestic	  bargaining	  table	  for	  the	  GATT/WTO	  accession.	  	  After	  power	  transition	  and	  
consolidation,	   top-­‐down	   authority	   proved	   to	   be	   more	   powerful	   than	   bottom-­‐up	  
authority,	   in	   terms	   of	   policy	   orientation,	   priority	   in	   agenda	   and	   win-­‐set.	   	   No	  
evidence	  indicated	  that	  international	  pressures	  could	  tip	  the	  domestic	  balance	  and	  
influence	   the	   succession	   politics	   in	   China.	   	   However,	   the	   occurrences	   on	   the	  
international	   negotiation	   table	   could	   hurt	   or	   strengthen	   the	   domestic	   position	   of	  
pro-­‐trade	   leaders	   and	   officials,	   expand	   the	   domestic	  win-­‐set	   or	   create	   a	   domestic	  
backlash,	  and	  thus	  impact	  on	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  deal.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Chapter	  6:	   Policy	  Recommendation:	  	  
Threatening	  vs.	  Persuasion	  
	  
In	  Dr.	   I.	  M.	  Destler’s	   thorough	   analysis	   of	   US	   trade	   policy,	   he	   asserted	   that	  
“much	   of	   the	   USTR’s	   energy	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   was	   directed	   to	   what	   critics	   have	  
labeled	   ‘aggressive	   unilateralism’:	   negotiations	   aimed	   at	   opening	   specific	   foreign	  
markets	  under	  threat	  of	  closing	  our	  own.”356	  	  In	  September	  1985,	  President	  Reagan	  
embraced	  a	  more	  aggressive,	  export-­‐oriented	  trade	  policy.	  	  About	  one	  year	  later,	  the	  
Uruguay	   Round	   was	   launched,	   and	   China	   submitted	   its	   application	   for	   the	   GATT	  
membership.	   	   Setting	   aside	   the	   first	   stage	   when	   China’s	   GATT	   application	   was	  
strategically	   attractive	   to	   the	   US	   geopolitical	   calculation	   and	   the	   Chinese	   trade	  
negotiators	  did	  not	  feel	  American	  pressure	  on	  the	  negotiating	  table,	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
bilateral	   negotiation,	   Stages	  Two	   and	  Three	   in	   1990s,	   American	   trade	   negotiators	  
employed	  retaliatory	  threats	  of	  trade	  sanctions	  and	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  most-­‐favored	  
nation	  (MFN)	  status,	  as	  the	  major	  pressure	  tactic,	  to	  force	  market	  opening	  in	  China.	  	  
Based	   on	   the	   detailed	   case	   study	   of	   the	   Chinese	   decision-­‐making	   in	   the	  
bilateral	  negotiation	  presented	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  this	  chapter	  examines	  the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   American	   strategy	   of	   aggressive	   unilateralism	   –	   to	   be	  
specific,	  the	  pressure	  tactics	  of	  retaliatory	  threats	  –	  and	  Chinese	  decision-­‐making	  on	  
concessions.	  	  It	  discusses	  the	  achievements	  and	  limitations	  of	  this	  pressure	  tactic,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  decline	  of	  its	  effectiveness.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  I	  offer	  a	  policy	  recommendation	  
that	   American	   trade	   negotiators	   should	   replace	   retaliatory	   threats	   as	   the	   major	  
tactics	   in	   negotiating	   with	   China	   and	   propose	   that	   the	   US	   pursue	   a	   strategy	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




persuasion	   by	   appealing	   to	   China’s	   self-­‐interest	   in	   achieving	   the	   twin	   US	   goals	   of	  
opening	  foreign	  markets	  and	  strengthening	  the	  global	  trading	  system.	  	  
	  
The	  Achievements	  and	  Limitations	  of	  Retaliatory	  Threats	  	  
	  
Against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   protectionists’	   claim	   that	   foreign	   producers	   and	  
investors	  enjoyed	  easy	  access	  to	  the	  relatively	  open	  US	  market	  while	  US	  firms	  were	  
denied	   equivalent	   opportunities	   abroad,	   aggressive	   unilateralism,	   one	  may	   argue,	  
would	   allow	   the	   administration	   to	   mobilize	   export	   interests,	   partially	   offset	   the	  
protectionists,	  and	  placate	  the	  Congress.	  	  It	  was	  necessary	  to	  enforce	  and	  strengthen	  
the	  GATT/WTO	  rules	  as	  part	  of	  the	  effort	  to	  fend	  off	  protection	  at	  home.	  	  When	  the	  
US	   negotiators	   have	   been	   aggressive	   in	   pursuing	   unilateral	   liberalization	   in	   areas	  
not	  covered	  by	  the	  GATT	  rules,	  one	  can	  even	  argue	  for	  its	  “justified	  disobedience,”357	  
inasmuch	  as	  the	  US	  assertions	  indeed	  aimed	  at	  strengthening	  the	  GATT,	  rather	  than	  
simply	  seeking	  unilateral	  trade	  concessions.	  	  Reportedly,	  the	  GATT	  Director-­‐General	  
Arthur	   Dunkel	   once	   credited	   US	   unilateralism	   with	   saving	   the	   GATT,	   at	   least	  
temporarily.	  	  	  
In	  opening	  up	   the	  Chinese	  market	   for	  American	  exports	  and	  pushing	  China	  
toward	   the	   rule-­‐based	   global	   trading	   system,	   retaliatory	   threats	   indeed	   had	   some	  
success.	   	   In	   Stage	   Two,	   by	   denouncing	   prison	   labor,	   the	   USTR’s	   annual	   report	   of	  
1991	   tactically	   created	   a	   powerful	   political	   linkage	  between	  China’s	   trade	   surplus	  
and	   its	   violation	   of	   human	   rights	   in	   order	   to	   tackle	   the	   trade	   imbalance.	   	   In	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  Robert	  E.	  Hudec,	  “Thinking	  About	  the	  New	  Section	  301:	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil,”	  in	  J.	  Bhagwati	  and	  H.	  Patrick,	  




November	   1991,	   the	   USTR	   threatened	   to	   impose	   $1.5	   billion	   in	   trade	   sanctions	  
should	  China	  fail	  to	  improve	  its	  intellectual	  property	  protection.	  	  In	  August	  1992,	  the	  
USTR	   initiated	  a	   regular	  Section	  301	  case	  against	  China	  and	  published	  a	  hit	   list	  of	  
$3.9	  billion	  of	  Chinese	  exports	  for	  possible	  retaliation.	  	  
Facing	  these	  three	  threats,	  China	  tried	  to	  bypass	  the	  US	  on	  multilateral	  talks	  
or	   even	   threatened	   counter-­‐retaliation	   against	   $4	   billion	   of	   US	   exports,	   yet	   it	  
decided	   to	   yield	   to	   American	   demands	   –	   interestingly	   all	   in	   the	   year	   of	   1992.	  	  
Typically,	   threats	   succeed	  when	   the	   perceived	   economic	   and	  political	   costs	   to	   the	  
target	   country	  of	   complying	  with	   a	  demand	  are	   lower	   than	   the	  perceived	   costs	  of	  
defiance. 358 	  	   The	   growing	   trade	   volume	   and	   trade	   surplus	   against	   the	   US	  
demonstrated	   the	   dependence	   of	   China’s	   exports	   on	   the	  US	  market.	   	   The	   political	  
cost	  of	   compliance	  was	  once	   significantly	  high	  due	   to	   the	  political	   reshuffle	   in	   the	  
top	  leadership	  after	  Tiananmen	  Square,	  but	  the	  balance	  between	  two	  factions	  of	  CPC	  
tilted	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  reformists	  in	  1992.	  	  As	  detailed	  in	  Chapter	  V,	  Deng’s	  inspection	  
trip	   to	   South	   China	   rallied	   support	   from	  provincial	   and	   local	   government	   leaders.	  	  
Those	  who	  took	  conservative	  position	  at	   the	  center	  yielded	  to	  this	  campaign.	   	  The	  
liberal	   economic	   policy	   regained	   its	  momentum.	   	   Therefore,	   the	   political	   costs	   of	  
compliance	   were	   significantly	   reduced,	   and	   those	   who	   supported	   trade	  
liberalization	  in	  the	  Chinese	  bureaucracy	  were	  able	  to	  work	  on	  negotiating	  deals.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358	  Analyses	  of	  the	  elements	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  William	  R.	  Cline,	  Reciprocity:	  A	  New	  
Approach	  to	  World	  Trade	  Policy?	  (Policy	  Analyses	  in	  International	  Economics),	  (Washington:	  Institute	  for	  
International	  Economics,	  1982);	  John	  McMillan,	  “Strategic	  Bargaining	  and	  Section	  301,”	  in	  Jagdish	  Bhagwati	  and	  
Hugh	  T.	  Patrick,	  Aggressive	  Unilateralism:	  America’s	  301	  Trade	  Policy	  and	  the	  World	  Trading	  System,	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  




The	  critical	  elements	  in	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  these	  negotiations	  were,	  on	  
one	  side,	  the	  value	  that	  China	  placed	  on	  maintaining	  access	  to	  the	  US	  market	  and,	  on	  
the	  other,	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  US	  threat	  to	  retaliate,	  which	  was	  strong	  in	  the	  early	  
1990s.	   	  The	  American	  side	  was	  united	  when	  import-­‐competing	  companies,	   injured	  
by	  cheap	  Chinese	  products,	   cried	   for	  a	   tough	  position	   in	  early	  1990s.	   	  After	  China	  
lost	  strategic	  attraction	  to	  American	  foreign	  policy	  on	  the	  international	  stage,	  both	  
the	   American	   executive	   branch	   and	   the	   US	   Congress	   were	   no	   longer	   willing	   to	  
tolerate	  trade	  policies	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  foreign	  policy	  goals.	   	  At	  this	  time,	  it	  was	  easy	  
for	  the	  US	  negotiators	  to	  convince	  their	  Chinese	  counterparts	  that	  their	  hands	  were	  
so	  tied.	  	  The	  US	  negotiators	  and	  their	  political	  supporters	  were	  so	  united	  that	  their	  
retaliatory	  threats	  were	  highly	  credible.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  Tiananmen	  Square	  incident	  
in	  1989	  sent	  an	  astonishing	  surprise	  to	  the	  international	  community.	   	  The	  Chinese	  
decision	  makers	  understood	  the	  high	  probability	  that	  trade	  sanctions	  would	  actually	  
be	  imposed	  if	  negotiations	  were	  to	  break	  down.	  	  	  
In	  this	  second	  stage,	  the	  American	  threats	  of	  trade	  sanctions	  possessed	  great	  
credibility	   and	   achieved	   conspicuous	   success	   in	   reaching	   a	   series	   of	   agreements	  
with	   China.	   	   Nevertheless,	   it	   depends	   on	   how	   success	   is	   defined	   and	   on	   the	   time	  
span	   we	   are	   looking	   at.	   	   Unlike	   many	   scholars	   who	   define	   the	   conclusion	   of	   an	  
agreement	   as	   a	   success	   case,	   Thomas	   Bayard	   and	   Kimberly	   Elliot	   believed	   that	  
conclusion	  of	  an	  agreement	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  call	  an	  outcome	  a	  negotiating	  success.	  	  




least	   partially	   achieved.359	  	   Although	   China	   agreed	   to	   join	   the	   Berne	   Copyright	  
Convention	   and	   the	  Geneva	  Phonograms	  Convention	   and	  promised	   to	   improve	   its	  
regulatory	   protection	   for	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   (IPR),	   the	   two	   scholars	  
categorized	   this	   application	   of	   retaliatory	   threats	   as	   failure	   or	   nominal	   success,	  
given	  the	  poor	  implementation	  of	   intellectual	  property	  protection	  in	  the	  few	  years	  
to	  follow.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  improvement	  in	  IPR	  law	  enforcement	  years	  later	  when	  
the	   Chinese	   companies	   started	   to	   apply	   for	   patents	   suggests	   that	   a	   relatively	  
vulnerable	  country	  engages	  in	  substantial	  and	  widespread	  liberalization	  only	  when	  
their	  policymakers	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  in	  their	  interests	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  
If	   we	   look	   beyond	   the	   second	   stage,	   the	   temporary	   suspension	   of	   1992	  
market	  access	  agreement	  in	  the	  third	  stage	  of	  bilateral	  negotiation	  may	  be	  a	  better	  
example.	  	  After	  China’s	  attempt	  to	  join	  the	  GATT	  before	  the	  end	  of	  1994	  and	  become	  
a	  founding	  member	  of	  the	  WTO	  failed,	  China	  felt	  that	  the	  US	  reneged	  on	  its	  written	  
promise	   to	   “staunchly	   support”	   China’s	   GATT	   application,	   and	   it	   suspended	   the	  
1992	  market	  access	  agreement.	  	  In	  response,	  the	  Clinton	  Administration	  threatened	  
to	   impose	  over	  $1	  billion	   in	   trade	   sanction.	   	  China	   threatened	   to	   counter-­‐retaliate	  
against	   a	  number	  of	  US	  exporters	  and	  US	  companies	   that	  were	   trying	   to	  establish	  
subsidiaries	  in	  China.	   	  Fear	  of	  US	  retaliation	  may	  squeeze	  out	  marginal	  compliance	  
or	  promises	  of	  China,	  but	  those	  concessions	  were	  held	  out	  with	  one	  hand	  and	  taken	  
back	  with	  the	  other.	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American	   retaliatory	   threats	   served	   as	   a	   crowbar	   to	   force	   China’s	   market	  
opening.	   	   In	   liberalizing	   China’s	   highly	   restrictive	   trade	   regime,	   US	   unilateral	  
demands	  worked	   effectively	   on	   readily	   identified,	   specific	   barriers,	   such	   as	   tariffs	  
and	  quotas.	   	  With	  domestic	  support	  for	  tariff	  reduction	  inside	  the	  bureaucracy	  (i.e.	  
the	   General	   Administration	   of	   Customs),	   China	   reduced	   tariffs	   various	   times	   in	  
Stages	   Two	   and	   Three.	   	   Regarding	   the	   broader,	   less	   easily	   defined	   or	   more	  
subjective	   barriers,	   such	   as	   administrative	   and	   regulatory	   impediments	   to	   trade,	  
American	   threats	   showed	   effectiveness	   in	   concluding	   agreements	   when	   China’s	  
domestic	  politics	  allowed.	   	  Nevertheless,	  both	  the	  lack	  of	  IPR	  law	  enforcement	  and	  
the	   temporary	   suspension	   of	   the	   1992	   market	   access	   agreement	   afterwards	  
highlighted	   the	   limitations	   of	   bilateral	   trade	   negotiations	   based	   on	   unilateral	  
demands	  backed	  by	  retaliatory	  threats.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Decline	  of	  Retaliatory	  Threats’	  Effectiveness	  
	  
The	   tactical	   mechanisms	   analyzed	   in	   the	   literature	   often	   follow	   Thomas	  
Schelling’s	  The	  Strategy	  of	  Conflict	  in	  focusing	  on	  the	  role	  of	  commitment	  in	  making	  
a	  threat	  credible.360	  	   John	  Odell	  has	  formulated	  two	  key	  hypotheses	  regarding	  how	  
domestic	   politics	   affects	   bargaining	   outcomes:	   First,	   within	   the	   target	   nation,	   the	  
greater	  the	  net	  internal	  political	  cost	  of	  compliance	  for	  the	  executive,	  relative	  to	  net	  
internal	  political	  cost	  of	  no-­‐agreement,	  the	  less	  likely	  the	  target	  government	  will	  be	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  such	  as	  Catherine	  L.	  Mann,	  “Protection	  and	  Retaliation:	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  the	  “Rules	  of	  the	  Game,”	  Brookings	  
Papers	  on	  Economic	  Activity,	  Vol.	  1987,	  No.1.	  (1987),	  pp	  311-­‐335.	  	  See	  also	  Alan	  O.	  Skyes,	  “Mandatory	  Retaliation	  
for	  Breach	  of	  Trade	  Agreements:	  Some	  Thoughts	  on	  the	  Strategic	  Design	  of	  Section	  301,”	  Boston	  University	  




to	  accept	  agreement	  on	  the	  terms	  demanded.	  	  Second,	  within	  the	  threatening	  nation,	  
the	   greater	   the	   internal	   opposition	   to	   carrying	   out	   a	   threat,	   the	   lower	   the	  
credibility.361	  	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  more	  united	  are	   interests	   in	   the	  US	  negotiators,	  
the	   easier	   the	   US	   negotiators	   can	   convince	   their	   Chinese	   counterparts	   that	   their	  
hands	  are	   so	   tied	  with	   respect	   to	   retaliation,	   the	  more	  credible	   retaliatory	   threats	  
will	  be.	  
On	   the	   side	   of	   the	   power	   recipient,	   the	   higher	   the	   political	   costs	   of	  
compliance	  in	  China,	  the	  lower	  the	  likelihood	  of	  getting	  an	  agreement	  satisfactory	  to	  
the	  US.	   	  As	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	  V,	   the	  Chinese	   succession	  politics	   at	   the	  very	   top	  
level	   was	   never	   affected	   by	   the	   international	   trade	   negotiations,	   yet	   American	  
pressure,	  especially	   retaliatory	   threats,	  may	  hurt	   the	  pro-­‐trade	  Chinese	  officials	  at	  
the	   working	   level.	   	   Those	   Chinese	   bureaucrats	   who	   sat	   across	   the	   international	  
negotiation	   table	  were	   in	   general	   pro-­‐trade	   and	   pro-­‐liberalization,	   relative	   to	   the	  
rest	  of	  Chinese	  bureaucracy.	  	  American	  threats	  and	  retaliation,	  if	  implemented,	  may	  
offer	  chances	  for	  the	  conservatives	  and	  protectionists	  to	  form	  a	  coalition,	  attack	  pro-­‐
trade	   Chinese	   officials,	   and	   promote	   their	   policy	   preference	   under	   the	   name	   of	  
nationalism.	   	   In	   doing	   so,	   they	   increase	   the	   political	   cost	   of	   compliance	   with	  
American	  demands	  in	  China.	  
On	   the	   side	  of	  power	  application,	   the	   third	   stage,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   second	  
stage	  of	  the	  bilateral	  negotiation,	  witnessed	  realignment	  of	  American	  interests	  and	  
the	   decline	   of	   retaliatory	   threat’s	   effectiveness.	   	   In	   early	   1990s,	   import-­‐injured	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American	   firms	  condemned	  cheap	  Chinese	  exports,	  and	  both	   the	  executive	  branch	  
and	  legislative	  branch	  agreed	  to	  take	  a	  tough	  position.	  	  When	  China	  loomed	  large	  for	  
American	  exports	  and	  for	  American	  multinational	  corporations’	  foreign	  investment	  
and	  expansion	  plans,	  a	  pro-­‐trade	  coalition	  was	  initiated	  and	  sustained	  by	  American	  
business.	   	   In	   the	  New	  China	   Lobby,	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   business	   interests,	   including	  
almost	  all	  prominent	  American	  multinational	  firms,	  united	  to	  lobby	  for	  China’s	  MFN	  
status,	  out	  of	   fear	  of	  being	  shut	  out	  of	   the	  Chinese	  market	  and	  big	   losses	   in	   firms’	  
broader	   competitiveness	   in	   East	   Asia.	   	   American	   business	  with	   interests	   in	   China	  
stood	  in	  a	  different	  position	  from	  American	  business	  injured	  by	  Chinese	  exports.	  
The	  US	  government	  was	  no	  longer	  as	  united	  on	  China	  issues	  as	   in	  the	  early	  
1990s.	   	   On	   the	   Hill,	   the	   coalition	   of	   American	   business	   with	   interests	   in	   China	  
worked	   with	   supportive	   legislators	   to	   counter	   balance	   those	   advocates	   for	   the	  
human	   rights	   linkage.	   	   Washington	   State	   Congressman	   Jim	   McDermott	   helped	  
mobilize	  106	  representatives	  to	  sign	  a	  letter	  to	  President	  Clinton	  urging	  for	  China’s	  
MFN	  status	  renewal.	  	  A	  bill	  was	  even	  introduced	  in	  1997	  to	  repeal	  the	  Jackson-­‐Vanik	  
Amendment.	  	  Inside	  the	  executive	  branch,	  Treasury,	  Commerce,	  USTR	  and	  the	  NEC	  
were	  aligned	  with	  business	  against	  State,	  which	  held	  tough	  positions	  on	  the	  human	  
rights	  issue.	  	  	  
On	   China’s	   MFN	   renewal,	   the	   realignment	   of	   the	   American	   government	  
agencies	  and	  the	  division	  of	  American	  commercial	  interests	  significantly	  affected	  the	  
US	  negotiators’	   application	  of	   threatening	  on	   the	  bilateral	  negotiation	   table.	   	  After	  




the	  Chinese	  suspension	  of	  the	  1992	  market	  access	  agreement,	  China	  threatened	  to	  
counter-­‐retaliate	  against	  US	  exporters	  and	  US	  companies	  which	  were	  applying	   for	  
establishing	  subsidiaries	  to	  the	  Chinese	  government.	   	  The	  US	  negotiators	  fell	  short	  
of	   saying	   that	   China	   was	   not	   complying	   with	   the	   1992	   agreement	   and	   tactically	  
chose	  to	  claim	  that	  China	  did	  not	  “comply	  with	  some	  important	  aspects.”362	  	  At	  the	  
same	  time,	  the	  US-­‐China	  Eight-­‐Point	  Agreement	  was	  reached	  to	  end	  the	  enmity.	  	  
On	   top	   of	   the	   divide	   in	   the	   American	   political	   arena	   against	   China,	   the	  
difference	   in	   the	   informational	   channel	   between	   the	   two	   countries	   enlarged	   its	  
impact	  on	  the	  bilateral	  negotiation.	  	  In	  a	  democracy	  such	  as	  the	  US,	  the	  media	  enjoys	  
the	   freedom	   to	   scoop	   out	   the	   different	   opinions	   inside	   the	   US	   government	   and	  
reveal	  various	  positions	  of	  American	  commercial	  interests.	  	  The	  Chinese	  perception	  
about	  American	  demands	  was	  formed	  based	  on	  the	  US	  negotiators’	  offerings	  as	  well	  
as	  American	  news	  reports.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  information	  sent	  by	  Chinese	  negotiators	  
and	  by	  Chinese	  news	  reports	  was	  harmonized	  after	  internal	  coordination.	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  information	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  Chinese	  negotiator	  received	  
different	   information	   about	   American	   positions.	   	   When	   American	   demands	  
presented	   at	   the	   international	   negotiating	   table	  were	   different	   from	   the	   positions	  
argued	  by	  some	  commercial	   interests	   in	  the	  American	  media,	   it	  had	   impact	  on	  the	  
progress	  of	  bilateral	  talks	  and	  reduced	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  American	  threats.	  	  When	  
the	   USTR	   threatened	   trade	   sanctions,	   the	   Chinese	   read	   about	   some	   American	  
commercial	   interests’	   position	   papers,	   their	   testimony	   at	   published	   congressional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




hearings,	   and	   American	   politicians’	   open	   debate	   and	   criticism	   on	   its	   own	   tough	  
position	   or	   on	   protectionism.	   	   Thanks	   to	   these	   different	   voices,	   China	   received	  
mixed	  signals	  about	  American	  demands,	  which	  significantly	  reduced	  the	  credibility	  
of	   these	   retaliatory	   threats.	   	   The	   Chinese	   perceived	   that	   they	   had	   natural	   allies	  
within	  the	  American	  domestic	  political	  arena	  and	  business	  communities.	  	  At	  a	  White	  
House	   briefing	   after	   Clinton	   backed	   out	   the	   deal	   during	   Zhu’s	   state	   visit	   in	   April	  
1999,	  the	  standing	  ovation	  Amb.	  Barshefsky	  received	  became	  an	  important	  signal	  to	  
the	  Chinese	  that	  Clinton	  was	  being	  criticized	  for	  passing	  up	  a	  good	  deal.	  	  Thereafter,	  
when	  American	  negotiators	  tried	  to	  get	  more	  out	  of	  the	  last	  round	  of	  bilateral	  talks,	  
the	  Chinese	  were	  able	   to	   stand	   tight	   and	   refuse,	  which	  also	   indicated	   that	  China’s	  
understanding	   about	   American	   politics	   had	   increased.	   	   On	   the	   flip	   side,	  when	   the	  
USTR	  wanted	   to	   conclude	   a	   deal,	   the	   different	   voices	   raising	   questions	   about	   the	  
deal	  released	  by	  the	  news	  media	  might	  shatter	  the	  Chinese	  confidence	  to	  step	  up	  its	  
efforts.	  	  	  
On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  international	  negotiating	  table,	  the	  Chinese	  voices	  were	  
harmonized,	  at	   least	   in	  1990s.	   	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  IV,	   the	  major	  companies	  in	  
every	  industry	  were	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (SOEs),	  which	  were	  controlled	  by	  each	  
industrial	  ministry,	   so	   each	   industry	  was	   aligned	  with	   their	   supervising	   industrial	  
ministry	   regarding	   specific	   issue-­‐topics.	   	   Therefore,	   internal	   lobbying	   between	  
industries	  and	  ministries	  happened	  between	  business	  leaders,	  who	  were	  generally	  
subordinates,	   and	   officials	   in	   the	   industry	   ministries,	   who	   were	   their	   supervisor.	  	  
Unlike	  the	  lobbying	  in	  the	  US,	  where	  varying	  voices	  of	  every	  industry	  can	  be	  heard	  




their	  positions	   to	   the	   supervising	  ministries	  when	   the	  business	   leaders	   conducted	  
work	   reports	   or	   made	   informal	   communication.	   	   The	   various	   voices	   of	   major	  
industrial	   players,	   which	   were	   extension	   organizations	   of	   the	   government,	   were	  
actually	  different	  opinions	  within	  the	  government.	  	  	  
The	   three-­‐tier	   decision-­‐making	   structure	   coordinated	   and	   harmonized	  
different	   opinions	   during	   the	   bilateral	   talks,	   detailed	   in	   Chapter	   IV.	   	   Different	  
positions	   of	   various	   commissions	   and	   ministries	   went	   through	   the	   State	   Council	  
Committee	  on	  Inter-­‐Ministerial	  Coordination	  on	  GATT/WTO,	  up	  to	  the	  vice	  premier	  
in	   charge	   of	   economic	   affairs	   or	   Premier	   Working	   Meeting,	   and	   if	   necessary,	  
eventually	   up	   to	   the	   CPC’s	   Central	   Committee	   Finance	   and	   Economic	   Leadership	  
Small	  Group.	  	  Most	  domestic	  bargaining	  occurred	  between	  industrial	  ministries	  and	  
pro-­‐trade	   agencies	   at	   the	   lowest	   level	   in	   this	   structure.	   	   After	   coordination	   at	  
different	  levels	  of	  forums,	  decisions	  were	  made	  and	  sent	  from	  the	  upper	  level	  forum	  
back	   to	   the	   lower	   level	   for	   the	   MOFTEC	   to	   implement.	   	   Therefore,	   what	   was	  
presented	   to	   American	   negotiators	  were	   harmonized	   bargaining	   positions.	   	   Given	  
that	  the	  news	  agency	  and	  major	  news	  outlets	  were	  also	  extension	  organizations	  of	  
the	   Chinese	   government,	   which	   emphasized	   solidarity,	   the	   propaganda’s	   news	  
reports	  reflected	  the	  coordinated	  positions.	  	  Allegedly,	  right	  before	  the	  conclusion	  of	  
the	   bilateral	   agreement,	   “sensational”	   and	   “exaggerated”	   coverage	   of	   the	   WTO	  
accession	  was	  prohibited.363	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




In	   contrast	   with	   threats	   sent	   by	   a	   democratic,	   weak	   government,	   a	   strong	  
government,	  which	  could	  decide	  for	  the	  SOEs’	  operation,	  unify	  the	  internal	  different	  
opinions,	   and	   determine	   the	   media’s	   reports,	   could	   send	   retaliatory	   threats	   with	  
high	  credibility.	   	  When	   the	  1992-­‐1994	  MFN	  campaign	  succeeded	  and	   the	  bilateral	  
talks	  moved	   into	   the	   third	   stage,	   the	   Chinese	   perception	  was	   that	   the	   retaliatory	  
threats	   of	   trade	   sanction	   sent	   by	   American	   trade	   negotiators	   were	   not	   as	   highly	  
credible	   as	   the	   Chinese	   threats.	   	   American	   threats	   appeared	   not	   as	   forceful	   or	  
effective	  as	  those	  announced	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  
	  
The	  Success:	  Persuasion	  with	  Tying	  Hands	  by	  Congressional	  Pressure	  
	  
As	   Jean	  Monnet,	   father	  of	   the	  European	  Union,	   remarked,	   “If	  negotiators	  sit	  
on	  opposite	  sides	  of	   the	  table	  and	  repeat	   their	   long-­‐held	  positions,	   they	  will	   fail.	   If	  
they	  sit	  on	  the	  same	  side	  of	  the	  table,	  and	  put	  the	  problems	  on	  the	  other	  side,	  they	  
can	   succeed.”	  	   In	   the	   third	   stage	   of	   Sino-­‐American	   trade	   negotiation	   when	   the	  
effectiveness	   of	   retaliatory	   threats	   declined,	   the	   US	   negotiators	   began	   more	   and	  
more	   to	   persuade	   their	   Chinese	   counterparts	   by	   appealing	   to	   China’s	   self-­‐interest	  
and	   tying	   their	   own	   hands	   by	   congressional	   pressure.	   	   These	   less	   antagonistic	  
strategies	  allowed	  their	  Chinese	  counterparts	  more	  room	  to	  work	  toward	  the	  pro-­‐
trade	  policy	  direction	  at	  the	  internal	  coordination	  process	  and	  provided	  them	  more	  
credibility	  when	  they	  conducted	  negotiations	  at	  the	  domestic	  level.	  	  
In	  Chapter	  IV,	  a	  study	  of	  the	  power	  balance	  between	  the	  leaders	  sitting	  on	  the	  




trade	   negotiators	   to	   “sit	   on	   the	   same	   side	   of	   the	   table”	   as	   the	   Chinese	   and	  
understand	   the	   timing	  of	  major	  Chinese	   concessions	  made	  during	   the	  negotiation.	  	  
In	  the	  power	  game	  between	  top-­‐down	  authority	  and	  bottom-­‐up	  authority,	  when	  no	  
clear	   or	   unified	   signal	   is	   sent	   out	   from	   the	   top,	   the	   bureaucrats	   tend	   to	   take	  
advantage	  of	   the	  uncertainty	   in	   the	  domestic	  political	  arena	  and	  hold	  out	   for	   their	  
own	   organizations’	   interests.	   	   This,	   in	   turn,	   increases	   the	   political	   costs	   of	  
concessions	  to	  American	  demands	  for	  the	  top	  executives	  relative	  to	  no-­‐agreement,	  
as	  happened	  in	  the	  year	  of	  1994.	  	  After	  the	  completion	  of	  power	  consolidation,	  the	  
balance	   of	   power	   tilts	   toward	   the	   top-­‐down	   authority	   because	   leaders	   have	  more	  
leverage	  over	  their	  subordinates	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  they	  can	  send	  out	  a	  unified	  signal.	  	  
Furthermore,	  after	  the	  top	  leadership	  comes	  to	  consensus,	  they	  can	  restructure	  the	  
bureaucracy	   by	   administration	   turnover	   or	   hold	   enlarged	   Politburo	   meetings	   in	  
their	  favor	  by	  controlling	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee.	  	  
No	  evidence	  has	  indicated	  that	  the	  Chinese	  succession	  politics	  at	  the	  very	  top	  
level	  was	  ever	  affected	  by	  the	  international	  trade	  negotiations,	  as	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  V.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   observed	   that	   major	   concessions	   always	   occurred	   after	   power	  
consolidation	   was	   completed	   and	   the	   top	   leadership	   could	   overpower	   the	  
bureaucracy.	   	   After	   Deng	  mounted	   the	   paramount	   position	   in	   the	   leadership	   and	  
placed	  liberal-­‐minded	  bureaucrats	  in	  posts	  in	  the	  1980s,	  China	  sent	  out	  signals	  that	  
it	   was	   willing	   to	   become	   part	   of	   the	   global	   trading	   net.	   	   Immediately	   after	   Deng	  
succeeded	  in	  rallying	  a	  campaign	  in	  1992	  for	  development	  of	  the	  market	  economy	  
and	   readjusted	   the	   policy	   direction	   of	   the	   country,	   China	   made	   a	   few	   major	  




bilateral	   talks	   resumed.	   	   By	   1998,	   Jiang	   had	   outmaneuvered	   his	   rivals	   and	  
consolidated	  power	  as	  the	  first	  among	  equals	  in	  the	  top	  collective	  leadership.	  	  Then	  
the	   bilateral	   negotiation	   achieved	   substantial	   progress	   and	   eventually	   moved	   to	  
completion.	  	  
An	   investigation	   of	   organizations’	   bargaining	   power	   inside	   the	   Chinese	  
bureaucracy	   is	   helpful,	   for	   it	   assists	   in	   understanding	   the	   natural	   allies	   on	   the	  
Chinese	   side	   and	   selecting	   issue-­‐topics	  where	  American	  pressure	   can	  be	   effective.	  	  
As	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  IV,	   inside	  the	  Chinese	  internal	  decision	  structure	  –	  tiers	  of	  
forums	   for	   discussion,	   negotiation,	   coordination,	   and	   decision,	   organizational	  
players’	   bargaining	   power	   was	   not	   equal.	   	   Ministries	   acted	   as	   representatives	   of	  
industries	   under	   their	   supervision	   and	  bargained	   for	   the	   industries’	   interests,	   but	  
their	   bargaining	   powers	   were	   not	   equal.	   	   Because	   Chinese	   policy	   preference	   has	  
created	   a	   rich	   industry	   and	   poor	   agriculture	   system,	   heavy	   industry	   has	   more	  
political	   influence	   than	   light	   industry,	   and	   light	   industry	   higher	   status	   than	  
agriculture.	   	   The	   structural	   weakness	   of	   agriculture	   that	   was	   displayed	   at	   the	  
domestic	  bargaining	   table	  partially	  revealed	   that	  American	  pressure	  on	   this	   issue-­‐
topic	  would	  meet	  less	  Chinese	  resistance	  on	  the	  international	  negotiation	  table	  than	  
the	   others,	   and	   vice	   versa.	   	   Both	   occasions	   –	   the	   incorporation	   of	   agricultural	  
produce	   in	   the	   1992	   market	   access	   agreement	   and	   entry	   into	   agriculture	   side-­‐
agreement	  immediately	  when	  Clinton	  backed	  out	  of	  the	  deal	  during	  Zhu’s	  state	  visit	  
in	   1999	   –	   indicated	   that	   China	   has	   been	   susceptible	   to	   American	   demands	   on	  




Understanding	   of	   the	   dynamics	   of	   Chinese	   domestic	   politics	   and	   structural	  
strength	   or	   weakness	   of	   different	   organizations	   will	   provide	   important	   aid	   and	  
input	  when	  American	   trade	   negotiators	   decide	   on	   the	   timing	   of	   pressure	   and	   the	  
issue-­‐topics	  to	  pursue.	   	  American	  power	  tended	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  pressuring	  China	  
at	   the	   time	   when	   China’s	   reform-­‐minded	   top	   leaders	   have	   completed	   power	  
consolidation,	   and	   on	   the	   issue-­‐topics,	   of	   which	   the	   relevant	   industries	   and	  
ministries	   possess	   weak	   bargaining	   power	   in	   the	   Chinese	   bureaucracy.	   	   On	   the	  
contrary,	   China	   did	   not	   yield	   to	  American	  pressure	  when	   it	  was	   in	   the	   process	   of	  
consolidating	  powers	  at	  the	  very	  top	  level.	  	  Even	  after	  China	  made	  compromises	  at	  
the	   international	   negotiating	   table,	   heavy	   industries	   were	   financially	   affluent	   and	  
politically	   capable	   enough	   to	   initiate	   plans,	   trying	   to	   protect	   their	   profits	   and	  
interests.	  	  	  
In	   the	   1990s,	   among	   trade	   negotiations	   with	   various	   countries,	   the	   USTR	  
prioritized	   the	   China	   deal	   at	   the	   right	   time,	   when	   the	   Chinese	   top	   leaders	   were	  
willing	  and	  able	  to	  coordinate	  their	  subordinate	  bureaucrats,	  make	  compromises	  to	  
American	   pressure,	   and	   steer	   China	   toward	  more	   openness.	   	   For	   such	   a	   complex	  
bilateral	   agreement,	   the	   USTR	   had	   inevitably	   to	   tackle	   difficult	   issue-­‐topics	   and	  
confront	  China’s	  bureaucratic	  resistance	  passed	  by	  the	  Chinese	  negotiators.	  	  To	  their	  




threats	   and	   tactically	   replaced	   it	   with	   persuasion	   by	   appeal	   to	   self-­‐interest,	   an	  
argument	  tactic	  high	  in	  the	  list	  of	  effectiveness.364	  	  	  
Appeal	  to	  self-­‐interest	  is	  one	  of	  the	  two	  argument	  tactics	  useful	  to	  negotiate	  
with	   bounded	   rational	   agents.	   	   According	   to	   advanced	   research	   about	  
argumentation	  and	  negotiation	  in	  artificial	  intelligence,	  in	  order	  for	  an	  argument	  to	  
be	  effective,	  it	  must	  address	  beliefs	  and	  intentions	  of	  the	  counterpart.365	  	  The	  beliefs	  
of	   American	   negotiators	   about	   the	   Chinese	   –	   in	   particular,	   the	   type	   of	   agent	   the	  
Chinese	  are	  believed	  to	  be	  –	  can	  be	  used	  as	  guidelines	  for	  argument	  generation	  and	  
tactics	  selection.	  	  As	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  III	  and	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  IV,	  China	  should	  
be	   regarded	   as	   a	   bounded	   rational	   agent	   on	   the	   international	   stage,	   although	   the	  
Chinese	  understanding	  about	  American	  politics	  and	  global	  trading	  net,	  among	  other	  
things,	   has	   been	   rapidly	   improving.	   	  When	   American	   negotiators	   believe	   that	   the	  
Chinese,	  their	  opponent	  agent,	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  all	  the	  implications	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  
they	   are	   not	   aware	   of	   their	   self-­‐interests	   and	   they	   have	   limited	   knowledge,	   an	  
appeal	  to	  self-­‐interest	  is	  appropriate	  and	  useful.	  
This	   is	   indeed	   what	   happened	   in	   the	   third	   stage	   of	   bilateral	   negotiation.	  	  
When	  China	   failed	   to	   join	   the	  GATT	  at	   the	   last	  minute,	   it	  was	  uncertain	  about	   the	  
difference	  between	  the	  WTO	  and	  GATT,	  hesitated	  about	  its	  impact	  on	  bilateral	  talks	  
and	  on	  its	  economy,	  and	  even	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  not	  seek	  to	  resume	  the	  talk.	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  Kraus,	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  and	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  1998):	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  weakest	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  threat;	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  reward;	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  an	  appeal	  to	  self-­‐interest;	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  an	  
appeal	  to	  past	  promise;	  (5)	  a	  counterexample;	  and	  (6)	  an	  appeal	  to	  prevailing	  practice.	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In	  order	  to	  vividly	  explain	  what	  China	  should	  do	  to	  achieve	  WTO	  entry,	  Barshefsky	  
drew	  and	  displayed	   a	   nine-­‐step	   roadmap	   to	  Wu	  Yi,	   the	  Chinese	   state	   councilor	   in	  
charge	  of	   trade.366	  	  This	  move	   to	   “generate	   the	   list	   of	   actions,	   the	  plan,	  which	  will	  
lead	   from	   the	   current	  world	   state	   to	   a	   state	  which	   satisfies	   the	   opponent	   agent’s	  
selected	  desire”367	  sent	  a	  strong	  signal	  of	  encouragement	  as	  well	  as	  information	  for	  
education	   purpose.	   	   Certainly,	   “this	   can	   be	   done	   using	   your	   own	   planning	  
procedure.”368	  	  	  
As	   Putnam	   pointed	   out,	   when	   negotiators	   conduct	   bargaining	   at	   the	  
international	   level,	   they	   should	   always	   be	   attentive	   to	   what	   is	   on	   the	   domestic	  
negotiation	  table.	  	  To	  her	  credit,	  Amb.	  Barshefsky	  correctly	  sensed	  that	  Premier	  Zhu	  
was	   deeply	   concerned	   about	   the	   SOE	   reform	   plan	   and	   wanted	   to	   improve	   the	  
performance	   of	   SOEs,	   which	   had	   already	   incurred	   an	   egregious	   amount	   of	   non-­‐
performing	  loans	  with	  banks.	  	  She	  repeatedly	  told	  Zhu	  the	  following	  rationale:	  trade	  
liberalization	  would	  bring	  foreign	  products	  and	  foreign	  companies	  to	  China;	  foreign	  
competition	   would	   exert	   pressure	   on	   Chinese	   companies,	   mainly	   SOEs;	   the	  
noncompetitive	  SOEs	  would	  be	  revived	  when	  they	  could	  learn	  efficient	  management	  
and	  operation	  from	  foreign	  companies	  and	  compete	  to	  survive	  in	  market	  economy.	  	  
This	   strategic	   linkage	   between	   trade	   liberalization	   and	   improvement	   of	   SOEs’	  
competitiveness	   occurred	   right	   on	   time,	   when	   Zhu’s	   SOE	   reform	   plan	   was	   in	  
difficulty.	   	  Zhu	  was	  confronted	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  impediments	  and	  questions	  from	  SOEs	  
in	  powerful	  industries	  and	  ministries.	  	  This	  linkage	  tactics	  presented	  an	  opportunity	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  interview	  with	  the	  American	  interviewee,	  No.	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  in	  2008.	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  Sycara,	  and	  Evenchik,	  “Reaching	  Agreements	  Through	  Argumentation:	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  Model	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Implementation,”	  p36.	  




for	   him	   to	   tie	   his	   hands	   by	   foreign	   pressure	   in	   front	   of	   those	   opposing	   his	   SOEs	  
reform.	   	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   correct	   discovery	   of	   the	   counterpart’s	   self-­‐interest	   and	  
strategic	  linkage	  between	  this	  and	  trade	  liberalization	  proved	  to	  be	  very	  persuasive	  
and	  effective.	  	  
In	   addition,	  when	  President	   Clinton	  decided	   to	   back	   out	   of	   the	  deal	   during	  
Zhu’s	  state	  visit	  in	  April	  1999,	  he	  presented	  options	  to	  Zhu.	  	  The	  first	  one	  was	  to	  sign	  
the	  deal	  when	  Zhu	  was	  in	  Washington,	  but	  the	  estimation	  was	  that	   it	  would	  fail	   in	  
Congress,	   so	   would	   the	   Permanent	   Normal	   Trade	   Relations	   (PNTR).	   	   The	   second	  
option	   was	   to	   put	   off	   the	   deal	   for	   a	   short	   period	   of	   time	   in	   order	   to	   make	   the	  
President	   look	   strong	   and	   tough.	   	   In	   turn,	   it	  would	  help	   sell	   the	  deal	   in	  Congress.	  	  
Clinton	   claimed	   that	   the	   second	   one	   would	   be	   political	   viable,	   helpful	   to	   the	  
congressional	   ratification,	  and	  beneficial	   to	   the	  deal	  and	  bilateral	   relationship.	   	  He	  
also	  assured	  Zhu	  that	  he	  would	  do	  everything	  imaginable	  to	  get	  it,	  if	  Zhu	  opted	  the	  
second	  one.369	  	  Although	   it	   is	  known,	   in	  hindsight,	   that	   this	  estimate	  was	  wrong,	  a	  
sincere	   persuasion	   from	   a	   leader	   of	   the	   superpower,	   with	   a	   plan	   to	   address	   the	  
Chinese	   self-­‐interests,	   could	   be	   powerful	   and	   effective.	   	   Besides,	   China’s	   limited	  
knowledge	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  US	  Congress,	  which	  affected	  Zhu’s	  judgment	  at	  
that	  time,	  has	  been	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  its	  Achilles	  heel.	  	  
Furthermore,	   a	   party’s	   bargaining	   strategy	   will	   also	   be	   affected	   by	   its	  
perceived	   vulnerability	   to	   retaliation	   or	   counter-­‐retaliation.	   	   Not	   only	   did	   the	  
features	   and	   occurrences	   of	   China’s	   domestic	   political	   landscape	   have	   impact	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




American	  trade	  negotiators’	  selection	  of	  negotiation	  strategies,	  but	  also	  the	  Chinese	  
perception.	  	  China	  understood	  that	  it	  could	  push	  American	  exporters	  by	  temporarily	  
suspending	   the	   market	   access	   agreement	   and	   prod	   American	   multinational	  
corporations	   by	   blocking	   their	   applications	   to	   run	   business	   in	   China,	   and	   it	   could	  
also	   nudge	   a	   few	   US	   Congressmen	   who	   counted	   thousands	   of	   jobs	   in	   their	  
constituencies	  which	  China’s	  big	  buying	  missions	  can	  bring.	  	  Even	  the	  dragon	  slayer	  
President	   Clinton	   looked	   more	   and	   more	   like	   a	   panda	   hugger	   after	   he	   delinked	  
human	  rights	  from	  MFN	  renewal	  and	  talked	  about	  engaging	  China.	  	  However,	  the	  US	  
Congress,	  nothing	  close	  to	  the	  National	  People’s	  Congress,	  is	  always	  a	  very	  difficult	  
subject	   for	   the	   Chinese	   to	   study	   and	   understand,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  most	   formidable	  
obstacle	  in	  the	  American	  political	  landscape	  against	  China.	  	  	  
For	  the	  Beijing	  administration,	  the	  questions	  and	  problems	  from	  US	  Congress	  
were	  constantly	  dreadful,	  which	  could	  date	  back	  to	  the	  “China	  Lobby”	  in	  the	  1950s	  
and	   1960s.370	  	   In	   the	   whole	   decade	   of	   the	   1990s,	   the	   human	   rights	   issues,	   Tibet,	  
Taiwan,	  and	  non-­‐proliferation	  were	  the	  major	  four	  topics,	  with	  which	  the	  Congress	  
repeatedly	  bashed	  China.	   	  After	  China’s	  MFN	  renewal	  was	  tied	  to	   its	  human	  rights	  
record,	   the	   accusation	   and	   censure	   of	   US	   Congress	   became	   annual	   whipping.	   	   To	  
borrow	  a	  phrase	  from	  French	  economist	  Patrick	  Messerlin,	   it	  can	  be	  characterized	  
this	  way:	  The	  Congress	  viewed	  its	  aggressiveness	  as	  a	  way	  to	  push	  China	  to	  follow	  
the	   rules	  of	   the	   international	   communities	  and	   the	  global	   trading	  net,	  while	  China	  
viewed	   its	   participation	   of	   the	   WTO	   as	   a	   way	   of	   restraining	   American	   use	   of	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aggressive	   unilateralism.371	  	   The	   aggressiveness	   of	   US	   Congress	   was	   an	   appalling	  
impediment,	  forcefully	  persuasive	  to	  the	  Chinese.	  	  
In	  the	  third	  stage	  of	  bilateral	  negotiation,	  the	  Congress,	  more	  aggressive	  than	  
the	   executive	   branch,	   gave	   the	   American	   negotiators	   more	   leverage	   on	   the	  
international	  table.	   	  Following	  the	  logics	  of	  Putnam’s	  two-­‐level	  game	  theory,	  losing	  
fast	   track	   in	  1997-­‐98	  undercut	   the	  US	  negotiators’	   deliverability,	   but	   claiming	   the	  
difficulties	  of	  winning	  congressional	  ratification	  provided	   the	  USTR	  a	  smaller	  win-­‐
set	  on	  the	  international	  negotiation	  table,	  which	  American	  trade	  negotiators	  might	  
exploit	  as	  leverage	  to	  enlarge	  the	  Chinese	  win-­‐set.	  
Having	  a	  president	  who	  had	  condemned	  “butchers	  of	  Beijing”	  come	   to	  visit	  
Beijing	  greatly	  increased	  the	  confidence	  about	  the	  bilateral	  deal	  among	  those	  in	  the	  
Chinese	  bureaucracy	  who	  had	  suspicions.	   	  The	  natural	  calculation	  would	  be	  that	   if	  
the	  Clinton	  administration	  wanted	  the	  deal,	   it	  was	  “on	  the	  Chinese	  side,”	  and	  what	  
was	   still	   on	   the	   opposite	   side	   of	   the	   table	   was	   US	   Congress.	   	   In	   March	   1999,	  
Secretary	   of	   Commerce	  William	  Daley’s	   talk	   in	  Beijing	   that	   Clinton	   came	   to	   China	  
against	   150	   congress	   members’	   opinion	   simply	   confirmed	   the	   aggressiveness	   of	  
Congress.	   	   Therefore,	   when	   the	   US	   negotiators	   explained	   to	   their	   Chinese	  
counterparts	  that	  their	  own	  hands	  were	  tied	  due	  to	  congressional	  pressure,	   it	  was	  
persuasive.	  	  The	  fear	  of	  involuntary	  defection	  enticed	  greater	  concession	  from	  China.	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  “To	  the	  US,	  the	  Code	  is	  an	  instrument	  to	  control	  subsidies.	  To	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  World,	  it	  is	  an	  instrument	  to	  
control	  US	  countervailing	  duties.”	  See	  Patrick	  Messerlin,	  "Public	  Subsidies	  to	  Industry	  and	  Agriculture	  and	  
Countervailing	  Duties,"	  (paper	  prepared	  for	  the	  European	  Meeting	  on	  the	  Position	  of	  the	  European	  Community	  




In	   summary,	   I	   argue	   that	   in	  bargaining	  with	  China,	  a	   rising	  power	  about	   to	  
enter	   into	   the	   international	   stage,	  American	   trade	  negotiators	   achieved	   success	   in	  
1999	  by	   correctly	   employing	   the	   two	   strategies.	   	   Facing	   a	  bounded	   rational	   agent	  
across	   the	   international	   negotiating	   table,	   the	   USTR	   made	   a	   timely	   change	   in	  
strategy	  from	  retaliatory	  threats	  to	  persuasion	  by	  appeals	  to	  China’s	  self-­‐interests.	  	  
The	   idea	  spread	  out	  and	  became	  widely	  accepted	   in	  China	   late	  1990s	   that	   foreign	  
competition	   would	  make	   the	   Chinese	   domestic	   companies,	   especially	   SOEs,	   more	  
competitive	  and	  efficient,	  and	  that	  openness	  to	  trade	  was	  the	  way	  to	  achieve	  it.	  	  The	  
USTR	   also	   effectively	   used	   congressional	   pressure	   as	   powerful	   leverage	   to	   tie	   its	  
own	  hands	  and	  convinced	  the	  Chinese	  that	  their	  compliance	  would	  be	  important	  not	  
only	  for	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  bilateral	  deal	  of	  1999,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  congressional	  
ratification	   of	   PNTR	   in	   the	   next	   year.	   	   This	   successful	   combination	   of	   these	   two	  
strategies	   at	   the	   end	   of	   last	   century	   is	   instructive	   and	   will	   demonstrate	   its	  




Exports	   have	   become	   a	   more	   important	   source	   of	   US	   growth,	   and	   the	   US	  
national	   interest	   is	   served	   by	   defending	   the	   market-­‐opening	   principles,	   such	   as	  
national	   treatment	   and	   nondiscrimination.	   	   It	   is	   also	   the	   US’s	   long-­‐term	   goal	   to	  
maintain	  its	  leadership	  of	  the	  international	  trading	  system,	  the	  success	  of	  which	  will	  
depends	  on	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  economic	  superpowers	  to	  uphold	  and	  enforce	  its	  




With	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   WTO	   in	   1995,	   the	   political	   and	   economic	  
calculus	   of	   retaliation	   has	   substantially	   changed.	   	   Since	   much	   stronger	   dispute	  
settlement	   rules	   were	   incorporated	   into	   the	   WTO,	   the	   argument	   for	   justified	  
disobedience,	  that	  the	  weakness	  and	  inadequacies	  of	  the	  GATT	  left	  no	  alternative	  to	  
an	   aggressive	   unilateral	   policy,	   no	   longer	   holds.	   	   And	   under	   the	   new	   WTO	  
circumstances,	   “The	   US	   [can]	   no	   longer	   retaliate,	   unilaterally,	   without	   the	   risk	   of	  
being	   taken	   to	   court	   and	   losing.”372	  	   However,	   the	   US	   should	   continue	   to	   pursue	  
aggressive	  unilateralism	  within	  the	  WTO’s	  purview,	  so	  that	  retaliatory	  threats	  carry	  
the	   approval	   of	   the	   entire	   global	   trading	   system	  and	   their	   credibility	   and	  political	  
weight	  will	  be	  enhanced.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  America’s	  trading	  partners	  will	  view	  it	  not	  as	  
the	   act	   of	   a	   bully	   which	   is	   to	   extract	   unilateral	   advantages	   for	   narrow	   sectoral	  
interests,	   but	   as	   a	   demonstration	   of	   the	   US	   global	   leadership	   in	   enforcing	   the	  
existing	  WTO	  regulations	  and	  strengthening	  the	  multilateral	  trade	  regime.	  	  
I	   argue	   that	   in	  bargaining	  with	  China,	  American	   retaliatory	   threats	  became	  
less	  effective	  in	  the	  1990s,	  and	  that	  they	  will	  become	  less	  desirable	  in	  the	  years	  to	  
come.	  	  With	  more	  and	  more	  commercial	  activities	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  it	  will	  
be	   hard	   to	   find	   the	   timing	   for	   credible	   threats	   when	   both	   the	   Congress	   and	   the	  
executive	   branch	  were	   united	   on	   a	   strong	   and	   tough	   position	   against	   China.	   	   The	  
USTR’s	  great	  leverage	  provided	  by	  the	  Chinese	  desire	  to	  join	  the	  global	  trading	  net	  
and	  to	  avoid	  the	  annual	  MFN	  renewal	  process	  no	   longer	  exists.	   	  The	  US	  may	  want	  
the	  cooperation	  of	  China,	  now	  the	  second	  largest	  economic	  entity,	  on	  nuclear	  non-­‐
proliferation,	   anti-­‐terrorism,	   etc.	   	   The	   tactics	   of	   retaliatory	   threats	   in	   trade	   policy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




may	   put	   the	   president	   in	   an	   undesirable	   position	   and	   force	   him	   to	   make	   costly	  
trade-­‐offs	  among	  US	  priorities	  or	  even	  at	  the	  price	  of	  trade.	  	  	  
A	  better	  replacement	  should	  be	  the	  combination	  of	  persuasion	  with	  appeal	  to	  
self-­‐interests	  and	  tying	  hands	  by	  congressional	  pressure.	  	  When	  China	  is	  rising	  as	  an	  
economic	  power	  and	  having	  more	  bargaining	  chips	  on	  hand	  than	  before,	  it	  is	  harder	  
to	  get	  it	  to	  acquiesce	  to	  unilateral	  demands.	  	  In	  improving	  market	  access,	  the	  key	  to	  
success	   is	   to	   understand	   its	   self-­‐interest.	   	   What	   is	   required	   are	   profound	  
understanding	   of	   causes	   and	   consequences	   of	   these	   impediments	   in	   the	   Chinese	  
bureaucracy	  and	  clear	  analysis	  of	  influential	  selectorates	  in	  the	  decision	  structure	  in	  
favor	  of	  change	  and	  their	  policy	  preferences.	  	  All	  of	  these	  take	  time	  to	  develop,	  but	  
they	  are	  doable.	  
Since	  China’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  international	  trading	  regime	  and	  its	  rules	  
and	   principles	   is	   increasing,	   the	   US	   should	   actively	   participate	   in	   this	   ongoing	  
process.	   	   China	   was	   forced	   under	   American	   threats	   to	   provide	   intellectual	   rights	  
protection	  in	  early	  1990s,	  yet	  in	  recent	  years	  of	  the	  patents	  boom	  it	  perceives	  that	  
enforcement	   of	   IPR	   regulations	   is	   actually	   in	   its	   own	   interests.	   	   In	   contrast	   with	  
threats	   of	   declining	   effectiveness,	   the	   US	   could	   take	   advantage	   of	   its	   advanced	  
technical	   and	   administrative	   expertise	   and	   experience	   and	   help	   China	   reshape	   its	  
perceptions	   of	   its	   potential	   benefits	   from	  maintaining	   international	   trade	   regime	  
and	   the	  perception	  of	   its	   role	   in	   it.	   	   In	   this	   process,	   the	  USTR	  will	   be	   informed	   to	  




The	  leverage	  of	  Congress	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  effective,	  and	  the	  USTR	  should	  
keep	  employing	  the	  tactics	  of	   tying	   its	  hands	  by	  the	  congressional	  pressure,	   to	  the	  
extent	  that	  this	  external	  pressure	  functions	  as	  a	  constructive	  adjunct	  to	  the	  Chinese	  
internal	   support	   for	   a	   policy	   change.	   	   In	   the	  1990s,	   the	  US	  pressure	   for	   removing	  
China’s	   trade	   barriers	   was	   effective	   when	   the	   reform-­‐minded	   leaders	   finished	  
power	  consolidation	  and	  pro-­‐liberalization	  organizations	  and	  bureaucrats	  were	  well	  
positioned	   in	   the	   decision	   structure	   and	   had	   sufficient	   bargaining	   power.	   	   The	  
congressional	  pressure	  should	  be	  applied	  in	  a	  way	  to	  forcefully	  empower	  those	  pro-­‐
trade	  organizations	  and	  officials	  on	  their	  domestic	  negotiation	  table.	  	  	  
In	   doing	   so,	   the	  US	   should	   aggressively	   publicize	   how	   these	   structural	   and	  
regulatory	  trade	  impediments	  impose	  significant	  costs	  on	  China’s	  domestic	  firms	  –	  
both	   the	   SOEs	   and	   private	   firms	   –	   and	   consumers.	   	   In	   China’s	   economic	   boom,	   a	  
rising	   middle	   class	   benefits	   more	   and	   more	   from	   a	   less	   regulated	   trade	   regime.	  	  
Although	  they	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  selectorate	  at	  present	  and	  do	  not	  have	  bargaining	  
power	  or	  representatives	  in	  the	  decision	  structure,	  modern	  technology,	  such	  as	  the	  
Internet,	   has	   given	   this	   middle	   class	   information	   channels	   to	   understand	   their	  
interests	  and	  discussion	  forums	  to	  voice	  their	  positions	  and	  preferences.	   	  An	  open	  
Chinese	  market	  serves	  the	  interests	  of	  this	  sector	  of	  the	  Chinese	  society	  and	  the	  US.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  caution	  should	  always	  be	  exercised	  that	  inappropriate	  linkage	  or	  
excessive	   power	   application	   might	   entice	   nationalism	   and	   weaken	   pro-­‐trade	  





Chapter	  7:	  	   Conclusion	  
	  
Going	  beyond	  important	  variables,	  such	  as	  raw	  power,	  dependence	  on	  the	  US	  
export	  market,	  and	  structure	  of	  trade,	  this	  dissertation	  searches	  for	  answers	  to	  the	  
question	   –	  Why	   does	   American	   pressure	   encounter	   Chinese	   resistance,	   different	   in	  
issue-­‐topics	   and	   time	   period?	   	   It	   looks	   at	   the	   question	   from	   Chinese	   perspectives,	  
trying	   to	   investigate	   how	   and	  why	   the	   Chinese	  made	   decisions	   to	   yield	   to	   the	  US	  
demands	  or	  to	  resist	  American	  pressure.	  	  	  
This	  thesis	  conducts	  a	  literature	  review	  about	  models	  of	  the	  Chinese	  politics	  
and	  concurs	  with	  Dr.	  Harding	  on	  his	  calling	  for	  a	  single,	  composite	  model	  to	  examine	  
the	  Chinese	  politics.	  	  I	  construct	  an	  analytical	  framework,	  based	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  
Dr.	  Graham	  Allison’s	  models,	   a	   classic	   in	  governmental	  decision-­‐making	   in	   foreign	  
policy	   in	   studying	   Cuban	   Missile	   Crisis.	   	   As	   an	   embodiment	   of	   advancement	   in	  
relevant	  disciplines,	  this	  analytical	  framework	  draws	  upon	  bounded	  rationality,	  the	  
garbage	  can	  model,	  and	  two-­‐level	  game	  theory.	  	  With	  these	  three	  conceptual	  lenses,	  
I	   investigate	   the	   Chinese	   decision-­‐making	   in	   foreign	   trade	   policy	   during	   Sino-­‐
American	  negotiation	  for	  China’s	  WTO	  protocol	  from	  1986	  to	  1999.	  	  	  
Selecting	   a	   set	   of	   models	   that	   has	   been	   thought	   not	   to	   apply	   to	   China’s	  
governmental	  behaviors,	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  revision	  could	  revive	  it	  and	  increase	  its	  
explanatory	  power	  so	  that	  the	  application	  of	  this	  single,	  composite	  set	  of	  models	  can	  
be	   extended	   from	   interpretations	   of	   national	   security	   crises	   to	   an	   analysis	   of	   an	  




involved.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  intend	  to	  support	  Dr.	  Johnston’s	  argument	  that	  theories	  and	  
models	   of	   international	   relations	   should	   not	   be	   rejected	   as	   inapplicable	   to	   the	  
Chinese	  politics,	  and	  that	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy	  should	  contribute	  to	  the	  theoretical	  
richness	  of	  international	  relations,	  rather	  than	  being	  analyzed	  only	  through	  the	  lens	  
of	  Sinology.	  	  	  
The	   analytical	   framework	   of	   bounded	   rationality,	   garbage	   can	   model,	   and	  
two-­‐level	  game	  theory	  lays	  the	  structural	   foundation	  of	  this	  dissertation.	   	  The	  first	  
cut	   allows	   the	   analysis	   to	   be	   conducted	   from	   the	  perspective	   that	   China	  was,	   and	  
most	   likely	   still	   is,	   a	   bounded	   rational	   player,	   and	   that	   it	   adjusted	   its	   behaviors	  
based	  on	   its	  perception	   in	   the	   learning	  process.	   	  Treating	  China	  as	  a	  unitary	  actor	  
with	  bounded	  rationality,	  the	  first	  primary	  cut	  revealed	  that	  China	  cautiously	  raised	  
five	  original	  positions;	  it	  needed	  some	  time	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  end	  of	  Cold	  War	  
affected	   the	   trade	   talks	   and	   change	   its	   estimation;	   it	   was	   over-­‐optimistic	   about	  
negotiation	   process	   and	   even	   employed	   a	   take-­‐it-­‐or-­‐leave-­‐it	   strategy	   without	  
accomplishing	  the	  goal;	   its	  pay-­‐off	   function	  and	  aspiration	   level	  were	  not	  constant	  
due	  to	  changes	  on	  the	  international	  stage.	  	  
In	   this	   learning	   process,	   American’s	   “softer”	   strategy	   –	   persuasion	   plus	  
congressional	  pressure	  –	  demonstrated	  its	  effectiveness.	  	  Out	  of	  its	  own	  calculation	  
for	  economic	  development,	  China	  offered	  a	  big	  tariff	  reduction	  plan	  and	  grabbed	  the	  
opportunity	  when	  Clinton	  proposed	  to	  make	  progress	  on	  bilateral	  talks.	   	  American	  
trade	  negotiators	   successfully	  persuaded	   the	  Chinese	  by	   linking	   foreign	   trade	   and	  




were	  needed	  for	  congressional	  vote	  for	  permanent	  MFN	  later.	  	  US	  high	  officials	  also	  
persuaded	  Premier	  Zhu	  to	  pay	  a	  state	  visit	  to	  the	  US	  for	  the	  deal	  and	  then	  agree	  to	  
not	   sign	   the	   deal	   due	   to	   congressional	   pressure.	   	   In	   the	   end,	   they	   effectively	  
convinced	   Zhu	   that	   no	   deal	   was	   an	   honest	   mistake,	   but	   this	   information	   was	  
sufficient	  for	  the	  Chinese	  to	  sit	  tight	  in	  the	  last	  round	  of	  negotiations	  and	  not	  to	  give	  
up	  more	  to	  congressional	  pressure.	  	  	  
China	   yielded	   to	  American	   demands	   in	   early	   1990s,	   especially	   in	   the	   Stage	  
Two.	   	   American	   threats	   were	   effective	   when	   China	   perceived	   that	   it	   could	   not	  
bypass	  American	  support	  to	  gain	  GATT/WTO	  accession.	  	  In	  the	  Stage	  Three,	  with	  its	  
increasing	  understanding	  of	  American	  politics	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  New	  China	  
Lobby,	  China	  threatened	  to	  counter-­‐retaliate	  against	  American	  commercial	  interests	  
in	  China.	   	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  American	  threats	  declined	  when	  China	  perceived	  its	  
bargaining	  chips	  through	  American	  business	  interests	  in	  China.	  	  	  
The	  second	  cut	  presents	  an	  institutional	  perspective	  to	  study	  China’s	  foreign	  
trade	  policy-­‐making	   in	   this	   lengthy	  negotiation.	   	  Different	   from	   the	  past	   literature	  
about	   China’s	   accession	   to	   the	   WTO,	   this	   research	   has	   discovered	   the	   three-­‐tier	  
decision	   structure:	   State	   Council	   Committee	   on	   Inter-­‐Ministerial	   Coordination	   on	  
GATT/WTO,	   the	   Premier	   Working	   Meeting,	   and	   Central	   Committee	   Finance	   and	  
Economic	  Leadership	  Small	  Group	  (LSG),	  and	  detailed	  the	  participants,	  procedures,	  
and	  routines	  on	  the	  three	  domestic	  bargaining	  and	  coordination	  forums	  inside	  the	  
Chinese	   government.	   	   This	   finding	   not	   only	   helps	   us	   understand	   the	   institutions,	  




GATT/WTO	  accession,	  but	  also	  exemplifies	  how	   the	  Chinese	  government	  operates	  
more	  generally.	  	  
The	   chapter	   on	   the	   second	   cut	   starts	   from	   a	   discussion	   of	   China’s	  
Party/government	   system,	   in	   order	   to	   lay	   a	   good	   foundation	   to	   understand	   the	  
decision	  structure.	  	  It	  explains	  the	  distribution	  of	  constitutional	  authority	  among	  the	  
National	  People’s	  Congress,	  the	  CPC	  Central	  Committee,	  and	  the	  Central	  Committee	  
Politburo	   and	   its	   Standing	   Committee	   and	   how	   it	   relates	   to	   policy	   making	   and	  
implementation.	   	   For	   the	   medium	   level	   decision	   forum,	   I	   change	   the	   standard	  
translated	   term	   from	   the	   Premier	   Working	   Conference	   to	   the	   Premier	   Working	  
Meeting.	   	  Comparing	   two	  other	  State	  Council	  decision	   formats	   stipulated	  by	   law,	   I	  
point	  out	   that	   the	  Premier	  Working	  Meeting	  has	  never	  been	  regulated	  by	   law	  and	  
thus	   has	   no	   required	   participants.	   	   On	   many	   occasions,	   it	   has	   two	   or	   three	  
participants,	   which	   makes	   it	   hard	   to	   be	   called	   a	   conference.	   	   This	   section	   also	  
explains	  that	  it	  has	  become	  a	  widely	  used,	  important	  decision	  mechanism.	  	  
Up	  to	  now,	   leadership	  small	  groups,	  as	  a	  collective	  decision-­‐making	   format,	  
are	   understood	   in	   a	   very	   limited	   way.	   	   Western	   literature	   tends	   to	   describe	   the	  
leadership	  small	  group	  as	  a	  perplexing	  decision	  body	  sitting	  at	   the	  very	  top	  of	   the	  
Chinese	   government.	   	   This	   dissertation	   tries	   to	   objectively	   reveal	   that	   this	   inter-­‐
agency	   mechanism	   for	   policy	   decision	   and	   coordination	   exists	   at	   all	   levels	   of	  
government,	  not	  only	  at	  the	  central	  government	  or	  top-­‐level	  leadership,	  but	  also	  at	  
provincial	  government,	  city	  government	  and	  district	  government.	   	  Moreover,	  there	  




Group,	   and	   Leadership	   Small	   Group.	   	   The	   dissertation	   also	   gives	   detailed	  
explanation	  of	  the	  hierarchical	  level,	  function,	  and	  operation	  of	  small	  groups	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  elevation	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  a	  policy	  implementation.	  	  Laying	  this	  foundation,	  I	  
examine	  the	  Central	  Committee	  Finance	  and	  Economic	  LSG,	  its	  rise,	  difference,	  and	  
role	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  accession.	  	  
The	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   decision	   structure	   and	   its	   established	   rules	   and	  
routines	   reveals	   unequal	   power	   at	   the	   domestic	   negotiation	   table.	   	   Deriving	   from	  
long-­‐term	   policy	   preference,	   heavy	   industries	   enjoy	   higher	   status	   than	   light	  
industries,	  and	  light	  industries	  are	  better	  off	  than	  agriculture.	   	  The	  unequal	  power,	  
funding	   and	   resources	   among	   these	   categories	   of	   industries	   and	   industrial	  
ministries	  translate	   into	  their	  bargaining	  power	  on	  the	  domestic	  negotiation	  table,	  
and	   then	   to	   the	   international	   negotiation	   table.	   	   Therefore,	   both	   the	   agriculture	  
industry	   and	   its	   ministry	   were	   the	   weakest	   at	   the	   domestic	   table,	   and	   American	  
pressure	   met	   the	   lightest	   resistance	   on	   this	   issue-­‐topic.	   	   By	   contrast,	   automobile	  
industry	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Machine-­‐Making	   were	   powerful	   on	   the	   domestic	  
bargaining	  table.	  	  At	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  decision	  structure,	  the	  SEC	  associate	  director,	  
as	   its	   coordinator,	   fought	   for	   its	   trading	   rights	   first	   and	   then	   gained	   compromise	  
from	  the	  Ministry.	   	  Even	  after	  the	  ministry	  compromised,	  the	  automobile	  industry,	  
on	   its	   own	   initiatives,	   strove	   to	   commission	   research	   projects	   and	   find	  
countermeasures	   to	   handle	   the	   concessions	  made	   at	   the	   international	   negotiation	  
table.	   	  The	   level	  of	   these	  officials	  sent	  by	  each	  ministry	   to	   the	   internal	  negotiation	  




With	  the	  aid	  of	  garbage	  can	  model,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  GATT/WTO	  accession	  had	  
never	  been	  an	   independent	  crisis	  or	  problem	  seeking	   for	  solutions	  and	  that	   it	  had	  
been	   attached	   to	   major	   policy	   directions:	   economic	   reform,	   the	   development	   of	  
market	   economy	   and	   the	   reform	   of	   SOEs.	   	   In	   late	   1990s,	   the	   slowdown	   of	   the	  
Chinese	  economy	  to	  under	  8%	  growth,	  as	  a	  countable	  problem,	  caught	  the	  attention	  
of	   decision	   makers	   and	   also	   let	   reform-­‐minded	   politicians	   and	   conservatives	  
converge.	   	   Zhu’s	   State	   Council	   believed	   that	   foreign	   competition	   and	   trade	   should	  
reinvigorate	   SOEs.	   	   Thereby,	   the	   GATT/WTO	   accession	   was	   a	   potential	   solution,	  
rather	  than	  a	  problem.	  	  
The	  policy	  proposal	  of	  GATT/WTO	  accession	  floated	  in	  the	  policy	  community	  
and	   survived	   various	   deadlocks.	   	   In	   this	   period,	   MOFTEC	   was	   on	   the	   rise;	   the	  
Department	   of	   International	   Trade	   and	   Economic	   Affairs	   was	   formed	   under	  
MOFTEC;	  and	  the	  GATT	  Division	  was	  formed	  and	  rose	  to	  department	  level.	  	  The	  pro-­‐
trade	  coalition	  came	  into	  being	  and	  also	  became	  intertwined	  by	  personnel	  transfer	  
between	  these	  agencies.	  	  With	  years	  of	  softening-­‐up,	  the	  pro-­‐trade	  coalition	  spread	  
the	  values	  of	  free	  trade	  to	  the	  policy	  communities	  and	  the	  general	  public.	  
In	  the	  political	  stream,	  Zhu	  rose	  to	  the	  premiership	  and	  was	  confronted	  with	  
bureaucratic	  resistance	  against	  his	  SOE	  reform	  plan.	  	  He	  began	  to	  perceive	  the	  WTO	  
accession	  as	   a	  potential	   resolution	   for	   the	  SOE	   reform.	   	  The	  government	   turnover	  
that	  occurred	  in	  1998	  had	  its	  own	  causes,	  yet	  it	  fundamentally	  changed	  the	  balance	  
of	  bargaining	  power.	  	  The	  pro-­‐trade	  agencies	  maintained	  their	  hierarchical	  level,	  but	  




eventually	  transformed	  to	  industrial	  association,	  out	  of	  the	  bureaucracy.	  	  The	  State	  
Council	  Committee	  on	  Inter-­‐Ministerial	  Coordination	  on	  GATT/WTO	  was	  dissolved.	  	  
The	  constraints	  were	  no	  longer	  strong	  enough	  to	  prohibit	  actions.	  As	  described	  by	  
the	   term	  coupling,	   in	   the	   year	  of	   1998,	   these	   separate	   streams	   inside	   the	   garbage	  
can	  came	  together,	  which	  explains	  very	  well	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  bilateral	  deal.	  	  	  
The	  third	  cut	  of	  two-­‐level	  game	  theory	  features	  bureaucratic	  politics	  on	  two	  
tables,	   the	  domestic	  bargaining	   table	  and	   international	  negotiation	   table.	   	   In	  other	  
words,	  it	  can	  be	  described	  as	  domestic	  causes	  and	  international	  consequences,	  and	  
international	   causes	   and	   domestic	   consequences.	   	   By	   reviewing	   Chinese	  
bureaucratic	   politics,	   especially	   succession	   politics	   parallel	   to	   the	   bilateral	  
negotiations,	  I	  have	  not	  found	  any	  evidence	  that	  the	  progress	  of	  international	  trade	  
negotiations	   had	   affected	   the	   political	   succession	   at	   the	   very	   top	   level	   of	   Chinese	  
leadership.	  	  	  
On	   the	   flip	   side,	   after	   the	   completion	   of	   political	   succession	   or	   power	  
consolidation	  of	   the	   top	   leadership,	   bilateral	   negotiation	   accomplished	   substantial	  
advancement,	   such	   as	   the	   time	   periods	  when	  Deng	   assumed	  power	   and	   launched	  
economic	   reform	  early	  1980s,	  when	  Deng	  reestablished	  his	  paramount	   leadership	  
and	   the	   goal	   of	   development	   of	   market	   economy	   in	   1992,	   and	   when	   Jiang	  
successfully	   consolidated	   his	   power	   in	   1998.	   	   At	   these	   time	   periods,	   the	   power	  
balance	  between	  the	  top	   leadership	  and	  the	  bureaucracy	  tilted	  toward	  the	  former,	  
and	   the	   bureaucratic	   resistance	   dwindled.	   	   Therefore,	   the	   reform-­‐minded	   top	  




resistant	   bureaucrats	   bet	   on	   the	   uncertainty	   at	   the	   top	   and	   hold	   out	   for	   their	  
organizational	  interests.	  	  
Yet,	   international	   negotiation	   could	   empower	   or	  weaken	   pro-­‐trade	   leaders	  
and	  officials	  in	  the	  bureaucracy.	  	  The	  progress	  on	  the	  international	  bargaining	  table	  
affected	   their	   credibility	   on	   the	  domestic	   negotiation	   table.	   	  On	   the	   eve	  of	   China’s	  
formal	  entry	   to	   the	  WTO,	   four	  chief	  negotiators	  accepted	   interviews	   together,	   and	  
they	   all	   talked	   about	   the	   domestic	   pressure.	   	   The	   one	   who	   led	   the	   Chinese	  
negotiating	   team	   through	   the	   year	   of	   1994	   revealed	   that	   he	   had	   to	   bear	   more	  
internal	  pressure	  than	  external	  pressure.	  	  Premier	  Zhu’s	  credibility	  in	  the	  domestic	  
political	  arena	  was	  also	  significantly	  undercut	  when	  he	  flew	  to	  the	  US	  but	  could	  not	  
bring	   a	   deal	   back	   home.	   	   Since	   the	   Chinese	   officials	  who	   sat	   across	   the	   table	   and	  
negotiated	   with	   the	   Americans	   were	   those	   pro-­‐trade	   officials	   arguing	   for	  
liberalization	   on	   the	   domestic	   table,	   these	   occasions	   generated	   chances	   for	   those	  
protectionists	  and	  political	  enemies	  to	  form	  coalitions.	  	  	  
In	   summary,	   after	   compiling	   and	   comparing	   the	   analyses	   from	   these	   three	  
primary	   angles,	   the	   dissertation	   draws	   the	   following	   conclusions.	   	   During	   this	  
lengthy	   bilateral	   negotiation,	   China	   tended	   to	   yield	   to	  American	   threats	  when	   the	  
Chinese	   reform-­‐minded	   top	   leaders	   finished	   political	   succession	   or	   power	  
consolidation,	  when	  trade	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  China’s	  economic	  problems,	  
and	   when	   the	   US	   Congress	   and	   executive	   branch	   united	   for	   credible	   threats.	  	  
American	   pressure	   confronted	   strong	   Chinese	   resistance	   when	   the	   Chinese	  




was	   high	   for	   pro-­‐trade	   officials,	   and	   when	   the	   Chinese	   perceived	   the	   divide	   in	  
American	   commercial	   interests	   between	   those	   with	   interests	   in	   China	   and	   those	  
injured	  by	  Chinese	  exports	  and	  the	  realignment	  in	  American	  political	  arena	  on	  China	  
issue.	  	  	  
Meanwhile,	  American	  pressure	  encountered	  less	  Chinese	  resistance	  in	  issue-­‐
topics,	   such	   as	   agriculture,	   behind	   which	   were	   a	   politically	   weak	   industry	   and	   a	  
ministry	   of	   little	   bargaining	   power	   at	   the	   domestic	   table.	   	   By	   contrast,	   American	  
pressure	  encountered	  strong	  resistance	  in	  issue-­‐topics,	  such	  as	  automobiles,	  behind	  
which	   were	   a	   politically	   strong	   industry	   and	   agency	   created	   by	   long-­‐term	   policy	  
preference.	   	   In	   the	   latter	   situation,	   not	   only	   did	   the	   relevant	   agency	   have	   strong	  
bargaining	   power,	   but	   the	   industry	   itself	   also	   possessed	   strong	   connections,	  
information	   channels,	   funding	   and	   resources	   to	   play	   on	   the	   domestic	   bargaining	  
table.	  	  
Upon	   the	  case	  study	  and	  detailed	  analyses,	   I	  argue	   that	   the	  effectiveness	  of	  
American	   threats	   backed	   by	   trade	   sanctions	   declined,	   although	   it	   had	   limited	  
achievements	   in	   the	   past.	   	   In	   bargaining	   with	   this	   rising	   power,	   the	   US	   should	  
pursue	  aggressive	  unilateralism	  within	  the	  WTO’s	  purview,	  which	  can	  empower	  the	  
Chinese	  trade	  negotiators	  on	  the	  domestic	  bargaining	  table	  because	  they	  can	  argue	  
for	  enforcement	  of	   international	   rules.	   	  The	  policy	   recommendation	   is	   that	   the	  US	  
should	  first	  discern	  how	  China	  perceives	  its	  self-­‐interests	  and	  build	  strategic	  linkage	  




appeal	  to	  self-­‐interests	  and	  tying	  hands	  by	  congressional	  pressure	  in	  bilateral	  trade	  
negotiations.	  	  	  
As	   we	   can	   see	   in	   the	   recent	   negotiation	   for	   the	   Information	   Technology	  
Agreement	  (ITA),	  when	  China	  tabled	  a	  list	  of	  sensitivities	  in	  June	  2013,	  withdrawing	  
from	   its	   earlier	   supportive	   position	   and	   surprising	   other	  WTO	  member	   countries,	  
the	   US	   trade	   negotiators	   strategies’	   demonstrated	   its	   effectiveness.	   	   One	   the	   one	  
hand,	   the	   US	   negotiators	   maintained	   their	   tough	   position	   to	   ask	   China	   to	  
significantly	   reduce	   the	   list	  of	   sensitivities,	   against	   the	  pressure	   from	   the	  member	  
countries	  which	  wanted	  to	  resume	  the	  talks.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  pressure	  on	  China	  had	  
the	  weight	  from	  the	  international	  trading	  regime.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  to	  their	  credits,	  
American	  negotiators	  spotted	  the	  Chinese	  interests	  in	  participation	  in	  the	  Trade	  in	  
Services	  Agreement	  (TISA)	  and	  strategically	  built	  a	   linkage	  between	  TISA	  and	  ITA.	  	  
Virtually,	   TISA	   became	   the	   substitute	   of	   MFN	   in	   1990s,	   giving	   the	   USTR	   more	  
leverage	   so	   that	   they	   could	  measure	  Beijing’s	   concession	   on	   ITA	   to	  weigh	  China’s	  
request	  to	  join	  the	  TISA.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  there	  was	  just	  modest	  congressional	  pressure	  
on	  China.	  	  But	  the	  outcome	  of	  applying	  this	  strategy	  was	  the	  US-­‐China	  agreement	  of	  
November	  2014	  eliminating	  tariffs	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  high-­‐tech	  products.	  
The	  contribution	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  as	  follows:	  It	  revives	  a	  set	  of	  models	  
rejected	  in	  the	  study	  of	  Chinese	  politics.	  	  By	  revising	  it	  with	  advancement	  in	  relevant	  
disciplines,	   I	   build	   this	   three-­‐prong	   analytical	   framework	   and	   apply	   it	   to	   China’s	  
foreign	   trade	   policy-­‐making	   during	   bilateral	   trade	   talks	   for	   the	   WTO	   accession.	  	  




and	   processes	   of	   the	   Chinese	   decision	   structure	   for	   us	   to	   understand	   not	   only	   its	  
decision-­‐making	  for	  the	  WTO	  case,	  but	  also	  how	  the	  Chinese	  government	  operates	  
more	   generally.	   	   In	   doing	   so,	   the	   application	   of	   this	   single,	   composite	   model	  
demonstrates	  that	  the	  concepts,	  models,	  and	  theories	  of	  international	  relations	  have	  
explanatory	  power	   in	   the	  Chinese	   foreign	  policy-­‐making,	  and	   it	   also	   indicates	   that	  
the	  study	  of	  Chinese	  politics	  should	  go	  beyond	  ideology-­‐related	  analysis.	  
Nevertheless,	   this	   thesis	   has	   the	   following	   limitations.	   	   First,	   the	   case	   of	  
China’s	  WTO	  entry	  has	  its	  unique	  position	  in	  China’s	  progress	  of	  engaging	  into	  the	  
global	   trading	   regime.	   	   Perhaps	  more	   than	   any	  other	   case	   in	   Sino-­‐American	   trade	  
negotiation,	   this	   case	   had	   almost	   all	   administrative	   agencies	   of	   the	   State	   Council	  
involved	  because	  of	  the	  complexity	  and	  thoroughness	  of	  the	  agreement.	  	  Although	  it	  
was	  confined	  to	  a	  few	  agencies	  in	  Stage	  One,	  all	  relevant	  agencies	  came	  to	  the	  play	  in	  
the	   later	   stages.	   	   The	   involvement	   inside	   the	   bureaucracy	   and	   the	   attention	   it	  
attracted	  nationwide	  were	  unprecedented	  and	  unique.	  	  However,	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  
uniqueness	   does	   not	   hold	   us	   from	   understanding	   how	   China	   conducts	   decision-­‐
making	   in	   trade	   policy	   and	   how	   the	   Chinese	   government	   operates.	   	   Second,	   my	  
interviews	  and	  field	  trips	  were	  constrained	  by	  limited	  funding	  and	  time.	  	  For	  various	  
reasons	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	  I,	  my	  access	   to	   former	  officials	  at	   those	  protectionist	  
industrial	  ministries	  was	  limited.	  	  Should	  I	  have	  resources	  to	  continue	  this	  research	  
in	  the	  future,	  I	  would	  very	  much	  like	  to	  cover	  those	  officials	  as	  well	  as	  head	  persons	  




A	  detailed	  case	  study	  has	  its	  limitations,	  and	  changes	  after	  this	  case	  should	  be	  
incorporated	   into	   future	   research	   of	   China’s	   decision-­‐making.	   	   The	   case	   selected	  
here	  is	  the	  first	  major	  decision	  in	  China’s	  foreign	  trade	  policy	  after	  it	  ended	  isolation	  
and	  reentered	  the	  global	  scene.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  provincial	  powers	  were	  not	  in	  the	  play	  
for	  most	  of	   the	   time	  until	   the	  very	  end;	   the	   information	  American	  negotiators	   got	  
from	   the	   Chinese	   negotiators	   and	   Chinese	   news	   reports	   was	   harmonized	   after	  
internal	   coordination;	   the	   top	   leaders	   of	   the	   second	   and	   third	   generations	   were	  
generally	  reform-­‐minded.	  	  The	  first	  two	  do	  not	  hold	  any	  more.	   	  In	  the	  study	  of	  any	  
case	   after	   this	   one,	   provincial	   powers	   should	   be	   added	   to	   the	   scene.	   	   The	   use	   of	  
Chinese	   media	   based	   in	   the	   US	   to	   send	   out	   signals	   different	   from	   the	   Chinese	  
propaganda	   needs	   to	   be	   considered	   for	   bilateral	   relations	   and	   domestic	   politics.	  	  
The	  third	   factor	  would	  raise	   the	  question:	   	  What	   if	   the	  top	   leadership	   is	  no	   longer	  
reform-­‐minded,	  but	  protectionist	  or	  mercantilist?	  	  Its	  impact	  on	  the	  power	  balance	  
between	   the	   top	   leadership	   and	   selectorate	   in	   foreign	   trade	   policy-­‐making	   needs	  












This	  research	  was	  conducted	  based	  on	  2	  field	  trips	  to	  Beijing,	  China	  and	  33	  
interviews	   in	   the	  US	   and	  China.	   	  My	   interviewees	   included	  American	   and	  Chinese	  
participants	   in	   the	   bilateral	   negotiation,	   former	   and	   current	   trade	   officials,	   those	  
engaging	   in	   foreign	   policy-­‐making	   toward	   China	   or	   the	   US,	   trade	   experts	   and	  
scholars	  on	  both	  sides.	  	  Upon	  the	  requests	  for	  confidentiality	  of	  many	  interviewees,	  I	  
do	  not	  reveal	  their	  names.	   	   Instead,	  I	  have	  coded	  every	  interviewee	  and	  presented	  
the	  list	  of	  interviewees	  to	  my	  dissertation	  committee.	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